Opinion
1:22-cv-09314-LGS-GRJ
12-29-2023
JOAN R.P., Plaintiff, v. COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY, Defendant.
REPORT & RECOMMENDATION
GARY R. JONES, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE.
In March of 2020, Plaintiff Joan R.P.applied for Disability Insurance Benefits under the Social Security Act. The Commissioner of Social Security denied the application. Plaintiff, represented by Dennis Kenny Law, Josephine Gottesman, Esq., of counsel, commenced this action seeking judicial review of the Commissioner's denial of benefits under 42 U.S.C. §§ 405 (g) and 1383 (c)(3).
Plaintiff's name has been partially redacted in compliance with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5.2 (c)(2)(B) and the recommendation of the Committee on Court Administration and Case Management of the Judicial Conference of the United States.
This case was referred to the undersigned for a Report and Recommendation on December 6, 2023. Presently pending are the parties' Motions for Judgment on the Pleadings under Rule 12 (c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. (Docket Nos. 22, 29).For the following reasons, it is recommended that Plaintiff's motion should be denied, the Commissioner's motion should be granted, and this case should be dismissed.
Although Plaintiff's motion is titled “Motion to Remand”, the Court interprets the motion as a motion for judgment on the pleadings under Rule 12 (c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Administrative Proceedings
Plaintiff applied for benefits on March 11, 2020, alleging disability beginning August 4, 2017. (T at 16, 395-98).Plaintiff's application was denied initially and on reconsideration. She requested a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”). A hearing was held on May 21, 2021, before ALJ John Barry. (T at 35-88). Plaintiff appeared with an attorney and testified. (T at 47-53, 65-79). The ALJ also received testimony from two medical experts - Dr. Richard Cohen (T at 42-47) and Dr. Steven Goldstein (T at 54-65) - and from Cantrell Pittman, a vocational expert. (T at 79-84).
Citations to “T” refer to the administrative record transcript at Docket No. 15.
B. ALJ's Decision
On September 1, 2021, the ALJ issued a decision denying the application for benefits. (T at 13-34). The ALJ found that Plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since August 4, 2017 (the alleged onset date) and would meet the insured status requirements of the Social Security Act through December 31, 2021 (the date last insured). (T at 18).
The ALJ concluded that Plaintiff's degenerative disc disease of the cervical spine, obesity, anxiety disorder, somatic disorder, and chronic fatigue syndrome were severe impairments as defined under the Act. (T at 18).
However, the ALJ found that Plaintiff did not have an impairment or combination of impairments that met or medically equaled one of the listed impairments in 20 CFR Part 403, Subpart P, Appendix 1. (T at 19).
At step four of the sequential analysis the ALJ determined that Plaintiff retained the residual functional capacity (“RFC”) to perform sedentary work, as defined in 20 CFR 404.1567 (a) and 416.967 (a), with the following limitations: she can lift/carry less than 10 pounds frequently and 10 pounds occasionally; sit for 6 hours and stand/walk for 1 hour each in an 8-hour workday; never climb ropes, ladders, or scaffolds; and should avoid exposure to unprotected heights, dangerous machinery, and operation of a motor vehicle. (T at 21).
The ALJ further found that Plaintiff should avoid extremes of temperature, humidity, and wetness; can understand, remember, and apply simple directions and instructions, and can perform simple, routine, and repetitive tasks, with occasional interaction with supervisors, coworkers, and the general public. (T at 21). The ALJ concluded that Plaintiff could adjust to minor changes in work routine and make simple work-related decisions but would be off task 8% of the workday due to chronic fatigue and non-epileptic seizures. (T at 21).
The ALJ found that Plaintiff could not perform her past relevant work as a sales manager, account clerk, or medical record clerk. (T at 27). However, considering Plaintiff's age (34 on the alleged onset date), education (at least high school), work experience, and RFC, the ALJ determined that there were jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national economy that Plaintiff can perform. (T at 27-28).
As such, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had not been under a disability, as defined under the Social Security Act, and was not entitled to benefits for the period between August 4, 2017 (the alleged onset date) and September 1, 2021 (the date of the ALJ's decision). (T at 28-29).
On September 7, 2022, the Appeals Council denied Plaintiff's request for review, making the ALJ's decision the Commissioner's final decision. (T at 1-7).
C. Procedural History
Plaintiff commenced this action, by and through her counsel, by filing a Complaint on October 31, 2022. (Docket No. 1). Plaintiff filed a motion for remand for further administrative proceedings, supported by a memorandum of law, on July 24, 2023. (Docket Nos. 22, 23). The Commissioner interposed a cross-motion for judgment on the pleadings, supported by a memorandum of law, on November 7, 2023. (Docket Nos. 29, 30). On November 20, 2023, Plaintiff submitted a reply memorandum of law in further support of her motion. (Docket No. 31). The matter was assigned to the undersigned for a Report and Recommendation on December 6, 2023.
II. APPLICABLE LAW
A. Standard of Review
“It is not the function of a reviewing court to decide de novo whether a claimant was disabled.” Melville v. Apfel, 198 F.3d 45, 52 (2d Cir. 1999). The court's review is limited to “determin[ing] whether there is substantial evidence supporting the Commissioner's decision and whether the Commissioner applied the correct legal standard.” Poupore v. Astrue, 566 F.3d 303, 305 (2d Cir. 2009) (per curiam).
The reviewing court defers to the Commissioner's factual findings, which are considered conclusive if supported by substantial evidence. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). “Substantial evidence” is “more than a mere scintilla” and “means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Lamay v. Commissioner of Soc. Sec., 562 F.3d 503, 507 (2d Cir. 2009) (internal quotations omitted) (quoting Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971)).
“In determining whether the agency's findings are supported by substantial evidence, the reviewing court is required to examine the entire record, including contradictory evidence and evidence from which conflicting inferences can be drawn.” Talavera v. Astrue, 697 F.3d 145, 151 (2d Cir. 2012) (internal quotations omitted).
“When there are gaps in the administrative record or the ALJ has applied an improper legal standard,” or when the ALJ's rationale is unclear, remand “for further development of the evidence” or for an explanation of the ALJ's reasoning is warranted. Pratts v. Chater, 94 F.3d 34, 39 (2d Cir. 1996).
B. Five-Step Sequential Evaluation Process
Under the Social Security Act, a claimant is disabled if he or she lacks the ability “to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months ....” 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A).
A claimant's eligibility for disability benefits is evaluated pursuant to a five-step sequential analysis:
1. The Commissioner considers whether the claimant is currently engaged in substantial gainful activity.
2. If not, the Commissioner considers whether the claimant has a “severe impairment” which limits his or her mental or physical ability to do basic work activities.
3. If the claimant has a “severe impairment,” the Commissioner must ask whether, based solely on medical evidence, claimant has an impairment listed in Appendix 1 of the regulations. If the claimant has one of these enumerated impairments, the Commissioner will automatically consider him disabled, without considering vocational factors such as age, education, and work experience.
4. If the impairment is not “listed” in the regulations, the Commissioner then asks whether, despite the claimant's severe impairment, he or she has residual functional capacity to perform his or her past work.
5. If the claimant is unable to perform his or her past work, the Commissioner then determines whether there is other work which the claimant could perform.See Rolon v. Commissioner of Soc. Sec., 994 F.Supp.2d 496, 503 (S.D.N.Y. 2014); see also 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(i)-(v), 416.920(a)(4)(i)-(v).
The claimant bears the burden of proof as to the first four steps; the burden shifts to the Commissioner at step five. See Green-Younger v. Barnhart, 335 F.3d 99, 106 (2d Cir. 2003). At step five, the Commissioner determines whether claimant can perform work that exists in significant numbers in the national economy. See Butts v. Barnhart, 416 F.3d 101, 103 (2d Cir. 2005); 20 C.F.R. § 404.1560(c)(2).
III. DISCUSSION
Plaintiff raises three primary arguments in support of her challenge to the ALJ's decision. First, Plaintiff asserts that the ALJ's step three Listings analysis was flawed. Second, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ's RFC determination is not supported by substantial evidence. Third, she challenges the ALJ's credibility determination. This Court will address each argument in turn.
A. Listings Analysis
At step three of the sequential evaluation, the ALJ must determine whether the claimant has an impairment or combination of impairments that meets or equals an impairment listed in Appendix 1 of the Regulations (the “Listings”). See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(d), 416.920(d). If a claimant meets or equals a listed impairment, she is “conclusively presumed to be disabled and entitled to benefits.” Bowen v. City of New York, 476 U.S. 467, 471, 106 S.Ct. 2022, 90 L.Ed.2d 462 (1986).
“The claimant bears the burden of establishing that his or her impairments match a Listing or are equal in severity to a Listing." Henry v. Astrue, 32 F.Supp.3d 170, 182 (N.D.N.Y. 2012) (citing Naegele v. Barnhart, 433 F.Supp.2d 319, 324 (W.D.N.Y.2006)).
Here, the ALJ found that Plaintiff did not have an impairment or combination of impairments that met or medically equaled one of the impairments set forth in the Listings. (T at 22).
Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred because her impairments satisfy the “B” criteria for Listing 12.07 (Somatic symptom and related disorders). The “B” criteria for this Listing are met when a claimant has extreme limitation of one, or marked limitation of two, of the following areas of functioning: understanding, remembering, or applying information; interacting with others; maintaining concentration, persistence, or pace; and adapting or managing oneself.
The ALJ recognized Plaintiff's somatic disorder as a severe impairment (T at 18) and gave explicit consideration to Listing 12.07 at step three. (T at 19). The ALJ found that Plaintiff had moderate limitation in each of the above-referenced domains and, thus, determined that the paragraph “B” criteria for Listing 12.07 had not been satisfied. (T at 20).
The following is an analysis of the ALJ's evaluation of each domain.
1. Understanding, Remembering, or Applying Information
In May of 2020, Dorinda Cataldo, a treating social worker, described Plaintiff's understanding and memory as “limited,” and reported that she had “difficulty focusing” and was “distracted by [her] medical condition.” (T at 1077). In February of 2021, Ms. Cataldo opined that Plaintiff was seriously limited, but not precluded, from asking simple questions, requesting assistance, accepting instructions, or responding appropriately to criticism from supervisors. (T at 1768). She assessed that Plaintiff could not meet competitive standards with respect to remembering work-like procedures or understanding and remembering very short and simple instructions. (T at 1768).
The ALJ found Ms. Cataldo's assessment of extreme impairment unpersuasive and concluded that Plaintiff had moderate limitation in this domain. (T at 20, 26). The ALJ's decision is supported by substantial evidence and consistent with applicable law.
Pursuant to the Social Security Regulations applicable here, the ALJ is obliged to consider all medical opinions and “evaluate their persuasiveness” based on supportability, consistency, relationship with the claimant, specialization, and other factors. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c (a), (b)(2). The ALJ is required to “articulate how [he or she] considered the medical opinions” and state “how persuasive” he or she finds each opinion, with a specific explanation provided as to the consistency and supportability factors. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c (b)(2).
The ALJ reasonably read the treatment record, which generally described Plaintiff as having logical thoughts, demonstrating appropriate affect and intact memory, and able to follow commands. (T at 509, 722, 725, 820, 825, 830, 894, 1173, 1295, 1696).
Although ALJs must not overestimate the significance of a claimant's ability to be cooperative and appropriate during brief visits with supportive medical providers, such evidence can support a decision to discount marked or extreme limitations. See, e.g., Knief v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., No. 20 Civ. 6242 (PED), 2021 WL 5449728, at *1-2, 8-9 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 22, 2021) (affirming ALJ decision based on treatment records and mental status examinations that claimant had “meaningful, but not profound, mental restrictions” with chronic anxiety and mood disturbances, adequately treated with regular psychiatric appointments and psychiatric medications); Burchette v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., No. 19 CIV. 5402 (PED), 2020 WL 5658878, at *10 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 23, 2020)(“In sum, Dr. Phillips' opinion, combined with largely unremarkable mental status examination findings in the treatment record and plaintiff's ADLs, provide substantial evidence for the ALJ's RFC determination.”).
In addition, the ALJ's assessment of moderate limitation in this domain is supported by other medical opinion evidence. Dr. Richard Cohen, a Board-certified psychiatrist, reviewed the record and testified at the administrative hearing. He assessed mild impairment in Plaintiff's ability to understand and apply information. (T at 44).
Dr. Dennis Noia performed a consultative psychiatric evaluation in June of 2020. On examination, Plaintiff's thought processes were coherent and goal-directed, she demonstrated appropriate orientation, intact attention and concentration, intact recent and remote memory skills, average cognitive functioning, and good insight and judgment. (T at 1088). Dr. Noia opined that Plaintiff had no limitation in her ability to understand, remember, or apply simple or complex directions or instructions and/or to use reason and judgment to make work-related decisions. (T at 1088).
Two non-examining State Agency review physicians (Dr. C. Walker and Dr. M. Momot-Baker) assessed mild to no limitation in this domain. (T at 195, 219-220).
The ALJ did not find any of the medical opinion evidence regarding Plaintiff's mental functioning fully persuasive. The ALJ concluded that Plaintiff was somewhat more impaired than the examining and nonexamining physicians believed, but less limited than Ms. Cataldo assessed. (T at 20, 25-26).
When the record contains competing medical opinions, it is the role of the Commissioner, and not this Court, to resolve such conflicts. See Veino v. Barnhart, 312 F.3d 578, 588 (2d Cir. 2002)(“Genuine conflicts in the medical evidence are for the Commissioner to resolve.”). The ALJ may reach a determination that “does not perfectly correspond with any of the opinions of medical sources,” provided the ALJ's overall assessment is supported by substantial evidence and consistent with applicable law. See Trepanier v. Comm'r of SSA, 752 Fed.Appx. 75, 79 (2d Cir. 2018).
Here, for the reasons discussed above, the Court concludes the ALJ's assessment of moderate limitation in the domain of understanding, remembering, or applying information is supported by substantial evidence.
2. Interacting with Others
Ms. Cataldo described Plaintiff as capable of being social with her family, but only in her home. (T at 1077). She opined that Plaintiff had extreme difficulties in maintaining social functioning. (T at 1770). Ms. Cataldo reported that Plaintiff was seriously limited, but not precluded from, getting along with co-workers or peers without unduly distracting them or exhibiting behavioral extremes. (T at 1768).
The ALJ assessed moderate limitation as to this domain. (T at 20). The ALJ's decision is supported by substantial evidence.
Dr. Cohen recognized evidence of Plaintiff's social withdrawal, but opined that Plaintiff had moderate limitation with respect to interacting with others. (T at 42-44). Dr. Noia assessed no limitation as to Plaintiff's social skills. (T at 1088). Dr. Walker opined that Plaintiff had mild limitation in this domain. (T at 189). Although the treatment record documents social anxiety and withdrawal, Plaintiff was consistently cooperative and capable of relating appropriately. (T at 20, 487, 499, 505, 512, 526, 529, 557, 563, 612, 713, 894, 1087).
Notably, the ALJ did not discount the evidence of impairment in this domain and found Plaintiff limited to work involving simple, routine, repetitive tasks and requiring no more than occasional interaction with supervisors, co-workers, and the general public. (T at 21). See McIntyre v. Colvin, 758 F.3d 146, 150-51 (2d Cir. 2014)(finding that ALJ appropriately accounted for moderate work-related psychiatric limitations by limiting the claimant to unskilled, low stress work involving limited contract with others); see also Sanchez v. Saul, No. 18CV12102 (PGG) (DF), 2020 WL 2951884, at *27 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 13, 2020); Miller v. Berryhill, No. 6:16-CV-06467(MAT), 2017 WL 4173357, at *6 (W.D.N.Y. Sept. 20, 2017); Sophie H. v. Saul, No. 5:18-CV-375 (CFH), 2019 WL 3975455, at *7 (N.D.N.Y. Aug. 22, 2019).
3. Maintaining Concentration, Persistence, or Pace
Ms. Cataldo opined that Plaintiff had extreme difficulties in maintaining concentration, persistence, or pace. (T at 1770). She reported that Plaintiff had no useful ability to maintain attention for two-hour segments, sustain an ordinary routine without special supervision, or perform at a consistent pace without an unreasonable number and length of rest periods. (T at 1768). Ms. Cataldo described Plaintiff's concentration, focus, and “follow through” as “impaired.” (T at 1076).
The ALJ assessed moderate limitation in this domain. (T at 20). This conclusion is supported by substantial evidence. Dr. Noia found Plaintiff's attention, concentration, and memory to be “intact” and opined that she had no limitation as to sustaining concentration, persistence, or pace. (T at 1088). Dr. Cohen and Dr. Walker assessed moderate impairment in this domain. (T at 44, 189). The ALJ reasonably read the treatment record as inconsistent with extreme limitations in attention and concentration. (T at 20, 820, 830, 1088).
The ALJ accounted for Plaintiff's impairment in this domain by limiting her to work involving only simple, routine, and repetitive tasks, in a job where she is allowed to be off-task 8% of the workday and required to make only simple work-related decisions. (T at 21).
4. Adapting or Managing Oneself
Ms. Cataldo opined that Plaintiff had no useful ability to deal with normal work stress or respond appropriately to changes in a routine work setting. (T at 1768). She believed Plaintiff would be absent from work more than 4 days per month due to her impairments or treatment. (T at 1771). Ms. Catado believed Plaintiff had limited ability to respond appropriately to changes in the work setting, be aware of hazards, travel/use public transportation, set realistic goals, and make plans independently. (T at 1078).
The ALJ found moderate limitation in this domain. (T at 20). This conclusion is also supported by substantial evidence.
Dr. Noia assessed mild limitation as to Plaintiff's ability to regulate her emotions, control her behavior, and maintain well-being. (T at 1089). Dr. Cohen opined that Plaintiff was moderately limited in this domain. (T at 4445). Dr. Walker assessed mild impairment. (T at 189).
The ALJ also reasonably relied on the treatment record, which documented a limited range of activities of daily living, but generally described Plaintiff as cooperative and demonstrating full orientation, logical thoughts, and intact memory. (T at 487, 499, 505, 509, 512, 526, 529, 553, 557, 563, 572, 577, 612, 619, 655, 664, 673, 695, 701, 713, 722, 725, 728, 731, 808, 811, 814, 894, 908, 944, 998, 1010, 1114, 1131, 1292, 1406, 1501).
Lastly, the ALJ adequately accounted for the impairment in Plaintiff's ability to self-regulate, adapt to changes, and maintain attendance by limiting her to work involving no more than simple directions and instructions; simple, routine, and repetitive tasks; occasional interaction with supervisors, coworkers, and the general public; minor changes in work routine; and simple work-related decisions. (T at 21). See McIntyre v. Colvin, 758 F.3d 146, 150-51 (2d Cir. 2014)(finding that ALJ appropriately accounted for moderate work-related psychiatric limitations by limiting the claimant to unskilled, low stress work involving limited contact with others); see also Platt v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 588 F.Supp.3d 412, 422 (S.D.N.Y. 2022)(collecting cases); Walters v. Saul, No. CV 19-3232 (AYS), 2021 WL 4861521, at *11 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 19, 2021); Jacqueline L. v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 515 F.Supp.3d 2, 12 (W.D.N.Y. 2021).
B. RFC
A claimant's “residual functional capacity” (“RFC”) is his or her “maximum remaining ability to do sustained work activities in an ordinary work setting on a continuing basis.” Melville, 198 F.3d at 52 (quoting SSR 96-8p). When assessing a claimant's RFC, an ALJ must consider medical opinions regarding the claimant's functioning and make a determination based on an assessment of the record as a whole. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(d)(2), 416.9527(d)(2) (“Although we consider opinions from medical sources on issues such as ...your residual functional capacity...the final responsibility for deciding these issues is reserved to the Commissioner.”).
As noted above, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff retained the RFC to perform sedentary work, as defined in 20 CFR 404.1567 (a) and 416.967 (a), with the following limitations: she can lift/carry less than 10 pounds frequently and 10 pounds occasionally; sit for 6 hours and stand/walk for 1 hour each in an 8 -hour workday; never climb ropes, ladders, or scaffolds; should avoid exposure to unprotected heights, dangerous machinery, and operation of a motor vehicle. (T at 21).
The ALJ further found that Plaintiff should avoid extremes of temperature, humidity, and wetness; can understand, remember, and apply simple directions and instructions, and perform simple, routine, and repetitive tasks, with occasional interaction with supervisors, coworkers, and the general public. (T at 21). The ALJ concluded that Plaintiff could adjust to minor changes in work routine and make simple work-related decisions but would be off task 8% of the workday because of the effects of chronic fatigue and non-epileptic seizures. (T at 21).
Plaintiff challenges the ALJ's assessment of her ability to meet the mental demands of basic work activity. In support of this argument, she points to the assessments of Ms. Cataldo, a third-party statement from her husband, and treatment notes documenting seizures, severe fatigue, depression, anxiety, and difficulty attending to self-care.
The Court finds the ALJ's determination of Plaintiff's mental RFC supported by substantial evidence.
As discussed above, the ALJ's conclusion that Plaintiff could perform a reduced range of work involving low stress, limited demands, and occasional interaction with others is supported by a reasonable reading of the treatment record and by multiple medical opinions of record, including the assessments of Dr. Cohen, Dr. Walker, Dr. Momot-Baker, and Dr. Noia. See DuBois v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., No. 20-CV-8422 (BCM), 2022 WL 845751, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 21, 2022)(“To be sure, there is some evidence in the record that would support the conclusion that plaintiff had greater limitations than those the ALJ built into her RFC. But that is not the test.”).
Regarding her physical limitations, Plaintiff cites clinical evidence, treatment notes, her husband's third-party statement, and an assessment signed by treating providers Dr. Rabi Sinha and Ralph Gargiulo, PA, indicating significant symptoms and limitations.
Dr. Sinha and PA Gargiulo completed a medical source statement in June of 2021. They opined that Plaintiff could never lift or carry any weight; could sit for 2 hours at a time and in total during an 8-hour workday; could stand for 1 hour at a time and in total during an 8-hour workday; could walk for 20 minutes at a time and in total during an 8-hour workday; could never reach, climb, kneel, crouch, crawl and push/pull; and could occasionally handle, finger, feel, balance, and stoop. (T at 1810-12).
Dr. Sinha and PA Gargiulo assessed that Plaintiff could never tolerate exposure to unprotected heights, moving mechanical parts, humidity/wetness, extreme cold, dust, odors, fumes, or pulmonary irritants; could tolerate occasional exposure to operating a motor vehicle and extreme heat; and could tolerate moderate office noise. (T at 1813).
They further opined that Plaintiff could never shop, travel without a companion, walk a block at a reasonable pace on rough or uneven surfaces, use public transportation, or climb at a reasonable pace with the use of a single handrail. (T at 1814). Dr. Sinha and PA Gargiulo reported that Plaintiff could ambulate without an assistive device, prepare simple meals, care for her personal hygiene, and sort, handle, and use paper files. (T at 1814).
The ALJ found this assessment unpersuasive. (T at 25).
In finding this assessment unpersuasive the ALJ relied on examination notes documenting full range of motion, generally full strength throughout the extremities, normal neurologic findings, and normal gait. (T at 24, 487, 492, 499, 505, 512, 535, 553, 557, 567, 572, 577, 580, 612, 619, 655, 664, 673, 695, 722, 731, 802, 811, 814, 820, 830, 833, 911, 981, 998, 1008, 1010, 1023, 1026, 1095, 1114, 1131, 1141, 1157, 1230, 1406, 1421, 1574,1596, 1653).
The ALJ also cited diagnostic findings, including a normal computed tomography brain (CT) scan, brain magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) study, CT angiogram, electromyography (EMG) of the upper extremities, nerve conduction studies, and electroencephalogram (EEG). (T at 23-24, 490, 514, 552, 666, 740, 775, 784-86, 789-90, 1049, 1057, 1102-03, 1478, 1600, 1624, 1760, 1799-1800).
Dr. Steven Goldstein, a neurologist, reviewed the record and testified at the administrative hearing. Dr. Goldstein opined that Plaintiff could perform light work that avoided heights, dangerous machinery, and driving. (T at 22-23, 57-58). He testified that he saw no reason why Plaintiff would need time off task. (T at 22-23, 63).
Dr. A. Periakaruppan, a non-examining State Agency review consultant, opined that Plaintiff could occasionally lift and/or carry 20 pounds; frequently lift and/or carry 10 pounds; sit more than 6 hours in an 8t-hour workday; stand and/or walk 2 hours in an 8-hour workday; and had unlimited capacity for pushing and/or pulling other than as indicated for lifting and/or carrying. (T at 191). Dr. Periakaruppan believed Plaintiff could occasionally climb ramps/stairs, balance, stoop, kneel, crouch, and crawl, but never climb ladders, ropes, or scaffolds. (T at 192). Dr. Periakaruppan recommended that Plaintiff avoid working around unprotected heights. (T at 192-93). Dr. Seok, another State Agency review physician, reached essentially the same conclusion on reconsideration. (T at 214-17).
The ALJ reconciled the evidence, finding Plaintiff more physically limited than the non-examining experts, but less impaired than the treating providers' assessment. This conclusion was supported by substantial evidence, including a reasonable reading of the treatment record and appropriate consideration of the various medical opinions of record.
“Substantial evidence is “a very deferential standard of review - even more so than the ‘clearly erroneous' standard." Brault v. SSA, 683 F.3d 443, 447-48 (2d Cir. 2012) (per curiam) (citation omitted). “The substantial evidence standard means once an ALJ finds facts, [a court] can reject those facts only if a reasonable factfinder would have to conclude otherwise.” Id. at 448 (emphasis in original) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). “The role of the reviewing court is therefore quite limited and substantial deference is to be afforded the Commissioner's decision.” Johnson v. Astrue, 563 F.Supp.2d 444, 454 (S.D.N.Y. 2008)(citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
Indeed, “[i]f the reviewing court finds substantial evidence to support the Commissioner's final decision, that decision must be upheld, even if substantial evidence supporting the claimant's position also exists.” Id. (citing Alston v. Sullivan, 904 F.2d 122, 126 (2d Cir. 1990)); see also McIntyre v. Colvin, 758 F.3d 146, 149 (2d Cir. 2014) (“If evidence is susceptible to more than one rational interpretation, the Commissioner's conclusion must be upheld.”)(citation omitted).
C. Credibility
A claimant's subjective complaints of pain and limitation are “an important element in the adjudication of [social security] claims, and must be thoroughly considered in calculating the [RFC] of a claimant.” Meadors v. Astrue, 370 Fed.Appx. 179, 183 (2d Cir. 2010) (citation omitted); see also 20 C.F.R. § 416.929. However, “the ALJ is ... not required to accept the claimant's subjective complaints without question.” Genier v. Astrue, 606 F.3d 46, 49 (2d Cir. 2010) (citations omitted). Rather, the ALJ “may exercise discretion in weighing the credibility of the claimant's testimony in light of other evidence in the record.” Id. (citation omitted); see also Henningsen v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 111 F.Supp.3d 250, 267 (E.D.N.Y. 2015) (“The ALJ retains discretion to assess the credibility of a claimant's testimony regarding disabling pain and ‘to arrive at an independent judgment, in light of medical findings and other evidence, regarding the true extent of the pain alleged by the claimant.'” (quoting Marcus v. Califano, 615 F.2d 23, 27 (2d Cir. 1979))).
The ALJ follows a two-step process in evaluating a claimant's credibility.
First, “the ALJ must decide whether the claimant suffers from a medically determinable impairment that could reasonably be expected to produce the symptoms alleged.” Genier, 606 F.3d at 49 (citation omitted).
Second, “the ALJ must consider the extent to which the claimant's symptoms can reasonably be accepted as consistent with the objective medical evidence and other evidence of record.” Id. (citation, alterations, and quotation marks omitted). The ALJ must “consider all of the available medical evidence, including a claimant's statements, treating physician's reports, and other medical professional reports.” Fontanarosa v. Colvin, No. 13-CV-3285, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 121156, at *36 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 28, 2014) (citing Whipple v. Astrue, 479 Fed.Appx. 367, 370-71 (2d Cir. 2012)).
If the claimant's allegations of pain and limitation are “not substantiated by the objective medical evidence, the ALJ must engage in a credibility inquiry.” Meadors, 370 Fed.Appx. at 184. This inquiry involves seven (7) factors: (1) the claimant's daily activities; (2) the location, duration, frequency, and intensity of the pain; (3) precipitating and aggravating factors; (4) the type, dosage, effectiveness, and side effects of any medications taken to alleviate the pain; (5) any treatment, other than medication, that the claimant has received; (6) any other measures that the claimant employs to relieve the pain; and (7) other factors concerning the claimant's functional limitations and restrictions as a result of the pain. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(3)(i)-(vii)).
If the ALJ discounts the claimant's credibility, the ALJ “must explain the decision to reject a claimant's testimony “with sufficient specificity to enable the [reviewing] Court to decide whether there are legitimate reasons for the ALJ's disbelief and whether [the ALJ's] decision is supported by substantial evidence.” Calzada v. Astrue, 753 F.Supp.2d 250, 280 (S.D.N.Y. 2010)(alterations in original, citations omitted).
In the present case, Plaintiff testified as follows: She experiences muscle weakness, aggravated by activity, sometimes resulting in strokelike symptoms and seizures. (T at 48, 50). She does not leave the house alone and needs help with activities of daily living, including self-care. (T at 48). She has been hospitalized for seizures. (T at 50-51). Therapy with Ms. Cataldo was the sole treatment Plaintiff was receiving as of the date of the administrative hearing. (T at 52).
The ALJ found that Plaintiff's medically determinable impairments could reasonably be expected to cause the alleged symptoms, but concluded that her statements as to the intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of those symptoms were not entirely credible. (T at 22).
For the following reasons, the Court finds that the ALJ's assessment must be sustained on the deferential standard of review applicable here. The ALJ conducted a thorough review and asked two medical experts (Dr. Cohen and Dr. Goldstein) to review the record and testify subject to cross-examination at the administrative hearing. The consultative examiner and State Agency review physicians (Drs. Noia, Walker, Momot-Baker, Periakaruppan, and Seok) all assessed less than disabling limitations.
An ALJ has the discretion to discount a claimant's subjective complaints where, as here, those complaints can be considered inconsistent with the objective medical evidence. See Kuchenmeister v. Berryhill, No. 16 Civ. 7975, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9750, at *59 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 19, 2018); Rodriguez v. Colvin, No. 15 Civ. 6350, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 159003, at *68-69 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 14, 2016); Robles v. Colvin, No. 16CV1557 (KMK) (LMS), 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 62118, at *51 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 9, 2019).
The ALJ also noted that Plaintiff generally attended to personal care, performed light chores, managed finances, and drove short distances. (T at 26, 1088). While ALJs must not overinterpret a claimant's ability to perform limited activities of daily living, the regulations permit consideration of the claimant's “daily activities” when assessing credibility. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(3)(i); see also Rutkowski v. Astrue, 368 Fed.Appx. 226, 230 (2d Cir. 2010)(affirming ALJ's credibility determination based upon “evidence ... that [claimant] was relatively ‘mobile and functional,' and that ... allegations of disability contradicted the broader evidence”); Ashby v. Astrue, No. 11 Civ. 02010, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 89135, at *43-44 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 27, 2012)(“As it appears that, in making his credibility assessment, the ALJ appropriately considered Plaintiff's ability to engage in certain daily activities as one factor, among others suggested by the regulations, this Court finds no legal error in this aspect of the ALJ's analysis.”).
Plaintiff also argues that she was entitled to enhanced credibility because of her excellent work record. Although a claimant with a “good work record is entitled to substantial credibility when claiming an inability to work,” Rivera v. Schweiker, 717 F.2d 719, 725 (2d Cir.1983), an ALJ is not required to find a claimant credible based upon work record alone. See Montaldo v. Astrue, No. 10 Civ. 6163(SHS), 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 35250, at *49-50, 2012 WL 893186 at *17-18 (S.D.N.Y. March 15, 2012); Johnson v. Astrue, No. 07-CV-0322C, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 98702, at *17, 2009 WL 3491300 at *7 (W.D.N.Y. Oct. 23, 2009) (good work history “cannot be a substitute for evidence of a medically supported disability”); Chavis v. Astrue, No. 5:11-CV-00220 TJM, 2012 WL 6150851, at *10 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 21, 2012), report and recommendation adopted, No. 5:11-CV-220, 2012 WL 6139661 (N.D.N.Y. Dec. 11, 2012).
Although Plaintiff suffers from significant symptoms the ALJ did not dismiss Plaintiff's subjective complaints and, instead, found her limited to a reduced range of sedentary work. (T at 21).
However, “disability requires more than mere inability to work without pain.” Dumas v. Schweiker, 712 F.2d 1545, 1552 (2d Cir. 1983). “Otherwise, eligibility for disability benefits would take on new meaning.” Id.
Here, the ALJ offered specific support for the decision to discount Plaintiff's subjective complaints, including a reasonable reading of the treatment notes and clinical assessments, an appropriate reconciliation of the medical opinion evidence, and proper consideration of the activities of daily living. This is sufficient to sustain the disability determination under the deferential standard of review applicable here. See Stanton v. Astrue, 370 Fed App'x 231, 234 (2d Cir. 2010)(stating that courts will not “second-guess the credibility finding . . . where the ALJ identified specific recordbased reasons for his ruling”); Hilliard v. Colvin, No. 13 Civ. 1942, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 156653, at *48 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 31, 2013)(finding that ALJ “met his burden in finding [subjective] claims not entirely credible because [claimant] remains functional in terms of activities of daily living and the objective medical evidence fails to support her claims of total disability based on pain”).
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, it is respectfully recommended that Plaintiff's Motion for Remand for Further Administrative Proceedings, which the Court treats as a Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings (Docket No. 22) should be DENIED; the Commissioner's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings (Docket No. 29) should be GRANTED; and this case should be dismissed.
PROCEDURE FOR FILING OBJECTIONS TO THIS REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Rule 72(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the parties have fourteen (14) days (including weekends and holidays) from service of this Report and Recommendation to file any objections. See also Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a), (b), (d). A party may respond to any objections within 14 days after being served. Any objections and responses shall be filed with the Clerk of the Court. Any request for an extension of time to file objections or responses must be directed to the District Judge. If a party fails to file timely objections, that party will not be permitted to raise any objections to this Report and Recommendation on appeal. See Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wagner & Wagner, LLP v. Atkinson, Haskins, Nellis, Brittingham, Gladd & Carwile, P.C., 596 F.3d 84, 92 (2d Cir. 2010).