3. Bias Or Prejudgment Exempts Litigants From Exhaustion Requirements One such exception to the exhaustion requirement applies where bias or prejudgment by the decisionmaker can be demonstrated. Peterson v. City of Pocatello, 117 Idaho 234, 236, 786 P.2d 1136, 1138 (Ct.App. 1990); 3 CHARLES H. KOCH, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PRACTICE, § 13.22(9) (2d ed. 1997); see Johnson v. Bonner Cty. Sch. Dist. No. 82, 126 Idaho 490, 493, 887 P.2d 35, 38 (1994). This is because "[t]he due process clause entitles a person to an impartial and disinterested tribunal."
Actual bias on the part of a decisionmaker is "constitutionally unacceptable." Id . at 135, 106 P.3d at 461 (quoting Johnson v. Bonner Cnty. Sch. Dist. No. 82, 126 Idaho 490, 493, 887 P.2d 35, 38 (1994) ). We reached a similar conclusion in Johnson .
The School District argues that the fact Miller obtained a permanent injunction is not dispositive on the issue of whether she was the prevailing party under §§ 1983 and 1988, maintaining that the mere appearance of impropriety of the School District Attorneys appearing before the Board does not meet the requirement of injury in fact in order to have standing under § 1983. Given that Miller's § 1983 claim for injunctive relief arose out of a procedural due process issue concerning her discharge hearing, the correct legal framework in which to analyze her "injury" is found in Johnson v. Bonner County School District No. 82, 126 Idaho 490, 887 P.2d 35 (1994) and Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564 (1973). Relying in part on Gibson, the Court in Johnson stated that a trial court may enjoin a biased decision maker from conducting a due process hearing.
"[U] pon a showing that there is a probability that a decisionmaker in a due process hearing will decide unfairly any issue presented in the hearing, a trial court may grant an injunction to prevent the decisionmaker from participating in the proceeding." Johnson v. Bonner County Sch. Dist. No. 82, 126 Idaho 490, 494, 887 P.2d 35, 39 (1994). However, under Johnson, Miller's motion to enjoin the Board is moot because the discharge hearing has been completed.
The exercise of discretion by the trial court in granting or refusing an injunction will not be reversed on appeal unless a clear abuse of discretion is shown. Id. The district court's role in deciding whether an injunction should issue in the proceedings below conformed to the opinion of this Court in Johnson v. Bonner County School Dist. No. 82, 126 Idaho 490, 887 P.2d 35 (1994), which addressed the authority of a trial court to grant an injunction, in circumstances similar to those in the present case, after the trial court had decided it lacked authority to enjoin the trustees of a school district. We concluded in Johnson that a trial court may enjoin a decisionmaker from conducting a due process hearing, upon a showing that there is a probability that the decisionmaker will decide unfairly any issue presented in the hearing.
On appeal, the Department no longer relies on its earlier argument that CRPM failed to exhaust its administrative remedies prior to the filing of the complaint for writs of prohibition and mandate, and maintains that this action should be dismissed as moot due to the fact that the temporary rules at issue no longer exist. While CRPM concedes that the underlying issues in this case are moot, it requests that the Court provide guidance under Johnson v. Bonner County Sch. Dist., 126 Idaho 490, 887 P.2d 35 (1994), as to what the standards are for exhausting administrative remedies under the Idaho APA promulgated in 1993, and whether extraordinary writs are precluded under the new APA. It is well-established that this Court does not decide moot cases.
See Johnson v. Bd. of Trs. of Boundary Co. Sch. Dist. No. 101, 2010 WL 530070, *6 (D. Idaho 2010) ("To conduct a hearing where there is even a 'probability' that the decision-maker will unfairly decide any issue presented violates due process requirements. To that end, where a board of representatives has predetermined the outcome of a due process hearing, there may be a denial of due process.") (quoting Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35 47 (1975), citing Johnson v. Bonner Co. Sch. Dist. No. 82 v. Bd. of Trs., 887 P.2d 35, 39 (Idaho 1994)); see also Playfair v. South Lemhi Sch. Dist. 292 Bd. of Trustees, 2009 WL 2474205, *5 (D. Idaho 2009) ("A hearing does not comport with due process if it 'is totally devoid of a meaningful opportunity to be heard' because the decision-makers have predetermined the outcome of the hearing.") (quoting Matthews v. Harney Co., Or., Sch. Dist. No. 4, 819 F.2d 889, 893-94 (9th Cir. 1987)) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The circumstances surrounding this discrete question preclude summary judgment on Falash's Constitutional due process claims.
Specifically, Defendants claim Mr. Byers could have utilized "pre" hearing procedures by obtaining a protective order before the hearing to preclude the allegedly biased School Board members from participating. Defendants cite Johnson v. Bonner County School Dist. No. 82, 126 Idaho 490, 494 (1994) in support of this contention. In Johnson, a teacher sought a temporary restraining order to prevent his termination hearing from going forward because he believed the school board presiding over his hearing was biased.
To that end, where a board of representatives has predetermined the outcome of a due process hearing, there may be a denial of due process. Johnson v. Bonner County Sch. Dist. No. 82 v. Bd. of Trs., 887 P.2d 35, 39 (Idaho 1994). However, mere familiarity with the facts of a case does not disqualify a decision-maker.
A board of representatives who has predetermined the outcome of a due process hearing may be a denial of due process. Johnson v.Bonner County Sch. Dist. No. 82 v. Bd. of Trs. , 887 P.2d 35, 39 (Idaho 1994). However, simply recommending non-renewal of a teacher's contract and holding a due process hearing is not a violation.