Opinion
B230971
10-27-2011
ALEXANDER JOHNSON, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. B5596, LLC, Defendant and Respondent.
Law Offices of Morse Mehrban, Morse Mehrban and Julie Mehrban, for Plaintiff and Appellant. Friedman Law Offices, Andrew Friedman and Ari Friedman, for Defendant and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
(Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. BC442689)
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Rex Heeseman, Judge. Affirmed.
Law Offices of Morse Mehrban, Morse Mehrban and Julie Mehrban, for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Friedman Law Offices, Andrew Friedman and Ari Friedman, for Defendant and Respondent.
Alexander Johnson, a hearing-impaired individual who uses a service dog, was denied access to a restaurant. He sued the proprietor for violation of the Unruh Civil Rights Act, Civil Code section 51 (Unruh Act). Following trial, Johnson was awarded damages pursuant to what is commonly known as the "Disabled Persons Act," Civil Code sections 54-55.3. He contends he is entitled to a more generous measure of damages for violations of the Unruh Act. We affirm.
Further statutory references are to the Civil Code unless otherwise indicated.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Johnson is a person with a disability—he has a hearing impairment. Johnson reads lips, but also uses a specially trained service/signal dog to alert him to sounds and to ease his depression.
On one occasion in April 2010, Johnson attempted to patronize a Burger King restaurant owned by defendant and respondent B5596, LLC. Johnson was unable to patronize the restaurant because the sales clerk refused to permit Johnson's service dog to accompany him inside the facility. As a result, a friend who was with Johnson bought food and brought it outside to Johnson.
Johnson sued respondent for disability discrimination (denial of access to public accommodation) in violation of the Unruh Act. (§ 51, subds. (a), (b), (e)(1), (f).) He sought statutory damages of $4,000, as well as injunctive relief, attorney fees and costs. (§ 52, subd. (a).)
Following a bench trial, the trial court found that respondent denied Johnson "full and equal access" to a place of public accommodation, by refusing to permit him to be accompanied by his service dog in violation of the Disabled Persons Act. The court found that the liability provisions of section 54.3 governed, and awarded Johnson statutory damages of $1,000.
DISCUSSION
Johnson contends that the trial court erred in awarding him only $1,000 in damages. He insists that, as a successful plaintiff suing for a violation of the Unruh Act, he is entitled to an award of at least $4,000. (§ 52, subd. (a).) He is wrong.
The Unruh Act prohibits arbitrary discrimination by businesses on the basis of specified classifications. (Marsh v. San Diego County (S.D.Cal. 2006) 432 F.Supp.2d 1035, 1059; Stamps v. Superior Court (2006) 136 Cal.App.4th 1441, 1448.) The Unruh Act was amended in 1992 to provide that a "violation of the right of any individual under the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 . . . shall also constitute a violation of this section." (§ 51, subd. (f); Munson v. Del Taco, Inc. (2009) 46 Cal.4th 661, 668 (Munson).) The amendments were intended to strengthen California civil rights law for individuals with disabilities in areas where existing law was not as strong as the ADA, and to retain California law to the extent that it provided greater protections for such individuals than those available under the ADA. (See Munson, at pp. 668-669 [discussing legislative intention underlying amendments to Unruh Act].) To that end, even though a violation of the ADA's public accommodations provisions permits no private right of action for anything but injunctive relief, under the Unruh Act an individual with a disability denied full access to a business establishment may also obtain damages for such discrimination. (42 U.S.C. § 12188, subds. (a), (b)(2), (B); Civ. Code, §§ 52, subd. (a), 54.1, 54.3; see also Munson, at pp. 669-670, 672-673; Wander v. Kaus (9th Cir. 2002) 304 F.3d 856, 858.) Respondent does not dispute that Johnson is an individual with a disability who uses a service/signal dog, or that he was denied full access to its dining facilities once during 2010. The sole issue is the appropriate measure of damages for that act.
"Service" and "signal" dogs are described at sections 54.1, subdivisions (b)(6)(C)(ii), (iii), and 54.2, subdivision (c).
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Although they have no official title, sections 54-55.3 of the Civil Code are commonly and collectively referred to as the "Disabled Persons Act" (DPA). (Munson,
supra, Cal.4th at p. 674, fn. 8.) While the Unruh Act provides broad civil rights protection in housing and business establishments to individuals in all protected classifications, the DPA is more narrowly tailored to "guarantee individuals with disabilities equal access to public places . . . and services, as well as . . . housing and places of public accommodation." (Ibid.) The DPA similarly "specifies remedies for violations of these guarantees . . . ." (Ibid.)
The DPA provides that individuals with disabilities are entitled to full and equal access, as other members of the general public, to places of public accommodation and other places, such as restaurants, to which the general public is invited. (§ 54.1, subd. (a)(1); Turner v. Association of American Medical Colleges (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th 1401, 1412; Hankins v. El Torito Restaurants, Inc. (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 510, 517.) To facilitate access, the DPA provides that "[e]very individual with a disability has the right to be accompanied by a . . . service dog, especially trained for the purpose, in any of the places specified in section 54.1 . . . ." (§ 54.2.) "Any person or persons, firm or corporation, who denies or interferes with admittance to or enjoyment of the public facilities as specified in Section[] . . . 54.1 or otherwise interferes with the rights of an individual with a disability under Sections . . . 54.1 and 54.2 is liable for each offense for the actual damages and any amount as may be determined by . . . the court sitting without a jury, up to a maximum of three times the amount of actual damages but in no case less than one thousand dollars ($1,000), and attorney's fees as may be determined by the court . . . ." (§ 54.3, subd. (a).) "'Interfere,' for purposes of this section, includes but is not limited to, preventing or causing the prevention of a . . . service dog from carrying out its functions in assisting a disabled person." (Ibid.) No one may be held liable for damages under both sections 52 and 54.3 for the same discriminatory act or failure to act. (§ 54.3, subd. (c).)
The trial court rejected Johnson's assertion that it should find respondent in violation of the more general Unruh Act and apply that Act's more generous damages provisions. Instead, it found the more specific liability provisions of the DPA and its attendant remedies governed the single denial of access at issue here. That conclusion was correct. Well-established principles of statutory interpretation state that a specific statutory provision controls over a more general one. (Salazar v. Eastin (1995) 9 Cal.4th 836, 857.) "That rule obtains even though the general provision standing alone is sufficiently broad to include the subject to which the statute relates." (Schelb v. Stein (2010) 190 Cal.App.4th 1440, 1448; § 3534.) The judgment must be affirmed.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. Respondent is awarded its costs on appeal.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.
JOHNSON, J. We concur:
ROTHSCHILD, Acting P. J.
CHANEY, J.