Opinion
Case No. 5D18-3084
03-06-2020
J.N., Appellant, v. DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILIES, Appellee.
Matthew J. Conigliaro, of Carlton Fields, P.A., Tampa, for Appellant. T. Shane DeBoard, Orlando, for Appellee. Mary L. Wakeman, of Heuler-Wakeman Law Group, P.L., Tallahassee, Amicus Curiae for The Academy of Florida Elder Law Attorneys, in support of Appellee.
Matthew J. Conigliaro, of Carlton Fields, P.A., Tampa, for Appellant.
T. Shane DeBoard, Orlando, for Appellee.
Mary L. Wakeman, of Heuler-Wakeman Law Group, P.L., Tallahassee, Amicus Curiae for The Academy of Florida Elder Law Attorneys, in support of Appellee.
PER CURIAM.
Appellant, J.N., appeals the Department of Children and Families' (the "Department") order imposing a penalty that denied Medicaid Institutional Care Program ("Medicaid ICP") benefits to Appellant from November 2017 through September 2018, based on its determination that Appellant transferred $100,000 to Coastal Income Properties–Zachary Taylor, LLC ("Coastal") in exchange for an interest in Coastal for less than fair market value for the sole purpose of attempting to become eligible for the Medicaid ICP. We affirm.
J.N. conceded below and on appeal that she invested in Coastal for the sole purpose of becoming eligible for Medicaid. However, she argues, inter alia , that she nevertheless remains eligible for medical assistance because she intended to receive fair market value for her investment. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(c)(2)(C) ; Fla. Admin. Code R. 65A-1.712(3). We disagree because the hearing officer's conclusion to the contrary is supported by substantial, competent evidence.
The record evidence is undisputed that J.N. is prohibited from transferring or selling any of her interest in Coastal. Nor can J.N. borrow against her interest. While J.N. receives $333.33 in monthly interest payments, the parties agree that her remaining life expectancy at the time of the investment was only 5.87 years. Fla. Admin. Code R. 65A-1.712(3)(b), 65A-1.716. Therefore, the record conclusively establishes that J.N. will not receive fair market value from this modest monthly interest payment, by itself, given her life expectancy.
Importantly, J.N. also has no right to a return of her investment within her lifetime. In the proceeding below, J.N. was co-represented by Aaron Ray, who is also an agent of Coastal. During his testimony, Mr. Ray took the position that J.N. will receive her investment back upon "maturity," which is within five to seven years, and J.N.'s counsel maintains this position on appeal. This argument is disingenuous.
Indeed, the investment's governing documents expressly provide that "maturity" is at the sole discretion of the managers. The five to seven-year window is, in essence, no more than an aspirational goal or estimation that can be changed or ignored by Coastal's managers without recourse for J.N. In short, the governing documents allow Coastal to keep J.N.'s investment until her death and provide no right for J.N. to recover the investment during her lifetime.
Accordingly, based upon the record evidence and all permissible inferences, the Department's conclusion that J.N. transferred $100,000 in cash to Coastal but did not intend to do so in exchange for fair market value was supported by substantial, competent evidence.
AFFIRMED.
ORFINGER, EISNAUGLE, and TRAVER, JJ., concur.