Opinion
02-CV-0115E(Sc)
October 16, 2003
MEMORANDUM and ORDER
This decision may be cited in whole or in any part.
Plaintiffs filed a complaint on February 7, 2002 stemming from an incident involving their young daughter Chelsy and Dean of Students Cheryl Nudd. The Complaint named as defendants Nudd, the Albion Central School District ("the District") and District Superintendent Ronald Sodoma. Plaintiffs assert a section 1983 claim for deprivation of Chelsy's due process rights, battery, intentional infliction of emotional distress and negligence. The Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment on April 14, 2003, which was argued and submitted on June 13. On June 12, plaintiffs filed a motion seeking leave to file an amended complaint. For the reasons set forth below, both motions will be denied.
Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure ("FRCvP") states that summary judgment may be granted only if the record shows "that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." In other words, after discovery and upon a motion, summary judgment is mandated "against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). Summary judgment is thus appropriate where there is "no genuine issue of material fact." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).
Of course, the moving party bears the burden of showing that no genuine issue of material fact exists and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Goenaga v. March of Dimes Birth Defects Found, 51 F.3d 14, 18 (2d Cir. 1995) (citing Adickes v. S.H. Kress Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157 (1970)). If the moving party makes such a showing, the non-moving party must then come forward with evidence of specific facts sufficient to support a jury verdict in order to survive the summary judgment motion. Ibid.; FRCvP 56(e).
With respect to the first prong of Anderson, a genuine issue of material fact exists if the evidence in the record "is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Anderson, at 248. Stated another way, there is "no genuine issue as to any material fact" where there is a "complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party's case." Celotex, at 323. Under the second prong of Anderson, the disputed fact must be material, which is to say that it "might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law." Anderson, at 248.
See also Anderson, at 252 ("The mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the [movant's] position will be insufficient; there must be evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the [movant].")
Furthermore, "[i]n assessing the record to determine whether there is a genuine issue as to any material fact, the district court is required to resolve all ambiguities and draw all factual inferences in favor of the party against whom summary judgment is sought." St. Pierre v. Dyer, 208 F.3d 394, 404 (2d Cir. 2000) (citing Anderson, at 255). Nonetheless, mere conclusions, conjecture, unsubstantiated allegations or surmise on the part of the non-moving party are insufficient to defeat a well-grounded motion for summary judgment. Goenaga, at 18.
See footnote 2.
On February 8, 2001 Chelsy attempted to attend a roller-skating party hosted by the District for middle school students ("the Party"). The Albion Student Council hosts three separate parties, respectively for the elementary, middle and high school students. Chelsy was a ten-year-old elementary student at the time of the Party. School policy prohibits elementary students from attending the middle school party. Nonetheless, Mrs. Johnson testified at her deposition that she had obtained permission from Thomas Mayer — the teacher responsible for supervising the roller-skating parties — to allow Chelsy to attend the Party with her cousin, who was a middle school student. It is undisputed that Nudd observed Chelsy at the Party and disciplined her for attending. The extent or degree of such discipline, however, is hotly debated. Evidence in the record suggests that Nudd, inter alia, dragged Chelsy, grabbed her by the arm and by the neck, grabbed Chelsy's face to forcibly require the child to look at Nudd and threw Chelsy against a wall and into a chair. There is also evidence that Nudd screamed at Chelsy and otherwise disciplined her in an inappropriate manner. Nudd, however, denies having done so. Consequently, there is a genuine issue of material fact whether Nudd physically and inappropriately disciplined Chelsy. The record also contains evidence of previous incidents of inappropriate conduct towards other school children by Nudd. After being disciplined by Nudd, Chelsy received treatment from a psychologist and the Medina Memorial Hospital.
The District holds roller-skating parties six or seven times a year and has done so for more than twenty years.
Mrs. Johnson, who regularly assisted Mayer with the roller-skating parties, left the Party to attend another daughter's swim meet. Chelsy's uncle — the father of the cousin with whom Chelsy was skating — was scheduled to pick both children up at the end of the Party.
Nudd's disciplining of Chelsy resulted in Nudd pleading guilty to harassment in the second degree, which case was adjourned in contemplation of dismissal upon Nudd's successful completion of, inter alia, a term of probation and psychological counseling. Plaintiffs filed the instant suit and now seek compensatory damages, punitive damages against Nudd personally, injunctive relief, attorneys' fees and costs.
Including reimbursement for the cost of the private school in which Chelsy has been enrolled since March of 2001.
Plaintiffs seek leave to file an amended complaint in order to clarify that they seek punitive damages against Nudd only. Consequently, the proposed amended complaint would merely name Nudd in her personal capacity. Such, however, is unnecessary inasmuch as the prayer for relief in the Complaint explicitly states that punitive damages are sought only against Nudd. The proposed amendment would therefore be redundant. Accordingly, plaintiffs' motion will be denied without prejudice.
Defendants contend that plaintiffs' allegations do not rise to the level of a constitutional violation. This Court disagrees. There is a genuine issue of material fact whether Nudd physically manhandled Chelsy in the manner alleged. Consequently, if a jury were to find that Nudd acted as alleged, it would be permitted to find that Nudd violated, inter alia, Chelsy's liberty interest to be free from excessive force — in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. See Johnson v. Newburgh Enlarged Sch. Dist., 239 F.3d 246, 251-252 (2d Cir. 2001) (holding that teacher violated student's Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process rights where teacher grabbed, beat and yelled at student causing physical and emotional harm); Metzger v. Osbeck, 841 F.2d 518, 520-521 (3d Cir. 1988) (holding that teacher violated student's rights in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments by restraining student in such a manner as to cause physical injury). Herein also, there is a genuine issue of material fact whether Nudd acted "maliciously and sadistically" towards Chelsy. Consequently, it will be for a jury to determine what Nudd's intent was as well as what Nudd in fact did while disciplining Chelsy. Defendants' motion for summary judgment will thus be denied.
See also Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 674 (1977) ("[W]here school authorities, acting under color of state law, deliberately decide to punish a child for misconduct by restraining the child and inflicting appreciable physical pain, we hold that Fourteenth Amendment liberty interests are implicated.").
Both Newburgh and Metzger cite Johnson v. Glick, 481 F.2d 1028, 1033 (2d Cir. 1973), partially abrogated on other grounds by Graham v. O'Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989). In Johnson v. Glick, Judge Friendly's opinion noted that:
"In determining whether the constitutional line has been crossed, a court must look to such factors as the need for the application of force, the relationship between the need and the amount of force that was used, the extent of injury that was inflicted, and whether force was applied in a good faith effort to maintain or restore discipline or maliciously and sadistically for the very purpose of causing harm." Johnson v. Glick, at 1033.
Although Glick involved claims of excessive force in the prisoner context, its analysis is equally applicable in the corporal punishment context — as demonstrated by its application in Newburgh and Metzger.
A reasonable jury could find that Nudd's conduct was motivated by malice or sadism on the grounds that, inter alia: (1) the discipline was excessive relative to the nature of Chelsy's infraction and in light of Chelsy's age; (2) Nudd had malice toward Mayer, which was a factor in Nudd's discipline of Chelsy — who allegedly had obtained permission from Mayer to attend the Party; and/or (3) Nudd's testimony that she considered Chelsy to be a "sneak." See e.g., Chelsy Johnson Dep., at 22-30, 38-42, 44-45, 51-60 (describing physical contact by Nudd); Decl. of James P. Evans, Esq. dated Apr. 7, 2003, Exh. E (depositions taken by police describing Nudd's treatment of Chelsy); Nudd Dep., at 55-58, 61-63 (testifying that Mayer and Nudd had a strained relationship); id. at 162-173 (describing her basis for calling Chelsy a "sneak"); Mayer Dep., at 59-60 (describing his relationship with Nudd); id. at 95-96 (indicating that he told Nudd that Chelsy was permitted to attend the Party and that Nudd said that Chelsy was lying and that she was a "sneak"); id. at 101-102 ("Miss Nudd is nose-to-nose with [Chelsy], screaming from the top of her lungs: You're making me very angry. Yelling you're making me very angry. You know how angry you're making me. [Nudd] looked like the witch on the Wizard of Oz, *** someone trying to frighten somebody.").
See Dockery v. Barnett, 167 F. Supp.2d 597, 602-605 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (denying summary judgment motion by teacher, principal and school district on grounds that, inter alia, there existed a genuine issue of material fact as to (1) whether teacher's handling of students was disproportionate to what was necessary under the circumstances, (2) whether the principal and school district were deliberately indifferent to prior complaints involving similar conduct by the teacher and (3) whether the principal was grossly negligent in supervising the allegedly abusive teacher).
Defendants argue that Sodoma is entitled to have the allegations of supervisory liability dismissed. This Court disagrees. There is a genuine issue of material fact whether Sodoma, when faced with numerous and serious complaints about Nudd, failed to undertake "meaningful" investigation and discipline. Vann v. City of New York, 72 F.3d 1040, 1049-1050 (2d Cir. 1995); Dockery, supra note 11, at 604. A reasonable jury could find that the discipline Nudd received concerning her treatment of Chelsy and other students was not "meaningful" and that such is evidence of "deliberate indifference" in the past by Sodoma. Accordingly, Sodoma's request for summary judgment on this ground will be denied.
A reasonable jury could find that Sodoma's letter of reprimand of Nudd, dated March 1, 2001, was not a meaningful response relative to her conduct. Indeed, Sodoma wrote in the letter of reprimand that he "deeply regret[ted]" having to discipline Nudd. See Decl. of James P. Evans, Esq. dated Apr. 7, 2003, Exh. E; see also Nudd Dep., at 212. Moreover, the letter of reprimand did not refer to any allegations of physical abuse — from which a reasonable jury could find that a less than meaningful investigation was conducted. Ibid. Finally, a reasonable jury could find that a letter of praise dated August 15, 2001 — which was placed in Nudd's file by the assistant superintendent, Ada Grabowski (who is the present superintendent) — was intended to negate or ameliorate the effect of the March 1, 2001 letter of reprimand. Compare ibid. with Aff. of James P. Evans, Esq. dated May 27, 2003, Exh. 3. It is also noteworthy that Nudd did not have a union representative present with her at a disciplinary meeting with Sodoma whereas Mayer did have one — even though he never summoned the union representative. Compare Nudd. Dep. at 132-133, 210-211 with Sodoma Dep., at 30-31, 38 and Mayer Dep., at 123-128. A jury could infer from such that Sodoma had a union representative summoned when he intended to discipline an employee ( i.e., Mayer), but did not do so when the discipline was a sham ( i.e., as against Nudd). Moreover, a reasonable jury could find that Sodoma had in the past failed to discipline or adequately investigate complaints about Nudd, and that this "discipline" of Nudd in 2001 was just the most recent example of Sodoma's continuous failure to supervise Nudd. Dockery, supra, note 11, at 604-606; see also Batista v. Rodriguez, 702 F.2d 393, 397 (2d Cir. 1983) ("[M]unicipal inaction such as the persistent failure to discipline subordinates who violate civil rights could give rise to an inference of an unlawful municipal policy of ratification of unconstitutional conduct within the meaning of Monell.").
Defendants also contend that Sodoma and Nudd are entitled to qualified immunity. This Court disagrees. Sodoma may not claim the defense of qualified immunity because he was sued in his official capacity. See Ying Jing Gan v. City of New York, 996 F.2d 522, 529-530 (2d Cir. 1996). Nudd's qualified immunity defense fails on the merits because Chelsy's right to be free from excessive force was clearly established when Nudd disciplined Chelsy. See Johnson v. Newburgh, at 253. would not violate this clearly established right — if a jury finds that Nudd acted as is alleged. Ibid. Accordingly, defendants may not assert the defense of qualified immunity and their motion for summary judgment will be denied.
Indeed, this proposition of law is also set forth in Baker v. Willett, 42 F. Supp.2d 192, 197 (N.D.N.Y. 1999), which was cited by defendants.
Cf. Salim v. Proulx, 93 F.3d 86, 89 (2d Cir. 1996).
As noted above, there is a genuine issue of material fact whether Sodoma — and hence the District — were deliberately indifferent in investigating and/or disciplining Nudd. Indeed, a reasonable jury could find that Sodoma demonstrated a pattern of deliberate indifference with respect to complaints about Nudd's earlier treatment of students — regardless of the fact that previous complaints involved different types of abuse. Consequently, it is for a jury to determine whether there existed a municipal policy of deliberate indifference. See Johnson v. Newburgh, at 254-255. Moreover, there is a genuine issue of material fact whether Sodoma and the District were negligent in supervising Nudd. Ibid. Accordingly, defendants' motion for summary judgment will be denied.
Dockery, supra note 11, at 605-606; cf. Fiacco v. City of Rensselaer, 783 F.2d 319, 326-327 (2d Cir. 1986).
As noted above, Nudd is being sued in her personal capacity. Consequently, plaintiffs may seek punitive damages against her. Moreover, as noted above, there is a genuine issue of material fact whether Nudd acted with evil motive or intent. Accordingly, defendants' motion for summary judgment will be denied on this ground.
Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED that defendant's motion for summary judgement is denied, that plantiff's motion seeking leave to file an amended complaint is denied without prejudice and that the parties shall appear before Part III of this court on November 21, 2003 at 3:00 p.m. (or as soon thereafter as they may be heard) to set a date for trial.