John Posey Corp. v. R.J.T. Engineering, Inc.

7 Citing cases

  1. Paul's Cars, Inc. v. Hershey Contracting, Inc.

    Case No. 5:13-cv-75-Oc-10PRL (M.D. Fla. Sep. 16, 2013)

    However, even applying Florida's arguably more lenient pleading standards, the Court finds that Paul's Cars has failed to assert a basis for in personam jurisdiction over Hershey. See e.g., John Posey Corp. v. R.J.T. Engineering, Inc., 617 So. 2d 441, 443 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993); Taylor Forge Int'l, Inc. v. Speciality Maintenance & Construction, Inc., 685 So. 2d 1360, 1361 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996) (both holding that the plaintiff bears the burden of alleging sufficient facts in his complaint to establish the application of Florida's long-arm statute). A federal court exercising diversity jurisdiction undertakes a two-step inquiry in determining whether personal jurisdiction exists: the exercise of jurisdiction must (1) be appropriate under the state long-arm statute and (2) not violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.

  2. Wallack v. Worldwide Machinery Sales

    Case No: 8:00-CIV-275-T-23EAJ (M.D. Fla. Jul. 3, 2003)   Cited 10 times

    To obtain jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant consistent with Florida's long-arm statute, Fla Stat. § 48.193, a plaintiff must allege specific, ultimate facts that bring the action within the ambit of the applicable long-arm statute.See John Posey Corp. v. R.J.T. Engineering, Inc., 617 So.2d 441, 443 (Fla. 5th DCA 1993); Miller v. Braunstein, 549 So.2d 797 (Fla. 5th DCA 1989). Plaintiffs bear the burden of alleging sufficient facts to establish the application of the long-arm statute. See Taylor Forge International, Inc. v. Specialty Maintenance Construction, Inc., 685 So.2d 1360, 1361 (Fla. 2nd DCA 1996).

  3. Redwood Recovery Services, LLC v. Addle Hill, Inc.

    140 So. 3d 1037 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2014)   Cited 1 times

    Minchuk v. Reyes, 967 So.2d 407 (Fla. 3d DCA 2007). See also, John Posey Corp. v. R.J.T. Eng'g, Inc., 617 So.2d 441 (Fla. 5th DCA 1993). A plaintiff may prove a basis for long-arm jurisdiction either by affidavit or “other sworn proof,” which includes deposition testimony.

  4. Shainwald v. Barro

    817 So. 2d 873 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2002)   Cited 6 times

    The motion may challenge the jurisdictional allegations of the complaint and it may claim a lack of sufficient minimum contacts. See Venetian Salami; Horowitz; Beasley v. Diamond R. Fertilizer, Co., Inc., 710 So.2d 1025 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998); Quality Christmas Trees; John Posey Corp. v. R.J.T. Eng'g, Inc., 617 So.2d 441 (Fla. 5th DCA 1993). Affidavits are generally necessary to support these challenges because the motion, by itself, only raises the legal sufficiency of the pleadings which is not an issue in these proceedings. Horowitz; Hewitt v. Toffee, 673 So.2d 929 (Fla. 5th DCA 1996).

  5. Ashemimry v. Ba Nafa

    778 So. 2d 495 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001)   Cited 8 times

    Ashemimry and his Florida corporation did not challenge personal jurisdiction over them. Venetian Salami Co. v. Parthenais, 554 So.2d 499 (Fla. 1989); Hobbs v. Don Mealey Chevrolet, Inc., 642 So.2d 1149 (Fla. 5th DCA 1994); John Posey Corp. v. R.J.T. Engineering, Inc., 617 So.2d 441 (Fla. 5th DCA 1993). The trial court concluded that the offshore corporations were subject to Florida's jurisdiction because they were nothing more than Ashemimry's alter ego and had been used to defraud Ba Nafa. The court found that Ba Nafa sent considerable sums of money to Florida to invest in these corporations under the assurance they were formed to purchase, operate or manage hotels in Florida and that the corporations in fact conducted business dealings in Florida through Ashemimry.

  6. Hewitt v. Taffee

    673 So. 2d 929 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996)   Cited 6 times
    In Hewitt v. Taffee, 673 So.2d 929 (Fla. 5th DCA 1996), this court explained that the filing of a motion to dismiss on grounds of lack of personal jurisdiction raises the legal sufficiency of the complaint.

    In other circumstances, where there were conflicting affidavits on the issue of personal jurisdiction, courts have reversed and remanded for an evidentiary hearing on the issue of jurisdiction. See John Posey Corp. v. R.J.T. Eng'g, Inc., 617 So.2d 441, 443-444 (Fla. 5th DCA 1993). Because of the unique procedural history of this case, remand for Taffee to amend her complaint would be futile because the facts surrounding her basis for jurisdiction surfaced at the evidentiary hearing on March 27, 1995. We therefore have elected to examine the substantive issue of whether Hewitt is subject to jurisdiction in Florida by way of the long arm statute.

  7. Seale v. Black Industries, Inc.

    650 So. 2d 1121 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995)   Cited 1 times

    However, I would hold that the lower court erred in failing to conduct an evidentiary hearing on that issue with regard to John Mathewson and Guardian Bank and Trust, Ltd. because appellant's counter-affidavit, filed in response to those appellees' affidavits contesting in personam jurisdiction, creates a material conflict requiring such a hearing. See Venetian Salami Co. v. Parthenais, 554 So.2d 499 (Fla. 1989); John Posey Corp. v. R.J.T. Eng'g, Inc., 617 So.2d 441, 443-44 (Fla. 5th DCA 1993) (where plaintiff's and defendant's affidavits directly conflicted on whether third party was an agent for the defendant and on the extent of defendant's action in soliciting business in Florida, remand was necessary to determine whether there were sufficient minimum contacts to exercise jurisdiction over defendant). I also believe Seale's (second) amended counterclaim and crossclaim provided sufficient jurisdictional allegations.