Johnson v. Autozone Inc.

22 Citing cases

  1. Blake v. Kroger Co.

    224 Ga. App. 140 (Ga. Ct. App. 1996)   Cited 23 times

    Where reasonable inspection would not yield knowledge, as here, reasonable cleaning procedures could correct the slippery condition nevertheless. A proprietor's duty to exercise ordinary care to keep the premises safe includes the duty "`to take reasonable precautions to protect the invitee from dangers which are foreseeable from the arrangement and use of the premises.' . . . [Cit.]" Johnson v. Autozone, 219 Ga. App. 390, 392 ( 465 S.E.2d 463) (1995). Regular cleaning of the floors would be such a precaution and, if adequate, would remove "invisible" spills.

  2. Cleveland v. Snowdrop Prop

    232 Ga. App. 447 (Ga. Ct. App. 1998)   Cited 11 times

    Moreover, even if Snowdrop Properties had a duty to discover and remove the leaves, no evidence shows it breached that duty because no evidence shows that the wet leaves remained on the paved area "for a sufficient amount of time that they should have been discovered and removed by a reasonable inspection of the premises . . . ." Johnson v. Autozone, 219 Ga. App. 390, 393 ( 465 S.E.2d 463) (1995). Here, evidence shows the leaves were being blown around by the wind, and no evidence shows how long the leaves on which Cleveland slipped were present. This incident occurred early on a Monday morning, and the leaves had not been present at the end of the previous Friday.

  3. Carter v. Wal-Mart Stores E., LP

    No. 22-10174 (11th Cir. Jan. 19, 2023)   Cited 1 times

    "[I]t is not always necessary for the proprietor to show compliance with reasonable inspection procedures to establish a lack of constructive knowledge." Johnson v. Autozone, Inc., 465 S.E.2d 463, 466 (Ga.Ct.App. 1995). "In seeking summary judgment, the proprietor may also produce evidence, as [it] did in this case, that the foreign substance had not been on the premises long enough to have been discovered by a reasonable inspection, regardless of whether inspection procedures had been instituted and complied with."

  4. Brown v. Host/Taco Joint Venture

    305 Ga. App. 248 (Ga. Ct. App. 2010)   Cited 33 times
    Finding that the plaintiff did not establish that the defendant could have easily seen a grease spot where the plaintiff testified that the grease spot was not "easily visible," and it was not apparent to him until after he had fallen

    (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Johnson v. Autozone, Inc., 219 Ga. App. 390, 392 ( 465 SE2d 463) (1995). See also Alterman Foods, 246 Ga. at 622.

  5. Leibel v. Sandy Springs Historic Comm

    281 Ga. App. 390 (Ga. Ct. App. 2006)   Cited 5 times

    A proprietor has a duty to exercise ordinary care to keep the premises safe for invitees, which includes a duty to inspect the premises to discover possible dangerous conditions of which he does not know and to take reasonable precautions to protect the invitee from dangers which are foreseeable from the arrangement and use of the premises.Johnson v. Autozone, 219 Ga. App. 390, 392 ( 465 SE2d 463) (1995) (citation and punctuation omitted). In a series of cases involving slips and falls on water on rainy days, and on leaves on fall days, and on ice in winter weather, we have held that where the accumulation of such substances "on a premises is naturally occurring and not attributable to any affirmative action on the proprietor's part, the proprietor has no affirmative duty to discover and remove it in the absence of evidence that it had become an obvious hazard by means other than natural accumulation."

  6. James v. Flash Foods, Inc.

    267 Ga. App. 210 (Ga. Ct. App. 2004)   Cited 5 times

    [I]n an ordinary negligence case, opinion evidence alone is insufficient to grant summary judgment, because the weight and credibility of opinion evidence are for the jury to determine. Harrison v. Tuggle, 225 Ga. 211, 213 (2) ( 167 SE2d 395) (1969); Ginn v. Morgan, 225 Ga. 192, hns. 2, 3 ( 167 SE2d 393) (1969); Galloway v. Banks County, 139 Ga. App. 649, 651 ( 229 SE2d 127) (1976); see also Home Ins. Co. v. Sunrise Carpet Indus., 229 Ga. App. 268, 272-273 (2) ( 493 SE2d 641) (1997); Walker v. MARTA, 226 Ga. App. 793, 797 (1) ( 487 SE2d 498) (1997); Johnson v. Autozone, 219 Ga. App. 390, 393 ( 465 SE2d 463) (1995).FPI Atlanta, L.P. v. Seaton, 240 Ga. App. 880, 888 (5) (c) ( 524 SE2d 524) (1999) (physical precedent only).

  7. Flores v. Strickland

    259 Ga. App. 335 (Ga. Ct. App. 2003)   Cited 6 times

    See Fisher v. HBS Mgmt., 220 Ga. App. 752, 753 ( 469 S.E.2d 885) (1996) (plaintiff's recovery precluded by his equal knowledge of the weather conditions and equal knowledge of the parking lot).Johnson v. Autozone, 219 Ga. App. 390, 393 ( 465 S.E.2d 463) (1995). 232 Ga. App. 447 ( 501 S.E.2d 546) (1998) (plaintiff slipped on natural accumulation of wet leaves during the fall season).

  8. FPI Atlanta, L.P. v. Seaton

    240 Ga. App. 880 (Ga. Ct. App. 1999)   Cited 22 times
    Holding that security service hired by residential housing complex had tort duty under O.C.G.A. § 51-3-1 stemming from both O.C.G.A. § 51-3-1 and contract with property manager to protect tenants

    While Boone stated his opinion that the conduct did not appear suspicious to him, in an ordinary negligence case, opinion evidence alone is insufficient to grant summary judgment, because the weight and credibility of opinion evidence is for the jury to determine. Harrison v. Tuggle, 225 Ga. 211, 213 (2) ( 167 S.E.2d 395) (1969); Ginn v. Morgan, 225 Ga. 192 (2), (3) ( 167 S.E.2d 393) (1969); Galloway v. Banks County, 139 Ga. App. 649, 651 ( 229 S.E.2d 127) (1976); see also Home Ins. Co. v. Sunrise Carpet Indus.,, 229 Ga. App. 268, 272-273 (2) ( 493 S.E.2d 641) (1997); Walker v. MARTA, 226 Ga. App. 793, 797 (1) ( 487 S.E.2d 498) (1997); Johnson v. Autozone, 219 Ga. App. 390, 393 ( 465 S.E.2d 463) (1995). Further, Boone made certain admissions against interest which create a jury question as to his exercise of ordinary care.

  9. J. H. Harvey Co. v. Reddick

    240 Ga. App. 466 (Ga. Ct. App. 1999)   Cited 54 times
    Holding that the defendant was not entitled to summary judgment where, although the plaintiff "could not positively state" what caused her to fall, there was evidence that the floor where she fell was "slippery," there were fruit skins on the floor in the proximity of her fall, and the plaintiff did "not recall seeing anything else on the floor that might have caused her to fall"

    As I pointed out in my dissent in Straughter, the holding there and the holding by the present majority flies in the face of the Supreme Court's decision in Lau's Corp. Moreover, these holdings are directly contrary to numerous other slip and fall decisions of this Court which hold in accord with Lau's Corp. that a slip and fall defendant moving for summary judgment and asserting lack of constructive knowledge of the hazard is not required to produce evidence of compliance with reasonable inspection procedures before it can rely on the absence of evidence as to how long the hazard had been on the floor. Sharfuddin, 230 Ga. App. at 686; Blake v. Kroger Co., 224 Ga. App. 140, 142-150 ( 480 S.E.2d 199) (1996); Johnson v. Autozone, 219 Ga. App. 390, 393 ( 465 S.E.2d 463) (1995); Moore v. Kroger Co., 221 Ga. App. 520, 521 ( 471 S.E.2d 916) (1996); Haskins v. Piggly Wiggly Southern, 230 Ga. App. 350, 351 ( 496 S.E.2d 471) (1998). Without evidence as to whether the hazard had been on the floor for as little as a minute or for as long as one hour and 42 minutes, there is no basis for a reasonable trier of fact to conclude, without engaging in pure speculation or conjecture, that it had been there long enough to have been discovered by a reasonable inspection.

  10. Lovins v. Kroger Company

    236 Ga. App. 585 (Ga. Ct. App. 1999)   Cited 22 times
    Concluding that summary judgment was properly granted to store because inference that store employee had actual knowledge of the hazard "cannot be based upon evidence which is too uncertain or speculative or which raises merely a conjecture or possibility"

    Plaintiff's knowledge and care. Assuming a factual issue was presented as to whether Lovins should have seen the dip before stepping in it, the trial court correctly granted summary judgment to Kroger because there was no evidence that Kroger had actual or constructive knowledge of the hazard before Lovins fell. See Williams v. Sing Bros., 226 Ga. App. 657, 658 (1) ( 487 S.E.2d 445) (1997); Johnson v. Autozone, 219 Ga. App. 390, 392 ( 465 S.E.2d 463) (1995). Judgment affirmed. Smith and Barnes, JJ., concur.