Opinion
April 8, 1999
Appeal from the Supreme Court, Bronx County (Douglas McKeon, J.).
The court has broad discretion to grant renewal and properly did so here, where third-party defendant did not have notice of third-party plaintiff's prior motion to vacate a default and submitted additional information not previously before the court on the motion to vacate (Frampac Delicatessen v. Aetna Cas. Sur. Co., 249 A.D.2d 36; see also, Robinson v. New York City Hous. Auth., 61 A.D.2d 746).
On renewal, the court properly reinstated the default order dismissing the third-party complaint. A party seeking vacatur of a default must demonstrate both that it has a meritorious claim or defense and a reasonable excuse for the default (Goncalves v. Stuyvesant Dev. Assocs., 232 A.D.2d 275). Here, even if the failure of third-party plaintiff's attorney to appear in court for oral argument is excused as law office failure, no excuse at all was given for the failure to respond to the motion to preclude (supra). Nor were the conclusory assertions of third-party plaintiff's attorney and the unverified pleadings submitted sufficient to demonstrate the merit of its underlying claim (supra; Cooper v. Badruddin, 192 A.D.2d 997). The absence of an affidavit of merit will not be excused where, as here, noncompliance is willful and contumacious (cf., Wasserman v. Manoco Co., 100 A.D.2d 758; see, Williamson v. City of New York, 249 A.D.2d 248). In reinstating the default order, the IAS Court properly disregarded the technical defect in third-party defendant's underlying cross motion seeking dismissal of the third-party complaint for non-compliance with court-ordered discovery, since third-party plaintiff had notice of the motion and an opportunity to be heard.
Concur — Ellerin, P. J., Sullivan, Wallach and Rubin, JJ.