Opinion
No. CV03 0283697-S
April 20, 2004
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION
This is an appeal from a decision of the planning zoning commission of the town of Hamden denying plaintiff's application for site plan approval of an indoor storage facility. The plaintiff, JMM Properties, LLC (JMM), is the owner of property known as 785 Sherman Avenue, Hamden, Connecticut. On November 25, 2002, JMM submitted an application for site plan approval with the defendant, the planning zoning commission of the town of Hamden (the Commission). The application sought the Commission's approval to convert an existing building on the property into an indoor self-storage facility. The property is located within the town of Hamden's manufacturing district, M-1 District. Section 552.1 of the zoning regulations of the town of Hamden provides that "warehousing and wholesaling with indoor storage" are uses permitted by right in the M-1 District. There is no dispute that the commission had previously interpreted § 552.1 of the regulations to allow self-storage in the M-1 District. There is also evidence in the record that, prior to JMM's instant application, the Commission had changed its interpretation and decided that self-storage was not a permitted use under § 552.1. Letter of Town Planner dated January 24, 2003. (ROR 42.) See, 1315 Hamden, LLC v. Town of Hamden Planning and Zoning Commission, Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven at New Haven, No. CV 02-0471309S (August 11, 2003, Radcliffe, J.) ( 35 Conn. L. Rptr. 316) ("Land use agencies in the Town of Hamden, prior to May 14, 2002, consistently interpreted the provisions of § 552.1 to include self-storage, within the language of `warehousing and wholesaling with indoor storage'").
The Commission held a public meeting with respect to JMM's application for site plan approval for "indoor storage" on January 28, 2003. The Commission denied the application for the reasons that "it is not a manufacturing use and the prior ruling established this zone for the purpose of industrial related business." The record also reflects that the Commission considered "self-storage" to involve storage of items for individual personal use and "warehousing" to involve storage of items for resale of wholesale and retail goods. Notice of the Commission's decision was published on February 2, 2003. By complaint dated February 10, 2003, JMM appealed from the denial of its application for site plan approval to this court. I find that JMM is aggrieved by the ruling of the Commission on JMM's site plan.
A zoning commission's authority in ruling on a site plan is limited. A site plan is "filed with a zoning commission or other municipal agency or official to determine the conformity of a proposed building, use or structure with specific provisions of the zoning regulations." R. Fuller, 9 Connecticut Practice Series: Land Use Law and Practice (2d Ed. 1999) § 2.2, p. 18. "In ruling upon a site plan application, the planning commission acts in its ministerial capacity, rather than its quasi-judicial or legislative capacity. It is given no independent discretion beyond determining whether the plan complies with the applicable regulations." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Berlin Batting Cages, Inc. v. Planning Zoning Commission, 76 Conn. App. 199, 221, 821 A.2d 269 (2003).
"Generally, it is the function of a zoning board or commission to decide within prescribed limits and consistent with the exercise of [its] legal discretion whether a particular section of the zoning regulations applies to a given situation and the manner in which it does apply . . . In applying the law to the facts of a particular case, the board is endowed with a liberal discretion, and its decision will not be disturbed unless it is found to be unreasonable, arbitrary or illegal." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Spero v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 217 Conn. 435, 440, 586 A.2d 590 (1991); see also Irwin v. Planning Zoning Commission, 244 Conn. 619, 627-28, 711 A.2d 675 (1998).
"The burden of proof to demonstrate that the board acted improperly is upon the party seeking to overturn the board's decision." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Pleasant View Farms Development, Inc. v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 218 Conn. 265, 269-70, 588 A.2d 1372 (1991).
JMM argues that the Commission could not ignore its prior interpretations of the zoning laws when considering JMM's application, in particular that "self-storage" was a permitted use in the M-1 District pursuant to § 552.1. The Commission rightly argues, however, that the germane question is not how § 552.1 was interpreted in the past, but rather what the correct interpretation is at present. Generally, it is the function of a zoning commission to decide whether a particular section of the zoning regulations applies to a given factual situation. Double I Limited Partnership v. Plan Zoning Commission, 218 Conn. 65, 72, 588 A.2d 624 (1991); Schwartz v. Planning Zoning Commission, 208 Conn. 146, 152, 543 A.2d 1339 (1988). This court must decide whether the Commission correctly interpreted § 552.1 of the regulations and must determine if the commission's interpretation goes beyond the fair import of the language of the regulations. See JM Realty Co. v. Board of Zoning Appeals, 161 Conn. 229, 233, 286 A.2d 317 (1971). It is for the trial court to determine whether the commission correctly interpreted the section. Id. Thus, it is for this trial court to determine whether the commission has correctly interpreted its regulations and applied them with reasonable discretion to the facts. Pascale v. Board of Zoning Appeals, 150 Conn. 113, 117, 186 A.2d 377 (1962).
The Commission's prior interpretation of the regulation and its change in interpretation, however, are not without significance in making that determination because they bear on issues of whether the regulation is ambiguous and whether the Commission's decision is arbitrary. The following principles are pertinent to deciding this appeal:
"`Ambiguous'" . . . has often been defined to mean that which is susceptible of more than one interpretation. See, e.g., Continental Casualty Co. v. Borthwick, 177 So.2d 687, 690 (Fla.App. 1965) (of uncertain meaning and that which may be fairly understood in more ways than one) . . ." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Lopinto v. Haines, 185 Conn. 527, 538, 44 A.2d 151 (1981).
Where a regulation is capable of two constructions, courts adopt "the one that renders the enactment effective and workable and reject any that might lead to unreasonable or bizarre results." Planning Zoning Commission v. Gilbert, 208 Conn. 696, 706, 543 A.2d 826 (1988); see also State v. Williams, 206 Conn. 203, 210, 536 A.2d 583 (1988).
Furthermore, when more than one interpretation of the language in a regulation is possible, "restrictions upon the use of land are not to be extended by implication . . . [D]oubtful language will be construed against, rather than in favor of, a restriction." Farrior v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 70 Conn. App. 86, 90, 796 A.2d 1262 (2002). "The practical construction placed over the years upon ambiguous language in legislation by those charged with its administration becomes weighty evidence of what the law is." Clark v. Town Council, 145 Conn. 476, 485, 144 A.2d 327 (1958); McDonald's System, Inc. v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 28 Conn. Sup. 181, 186, 225 A.2d 862 (1968).
The Commission claims that its interpretation of § 552.1 was reasonable and should be accorded great deference by the court. It argues that "[a]lthough prior Commissions may have interpreted this provision to allow for self-storage facilities, the present Commission's interpretation is support[ed] [by the] clear and unambiguous language of the regulation." The problem with this argument is that the Commission's changing interpretation of § 552.1 does not connote clear and unambiguous language. The Commission contends that although the plaintiff's proposal could arguably be considered warehousing, the proposed activity must include both "warehousing" and "wholesaling" to come within the meaning of § 552.1 because the regulation uses the conjunctive word "and" between warehousing and wholesaling. Such an interpretation is not supported as reasonable when the regulation is viewed as a whole. Other uses permitted by right contain the conjunctive but it would be contrary to reason and experience to interpret the regulations to require that one of those uses must be conducted with the other. For instance, "Radio and TV Stations" are permitted as of right in the M-1 District.
The Commission also argues that since the M-1 District is a manufacturing district, the "warehousing/wholesaling envisioned in the zoning regulations presumably would be in conjunction with manufacturing and would not be a stand-alone use totally unrelated to any manufacturing use. Under the regulations, however, `[t]he purpose of the Manufacturing M-1 District is to provide for a broad range of industrial and commercial uses in an open setting that will not have environmentally objectionable influences on adjoining residential and business districts.'" Use of property in the M-1 District to afford warehouse or storage space for hire, whether related or unrelated to manufacturing, is a commercial use consistent with the stated purpose of the regulations. Moreover, the regulations permit by right other uses which are neither industrial nor related to manufacturing. They include office buildings, business schools, TV and radio stations, and computer and data processing centers. Manufacturing is listed as a separate permitted use. Section 552.1. Uses permitted by Right. Thus, the reasons stated by the Commission for denying the site application for indoor self-storage — "it is not a manufacturing use and [not] for the purpose of industrial related business" — are not based on a fair and reasonable reading of the regulations pertaining to permitted uses in the M1 District and are not valid reasons for denying JMM's application for site plan approval.
This, however, does not end the inquiry as to whether self-storage falls within the meaning of "warehousing." At the public hearing that took place on January 28, 2003, the Commission made a distinction between the definition of "warehousing" and "self-storage." According to them, warehousing involves the resale and wholesale of retail goods, while self-storage is for individual personal use. The term "self-storage" is not mentioned in the regulations and the term "warehousing" is not defined in the regulations. The Connecticut Supreme Court has stated that the term "warehouse," as used in the law, "ordinarily means a building for the reception and keeping of goods and, in a more restricted sense, a building where goods of others are stored for hire." Fisher v. Board of Zoning, 143 Conn. 358, 363, 122 A.2d 729 (1956). It is a place where others pay to store and keep goods. This would clearly encompass the common definition of "self-storage," which is "of relating to, or being a commercial facility where customers can rent space to store possessions: a self-storage warehouse." (Emphasis in original.) The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language (4th Ed. 2000). It is beyond the plain meaning of the term "warehouse" to suggest that it excludes a place where goods are stored for private or personal use and only applies to a place where goods are stored for resale or commercial use. Even if that were so, the record reflects that self-storage units are used by commercial entities such as pharmaceutical companies, antiques dealers, landscapers and are used by professionals for document storage. (ROR 45 and 56.) When analyzed further, the distinction between storage of personal items and business items is an arbitrary and meaningless one. A retired couple having downsized and using "self storage units" to store their antiques for resale is hardly distinguishable from an antique dealer storing items for resale. It is a distinction that is illogical and unworkable. Courts should reject interpretations of statutes (and regulations) that produce bizarre or illogical results. See State v. Uretek, Inc., 207 Conn. 706, 719, 543 A.2d 709 (1988). Additionally, zoning regulations, which are in derogation of common-law property rights, should not be construed to include or exclude by implication matters that are not clearly within their expressed terms. Planning Zoning Commission v. Gilbert, supra, 208 Conn. 705. The term "self-storage" does not appear in the regulations of the town of Hamden and the regulations should not be construed to exclude that use unless expressed. "Where more than one interpretation of language is permissible, restrictions upon the use of lands are not to be extended by implication . . . doubtful language will be construed against rather than in favor of a [restriction]." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Daughters of St. Paul, Inc. v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 17 Conn. App. 53, 66, 549 A.2d 1076 (1988), quoting Basset v. Pepe, 94 Conn. 631, 637, 110 A. 56 (1920).
While a local zoning commission, "is in the most advantageous position to interpret its own regulations and apply them to situations before it . . . [t]he court is not bound by the legal interpretation of the ordinance by the [commission]." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Doyen v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 67 Conn. App. 597, 603, 789 A.2d 478, cert. denied, 260 Conn. 901, 793 A.2d 1088 (2002). A zoning commission acts arbitrarily and unreasonably when it interprets the applicable regulatory language in a manner that is contrary to the natural and usual meaning of its terms. See Farrior v. Zoning Board of Appeals, supra, 70 Conn. App. 95 (overturning a zoning board's decision that "motor homes" were included in the zoning regulations' prohibition of "mobile homes"). Zoning regulations, which are in derogation of common-law property rights, should not be construed to include or exclude by implication matters that are not clearly within their expressed terms. Planning Zoning Commission v. Gilbert, supra, 208 Conn. 705.
In Concord Food Festival, Inc. v. Planning Zoning Commission, Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford-New Britain at West Hartford, Docket No. CV 920506080 (March 24, 1993, Scheinblum, J.), the plaintiff was denied a special use permit to sell liquor based on the defendant's reinterpretation of its zoning regulations. The court held that a denial of the plaintiff's similar application was arbitrary and an abuse of discretion because it "has lead to the bizarre result of permitting only some restaurants with identical service styles to serve beer and wine, while permitting others from doing the same." Concord Food Festival, Inc. v. Planning Zoning Commission, supra, Superior Court, Docket No. CV 92 0506080. In the present case, the Commission's denial of JMM's site application leads to the bizarre result that some self-storage facilities are allowed by right in the M-1 zoning district, while other self-storage facilities, including JMM's, are prohibited. See Id.; see also Hardisty v. Woodbury Zoning Commission, Superior Court, judicial district of Waterbury, Docket No. CV 95 0128499 (May 2, 1996, Flynn, J.) ( 17 Conn. L. Rptr. 108, 109) (noting that when a zoning board "departs from a settled interpretation of [an] ordinance it used in other similar applications it might indicate an arbitrary exercise of authority").
The Commission, in denying JMM's application for site plan approval, failed to correctly interpret § 552.1 of the zoning regulations and failed to apply that section in a consistent and reasonable manner to the facts and circumstances of the application. The decision of the Commission was not legal and was arbitrary.
For the reasons expressed above, JMM's appeal is sustained.
BY THE COURT
Tanzer, Judge.