(Internal251 quotation marks omitted.) Jobe v. Commissioner of Correction, 334 Conn. 636, 644 n.2, 224 A.3d 147 (2020). [23, 24] This case presents a unique situation in which the petition for certification and the statement in response to the petition indicate that certification was sought regarding two main questions: (1) whether the commission had subject matter jurisdiction, and (2) whether the Appellate Court properly held that Estrada’s disclosure was not a protected disclosure under § 4-61dd.
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Jobe v. Commissioner of Correction , 334 Conn. 636, 644 n. 2, 224 A.3d 147 (2020) ; see State v. Santiago , 318 Conn. 1, 124, 122 A.3d 1 (2015) ("[W]e generally do not consider claims or issues that the parties themselves have not raised ... [but] in cases too numerous to mention, we have considered arguments or factors pertaining to those claims or issues that were not expressly identified by the parties." (Citation omitted; emphasis in original.)).
As such, our review is plenary. See, e.g., Jobe v. Commissioner of Correction , 334 Conn. 636, 647–48, 224 A.3d 147 (2020). "When construing a statute, [o]ur fundamental objective is to ascertain and give effect to the apparent intent of the legislature. ... In other words, we seek to determine, in a reasoned manner, the meaning of the statutory language as applied to the facts of [the] case, including the question of whether the language actually does apply. ... In seeking to determine that meaning, General Statutes § 1-2z directs us first to consider the text of the statute itself and its relationship to other statutes. If, after examining such text and considering such relationship, the meaning of such text is plain and unambiguous and does not yield absurd or unworkable results, extratextual evidence of the meaning of the statute shall not be considered."
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Jobe v. Commissioner of Correction , 334 Conn. 636, 644 n.2, 224 A.3d 147 (2020). Because "[o]ur rules of preservation apply to claims ... [and not] to legal arguments ... [w]e may ... review legal arguments that differ from those raised below if they are subsumed within or intertwined with arguments related to the legal claim before the court."
We reject this claim as well. See, e.g., Jobe v. Commissioner of Correction , 334 Conn. 636, 644 n.2, 224 A.3d 147 (2020) ("[o]ur rules of preservation apply to claims, but they do not apply to legal arguments, and, therefore, [w]e may ... review legal arguments that differ from those raised below if they are subsumed within or intertwined with arguments related to the legal claim before the court" (internal quotation marks omitted)). Finally, the plaintiff's claim that the defendants have caused it prejudice by attempting to interject new evidence relating to the internal procedures of the Legislative Commissioners’ Office lacks merit because the defendants’ argument simply relies on references to various pieces of legislation passed by the General Assembly.
Accordingly, we decline to review such a claim. See Jobe v. Commissioner of Correction , 334 Conn. 636, 659 n.9, 224 A.3d 147 (2020). explicitly directed Stawicki to "play no further role in his case."
In addition, statutes of limitations and other constraints applicable to petitions for state and federal habeas and coram nobis relief can further be expected to reduce the likelihood that a flood will follow in this decision's wake. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f) (setting forth one-year statute of limitations, which runs from the latest of four dates, for § 2255 motions); Jobe v. Comm'r of Corr., 224 A.3d 147, 159 (Conn. 2020) (concluding that "a petitioner whose conviction has expired fully prior to the filing of a habeas petition is not in 'custody' on that conviction within the meaning of [Connecticut's habeas statute]" (internal quotation marks omitted)); State v. Grisgraber, 439 A.2d 377, 379 (Conn. 1981) (stating that, in Connecticut, a writ of coram nobis "authorize[s] the trial judge, within three years, to vacate the judgment"); People v. Friedgood, 448 N.E.2d 1317, 1319 (N.Y. 1983) (finding no abuse of discretion in the trial court's denial of the defendant's motion to vacate his conviction under N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law § 440.10 where the defendant "waited for over three years to bring" his challenge). But see In re D.C., 149 A.3d 466, 470 n.2 (Vt. 2016) (explaining that petitions for post-conviction relief "are not subject to a statute of limitations"); Thompson v. Comm'r of Corr., 158 A.3d 814, 823
Whether § 18-98d (c) confers exclusive authority on the commissioner to calculate and apply a defendant's presentence confinement credit is a question of statutory interpretation subject to plenary review. See, e.g., Jobev.Commissioner of Correction, 334 Conn. 636, 647, 224 A.3d 147 (2020).
Because the defendant failed to argue at trial that the property was legally a ''good'' and the trial court concluded that the defendant had sufficient notice of the plaintiff's argument based on § 1281 (50), we decline to address that issue. See, e.g., Jobe v. Commissioner of Correction, 334 Conn. 636, 643, 224 A.3d 147 (2020).
See, e.g., Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 33-1314.01 and 33-2107 (2021); Md. Code Ann., Real Prop. § 8-212.4 (c) and (d) (LexisNexis Supp. 2023); Minn. Stat. Ann. § 504B.215 (2a) (West 2023); N.M. Stat. Ann. § 47-8-20 (F) (Cum. Supp. 2015); Or. Rev. Stat. § 90.562 (2023); Va. Code Ann. § 55.1-1212 (D) (2022). See generally Jobe v. Commissioner of Cometion, 334 Conn. 636, 659, 224 A.3d 147 (2020) (observing that "the primary responsibility for formulating public policy must remain with the legislature" (internal quotation marks omitted)); Doe v. Norwich Roman Catholic Diocesan Corp., 279 Conn. 207, 216, 901 A.2d 673 (2006) ("It is axiomatic that the court itself cannot rewrite a statute to accomplish a particular result. That is a function of the legislature."