JOHN G. LADD v. ROBERT KING

8 Citing cases

  1. Berube v. Montgomery

    463 A.2d 158 (R.I. 1983)   Cited 19 times
    In Berube v. Montgomery, 463 A.2d 158, 159 (R.I. 1983), this Court held that once a document meets the requirements of the statute of frauds, "other elements may be supplied by oral agreement."

    The sellers argue that the statute of frauds in this state, G.L. 1956 (1969 Reenactment) ยง 9-1-4, prohibits enforcement of an oral extension of a contract to purchase land. In support of this proposition, the sellers cite Ladd v. King, 1 R.I. 224 (1849), which held that an agreement for sale of land could not be extended in regard to time by parol. Somewhat later this court in Hicks v. Aylsworth, 13 R.I. 562 (1882), also held that a gratuitous oral agreement to extend the time for exercise of an option for the purchase of real estate was ineffective.

  2. Bangs v. Barret

    18 A. 250 (R.I. 1889)   Cited 1 times

    Blanchard v. McDougal, 6 Wisc. 167; Mahana v. Blunt, 20 Iowa, 142; Rosenthal v. Freeburger, 26 Md. 75; Wills v. Stradling, 3 Ves. Jun. 378; Danforth v. Laney, 28 Ala. 274; Cole v. Potts, 10 N.J. Eq. 67; Knoll v. Harvey, 19 Wisc. 110; Sitton v. Shipp, 65 Mo. 297; Tate v. Jones, 16 Florida, 216; Armstrong v. Kattenhorn, 11 Ohio, 265; Jones v. Peterman, 3 Serg. R. 543; Crawford Murray v. Wick, 18 Ohio St. 190. II. The defendant cannot show a parol waiver of the clause of rescission. It is now settled that a party cannot be charged on an agreement within the statute of frauds which has been modified by parol, even in regard to a particular which is not of the essence of such a contract; Ladd v. King, 1 R.I. 224, 226; Ives v. Armstrong, 5 R.I. 567; Hicks v. Aylsworth, 13 R.I. 562, 566; Browne on the Statute of Frauds, ยงยง 410-428; although parol evidence is admissible to show that such an agreement is totally discharged. 1 Greenleaf on Evidence, ยง 302; Harvey v. Grabham, 5 Ad. El. 61, 74; Marshall v. Lynn, 6 M. W. 109; Monroe v. Perkins, 9 Pick. 298. III. A written agreement thus modified by parol becomes a new agreement, the evidence of the existence of which is the original written agreement and oral proof of the modifications.

  3. MARTIN v. CLARKE ET ALS

    8 R.I. 389 (R.I. 1866)   Cited 13 times

    1 Greenl. on Ev. 371, 372 (ยง 281); Fry on Spec. Perf. 123, and n. (ยง 148); Fenley v. Stewart, 5 Sandf. S.C.R. 105; Spencer v. Field, 10 Wend. 88; Penty v. Staunton, 10 Ib. 271; Newcomb v. Clarke, 1 Denio, 226: Minard v. Meade, 7 Wend. 68; Williams v. Christie, 4 Duer, 29; Evans v. Wells, 22 Wend. 337; Stephen v. Cooper, 1 Johns. Ch. R. 429; Stackpole v. Arnold, 11 Mass. 27; Bank of British North America v. Hooper, 5 Gray, 567; United States v. Parmlee, 1 Paine's C.C.R. 252; Ladd v. King, 1 R.I. 224; Sweet v. Stevens, 7 Ib. 375; Porter v. Bradley, 7 Ib. 541; Bartlett v. Pickersgill, 1 Cox, 15. Again, the contract between Clarke and Martin was for the sale of an interest in real estate, and, by the statute of frauds, must be in writing.

  4. Imperator Realty Co. v. Tull

    228 N.Y. 447 (N.Y. 1920)   Cited 123 times
    In Imperator Realty Co. v. Tull (supra) defendant and plaintiff signed an integrated contract for the exchange of real estate and at the same time made a contemporaneous oral agreement that should there appear any violation of a municipal ordinance on the closing date, they could be cleared up by deposit of sufficient moneys with the title insurance company.

    The cases which maintain it hold that oral promises in such circumstances constitute an accord, and that an accord, though executory, constitutes a bar if there is a tender of performance ( Cummings v. Arnold; Whittier v. Dana, supra). There seems little basis for such a distinction in this state where the rule is settled that an accord is not a bar unless received in satisfaction ( Reilly v. Barrett, 220 N.Y. 170; Morehouse v. Second Nat. Bank of Oswego, 98 N.Y. 503, 509; Ladd v. King, 1 R.I. 224; Pollock on Contracts [3d Am. ed.], p. 822). But there is another objection, more fundamental and far reaching.

  5. Herreshoff v. Misch

    45 A. 145 (R.I. 1900)   Cited 1 times

    It appears by the bill that the contract sought to be enforced has been varied by parol. In such cases the law seems to be well settled, both in this State and elsewhere, that a suit cannot be maintained on a contract so varied. Ladd v. King, 1 R.I. 224; Hicks v. Aylsworth, 13 R.I. 562; Dana v. Hancock, 30 Vt. 616; Rucker v. Harrington, 52 Mo. App. 481. The cases relied on by the complainant are cases where substituted performance has been allowed simply as a defence.

  6. Hicks v. Aylsworth

    13 R.I. 562 (R.I. 1882)   Cited 15 times
    In Hicks, the parties entered into an agreement to redeem property which had been conveyed by plaintiff as security for monies lent to a third party.

    Ives v. Armstrong, 5 R.I. 567. And for a case at law, see Ladd v. King, 1 R.I. 224. It has been held that the rule is exceptionally strict, where, as here, the time relates to an option.

  7. Latham v. Kistler

    235 S.W. 938 (Tex. Civ. App. 1921)   Cited 11 times

    To the same effect are Thomas v. Hammond, 47 Tex. 42; Crutchfield v. Donothan, 49 Tex. 691, 30 Am.Rep. 112; and Simpson v. Green (Sup.) (opinion dated June 1, 1921, not yet [officially] published) 231 S.W. 375. Following are some of the authorities of other states predicated upon the contrary rule of liberal construction and holding that since plaintiff's executory contract, as well as that of defendant, comes within the operation of the statute of frauds, it cannot be modified or changed by a subsequent parol agreement: Rucker v. Harrington, 52 Mo. App. 481; Ladd v. King, 1 R. I. 224, 51 Am.Dec. 624, and other decisions cited in note 12, ยง 352, 25 R.C.L. p. 709; Bradley v. Harter, 156 Ind. 499, 60 N.E. 139. But Malkan v. Hemming, 82 Conn. 293, 73 A. 752, also cited by appellee, was a suit by a vendor of realty to enforce specific performance by the purchaser to pay the purchase price, and the ruling was that it was not permissible for plaintiff to prove a material change in his contract to sell by a subsequent parol agreement between the parties, since such parol agreement would be in contravention of the statute of frauds.

  8. Adams v. Hughes

    140 S.W. 1163 (Tex. Civ. App. 1911)   Cited 22 times

    The weight of authority seems to us to sustain the proposition that a parol extension of the time of performance of a contract required by the statute of frauds to be in writing is void. Ladd v. King, 1 R. I. 224, 51 Am.Dec. 627; Hicks v. Aylsworth, 13 R. I. 562; Davis v. Parish, Litt. Sel. Cas. (Ky.) 153, 12 Am.Dec. 287; Atlee v. Bartholomew, 69 Wis. 43, 33 N.W. 110, 5 Am.St.Rep. 103; Jarman v. Westbrook, 134 Ga. 19, 67 S.E. 403; Blood v. Goodrich, 9 Wend. (N.Y.) 68, 24 Am.Dec. 121; Emerson v. Slater, 22 How. 28, 16 L.Ed. 360; Swain v. Seamans, 9 Wall. 254, 19 L.Ed. 554. And see, also, Abell v. Munson, 18 Mich. 306, 100 Am.Dec. 165, and decisions collected in note.