Johnson Creative Arts v. Wool Masters

100 Citing cases

  1. Maybelline Co. v. Noxell Corp.

    813 F.2d 901 (8th Cir. 1987)   Cited 17 times   1 Legal Analyses
    In Maybelline Co. v. Noxell Corp., 813 F.2d 901 (8th Cir. 1987) (Maybelline), rev'g 643 F. Supp. 294 (E.D.Ark. 1986), a cosmetics manufacturer sued a competitor and its advertising agency, alleging that the defendants' nationwide advertising constituted unfair competition.

    Thus, when a defendant's business in a district is sufficiently intrastate and localized that the state, consistent with the commerce clause, could require it to qualify to do business there, see Allenberg Cotton Co. v. Pittman, 419 U.S. 20, 33, 95 S.Ct. 260, 267, 42 L.Ed.2d 195 (1974), venue is proper. This view also has been adopted by respectable authorities, including two courts of appeals, see Eli Lilly Co. v. Home Ins. Co., 794 F.2d 710, 721 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (citing Noxell Corp. v. Firehouse No. 1 Bar-B-Que Restaurant, 760 F.2d 312, 316 n. 7 (D.C. Cir. 1985)), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 107 S.Ct. 940, 93 L.Ed.2d 991 (1987); Johnson Creative Arts, Inc. v. Wool Masters, Inc., 743 F.2d 947 (1st Cir. 1984), and, with some differences, a number of district courts. See, e.g., Lubrizol Corp. v. Neville Chem. Co., 463 F. Supp. 33, 36-37 (N.D.Ohio 1978); Damon Coats, Inc. v. Munsingwear, Inc., 431 F. Supp. 1303, 1309 (E.D.Pa. 1977); P.C. Prods. Corp. v. Williams, 418 F. Supp. 331, 332 (M.D.Pa. 1976), appeal dismissed, 556 F.2d 568 (3d Cir. 1977).

  2. Leidholdt v. L.F.P., Inc.

    647 F. Supp. 1283 (D. Wyo. 1986)   Cited 3 times
    Applying both the equal plausibility and the weight of the contacts test

    They argue that Wyoming cannot be a proper venue because none of the defendants reside here and because the claim did not arise here. In regard to the issue of "where the claims arose," the defendants contend that the proper test for determining this was set forth by the federal district court in Massachusetts in Johnson Creative Arts, Inc. v. Wool Masters, Inc., 573 F. Supp. 1106 (D.Mass. 1983), aff'd, 743 F.2d 947 (1st Cir. 1984). They assert that under Johnson the test for venue under the "claim arising" provision of § 1391(b) is "[w]hether a substantial portion of the acts giving rise to the plaintiff's claim occurred in this district. . . . (citations omitted) In applying this test, the court must consider the availability of witnesses, the accessibility of other relevant evidence and the convenience of the defendant."

  3. Catrone v. Ogden Suffolk Downs, Inc.

    647 F. Supp. 850 (D. Mass. 1986)   Cited 18 times
    Applying Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(K)

    In particular, defendants point to the Supreme Court's opinion in Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 97 S.Ct. 2569, 53 L.Ed.2d 683 (1977). The approach of the First Circuit has been set forth by the court of appeals in cases decided subsequent to Shaffer. E.g., Johnson Creative Arts, Inc. v. Wool Masters, Inc. 743 F.2d 947, 950 (1st Cir. 1984). This Court therefore declines to rule those cases as contrary to current Fifth Amendment due process doctrine.

  4. Lilly v. Home Insurance

    794 F.2d 710 (D.C. Cir. 1986)   Cited 63 times
    Holding that products liability insurer could anticipate being haled into foreign forum because insurer knew that insured distributed its products nationwide, that insured was likely to be sued anywhere in the nation, and that insurer would likely be impleaded over its duty to indemnify or defend insured nationwide

    Although it is hardly clear just what that phrase means, it is certain that it does not refer to the collusive creation of subject matter jurisdiction. It therefore presumably refers to in personam jurisdiction and constitutes an implicit promise to consent to the exercise of such jurisdiction. Compare Du-Al Corp. v. Rudolph Beaver, Inc., 540 F.2d 1230, 1233 (4th Cir. 1976) (implicitly equating the two tests); Houston Fearless Corp. v. Teter, 318 F.2d 822, 826 (10th Cir. 1963) (expressly equating the two tests), with Johnson Creative Arts, Inc. v. Wool Masters, Inc., 743 F.2d 947, 954 (1st Cir. 1984) (finding that the outer limits of the "doing business" provision of the federal venue statute are defined by the dormant Commerce Clause, not the Due Process Clause). See also 15 C. WRIGHT. A. MILLER E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: JURISDICTION § 3811 at 117-130 (1986) (criticizing the Commerce Clause test). On the other hand, it would seem that if the term "competent" in the consent to suit clause is reduced to consent to subject matter jurisdiction, that term would be mere surplusage.

  5. Whistler Corp. v. Solar Electronics, Inc.

    684 F. Supp. 1126 (D. Mass. 1988)   Cited 23 times
    Holding that to fall within subsection (d), the defendant must cause tortious injury to the plaintiff in Massachusetts while regularly doing or soliciting business, or deriving substantial revenue from services used or consumed in Massachusetts

    The Constitution does not require the federal districts to follow state boundaries.Johnson Creative Arts, Inc. v. Wool Masters, Inc., 743 F.2d 947, 950 (1st Cir. 1984) (footnote and citation omitted).

  6. Critzas Industries v. Waterway-Creve Coeur

    652 F. Supp. 56 (E.D. Mo. 1986)   Cited 3 times
    In Critzas, the district court recognized that recent cases in other circuits have limited preemption of state trademark law only to the extent that such laws permit behavior outlawed by the Lanham Act.

    In recent decisions, the First Circuit and the District of Columbia Circuit have applied the general principles established in Leroy to trademark infringement cases. The First Circuit in Johnson Creative Arts v. Wool Masters, 743 F.2d 947 (1st Cir. 1984); found, on facts similar to those here, that venue was improper in Massachusetts. In that case, a Massachusetts plaintiff brought a trademark suit in Massachusetts against two Massachusetts retailers and two New York defendants.

  7. United Elec. Wkrs. v. 163 Pleasant St. Corp.

    960 F.2d 1080 (1st Cir. 1992)   Cited 702 times
    Holding that the Scottish company's contempt did not forfeit its right to appeal based on its "good-faith challenges" to the U.S. district court's jurisdiction over it

    Nevertheless, while courts in federal question cases have found "that sufficient contacts [to justify the assertion of personal jurisdiction] exist whenever the defendant is served within the sovereign territory of the United States," Lorelei, 940 F.2d at 719 (citing cases), the basis for service of process returnable to a particular court must be grounded within a federal statute or Civil Rule. See, e.g., id. at 719-20; Johnson Creative Arts, Inc. v. Wool Masters, Inc., 743 F.2d 947, 950 (1st Cir. 1984). In other words, though personal jurisdiction and service of process are distinguishable, they are inextricably intertwined, since service of process constitutes the vehicle by which the court obtains jurisdiction.

  8. Lorelei Corp. v. County of Guadalupe

    940 F.2d 717 (1st Cir. 1991)   Cited 56 times
    Discussing former language of Rule 4(e) and (f), which imposed the same limitations relevant here

    It is clear that the fifth amendment "permits a federal court to exercise personal jurisdiction over a defendant in a federal question case if that defendant has sufficient contacts with the United States as a whole," Whistler Corp. v. Solar Electronics, Inc., 684 F. Supp. 1126, 1128 (D.Mass. 1988), citing Trans-Asiatic Oil Ltd. S.A. v. Apex Oil Co., 743 F.2d 956, 959 (1st Cir. 1984), and that sufficient contacts exist whenever the defendant is served within the sovereign territory of the United States. Johnson Creative Arts, Inc. v. Wool Masters, Inc., 743 F.2d 947, 950 n. 3 (1st Cir. 1984); Driver v. Helms, 577 F.2d 147, 156 n. 25 (1st Cir. 1978).

  9. Noxell v. Firehouse No. 1 Bar-B-Que Rest

    760 F.2d 312 (D.C. Cir. 1985)   Cited 42 times
    In Noxell v. Firehouse No. 1 Bar-B-Que Restaurant, 760 F.2d 312 (D.C. Cir. 1985), the court held that venue in a trademark infringement case was improperly placed in the District of Columbia despite the fact that the defendant sold its product which allegedly infringed on the plaintiff's trademark to the general public in the District of Columbia.

    We do not understand Noxell to argue that defendant English, engaged full-time as a fire-fighter in California, somehow "resides" in the District of Columbia. Nor do we agree that Firehouse is so extensively engaged in activity in the District of Columbia as to warrant a determination that it is "doing business" and therefore resides in the District. See 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c) (corporation resides for venue purposes where "it is incorporated or licensed to do business or is doing business"); Johnson Creative Arts, Inc. v. Wool Masters, Inc., 743 F.2d 947, 954 (1st Cir. 1984) ("`[D]oing business' in a district for purposes of § 1391(c) [should be] read to mean engaging in transactions there to such an extent and of such a nature that the state in which the district is located could require the foreign corporation to qualify to `do business' there."). At oral argument, Noxell affirmed that Caliente's products are marketed in California, and that California is indeed a place where the claim arose.

  10. Langone v. Son, Inc.

    CIVIL ACTION NO. 12-11717-GAO (D. Mass. Jun. 15, 2015)   Cited 1 times

    "[S]ufficient contacts exist whenever the defendant is served within the sovereign territory of the United States." Lorelei Corp., 940 F.2d at 719 (citing Johnson Creative Arts, Inc. v. Wool Masters, Inc., 743 F.2d 947, 950 n. 3 (1st Cir. 1984)); accord United Elec., Radio & Mach. Workers of Am., 960 F.2d at 1085.