Actual bias on the part of a decisionmaker is "constitutionally unacceptable." Id . at 135, 106 P.3d at 461 (quoting Johnson v. Bonner Cnty. Sch. Dist. No. 82, 126 Idaho 490, 493, 887 P.2d 35, 38 (1994) ). We reached a similar conclusion in Johnson .
See Johnson v. Bd. of Trs. of Boundary Co. Sch. Dist. No. 101, 2010 WL 530070, *6 (D. Idaho 2010) ("To conduct a hearing where there is even a 'probability' that the decision-maker will unfairly decide any issue presented violates due process requirements. To that end, where a board of representatives has predetermined the outcome of a due process hearing, there may be a denial of due process.") (quoting Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35 47 (1975), citing Johnson v. Bonner Co. Sch. Dist. No. 82 v. Bd. of Trs., 887 P.2d 35, 39 (Idaho 1994)); see also Playfair v. South Lemhi Sch. Dist. 292 Bd. of Trustees, 2009 WL 2474205, *5 (D. Idaho 2009) ("A hearing does not comport with due process if it 'is totally devoid of a meaningful opportunity to be heard' because the decision-makers have predetermined the outcome of the hearing.") (quoting Matthews v. Harney Co., Or., Sch. Dist. No. 4, 819 F.2d 889, 893-94 (9th Cir. 1987)) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The circumstances surrounding this discrete question preclude summary judgment on Falash's Constitutional due process claims.
Specifically, Defendants claim Mr. Byers could have utilized "pre" hearing procedures by obtaining a protective order before the hearing to preclude the allegedly biased School Board members from participating. Defendants cite Johnson v. Bonner County School Dist. No. 82, 126 Idaho 490, 494 (1994) in support of this contention. In Johnson, a teacher sought a temporary restraining order to prevent his termination hearing from going forward because he believed the school board presiding over his hearing was biased.
To that end, where a board of representatives has predetermined the outcome of a due process hearing, there may be a denial of due process. Johnson v. Bonner County Sch. Dist. No. 82 v. Bd. of Trs., 887 P.2d 35, 39 (Idaho 1994). However, mere familiarity with the facts of a case does not disqualify a decision-maker.
Another exception to the mootness doctrine recognized by this Court is the public interest exception. Under this exception, even if the case is determined to be moot, if the issue presented is one of substantial public interest, the Court may address the issue for future direction and guidance. Johnson v. Bonner County Sch. Dist. No. 82, 126 Idaho 490, 492, 887 P.2d 35, 37 (1994). Even were we to determine that this controversy is technically moot due to the sunsetting of the Board's regulations, the issue whether current levels of state funding meet the constitutionally-mandated requirement of "thoroughness" is a matter of great fundamental importance.