Johns v. Johns

6 Citing cases

  1. Boone v. State ex rel. Carter

    297 S.E.2d 727 (Ga. 1982)   Cited 7 times
    In Boone v. State, 250 Ga. 379 (297 S.E.2d 727) (1982), we looked at a close but not identical problem and ruled on state due process grounds that the state cannot require a putative father to pay the costs of a blood test requested by it for purposes of determining paternity when no hearing has been conducted on the merits of the case.

    While the State has a legitimate interest in the determination of paternity and recovery of public assistance funds from those who have a duty to support minor children, to allow the State to extract prepayment of costs for its benefit without the consent of the alleged offender violates principles of fundamental fairness which govern the relationship between this state and its citizens. In Brainard v. State, 246 Ga. 586 ( 272 S.E.2d 683) (1980), we held that while the State may collect costs from a criminal defendant after conviction pursuant to Code Ann. § 27-3801, that part of the statute allowing the judgment to relate back to the time of arrest so as to create an inchoate lien on the property of the accused pending final determination was an unconstitutional deprivation of private property. It was recognized that while the taking could be temporary, the time between the deprivation and a determination on the merits could be substantial. The same principle applies here.

  2. Taylor v. State

    261 Ga. App. 248 (Ga. Ct. App. 2003)   Cited 7 times

    Ardeneaux v. State, 225 Ga. App. 461, 462(1) ( 484 S.E.2d 74) (1997).Brainard v. State, 246 Ga. 586 ( 272 S.E.2d 683) (1980). 2.

  3. Ardeneaux v. State

    484 S.E.2d 74 (Ga. Ct. App. 1997)   Cited 2 times

    We find that this claim presents nothing for review. "[Ardeneaux], who failed to include an appeal from his sentence and probation at the time he appealed his conviction, cannot complain about the terms of his probation at this late date. [Ardeneaux], having once invoked the appellate process, cannot now seek to raise issues which should have been raised in that appeal." Carver v. State, 202 Ga. App. 102, 103 ( 413 S.E.2d 265) (1991); see also Brainard v. State, 246 Ga. 586 ( 272 S.E.2d 683) (1980) ("Defendant was apparently satisfied with his sentence at the time it was entered as he did not appeal from it as was his right under [OCGA § 42-8-64]. . . . This being so, he will not be heard to complain at this late date that the fine was excessive."). 2.

  4. Latham v. State

    225 Ga. App. 147 (Ga. Ct. App. 1997)   Cited 16 times

    Latham's sentence was a final, appealable judgment. See Brainard v. State, 246 Ga. 586 ( 272 S.E.2d 683) (1980), in which the Court held that a first offender who failed to timely appeal his sentence could not later raise that issue. Because Latham made no effort to contest her sentence within the time for appeal or within the term of court, the trial court had no power to modify that ruling unless a statute authorized such action.

  5. Carver v. State

    413 S.E.2d 265 (Ga. Ct. App. 1991)   Cited 2 times

    Appellant invoked the appellate process and appealed his conviction in 1987, yet raised no complaint about his probation. In Brainard v. State, 246 Ga. 586 ( 272 S.E.2d 683) (1980), the defendant was placed on probation for five years and fined after pleading guilty to a drug violation. He appealed the conviction but did not appeal the sentence. One year after the defendant was sentenced, his probation was revoked.

  6. Dean v. State

    177 Ga. App. 123 (Ga. Ct. App. 1985)   Cited 34 times
    Concluding that the discretionary appeal procedure of OCGA § 5–6–35 is applicable to the revocation of “first offender” probation

    " Ga. L. 1968, pp. 324, 325. Viewed in this light, it is clear that OCGA § 42-8-64 is intended to provide a defendant a direct appeal from his conviction upon the imposition of first-offender status (a "sentence" if you will), notwithstanding the absence of a formal and final "adjudication of guilt." See Brainard v. State, 246 Ga. 586 ( 272 S.E.2d 683) (1980). See also Davenport v. State, 136 Ga. App. 913 (2) ( 222 S.E.2d 644) (1975).