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Joachin v. Dream Job Staffing

United States District Court, S.D. New York
Jan 29, 2024
23-CV-10083 (LTS) (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 29, 2024)

Opinion

23-CV-10083 (LTS)

01-29-2024

NADINE JOACHIN, Plaintiff, v. DREAM JOB STAFFING; EAST HAVEN NURSING AND REHAB CENTER; CHRC LEGAL UNIT; AMSTERDAM NURSING HOME, Defendants.


ORDER TO AMEND

LAURA TAYLOR SWAIN, CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Plaintiff Nadine Joachin, who is proceeding pro se, alleges that Defendants violated her constitutional rights when they denied her application for employment because of her criminal history. By order dated November 20, 2023, the Court granted Plaintiff's request to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”), that is, without prepayment of fees. For the reasons set forth below, the Court grants Plaintiff leave to file an amended complaint within 60 days of the date of this order.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

The Court must dismiss an IFP complaint, or any portion of the complaint, that is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); see Livingston v. Adirondack Beverage Co., 141 F.3d 434, 437 (2d Cir. 1998). The Court must also dismiss a complaint when the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction of the claims raised. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3).

While the law mandates dismissal on any of these grounds, the Court is obliged to construe pro se pleadings liberally, Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009), and interpret them to raise the “strongest [claims] that they suggest,” Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (emphasis in original). But the “special solicitude” in pro se cases, id. at 475 (citation omitted), has its limits -to state a claim, pro se pleadings still must comply with Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which requires a complaint to make a short and plain statement showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.

Rule 8 requires a complaint to make a short and plain statement showing that the pleader is entitled to relief. A complaint states a claim for relief if the claim is plausible. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-79 (2009) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). To review a complaint for plausibility, the Court accepts all well-pleaded factual allegations as true and draws all reasonable inferences in the pleader's favor. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-79 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). The Court need not accept, however, “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action,” which are essentially legal conclusions. Id. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). After separating legal conclusions from well-pleaded factual allegations, the court must determine whether those facts make it plausible - not merely possible - that the pleader is entitled to relief. Id.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff brings this action asserting that Defendants violated her constitutional rights, presumably when she applied for work and was denied employment because of her alleged criminal background. She names as Defendants (1) New York State Department of Health (“DOH”) Criminal History Record Check (“CHRC”) legal unit; (2) Amsterdam Nursing Home (“Amsterdam”); (3) East Haven Nursing & Rehab Center (“East Haven”); and (4) Dream Job Staffing (“Dream Job”). The following facts are drawn from the complaint.

On January 14, 2023, in the Bronx, New York,
I submitted documents to my EEOC Paul Esposito investigator regarding discrimination being promoted with these health care setting violating my 14th Amendment rights and 1st Amendment rights. They also violating my rights discriminating against [me] due to criminal background check.
(ECF 1, at 5.) Plaintiff alleges that she suffered the following injuries: “I suffered bruises and individuals calling me the n-word multiple times & referred to me as an slave.” (Id. at 6.) She seeks $50,000,000 in monetary damages.

The Court quotes from the complaint verbatim. All spelling, grammar, and punctuation are as in the original, unless noted otherwise.

DISCUSSION

A. Claims Against DOH CHRC Legal Unit

Plaintiff names as a defendant “CHRC legal unit,” which the Court understands to be DOH's unit that processes criminal background checks for individuals who seek employment in a nursing facility. The Court construes these claims as asserting a procedural due process claim under the Fourteenth Amendment.

The Court first addresses the relevant statutory scheme for individuals seeking employment at nursing facilities.

Under New York law, applicants for employment involving direct patient care in a nursing home are required to submit to criminal background checks, including fingerprinting. N.Y. Pub. Health Law §§ 2899, 2899-a; N.Y. Exec. Law § 845-b. The Criminal History Records Check Legal Review Unit (“CHRC Unit”) is the administration unit within the DOH tasked with fulfilling that statutory obligation. N.Y Pub. Health Law § 2899-a(4).
Walker v. Daines, No. 08-CV-4861 (JGLB), 2009 WL 2182387, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. July 21, 2009). To the extent Plaintiff seeks to bring claims against individuals employed at the CHRC legal unit concerning the decision regarding her eligibility to work at a nursing home, the Court grants Plaintiff 60 days leave to amend this claim as follows.

To the extent Plaintiff seeks to assert claims against the CHRC legal unit itself, as opposed to the individuals working in that unit, seeking money damages, such claims are barred under the Eleventh Amendment. See, e.g., Walker, 2009 WL 2182387, at *7 (“The DOH and its administrative subunit, the CHRC Unit, may assert Eleventh Amendment immunity since the DOH is an agency of the state, which is the real party in interest.”).

1. 42 U.S.C. § 1983

The Court construes Plaintiff's due process claims under Section 1983 because she seeks relief from a state actor.

To state a claim under Section 1983, a plaintiff must allege both that: (1) a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) the right was violated by a person acting under the color of state law, or a “state actor.” West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48-49 (1988). Private parties generally are not liable under the statute because “the United States Constitution regulates only the Government, not private parties.” Ciambriello v. Cnty. of Nassau, 292 F.3d 307, 323 (2d Cir. 2002). State officials can be sued in actions seeking injunctive relief where there is a “special relation” between the state official and the statute being challenged, and the officer has “some connection with the enforcement of the act.” Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 157 (1908).

The complaint suggests that Plaintiff seeks injunctive relief under Section 1983 against one or more state officials at DOH under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

2. Due Process

The Court understands Plaintiff's allegations as a challenge to the application of New York's statute requiring a background check following her employment application at Amsterdam, East Haven, and Dream Job. As noted above, the Court construes this part of Plaintiff's complaint as asserting a procedural due process claim under the Fourteenth Amendment. See, e.g., Walker, 2009 WL 2182387, at *8 (discussing the plaintiff's due process challenge regarding the denial of his employment application by the CHRC legal unit).

“The two threshold questions in any [Section] 1983 claim for denial of procedural due process are whether the plaintiff possessed a liberty or property interest protected by the United States Constitution or federal statutes, and, if so, what process was due before plaintiff could be deprived of that interest.” Green v. Bauvi, 46 F.3d 189, 194 (2d Cir. 1995) (citing Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 428 (1982)); see also Hynes v. Squillance, 143 F.3d 653, 658 (2d Cir. 1998) (To state a procedural due process claim, a plaintiff must “demonstrate that he possessed a protected liberty or property interest, and that he was deprived of that interest without due process of law.”). The Court assumes for the purpose of this order that Plaintiff possessed a property interest in her employment.

“In general, the nature and contours of a specific property interest are defined by some source independent of the Constitution - most often state law.” Ezekwo v. New York City Health & Hosp. Corp., 940 F.2d 775, 782 (2d Cir. 1991) (citing Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972)).

When the government deprives a plaintiff of some property interest pursuant to an established procedure, procedural due process is generally satisfied so long as some form of hearing is provided before the individual is deprived of the property interest. Nnebe v. Daus, 644 F.3d 147, 158 (2d Cir. 2011). “[I]f a plaintiff had an opportunity to contest a defendant's actions but failed to do so, there can be no claim for violation of his or her procedural due process rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.” Vialez v. N.Y.C. Hous. Auth., 783 F.Supp. 109, 113 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).

The complaint does not state facts to suggest that any state official denied Plaintiff procedural due process with regard to her application for employment because she does not allege that she took advantage of the state law remedies available to challenge any unfavorable decision. For example, Plaintiff does not plead any facts suggesting that she challenged any decision by DOH in state court by filing an Article 78 proceeding. See, e.g., Walker, 2009 WL 2182387, at *4 (describing a plaintiff's due process challenge to employment eligibility where plaintiff filed an Article 78 proceeding before seeking relief in federal court). Because this state court remedy is available to Plaintiff, and there are no allegations that she took advantage of the process or that the process is in any way inadequate, the complaint does not suggest that a state official violated her procedural due process rights.

3. Leave to Amend Procedural Due Process Claim

The Court grants Plaintiff leave to amend her procedural due process claim. Should she choose to proceed with this claim, she must name the DOH state official(s) who were involved personally in her employment application, plead facts describing the steps she has taken to challenge any unfavorable DOH decisions, and allege any additional facts in support of her claim that the decision to deny her employment application violated her procedural due rights. If Plaintiff does not know the name of a state official, she can name him or her as a John or Jane Doe Defendant.

4. First Amendment Claim

Plaintiff asserts in her complaint that her rights under the First Amendment were violated, but she does not state facts in support of this allegation. Should she want to proceed with a First Amendment claim against a state actor, she must allege facts describing the conduct on the part of a state actor that she considers a violation of her First Amendment rights.

B. Claims Against Amsterdam, East Haven, and Dream Job

Plaintiff asserts claims against two nursing facilities (Amsterdam and East Haven) and an employment agency (Dream Job), presumably related to DOH's decision regarding her employment eligibility. To the extent Plaintiff's claims against these Defendants concern her employment, Plaintiff does not state facts suggesting that these Defendants violated any federal laws, such as Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, which bars employers from discriminating “against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex or national origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a). To the extent she asserts claims of discrimination regarding her criminal history, Title VII generally does not prohibit discrimination solely on the basis of a prior criminal conviction. See e.g., Booker v. City of New York, 2017 WL 151625, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 13, 2017) (collecting cases).

If an employment practice - such as relying on an applicant's criminal history - has a disparate impact on an employee who is protected under Title VII, that employee may assert a disparate impact claim. See Mandala v. NTT Data, Inc., 975 F.3d 202, 208 (2d Cir. 2020) (holding that plaintiffs did not state a disparate impact claim). The complaint does not suggest that Plaintiff can assert a disparate impact claim under Title VII because Amsterdam, East Haven, and Dream Job presumably denied Plaintiff employed based on a decision by DOH.

To the extent Plaintiff is asserting a race discrimination claim, based on her allegation individuals used racist language toward her, she does not provide any details regarding this conduct or attribute the racist language to an individual employed by Amsterdam, East Haven, or Dream Job, and her complaint, in its current form, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. The Court therefore grants Plaintiff leave to amend her complaint to state facts in support of any claim of race discrimination she may be asserting by describing what occurred, when and where the discrimination took place, who participated in the discrimination, and any other facts that suggest Defendants considered Plaintiff's race when denying her employment.

LEAVE TO AMEND

Plaintiff proceeds in this matter without the benefit of an attorney. District courts generally should grant a self-represented plaintiff an opportunity to amend a complaint to cure its defects, unless amendment would be futile. See Hill v. Curcione, 657 F.3d 116, 123-24 (2d Cir. 2011); Salahuddin v. Cuomo, 861 F.2d 40, 42 (2d Cir. 1988). Indeed, the Second Circuit has cautioned that district courts “should not dismiss [a pro se complaint] without granting leave to amend at least once when a liberal reading of the complaint gives any indication that a valid claim might be stated.” Cuoco v. Moritsugu, 222 F.3d 99, 112 (2d Cir. 2000) (quoting Gomez v. USAA Fed. Sav. Bank, 171 F.3d 794, 795 (2d Cir. 1999)). Because Plaintiff may be able to allege additional facts to state a procedural due process claim, a First Amendment claim, and/or a Title VII claim, the Court grants Plaintiff 60 days' leave to file an amended complaint to detail these claims.

In the “Statement of Claim” section of the amended complaint form, Plaintiff must provide a short and plain statement of the relevant facts supporting each claim against each defendant. If Plaintiff has an address for any named defendant, Plaintiff must provide it. Plaintiff should include all of the information in the amended complaint that Plaintiff wants the Court to consider in deciding whether the amended complaint states a claim for relief. That information should include:

a) the names and titles of all relevant people;
b) a description of all relevant events, including what each defendant did or failed to do, the approximate date and time of each event, and the general location where each event occurred;
c) a description of the injuries Plaintiff suffered; and
d) the relief Plaintiff seeks, such as money damages, injunctive relief, or declaratory relief.

Essentially, Plaintiff's amended complaint should tell the Court: who violated her federally protected rights and how; when and where such violations occurred; and why Plaintiff is entitled to relief.

Because Plaintiff's amended complaint will completely replace, not supplement, the original complaint, any facts or claims that Plaintiff wants to include from the amended complaint must be repeated in the second amended complaint.

Plaintiff may consider contacting the New York Legal Assistance Group's (“NYLAG”) Clinic for Pro Se Litigants in the Southern District of New York, which is a free legal clinic staffed by attorneys and paralegals to assist those who are representing themselves in civil lawsuits in this court. The clinic is run by a private organization; it is not part of, or run by, the court. It cannot accept filings on behalf of the court, which must still be made by any pro se party through the Pro Se Intake Unit. A copy of the flyer with details of the clinic is attached to this order.

CONCLUSION

Plaintiff is granted leave to file an amended complaint that complies with the standards set forth above. Plaintiff must submit the amended complaint to this Court's Pro Se Intake Unit within 60 days of the date of this order, caption the document as an “Amended Complaint,” and label the document with docket number 23-CV-10048 (LTS). An Amended Complaint form is attached to this order. No summons will issue at this time. If Plaintiff fails to comply within the time allowed, and she cannot show good cause to excuse such failure, the complaint will be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.

A copy of NYLAG's flyer with details of the clinic is attached to this order.

The Court certifies under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) that any appeal from this order would not be taken in good faith, and therefore IFP status is denied for the purpose of an appeal. Cf. Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 444-45 (1962) (holding that an appellant demonstrates good faith when he seeks review of a nonfrivolous issue).

SO ORDERED.


Summaries of

Joachin v. Dream Job Staffing

United States District Court, S.D. New York
Jan 29, 2024
23-CV-10083 (LTS) (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 29, 2024)
Case details for

Joachin v. Dream Job Staffing

Case Details

Full title:NADINE JOACHIN, Plaintiff, v. DREAM JOB STAFFING; EAST HAVEN NURSING AND…

Court:United States District Court, S.D. New York

Date published: Jan 29, 2024

Citations

23-CV-10083 (LTS) (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 29, 2024)