Summary
declining to transfer FLSA case to another district for consolidation because plaintiffs had chosen to "opt-in" to litigation in original district
Summary of this case from Koslofsky v. Santaturs, Inc.Opinion
Civil Action No: 04-3201 Section: "R" (1).
February 10, 2005
ORDER AND REASONS
The defendant moves the Court to transfer the action to the Eastern District of Texas, Texarkana Division. For the following reasons, the Court DENIES the motion.
I. BACKGROUND
On November 23, 2004, John Johnson, Charles Burden, and Patty Hecker sued Big Lots Stores for violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 201, et seq. Johnson, a resident of North Port, Florida, worked as an assistant manager at a Big Lots store in Florida. Burden, a resident of Port Charlotte, Florida, also worked as an assistant manager at a Big Lots store in Florida. Hecker, a resident of Columbia, South Carolina, worked as an assistant manager at various Big Lots stores in Florida and South Carolina.
The plaintiffs allege that Big Lots violated FLSA sections 206, 207, and 215(a)(2) by employing employees in an enterprise engaged in commerce in the production of goods who were required to work in excess of 40 hours per week without compensating them with overtime pay. (Pl.'s Compl. at ¶ 16.) According to the plaintiffs, Big Lots incorrectly classified the job of assistant manager as exempt from the overtime requirements of FLSA. ( Id. at 17.) They argue that the job duties of the assistant managers consist primarily of physical labor, including stocking shelves, operating cash registers, unloading trucks, stocking the storeroom, straightening merchandise, assisting customers, and cleaning the restrooms. ( Id. at ¶ 9.) The plaintiffs allege that their actual managerial duties constituted less than ten percent of their work day. ( Id. at ¶ 10.) Furthermore, the plaintiffs contend that Big Lots required them to work "off the clock" without pay. ( Id. at ¶ 15.) Specifically, the plaintiffs allege that they performed a variety of tasks before their shifts that were necessary to performing their jobs. ( Id.) The plaintiffs assert that "that corporate payroll practices and policies of defendant are applicable companywide and are not of limited application." ( Id.)
The plaintiffs have designated their suit as a collective action under section 216(b) of FLSA. ( Id. at ¶ 19.) Section 216(b) provides that a plaintiff may maintain an action against an employer who has allegedly violated sections 206, 207, or 215(a)(3) of FLSA in any federal or state court of competent jurisdiction. Plaintiff may sue "for and in behalf of himself . . . and other employees similarly situated," but "no employee shall be a party plaintiff to any such action unless he gives his consent in writing to become such a party and such consent is filed in the court in which such action is brought." 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). Here, the plaintiffs sue Big Lots on their own behalf and on behalf of all similarly situated assistant managers who worked in excess of 40 hours per week and did not receive proper pay. (Pl.'s Compl. at ¶ 20.) Apart from the named plaintiffs, Johnson, Burden, and Hecker, no other current or former Big Lots employees have filed notices of consent to be parties to the collective action.
Before the plaintiffs filed this suit, another group of plaintiffs filed a FLSA collective action against Big Lots in the Eastern District of Texas, Texarkana Division. The putative class members in that action include "furniture department managers, furniture sales managers and assistant managers." ( See Def.'s Mot. Transfer, Ex. B at ¶ 2.) Big Lots operates both general stores and freestanding furniture stores. It is unclear from the language of the complaint whether the Texas plaintiffs bring suit on behalf of managers and assistant managers at Big Lots furniture stores only, or whether they sue on behalf of managers and assistant managers at both Big Lots furniture stores and Big Lots general stores. Otherwise, the Texas complaint is substantially similar to the plaintiffs' complaint in this action.
II. DISCUSSION
A. Transfer Standard
The defendant who brings a motion to transfer venue bears the burden to prove why the case should be transferred to an alternate forum. Trevino v. Louisiana-I Gaming, 2002 WL 27769, No. Civ. A. 00-3110, at *1 (E.D. La. 2002) (citing Time, Inc. v. Manning, 366 F.2d 690, 698 (5th Cir. 1966)). Under Section 1404(a), the Court may transfer an action to any other district where the plaintiff could have filed suit for the convenience of parties and witnesses. 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). The defendant must first demonstrate that the plaintiff could have brought the action in the transferee court initially. See Hoffman v. Blaski, 363 U.S. 335, 343-44 (1960); In re Volkswagen AG, 371 F.3d 201, 203 (5th Cir. 2004). The defendant must then show that a transfer of venue will serve the convenience of the parties, the witnesses, and the interests of justice. See 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a).
In deciding a transfer motion, the district court must consider both private and public interest factors. Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 508 (1947). The private interest factors include (1) the plaintiff's choice of forum; (2) the situs of material events; (3) the cost of obtaining attendance of witnesses and other trial expenses; (4) the place of the alleged wrong; and (5) the possibility of delay and prejudice if the court grants the transfer. See Laitram Corp. v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 120 F. Supp. 2d 607, 608 (E.D. La. 2000). The plaintiff's choice of forum is typically entitled to great deference. Peteet v. Dow Chem. Co., 868 F.2d 1428, 1436 (5th Cir. 1989). The Court accords less than the customary degree of deference to the plaintiff's choice of forum when the plaintiff does not reside in the chosen forum or the operative facts of the action occurred outside the chosen forum. Minka Lighting, Inc. v. Trans Globe Imports, Inc., 2003 WL 21251684, at *1 (N.D. Tex. May 23, 2003). As a general rule, however, if the balance of public and private interest factors does not strongly favor the movant, "the district court will not disturb a plaintiff's choice of forum." Trevino, 2002 WL 27769, at *2 (citing In re McDonnell-Douglas Corp., 647 F.2d 515, 517 (5th Cir. 1981)).
The public interest factors include (1) the administrative difficulties resulting from court congestion; (2) the relationship of the community from which jurors will be drawn to the litigation; (3) the local interest in having localized controversies decided at home; and (4) choice of law issues. See Laitram, 120 F. Supp. 2d at 608. Conservation of judicial resources is an important consideration in determining the propriety of a motion to transfer. Houston Trial Reports, Inc. v. LRP Publications, Inc., 85 F.Supp.2d 663, 671 (S.D. Tex. 1999).
B. Analysis
(1) Venue and Personal Jurisdiction
The Court must first determine whether the plaintiffs could have brought this action in the Eastern District of Texas. The plaintiffs sue under FLSA, which vests federal question jurisdiction in the district courts. FLSA provides for venue in any district where the defendant resides or where a substantial part of the actions or omissions that form the basis of the action occurred. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b). A defendant corporation "resides" in any district in which it is subject to personal jurisdiction. Id. at § 1391(c). Big Lots operates retail sotres in several locations in the Eastern District of Texas, including Tyler, Marshall, Texarkana, and Orange. ( See Def.'s Mot. Transfer, Decl. of Abrams at ¶ 5.) Therefore, Big Lots is subject to personal jurisdiction in the Eastern District of Texas. Accordingly, the plaintiffs could have brought the action in the Eastern District of Texas because both jurisdiction and venue are proper there.
(2) Private Interest Factors (a) The Plaintiffs' Choice of Forum
As noted, courts typically attach great weight to the plaintiff's choice of forum. Here, however, the Court will accord less than the customary degree of deference to the plaintiffs' choice of forum because the plaintiffs do not reside here, nor did the operative facts of the action occur here. See Roulston v. Yazoo River Towing, Inc., 2004 WL 1687232 (E.D. La. July 26, 2004) (according less deference to the plaintiff's choice of forum when he did not reside there and the accident occurred elsewhere).
(b) Situs of Material Events
As noted supra, none of the material events that form the basis of the plaintiffs' suit occurred in either Texas or Louisiana. This is because the plaintiffs worked for Big Lots in Florida and South Carolina, not in Texas or Louisiana. Therefore, this factor weighs neither in favor of nor against transfer. (c) Convenience of the Witnesses and the Location of Documents
Big Lots informs the Court of no witnesses for whom the Texas forum would be more convenient. Specifically, Big Lots has not asserted that any witnesses reside in Texas, nor has Big Lots alleged that there will be substantial overlap in its witnesses and their testimony in the two pending actions. Compare Whistler Group v. PNI Corp., 2003 WL 22939214, at *5 (N.D. Tex. Dec. 5, 2003) (transferring action because, inter alia, the defendant proved that the related actions involved overlapping witnesses).
Furthermore, Big Lots does not contend that this action will involve a substantial volume of documents or that there are any documents in Texas that would make the Eastern District of Texas a more convenient forum. Accordingly, this factor does not weigh in favor of transfer. Compare Mobil Oil Corp. v. S.E.C., 550 F.Supp 67, 70-71 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (transferring an action because the parties expect to produce over 7,000 documents).
(d) Possibility of Delay or Prejudice
The plaintiffs allege that transferring the action to Texas will cause delay because they will dispute consolidation with the pending Texas case. The plaintiffs argue that the two cases involve different types of plaintiffs and that transfer to Texas will spur an additional round of litigation over the propriety of consolidation. Big Lots has not responded to the plaintiffs' arguments. Therefore, the Court finds that this factor weighs against transfer.
(3) Public Interest Factors
Conservation of judicial resources appears to favor transfer because the Eastern District of Texas is handling a related action. Additionally, transfer will potentially avoid duplicative or inconsistent judgments. While these considerations may be especially persuasive in other contexts, see Data Treas. Corp. v. First Data Corp., 243 F.Supp.2d 591, 594 (N.D. Tex. 2003) (finding that transfer to a forum handling related litigation in the "complex and technical area of patent and trademark law" is especially desirable), the Court notes that "the `opt-in' structure of collective actions under section 216(a) of the FLSA strongly suggests that Congress intended to give plaintiffs considerable control over the bringing of a FLSA action." Alix v. Shoney's, 1997 WL 66771, at *3 (E.D. La. Feb. 18, 1997) (finding that transfer of a FLSA action to transferee district where a related FLSA action was pending was not in the interests of justice because transferring the action "would in effect force these plaintiffs to `opt in'"). As in Alix, transferring this action to the Eastern District of Texas may have the de facto effect of forcing the plaintiffs to "opt-in" to the Texas suit. The Court will not force the plaintiffs to "opt-in" to another suit lightly. See Alix, 1997 WL 66771, at *3 (finding that it was not in the interests of justice to force the plaintiffs to "opt-in" to a related action in the transferee district).
Moreover, the other public interest factors do not favor transfer. First, the action is purely federal in nature. Therefore, the same law applies regardless of which district court applies it. Accordingly, this Court is equally competent to evaluate the plaintiffs' FLSA claims as any other district court. See Holmes v. Warrior Gulf Navigation Co., 2004 WL 1774615, at *5 (E.D. La. Aug. 6, 2004). Second, as the plaintiffs point out, their action may affect the interests of Louisiana residents because Big Lots operates several stores in Louisiana.
Upon considering the private and public interest factors, the Court finds that, on balance, the factors simply do not weigh so strongly in favor of transfer to justify granting the motion.
III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court DENIES the defendant's motion.