Opinion
No. C.A. 2:03-1507-23.
November 30, 2004
ORDER
This matter is before the court upon the Magistrate Judge's recommendation that summary judgment be entered against Anthony Joe ("Joe"). The record contains a Report and Recommendation of the United States Magistrate Judge ("the RR"), which was made in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B). A petitioner may object, in writing, to a RR within ten days after being served with a copy of that report. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). On October 8, 2004, Joe filed timely objections to the RR.
I. BACKGROUND
Petitioner is presently serving a twenty year sentence at Evans Correctional Institution of the South Carolina Department of Corrections. Petitioner was convicted in the Court of General Sessions for Richland County, SC on August 8, 2000 after pleading guilty to second degree burglary and grand larceny. Following his conviction, Petitioner did not file a direct appeal, but instead filed an application for post conviction relief ("PCR") with the Court of Common Pleas on September 6, 2000. In this petition, Joe raised the following grounds for relief: (1) invalid plea of guilty, (2) ineffective assistance of counsel, and (3) a due process violation. The court held an evidentiary hearing on March 9, 2001 and dismissed Petitioner's application on October 12, 2001. On November 30, 2001, Petitioner filed a motion to alter or amend the order, which was subsequently denied.
Daniel T. Stacey, Chief Attorney of the South Carolina Office of Appellate Defense, was appointed to represent Petitioner in the appeal of his PCR dismissal. Counsel filed a Johnson petition for a writ of certiorari with the South Carolina Supreme Court. In this petition, the issue presented to the Supreme Court was "[w]hether the petitioner received effective assistance of counsel so as to render his guilty plea knowing, intelligent, and voluntary." (Gov. Am. Return at 4). The court denied Joe's petition on November 21, 2002 and issued a remittitur on December 9, 2002.
On May 28, 2003, Joe filed this habeas action. Joe alleges that he is entitled to relief on four grounds: (1) actual innocence, (2) that the evidence used to convict him was insufficient to support the verdict. (3) "the rulings in the final order concerning ineffective assistance of counsel are contrary to clearly established [f]ederal law as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States[.]" and (4) that "[t]here are circumstances that exists [sic] which render the process ineffective to protect the rights of the Petitioner." (Pet. at 5-6).
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
A. Summary Judgment
To grant a motion for summary judgment, this court must find that "there is no genuine issue as to any material fact." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). The judge is not to weigh the evidence, but rather to determine if there is a genuine issue of fact. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986). If no material factual disputes remain, then summary judgment should be granted against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which the party bears the burden of proof. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986). All evidence should be viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. See Perini Corp. v. Perini Constr., Inc., 915 F.2d 121, 123-24 (4th Cir. 1990).
B. Magistrate Judge's RR
This court is charged with conducting a de novo review of any portion of the Magistrate Judge's RR to which a specific objection is registered and may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the recommendations contained in that RR. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). A review of the entire record, including Joe's objections, indicates that the RR accurately summarizes this case and the applicable law pertinent to the issues before the court. Accordingly, the RR is adopted in whole and incorporated into this Order.
III. DISCUSSION
A. Habeas Standard of Review
With respect to those claims adjudicated on the merits, habeas relief is warranted only if Gladden can demonstrate that the state court adjudication "resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1).
In Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000), the Supreme Court explained that § 2254(d)(1)'s "contrary to" and "unreasonable application" clauses have independent meaning. Id. at 404-05. A federal habeas court may issue the writ under the "contrary to" clause if the state court applies a rule different from the governing law set forth in controlling cases, or if it decides a case differently than the Supreme Court has done on a set of materially indistinguishable facts. Id. at 405-06. The court may grant relief under the "unreasonable application" clause if the state court correctly identifies the governing legal principle from our decisions but unreasonably applies it to the facts of the particular case. Id. at 407-08.
"The federal habeas scheme leaves primary responsibility with the state courts for these judgments, and authorizes federal-court intervention only when a state-court decision is objectively unreasonable." Woodford v. Visciotti, 123 S. Ct. 357, 360 (2002). "An `unreasonable application' of federal law is different from an incorrect application of federal law." Id.
B. Objections
In his objections, Petitioner claims that the Magistrate erred in granting summary judgment to the Government because he has presented sufficient evidence of a genuine issue of material factual dispute. Joe raises myriad objections to the RR, some of which do not even involve the four claims asserted in his petition for habeas relief. While somewhat hard to articulate, it appears that Joe raises the following objections: (1) Joe objects to the Magistrate's conclusions that his guilty plea was knowing and intelligent, given his allegations that the prosecutor failed to turn over exculpatory evidence; (2) Joe objects to the Magistrate's conclusion that his counsel's performance did not constitute ineffective assistance when there was evidence that his counsel failed to impeach the credibility of a state witness: and (3) Joe objects to the Magistrate's conclusion that he should not be allowed to amend his petition to add claims based on state procedural rules, and the Magistrate's denial of entry of a default judgment against the Government. Moreover, Joe appears to newly contend that South Carolina somehow broke a plea agreement he entered with a judge in Tennessee, that prison officials have effectively lengthened his incarceration beyond what is warranted for the crime charged, and continues to argue that he is actually innocent of the crime charged.
A habeas petitioner faces a formidable barrier when he attempts to challenge the validity of his guilty plea. See Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 74 (1977). When a defendant making a guilty plea is represented by counsel, as Joe was, his guilty plea is strongly presumed to be valid in subsequent habeas proceedings. Savino v. Murray, 82 F.3d 593, 603 (4th Cir. 1996) (citing United States v. Custis, 988 F.2d 1355, 1363 (4th Cir. 1993). A guilty plea "is an admission of all the elements of a formal criminal charge. . . ." McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459 (1969). "[T]he accuracy and truth of an accused's statements . . . in which his guilty plea is accepted are conclusively established by that proceeding unless and until he makes some reasonable allegation why this should not be so." Crawford v. United States, 519 F.2d 347, 350 (4th Cir. 1975). Further, "[i]t is well settled that a voluntary and intelligent plea of guilty made by an accused person, who has been advised by competent counsel, may not be collaterally attacked." United States v. Broce, 488 U.S. 563, 574 (1989); see also Fields v. Taylor, 956 F.2d 1290, 1294 (4th Cir. 1992). The only challenges left open in a habeas corpus petition after a guilty plea are the nature of advice of counsel to plead and the nature of the plea as voluntary and intelligent. See Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 56 (1985); Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 267 (1973); United States v. Signori, 844 F.2d 635 (9th Cir. 1988). Moreover, a guilty plea forecloses consideration of constitutional deprivations in federal habeas corpus petitions where the alleged deprivations occurred prior to the entry of the guilty plea. Tollett, 411 U.S. at 267.
As more thoroughly discussed in the RR (which has been incorporated into this order), in pleading guilty, Joe accepted a version of facts under which he admitted that he had turned himself into the Sheriff's Office on the crime charged, that a fingerprint matching his had been identified at the crime scene, and that he had been picked out of a lineup as a person attempting to pawn the stolen goods. (App. at 23: RR at 15). The court had the following colloquy with Joe:
The Court: Once again. Mr. Joe, you're telling me you're pleading guilty to indictment 99-40842, the burglary in the second degree, because you did in fact here in Richland County, on or about April the 16th, 1999, break into the house of David and Susan Martens.
Mr. Joe: Yes, Sir.
The Court: You're pleading guilty, Mr. Joe, because you are guilty and you broke into the house. Is that correct?
Mr. Joe: Yes, sir.
(App. at 12-13). The court repeated this question several more times, and each time, Joe answered that he was pleading guilty because he committed the crime charged. Later, the court asked Joe whether he was "pleading guilty of [his] own free will and accord," to which he responded affirmatively. (App. at 17). Joe also answered that he was "completely satisfied" with the way his lawyer had advised and represented him on the charges. (App. at 18).
As the Magistrate rightfully concluded, there is nothing in the record to suggest that Joe's guilty plea was involuntary, and he presents no new evidence to this effect in his objections to the RR. Accordingly, any of Joe's claims involving alleged deprivations that occurred prior to the entry of the guilty plea are barred. See, Tollett, 411 U.S. at 267. Thus, Joe cannot prevail on his claims that the prosecutor failed to turn over exculpatory evidence, that his counsel was ineffective in failing to impeach a state's witness, or that he is actually innocent of the crime he pled guilty to. See, e.g., U.S. v. Walton, 2002 WL 322812324, *1 (E.D.Va. August 13, 2002) (finding a habeas petitioners' claims that the government failed to provide exculpatory evidence and that his counsel was ineffective when he failed to properly conduct discovery and to file a motion to suppress barred because petitioner had pled guilty; "the purported facts the petitioner argues support those claims occurred prior to the entry of the guilty plea."); Hutchings v. Herbert, 260 F.Supp. 2d 571, 576 (W.D.N.Y. 2003) ("Hutchings' guilty plea forecloses any possible demonstration of actual innocence."); Shakoor v. Collins, 63 F.Supp.2d 858, 867 (N.D. Ohio 1999) ("[a]s established by his admission of guilt, actual innocence is not an issue in this case."). The court similarly agrees with the Magistrate's conclusions that Joe should not be allowed to amend his petition to add claims based on state procedural rules, and the Magistrate's denial of entry of a default judgment against the Government. The court declines to address the specious new arguments raised by Petitioner's objections.
To the extent that Joe raises other claims of ineffectiveness of counsel, his claim would similarly fail unless he could demonstrate that but for the deficient advice of counsel, he would have insisted on going to trial. Hill, 474 U.S. at 59. Joe makes no such allegations, and accordingly, any ineffectiveness claims are without merit as the PCR court concluded.
Joe has filed a second set of Objections to the RR in which he contends that prison officials have taken all of his legal work and refused to give it back to him. The court makes no ruling on the merits of such a claim, as federal habeas relief does not provide a remedy for this sort of alleged wrong. See, e.g., Doan v. Buss, 82 Fed. Appx. 168. *4 (7th Cir. Oct. 31, 2003) ("This § 2254 action, however, is not the appropriate vehicle by which to recover materials of significance to some unrelated lawsuit."); see also Moran v. Sondalle, 218 F.3d 647, 650-51 (7th Cir. 2000) (per curium) (noting that habeas corpus affords means of challenging only the fact or duration of custody).
IV. CONCLUSION
It is, therefore,ORDERED, for the foregoing reasons that Joe's § 2254 motion is DENIED. Judgment is hereby entered in favor of Respondents. All outstanding motions are rendered MOOT.