Opinion
Case No. 20040322-CA.
Filed January 27, 2005. (Not For Official Publication).
Appeal from the Third District Juvenile, Salt Lake Department, The Honorable Charles D. Behrens.
Steven C. Russell, Salt Lake City, for Appellant.
Mark L. Shurtleff and Carol L. Verdoia, Salt Lake City, for Appellee.
Martha Pierce and Felipe E. Rivera, Salt Lake City, Guardians Ad Litem.
Before Judges Billings, Greenwood, and Jackson.
MEMORANDUM DECISION
Mother appeals the termination of her parental rights to four of her children, B.W., J.W., K.W., and K.K. She contends that first, the juvenile court failed to expressly consider all required statutory factors in its decree and second, the evidence is legally insufficient to establish that the best interests of the children are served by termination. We affirm.
Reviewing a juvenile court's application of the parental rights termination statute presents a mixed question of law and fact. "We review the juvenile court's findings for clear error and its conclusions of law for correctness, affording the court `some discretion in applying the law to the facts.'" In re G.B., 2002 UT App 270, ¶ 11, 53 P.3d 963 (quoting In re C.B., 1999 UT App 293, ¶ 5, 989 P.2d 76).
The State and guardian ad litem both argue that Mother failed to preserve her contention regarding the adequacy of the court's findings. But even if we assume she had preserved the issue, we would conclude that the juvenile court's findings are adequate. In essence, Mother claims that the juvenile court failed to address the factors outlined in Utah Code section 78-3a-409. See Utah Code Ann. § 78-3a-409(1) (2002). This section requires the court to consider (a) "the physical, mental, or emotional condition and needs of the child and his desires regarding the termination" and (b) "the effort the parent . . . [has] made to adjust their circumstances, conduct, or conditions to make it in the child's best interest to return to him to his home after a reasonable length of time." Id. When, as here, a juvenile court does not expressly refer to the statute in its findings, a court's conclusions with regard to the statutory considerations are sufficient when "it is clear from the detailed findings that the court did consider the requirements set forth in this section when making its final determination." In re G.B., 2002 UT App 270 at ¶ 22; see also In re S.T., 928 P.2d 393, 400 (Utah Ct.App. 1996) ("While the juvenile court did not expressly refer to the statute when considering [the section 78-3a-409] factors, the court's findings are replete with detailed discussion of the offered services, the children's conditions and needs, and appellant's efforts. Thus, the juvenile court properly considered each statutory factor prior to terminating appellants' parental rights.").
Under the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, which apply to parental termination cases, see Utah R. Juv. P. 2(a), a party may raise its objection to a trial court's findings in several ways, including (1) moving to amend the findings within ten days after the judgment, see Utah R. Civ. P. 52(b); (2) moving for a new trial or additional findings for insufficiency of the evidence, see Utah R. Civ. P. 59(a)(6); or (3) moving for relief from judgment, see Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b)(6). Appellant failed to pursue any of these remedies.
Here, the juvenile court did not cite to Utah Code section 78-3a-409 in its decree, but it did provide detailed findings regarding the needs of the children and Mother's efforts to rehabilitate the situation. The court reviewed the present circumstances of each child and found that it was in their best interest "to be adopted where they will be secure, stable, and protected from further abuse and neglect and where [their] physical and emotional needs are being met." The court also found that, although Mother had made some progress in therapy in the last month, she would not be able to change the atmosphere in a reasonable amount of time due, in part, to her history of resistence to intervention, mental illness, and disputes with her ex-husbands and the Division of Child and Family Services (DCFS). These findings suffice to indicate that the court weighed the section 78-3a-409 considerations.
Similarly, we conclude that the evidence described by the trial court is legally sufficient to warrant termination. Again, although we review the juvenile court's conclusions for correctness, we still afford it "`some discretion in applying the law to the facts.'" In re G.B., 2002 UT App 270 at ¶ 11 (quoting In re C.B., 1999 UT App 293 at ¶ 5). The juvenile court found that the children are in need of a stable home but "have been removed from the custody of their mother on three occasions" due to "inappropriate parenting, inappropriate discipline, the children's safety and the mother's mental health issues" which "le[d] to an atmosphere of chaos in the mother's home." Based on these findings, its determination that termination is in the children's best interests is supported by "clear and convincing evidence." Utah Code Ann. § 78-3a-406(3).
Mother frames this issue as a question of law, but to the extent that she challenges the factual basis of the court's findings, we note that such a challenge would fail. As a procedural matter, she has not properly marshaled the evidence.See In re S.L., 1999 UT App 390, ¶ 20, 995 P.2d 17 ("[A] party challenging the juvenile court's findings must marshal the evidence in support of those findings, and then show that the marshaled evidence is insufficient, as a matter of law, to support the findings."). Moreover, even if she had marshaled the evidence, "`[f]indings of fact in a parental rights termination proceeding are overturned only if they are clearly erroneous.'"In re G.B., 2002 UT App 270, ¶ 9, 53 P.3d 963 (citation omitted). Based on the court's evidence, summarized above, we cannot conclude the court has clearly erred in its determination.
The facts emphasized by Mother do little to change this result. Mother relies on the testimony of various therapists that indicate (a) Mother has been keeping her therapy appointments and appears to be making some improvement, and (b) the children have expressed that they need their mother. One DCFS social worker testified that the children have not shown marked improvement since being taken from Mother. However, in light of the court's findings and Mother's long history of neglect and abuse, her facts do little to counter the weight of evidence detailed by the court. Further, the value of Mother's evidence is reduced because the witnesses upon whom she relies also indicated that it was not safe to return the children to Mother and that the possibility of a return in the future depended largely on the long-term success of Mother's therapy.
In sum, we conclude that the juvenile court did not err in applying the termination statute to the facts of the case and that it adequately described its analysis in its findings. Accordingly, we affirm.
WE CONCUR: Judith M. Billings, Presiding Judge, Pamela T. Greenwood, Judge.