eding and there is no basis on which we can say that he has standing to secure an adjudication of his patients' constitutional right to life, which they do not assert in their own behalf. Cronin v. Adams, 192 U.S. 108, 114; Standard Stock Food Co. v. Wright, 225 U.S. 540, 550; Bosley v. McLaughlin, 236 U.S. 385, 395; Blair v. United States, 250 U.S. 273; The Winnebago, 205 U.S. 354, 360; Davis Farnum Mfg. Co. v. Los Angeles, 189 U.S. 207, 220. No question is raised in the record with respect to the deprivation of appellant's liberty or property in contravention of the Fourteenth Amendment, nor is there anything in the opinion or judgment of the Supreme Court of Errors which indicates or would support a decision of any question other than those raised in the superior court and reserved by it for decision of the Supreme Court of Errors. That court's practice is to decline to answer questions not reserved. General Statutes § 5652; Loomis Institute v. Healy, 98 Conn. 102, 129, 119 A. 31; John J. McCarthy Co. v. Alsop, 122 Conn. 288, 298-99, 189 A. 464. Since the appeal must be dismissed on the ground that appellant has no standing to litigate the constitutional question which the record presents, it is unnecessary to consider whether the record shows the existence of a genuine case or controversy essential to the exercise of the jurisdiction of this Court.
Being a body created by the General Assembly, the powers of the P.U.C. are limited to those given to it by its creator. Southern New England Telephone Co. v. Public Utilities Commission, 144 Conn. 516, 523, 134 A.2d 351; John J. McCarthy Co. v. Alsop, 122 Conn. 288, 189 A. 464. The five relevant sections in title 16 of the General Statutes give the P.U.C. broad powers, the scope of which has been recognized by this court. In Connecticut Co. v. Norwalk, 89 Conn. 528, 533, 94 A. 992, this court, in describing the Public Utilities Act of 1911, stated that the Act was "broad in its sweep, extensive in the jurisdiction conferred, and far-reaching in the supervision of public service corporations and the control over public and private interests."
No claim is made to the contrary The trial court found, and its finding is not challenged, that the plaintiff's representative appeared, spoke in opposition to the proposal and was heard without interruption, and that he did not seek to offer any evidence or to examine or cross-examine any witnesses. The due process clause of the fourteenth amendment to the federal constitution, which has substantially the same meaning as article first, 12, of our state constitution, does not guarantee any particular form of state procedure. Due regard must be had to the nature of the proceeding and the individual rights affected by it. Proctor v. Sachner, 143 Conn. 9, 17, 118 A.2d 621; John J. McCarthy Co. v. Alsop, 122 Conn. 288, 296, 189 A. 464; 2 Cooley, Constitutional Limitations (8th Ed.) p. 741. The proceeding in the instant case was to determine the need for the acquisition of private property for a public purpose, and the extent of the acquisition.
" Dohany v. Rogers, 281 U.S. 362, 369, 50 S.Ct. 299, 74 L.Ed. 904; Missouri ex rel. Hurwitz v. North, 271 U.S. 40, 42, 46 S.Ct. 384, 70 L.Ed. 818. "Due process of law . . . means such an exertion of the powers of government as the settled maxims of law permit and sanction, and under such safeguards for the protection of individual rights as those maxims prescribe for the class of cases to which the one in question belongs." 2 Cooley, Constitutional Limitations (8th Ed.) p. 741; John J. McCarthy Co. v. Alsop, 122 Conn. 288, 296, 189 A. 464. Due process of law is "that law of the land in each State, which derives its authority from the inherent and reserved powers of the State, exerted within the limits of those fundamental principles of liberty and justice which lie at the base of all our civil and political institutions, and the greatest security for which resides in the right of the people to make their own laws, and alter them at their pleasure." Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 535, 4 S.Ct. 111, 292, 28 L.Ed. 232.
Where the plaintiff proceeds in accordance with the statute and the power is properly exercised, the proceeding constitutes due process; ConnecticutLight Power Co. v. Southbury, 95 Conn. 88; especially where the individual is secure from arbitrary exercise of the power of eminent domain. John J. McCarthy Co. v. Alsop, 122 Conn. 288. A hearing may be held in the instant case in accordance with the issues joined. Any additional requisites are met, since there appears to be a taking for a public use; Hawley v. Harrall, 19 Conn. 142; Skinner v. Hartford Bridge Co., 29 Conn. 523; and the owners are entitled to compensation by virtue of the statute.
Counsel also states, in an informal written reference to the law on the subject of constitutionality, "I have not been able to find anything definitely in point". Counsel cite on this point the cases of Silver v. Silver, 108 Conn. 371, 377; State v. Andrews, 108 Conn. 209, 212; and John J. McCarthy Co. v. Alsop, 122 Conn. 288. None of these cases, however, declare the particular statute or regulation under consideration therein to be unconstitutional, and they do not appear to be authority for the court to hold that the statute now under consideration is unconstitutional. The court has already pointed out above that the intention of the legislature is clear. It is a reasonable legitimate exercise of the police power. It does not appear that the legislature has abused its discretion "to determine not only what the interests of public health, security and morals require, but what measures are necessary for the protection of such interests."
See cases cited next supra. This last, though very limited remedy, however, resides in him, by the settled law of this State, and since it does, a denial of it to him deprives him of the benefit of due process of law as this is defined in Water Commissioners vs. Johnson, supra, pp. 151, 162, and in John J. McCarthy Co. vs. Alsop, 122 Conn. 288, 297. In the law of eminent domain, particularly where land is taken under the provisions of municipal charters, the courts often speak of two "takings" as involved in the condemnation of private property for public use, viz., (1) that which is theoretical only and occurs when the final act under the statutorily delineated procedure is performed by which specific property is designated to be condemned, as a result of which proceedings for the ascertainment of the amount of compensation are set in motion; and (2) actual physical occupation and use of the land condemned.