Opinion
NO. 5-17-0243
12-08-2017
In re ADOPTION OF J.J.S., a Minor (J.J.S., Susan Miller, and Brandon Miller, Petitioners-Appellees, v. Chad Stanford, Respondent-Appellant).
NOTICE
Decision filed 12/08/17. The text of this decision may be changed or corrected prior to the filing of a Petition for Rehearing or the disposition of the same.
NOTICE
This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and may not be cited as precedent by any party except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1). Appeal from the Circuit Court of Washington County. No. 16-AD-10 Honorable Daniel J. Emge, Judge, presiding. JUSTICE WELCH delivered the judgment of the court.
Presiding Justice Barberis and Justice Overstreet concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶ 1 Held: The circuit court's order is affirmed where the court's finding that the respondent father was an unfit parent was proven by clear and convincing evidence and the court's finding that it was in the best interests of the child that his parental rights be terminated was proven by a preponderance of the evidence. ¶ 2 The respondent biological father, Chad Stanford (Chad), appeals the judgment of the circuit court of Washington County finding that (1) he was an unfit parent pursuant to factors (b), (c), and (n) in section 1(D) of the Adoption Act (750 ILCS 50/1(D)(b), (c), (n) (West 2016)) and that (2) it was in the best interest of the child that his parental rights be 2 terminated pursuant to the factors set out in section 1-3(4.05) of the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 (Juvenile Court Act) (705 ILCS 405/1-3(4.05) (West 2016)). On appeal, Chad argues that the trial court erred in finding by clear and convincing evidence that he was an unfit parent and in finding by the preponderance of the evidence that it was in the best interest of the child that his parental rights be terminated. For the following reasons, we affirm. ¶ 3 The petitioners, Suzan Miller (Suzan) and Brandon Miller (Brandon), filed a petition for adoption of the minor child, J.S., on February 24, 2016. J.S., born September 24, 2006, is the biological son of Suzan and Chad. Brandon is Suzan's husband and J.S.'s stepfather. The petition alleged that Chad was an unfit parent and that it was in J.S.'s best interest that the petition for adoption be granted. ¶ 4 On April 8, 2016, Chad filed a pro se response to the petition for adoption, requesting that the court not proceed with the adoption, not terminate his parental rights, and award Chad visitation rights with J.S. The response also indicated that Chad wished to continue paying child support for J.S., as previously ordered in Clinton County. ¶ 5 The parties appeared for a hearing on May 6, 2016. After determining that Chad was indigent, the court appointed counsel to represent him in the matter. The court also appointed Marsha Holzhauer to act as the guardian ad litem (GAL) for J.S. ¶ 6 On October 11, 2016, and November 1, 2016, the trial court conducted a hearing to determine if Chad was an unfit parent as alleged by the petitioners. The following evidence was presented. 3 ¶ 7 Suzan and Chad began a relationship in 2002 or 2003. The parties resided together until J.S. was approximately 16 months old. At that time, Suzan began a relationship with Brandon, and Chad kicked Suzan out of his home. Suzan and J.S. moved in with her parents on Krupp Lane in Centralia, Illinois, for a year; they then moved to Condit Street in Centralia, across the street from Suzan's sister. Suzan and J.S. returned to Suzan's parents' home shortly thereafter and stayed for four or five months; they then moved to Sandoval, Illinois, and resided there for five or six years. Suzan testified that Chad was aware of where she was living at all times. ¶ 8 Suzan testified that she sought an order of protection against Chad in 2007, and a final plenary order of protection was entered on January 2, 2008. She stated that Chad was ordered to stay away from her but was given visitation with J.S. every weekend from noon on Saturday until noon on Sunday at the home of Joe and Vickie Stanford, Chad's parents. Transportation was to be provided by the Stanfords. However, a month or two after the order of protection was entered, Suzan requested that it be vacated so that Chad could have a more active role in J.S.'s life. Suzan testified that Chad only exercised his visitation once during that time period. ¶ 9 At some point during Suzan and J.S.'s time on Condit Street, Brandon moved in with them. Suzan married Brandon in 2008, and Brandon has resided with Suzan and J.S. since that time. Suzan testified that Chad has not had any contact with J.S. since 4 2008, and Chad has never contacted her asking to see J.S. She stated that in the past seven to eight years, she has sent written invitations to the Stanfords' house for J.S.'s birthday parties but neither Chad nor his parents attended; J.S. did not receive birthday cards, Christmas gifts, or phone calls from Chad. She testified that J.S. has been involved in school activities such as track and basketball, but Chad has never attended any events, contacted the school, or been to parent-teacher conferences. Suzan stated that her relationship with Chad was "horrible" and that she had not spoken to him since J.S. was two years old. However, she noted that she has never told Chad that he cannot visit J.S. and that he "was more than welcome to have something to do with his son, but that was his choice that he didn't." ¶ 10 On January 8, 2009, the Illinois Department of Healthcare and Family Services filed a complaint for support. On May 15, 2009, a uniform order for support was entered in that case, setting Chad's child support obligation at $50 per month. Suzan testified that the State required her to file the complaint, telling her that if she did not comply, "they would take [J.S.]'s medical card away from him." To date, all of Chad's child support payments have been made by Chad or by someone on his behalf. ¶ 11 Chad testified that he was 34 years old and had completed a general equivalency degree (GED). He has been unemployed since 2001 and paid his child support by picking up cans, mowing grass, or having others pay the child support for him. He 5 testified that he was in a wreck five years ago and "never paid in enough to get disability" so he has not pursued a job since then. From 2001 until the wreck, he "just did odds and ends jobs" and drove his girlfriend to work. ¶ 12 Chad stated that his relationship with Suzan had not been good since they broke up and that Suzan has been hiding J.S. from him because she did not want him in J.S.'s life. He testified that Suzan did not keep him informed of where J.S. had been living and that when he attempted to have contact with J.S., he was denied. He testified that he exercised the visitation he received pursuant to the order of protection while it was in effect and that he had some visitation after the order was vacated. He stated that he last visited J.S. in 2009, when they went to a park in Salem, Illinois. He agreed, however, that he has had no contact with J.S. in the last five years, because "[a]ny time I attempted to try I was denied or it turned out to be an argument." He felt that it was better for J.S. not to see them fight. He testified that he never filed a petition for visitation in the Clinton County support order case because he was told that he would need an attorney, and he did not have enough money to hire an attorney. He stated that when he found out he would have to defend against the petition for adoption in this case, he contacted Land of Lincoln but was told that there was a conflict of interest in representing him because they had represented Suzan in the past. ¶ 13 Chad testified that sometime in 2011 or 2012, he received a settlement of approximately $5000 and wanted to buy J.S. some clothes and shoes with the money. Chad went unannounced to Suzan's residence in Sandoval to do so, but "[Suzan] had one of her cousins come out and run me off the property." In response to the GAL's 6 questioning, Chad agreed that the GAL had been by his house three or four times and asked him to call her. She reminded him that approximately one week before the hearing, she asked Chad's father to have Chad call her. He agreed that while he had called at one time and left a message, he did not respond to her most recent request for him to call her. ¶ 14 Brandon testified that he is a 34-year-old truck driver and that he lives with Suzan, J.S., and his child from his previous marriage in Richview, Illinois. He stated that Chad was "nothing but drama" and was "always drunk and always wanting to pick a fight." He testified that on September 28, 2011, he mailed Chad a letter in regard to his relationship with J.S. In this letter, Brandon told Chad that as long as he did not put J.S. and Suzan in harm's way, and Brandon was present to supervise, Chad would be permitted to visit J.S., and they could begin to build trust. Brandon testified that he did not want Chad to have visitation without him present because of Chad's past behavior. He stated that Chad has never contacted him to ask about visitation with J.S. ¶ 15 Vickie Stanford (Vickie) testified that she is Chad's mother and J.S.'s grandmother. She stated that in the last six months before the hearing, Suzan would not let Chad see J.S. She stated that she, her husband, Joe, and Chad sent J.S. a birthday card every year from 2008 to 2014. She asserted that she never received any invitations from Suzan inviting her to J.S.'s birthday parties. 7 ¶ 16 The witnesses all testified regarding an incident that occurred in January 2016. Suzan and Brandon went to Vickie's home, where Chad lived. Suzan testified that she went over to ensure that Chad was currently living there because she planned to serve him with the adoption petition and to tell him that she no longer wanted his child support payments. Suzan agreed that the State would not let her drop her current State insurance coverage because of Chad's child support payments, but if the child support payments were dropped, she and J.S. would be able to get insurance through Brandon's work plan. Suzan and Brandon testified that Chad came outside with a shotgun; Chad testified that he came outside but did not have a gun. Suzan and Brandon testified that Joe Stanford came outside and bounced his chest off of the front of their truck while they were leaving; Chad testified that his father was attempting to leave for work, and Suzan bumped him with her truck. ¶ 17 The trial court heard arguments from the parties and took the matter under advisement. In a November 18, 2016, written order, the court found that Chad was an unfit parent based upon (1) his failure to maintain a reasonable degree of interest, concern or responsibility as to the child's welfare; (2) desertion of the child for more than three months preceding the commencement of fitness proceeding; and/or (3) evidence of an intent to forgo his parental rights as manifested by his failure to visit the child for a period of 12 months. ¶ 18 In regard to Chad's failure to maintain a reasonable degree of interest, concern or responsibility as to J.S.'s welfare, the court stated that it was undisputed that Chad has made no effort to see or communicate with J.S. in over five years. The court rejected 8 Chad's claim that his lack of interest should be excused because he is young, uneducated, poor, and Suzan created impediments to his relationship with J.S. The court noted that Chad was not disabled or otherwise unable to maintain employment, and even if Chad had no money, he would have had no travel expenses in going to see his son who lived in the same town as him for five to six years prior to June 2015. Though Chad asserted that Suzan hid J.S. from him, the court concluded that "[i]t would be virtually impossible for Chad, a lifelong resident of Sandoval, to be unaware that his ex and son were also living in the same small town as him." This claim was also inconsistent with Suzan and Brandon's testimony that Chad would be allowed to see J.S. as long as Brandon was present to supervise. The court also noted that Chad did not petition the court in Clinton County for visitation, and "[e]ven if one were to buy Chad's story that he believed he needed to hire an attorney to petition the court and he could not afford an attorney, he could afford one after receiving his $5,000 settlement and he still failed to do so." The court also found unpersuasive Chad's argument that he did not want to subject J.S. to the parties' volatile relationship, as visits could have been arranged so that Chad and Suzan did not have contact. The evidence also indicated that the effort to send J.S. birthday cards was made by Chad's mother, not Chad. Finally, the court noted that the only "interest" Chad has shown in J.S. for well over five years was his nominal payment of $50 in child support. The court concluded that, even if the court were to agree that Chad's payments maintained a reasonable degree of financial responsibility, the statute "is disjunctive in that a parent is unfit if they have failed to maintain a reasonable degree of interest, concern or responsibility as to a minor's welfare." (Emphasis in original.) 9 The court found by clear and convincing evidence that Chad was an unfit parent on these grounds. ¶ 19 As to desertion, the court stated that the relevant time period was the three months preceding the filing of the adoption petition, which was November 24, 2015, through February 24, 2016. The court reiterated that Chad last made an effort to contact J.S. in 2011, has not visited him since 2009, did not petition any court for visitation, and did not request visitation from Suzan. The court stated that the only thing that Chad has done for J.S. in the past five years is pay $50 per month in child support, which "is a parental duty and has nothing to do with custody." The court found that "it is obvious that Chad's conduct from November 2015 through the filing of the adoption petition, as well as for years prior to that timeframe, indicated his intention to permanently terminate custody of J.S. but not to relinquish all of his parental duties and claims." The court found by clear and convincing evidence that Chad was an unfit parent on these grounds. ¶ 20 Finally, as to Chad's intent to forgo his parental rights as manifested by his failure to visit J.S. for a period of 12 months from the date of the last visit or communication between the parent and the child, the court found that it was undisputed that Chad had zero contact with J.S. for 12 months after the date of his last visitation with J.S., in 2009. Despite Chad's claims of impediments to his relationship with J.S. from Brandon and Suzan, the court noted that none of these impediments occurred within 12 months of the last visitation; further, the September 28, 2011, letter from Brandon to Chad did not preclude Chad from visiting J.S.—it only stated that if there was visitation, it would 10 occur in Brandon's presence. The court found by clear and convincing evidence that Chad was an unfit parent on these grounds. ¶ 21 On January 10, 2017, and on February 2, 2017, the parties appeared for a hearing to determine if it was in J.S.'s best interests that Chad's parental rights be terminated. The court also conducted an in camera interview with J.S. on January 10, 2017, to determine his wishes. The following evidence was presented. ¶ 22 Suzan testified that she lives with Brandon, J.S., and their two other children. She is not employed outside the home. Brandon is employed as a truck driver and supports Suzan and the children. Both her mother and Brandon's mother and stepfather live within 10 minutes of her residence. ¶ 23 Suzan testified that J.S. is in fourth grade at Irvington Grade School. She stated that he has friends at school and is doing well academically. J.S. has been involved in track, basketball, and youth wrestling. Suzan noted that she and Brandon attended J.S.'s sporting events, but Chad has not been to any of them. J.S.'s basketball jersey had the name "Miller" printed on the back. She agreed that everyone in their household's last name is Miller except for J.S. ¶ 24 Suzan testified that J.S. has called Brandon "Dad" since he was 18 months old. She stated that they do many things together, such as fishing and shooting, and that the family goes camping every weekend in the summer. She noted that the family celebrates holidays with both her and Brandon's extended families. ¶ 25 Brandon Miller testified that J.S. calls him "Dad" and that they do many things together, such as mushroom hunting, shooting, fishing, camping, and four-wheeling. He 11 agreed that he attends J.S.'s athletic events and helps him with his homework. He testified that they live in a four-bedroom, one-bathroom house with a garage. Brandon stated that J.S. shares a bedroom with his half-brother, Brandon's child from a previous marriage. Brandon agreed that he treats J.S. the same as he treats the other children. ¶ 26 The GAL, Marsha Holzhauer, testified that when she is appointed to a case, she generally tries to go unannounced to homes so that she can get a true picture of what is going on in the child's life. She agreed that she had previously been the GAL in a proceeding with another one of Brandon's children in a previous case in Marion County. She stated that she has been the GAL for all abuse and neglect cases in Marion County for the last 10 years and did not remember the child until she saw him. ¶ 27 In this case, the GAL made an unannounced visit to J.S.'s home. She described it as a noisy and active household with lots of room to play. She testified that she stayed for approximately 45 minutes and spoke to J.S. alone in his room. She observed that he was a happy child, and he was clearly a part of the family unit. When she asked J.S. to write down his name, he wrote "[J.] Miller." She testified that she explained the adoption in "kid language," and he seemed to understand the concept, though she could not recall the specific language she used. She reported that J.S. seemed comfortable with Brandon. J.S. told her that he sees Brandon as his dad and wants Brandon to be his dad. She stated that J.S. told her that he had no desire to see Chad. ¶ 28 The GAL testified that she spoke with J.S. one other time, when she ran into him at a Halloween parade in Centralia. She stated that J.S. approached her to give her a hug and to tell her that he wanted to be adopted. 12 ¶ 29 The GAL testified that she had attempted to meet with Chad on three separate occasions by going to his home. She stated that, at the next court date, when she told Chad that she had been by three times, he told her to knock on the side door next time. She testified that she did return to do that one day, and Chad's father told her that Chad was out fishing. She gave Chad's father her card and told him, "have [Chad] be sure and call me." She testified that Chad never called her after that exchange, and she has never interviewed him. ¶ 30 The GAL recommended to the court that it was in J.S.'s best interests that Chad's parental rights be terminated and that Brandon be allowed to adopt J.S. She agreed that one of her reasons for this recommendation was that Chad has had no contact with J.S. in over five years, which is more than half of the child's life. ¶ 31 The court conducted an in camera interview with J.S. The court reviewed the difference between a truth and a lie with J.S., and J.S. indicated that he understood the difference and that he would tell the truth. The court explained the termination and adoption proceedings to J.S., and J.S. indicated that he understood that if the adoption proceeded, Chad would no longer have parental rights, and Brandon would be his legal father, not just the person with whom he lives. J.S. stated that, "[Chad] could visit me, I will run away." ¶ 32 The court explained J.S.'s options. The court explained that the first option was that the adoption did not take place; Chad would continue to be J.S.'s legal dad, and while J.S. would continue to live with his mom and Brandon, Brandon would remain his stepfather. The court explained that the second option was that Chad's rights to J.S. are 13 terminated, and he would no longer be J.S.'s legal father; J.S. would continue to live with his mom and Brandon, and Brandon would adopt J.S. J.S. was at first confused by this explanation, but the court again laid out the two options. J.S. responded that he wanted the second option. The court asked again if J.S.'s wishes were that Chad's rights were terminated, and J.S. responded affirmatively. The court asked again if J.S.'s wishes were that he be adopted by Brandon, and J.S. responded, "yes." J.S. stated that he was not forced into his decision and that he wanted his last name to be Miller like everyone else in his household. ¶ 33 Chad testified that he is 35 years old and lives in Sandoval, Illinois, with his parents. He agreed that though he has not been employed since 2001 and does not currently have any income, he has always paid his child support obligation, whether the source of that support was himself or a third party. ¶ 34 Chad testified that he believed that it was in J.S.'s best interests to get to know his real father. When asked how he would go about doing that, Chad responded, "I really don't know how I would go about it other than if the family he is with now would allow me to see him." He stated that he did not believe that he needed supervised visitation and that he had never been accused of harming J.S. in any way. He believed that J.S. is well taken care of with his mother and stepfather and felt that the best place for J.S. to reside is with them because they offered a stable home environment. Chad based his belief on Facebook pictures that he had seen of J.S., noting that he could tell by the pictures "that [J.S.] is in a happy environment and a healthy home." 14 ¶ 35 Vickie testified that she is J.S.'s grandmother. She stated that she used to be close to J.S. and that she saw him every day until he was about 2½ years old. She testified that Suzan brought him over for the last time around Christmas when he was around three years old. Over the years, she would see J.S. around town with his mother and she would talk to him. She stated that she felt it was important for J.S. to have an ongoing relationship with her. ¶ 36 The trial court heard arguments from the parties and took the matter under advisement. In a November 18, 2016, written order, the court concluded that it was in J.S.'s best interests that Chad's parental rights be terminated. ¶ 37 The trial court reviewed the factors set forth in section 1-3(4.05) of the Juvenile Court Act (705 ILCS 405/1-3(4.05) (West 2016)) and found that the following factors weighed in favor of terminating Chad's parental rights: (a) the physical safety and welfare of the child, as Brandon provided financially for all of J.S.'s needs other than the $50 per month Chad contributed in the form of child support; (b) the development of the child's identity, as J.S. identified himself with the Miller family, and Brandon was the only father J.S. has ever known; (c) and (d) the child's background, ties, and sense of attachments, as all of J.S.'s background, ties, and attachments are with Brandon and Suzan because it was undisputed that Chad had made no effort to contact J.S. since 2009; (e) the child's wishes and long-term goals, as J.S. had unequivocally stated that he wanted Chad's parental rights to be terminated and to be adopted by Brandon; (f) the child's community ties, as J.S. attended Irvington Grade School, where he had friends and was involved in extracurricular activities; (g) the child's need for permanence, including the 15 child's need for stability and continuity of relationships, as Chad admitted that J.S. had a stable home life with Suzan and Brandon, the only familial relationships that J.S. knew were those with Brandon, Suzan, and their extended families, and J.S.'s relationship with Chad and his family did not exist and has not existed for over five years; and (h) the uniqueness of every family and child, as J.S. is a typical child living in a typical blended household, with the most unique aspect of the parties being that Chad had absolutely no relationship with J.S. and had not contacted him in five years. ¶ 38 The court found that factor (i), the risks attendant to entering and being in substitute care, did not apply in this case. As to factor (j), the preferences of the persons available to care for the child, the court noted that Suzan and Brandon want Chad's parental rights to be terminated and for Brandon to adopt J.S., and Chad does not want his rights terminated. The court found that the burden was on Suzan and Brandon to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that it was in J.S.'s best interests for Chad's parental rights to be terminated. The court concluded that "[e]ven though the evidence presented was not in depth, Suzan and Brandon presented enough to meet their burden of proof." ¶ 39 The court noted that though Chad believed it was in J.S.'s best interests for the two of them to develop a relationship, Chad was content to do nothing for the past five years, "and the Court finds it improbable that Chad is now ready and willing to put forth the effort required to have, much less build, a relationship with J.S." The court speculated that Chad's reason for not contacting J.S. in the last five years, his bad relationship with Suzan, was simply an excuse he came up with in hindsight, as there were a variety of 16 ways Chad could have had a relationship with J.S. without subjecting him to his and Suzan's relationship. The court noted that during Chad's absence, J.S. matured, developed an identity, and bonded with Brandon, the male figure present in his life. The court also noted that Chad's allegation, that Suzan and Brandon had an ulterior motive in filing their petition for adoption, is irrelevant if Suzan and Brandon nevertheless adequately met their burden of proof in this case. ¶ 40 The court concluded that because no relationship exists between Chad and J.S., terminating Chad's parental rights will not negatively affect any of J.S.'s current relationships, and J.S. will benefit by being able to adopt the family last name and therefore feel more completely integrated into Suzan and Brandon's family. The court found that it was in J.S.'s best interests that Chad's parental rights be terminated. ¶ 41 On March 8, 2017, Chad filed a motion to reconsider the trial court's findings, and on June 2, 2017, the court entered an order denying the motion. On June 30, 2017, Chad filed a notice of appeal. ¶ 42 On appeal, Chad argues that the trial court erred in finding by clear and convincing evidence that Chad was an unfit parent under factors (b), (c), and (n) in section 1(D) of the Adoption Act (750 ILCS 50/1(D)(b), (c), (n) (West 2016)), as Suzan and Brandon did not meet their burden of proof. He also argues that the trial court erred by finding by a preponderance of the evidence that it was in the best interest of J.S. for Chad's parental rights to be terminated. ¶ 43 Termination of parental rights proceedings are governed by the Juvenile Court Act (705 ILCS 405/1-1 et seq. (West 2016)) and the Adoption Act (750 ILCS 50/0.01 et seq. 17 (West 2016)). Termination of parental rights is a two-step process. In re Adoption of Syck, 138 Ill. 2d 255, 276 (1990). At the first stage "fitness hearing," the petitioning parent must prove by clear and convincing evidence that the respondent parent is "unfit" under one or more of the grounds of unfitness enumerated in section 1(D) of the Adoption Act (750 ILCS 50/1(D) (West 2016)), with the focus of the evidence being on the conduct of the parent. Id. at 276. If the court finds that the parent is unfit, the matter proceeds to a second hearing, at which the petitioning parent must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that termination of the respondent parent's parental rights is in the best interests of the child. Id. at 276-77. At the best-interests hearing, the focus shifts from the respondent parent to the child, and the issue becomes whether, in light of the child's needs and best interests, the respondent's parental rights should be terminated. In re D.T., 212 Ill. 2d 347, 364 (2004). ¶ 44 In reviewing a trial court's finding that there was clear and convincing evidence presented as to parental unfitness, this court will not disturb the trial court's decision unless it is against the manifest weight of the evidence. Syck, 138 Ill. 2d at 274. A finding is against the manifest weight of the evidence only if the opposite conclusion is clearly apparent or the determination is unreasonable, arbitrary, or not based on the evidence presented. In re D.F., 201 Ill. 2d 476, 498 (2002). A trial court's finding of unfitness is given great deference because it has the best opportunity to view and evaluate the parties and their testimony. In re Daphnie E., 368 Ill. App. 3d 1052, 1064 (2006). A reviewing court, therefore, does not reweigh the evidence or reassess the credibility of the witnesses. In re M.A., 325 Ill. App. 3d 387, 391 (2001). 18 ¶ 45 In this case, Suzan and Brandon asserted that Chad was an unfit parent based upon the following three grounds: (1) that under section 1(D)(b) of the Adoption Act, he failed to maintain a reasonable degree of interest, concern or responsibility as to J.S.'s welfare; (2) that under section 1(D)(c) of the Adoption Act, he deserted J.S. for more than three months next preceding the commencement of a fitness proceeding; and (3) that under section 1(D)(n) of the Adoption Act, he demonstrated evidence of an intent to forgo his parental rights as manifested by his failure for a period of 12 months to visit J.S. 750 ILCS 50/1(D)(b), (c), (n) (West 2016). The trial court determined that Chad was unfit on all three grounds. We find that the court's conclusion is not against the manifest weight of the evidence. ¶ 46 Chad notes that proof of the fact that his failure was due to circumstances beyond his control, or to impediments created by the mother, need only be proved by a preponderance of the evidence. 750 ILCS 50/1(D)(n) (West 2016). As to the allegation of his failure to maintain a reasonable degree of interest, concern or responsibility as to J.S.'s welfare, Chad argues that he met his burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence the affirmative defense that Suzan and Brandon created impediments for him in establishing contact with J.S. ¶ 47 A parent may be found unfit based on his failure to maintain a reasonable degree of interest, concern or responsibility as to the child's welfare. 750 ILCS 50/1(D)(b) (West 2016). In determining whether a parent has shown a reasonable degree of interest, concern or responsibility for a child's welfare, courts consider a parent's efforts to visit and maintain contact with the child, as well as other indicia of interest, such as inquiries 19 into the child's welfare. Syck, 138 Ill. 2d at 278-79. The interest, concern or responsibility must be objectively reasonable. In re M.J., 314 Ill App. 3d 649, 657 (2000). ¶ 48 Chad cites to Syck to note that the court must examine his conduct concerning J.S. in the context of the circumstances, including his poverty, the actions and statements of Suzan and Brandon that hindered or discouraged his visitation with J.S., and whether his failure to visit J.S. was motivated by a need to cope with other aspects of his life or by true indifference to the child. See Syck, 138 Ill. 2d at 278-79. ¶ 49 However, as the trial court noted, the evidence presented at the fitness hearing rebuts Chad's assertion that he was impeded from seeing J.S. Chad lived in the same small town as Suzan and J.S. The evidence reflects that, even if Suzan were attempting to hide J.S. from Chad as he claims, Chad knew where they were living from at least 2012 to 2015, as he testified that he went to J.S.'s residence in Sandoval to buy J.S. shoes and clothes. Further, the letter Brandon sent to Chad in 2011 stated that Brandon would allow Chad to see J.S. as long as he was present to supervise, and Suzan testified that she would have allowed Chad to be a part of J.S.'s life. ¶ 50 Even assuming arguendo that Chad was impeded from contacting J.S., we note that Syck goes on the say that "[i]f personal visits with the child are somehow impractical, letters, telephone calls, and gifts to the child *** may demonstrate a reasonable degree of concern, interest and responsibility, depending upon the content, tone, and frequency of those contacts under the circumstances. *** [A] court is to examine the parent's efforts to 20 communicate with and show interest in the child, not the success of those efforts." Syck, 138 Ill. 2d at 279. ¶ 51 Here, as the trial court noted, Chad made absolutely no effort to contact J.S. in any manner for well over five years, which is more than half of J.S.'s life. The birthday cards that Vickie testified that she sent appear to be her efforts to maintain contact with J.S., not Chad's. Chad never petitioned the court in Clinton County for visitation of his son. Though Chad claims he could not afford an attorney to advise him regarding his parental rights, no evidence was presented that Chad was physically or mentally unable to maintain employment. Even after receiving a $5000 settlement in 2011 or 2012, Chad still did not hire an attorney. His only genuine attempt at legal assistance was a phone call to Land of Lincoln after the petition for adoption was filed. Indeed, as the trial court explained, the only interest Chad has shown in J.S. during the majority of the child's lifetime is a $50 per month child support payment. Chad's maintenance of this nominal financial responsibility does not outweigh his otherwise complete failure to maintain a reasonable degree of interest, concern or responsibility as to J.S.'s welfare. The trial court's finding by clear and convincing evidence that Chad is an unfit parent pursuant to section 1(D)(b) of the Adoption Act, failure to maintain a reasonable degree of interest, concern or responsibility as to J.S.'s welfare, was not against the manifest weight of the evidence. ¶ 52 Suzan and Brandon also alleged that under section 1(D)(c) of the Adoption Act, Chad deserted J.S. for more than three months next preceding the commencement of the adoption proceeding. 750 ILCS 50/1(D)(c) (West 2016). Desertion connotes any 21 conduct on the part of the parent which indicates an intent to terminate custody over the child but not to relinquish all parental duties and claims. In re Adoption of Markham, 91 Ill. App. 3d 1122, 1125 (1981). ¶ 53 The relevant time period for this consideration is the three months preceding the adoption petition, November 24, 2015, through February 24, 2016. Chad testified that he did not want to seek custody but wanted to maintain his parental rights and develop a relationship with J.S. However, in analyzing the question of desertion, the primary consideration is whether the parent intended to desert the child. In re Adoption of Mantzke, 121 Ill. App. 3d 1060, 1067 (1984). ¶ 54 As the trial court noted, it is undisputed that Chad last attempted to contact J.S. in 2011 and has not visited J.S. since the 2009 outing to a park in Salem. Chad did not petition the Clinton County court for visitation, and he did not contact Suzan or Brandon requesting visitation. Chad has not given J.S. a birthday or Christmas present in years. Chad's only contribution to J.S.'s welfare is his $50 per month child support payment, which is a court-ordered obligation. We agree with the trial court that from November 24, 2015, through the filing of the adoption petition, Chad indicated his intention to permanently terminate custody of J.S. but not to relinquish all of his parental duties and claims. The trial court's finding by clear and convincing evidence that Chad is an unfit parent pursuant to section 1(D)(c), desertion of the child for more than three months next preceding the commencement of the adoption proceeding, was not against the manifest weight of the evidence. 22 ¶ 55 Finally, Suzan and Brandon alleged that under section 1(D)(n) of the Adoption Act, Chad demonstrated evidence of an intent to forgo his parental rights as manifested by his failure for a 12-month period to visit J.S. 750 ILCS 50/1(D)(n) (West 2016). The 12-month line of demarcation begins with the date of the last visit or communication between the parent and the child. Douglas R.S. v. Jennifer A.S., 2012 IL App (5th) 110321, ¶ 7. ¶ 56 Again, it is undisputed that the most recent visitation or communication between Chad and J.S. was in 2009. Though Chad claims that Suzan and Brandon created impediments to visitation, the only evidence presented on the subject was that he and Suzan had a bad relationship, that Brandon sent a letter in 2011 stating that if Chad were to visit J.S., it would be supervised by Brandon, and that Chad was "run off" Suzan's property in 2011 or 2012. No evidence was presented that any of the impediments to visitation occurred within 12 months of Chad's 2009 visit with J.S. The trial court's finding by clear and convincing evidence that Chad is an unfit parent pursuant to 1(D)(n), that he demonstrated an intent to forgo his parental rights as manifested by his failure for a 12-month period to visit the child, was not against the manifest weight of the evidence. ¶ 57 Chad also challenges the trial court's best-interest finding. Once the court makes a finding of unfitness pursuant to the Adoption Act, the court then determines whether it is in the best interests of the child that parental rights be terminated. In re D.T., 212 Ill. 2d 347, 352 (2004). The petitioning party is required to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that it is in the child's best interest to terminate parental rights. Id. at 365. When reviewing a trial court's determination that it is in a child's best interest to terminate 23 parental rights, a reviewing court will apply the manifest weight of the evidence standard. In re B.B., 386 Ill. App. 3d 686, 697 (2008). A determination will be found to be against the manifest weight of the evidence only if the opposite conclusion is clearly evident or the determination is unreasonable, arbitrary, or not based on the evidence presented. Id. at 697-98. ¶ 58 At the best-interests hearing, the focus shifts to the child; the issue is no longer whether parental rights can be terminated, but whether, in light of the child's needs, parental rights should be terminated. In re D.T., 212 Ill. 2d at 364. Accordingly, the parent's interest in maintaining the parent-child relationship must yield to the child's interest in a stable, loving home life. Id. ¶ 59 In determining the best interests of the child, the court must consider the following statutory factors in the context of the child's age and developmental needs: (a) the child's physical safety and welfare; (b) the development of the child's identity; (c) the child's background and ties, including familial, cultural, and religious; (d) the child's sense of attachments; (e) the child's wishes and long-term goals; (f) the child's community ties; (g) the child's need for permanence; (h) the uniqueness of every family and child; (i) the risks related to substitute care; and (j) the preferences of the persons available to care for the child. 705 ILCS 405/1-3(4.05) (West 2016). ¶ 60 Chad asserts that the testimony was devoid of any evidence on a number of factors set out in section 1-3(4.05) of the Juvenile Court Act (705 ILCS 405/1-3(4.05) (West 2016)). However, as seen in the trial court's detailed analysis of each factor set forth in 24 the statute, sufficient evidence was presented for the trial court to find that Brandon and Suzan met their burden of proof. ¶ 61 As to factor (a), the physical safety and welfare of the child, J.S. lives in a four-bedroom house with Suzan, Brandon, and his siblings, and Brandon provides financially for all of J.S.'s needs other than the $50 per month Chad (or someone on Chad's behalf) contributes in child support. As to factor (b), the development of the child's identity, J.S. identifies with the Miller family. He calls Brandon "Dad," and Brandon is the only father J.S. has known for approximately 8 of the 10 years of his life. As to factor (c), the child's background and ties, again, but for the first couple years of J.S.'s life, Suzan and Brandon are the only parents he has ever known. He spends time with Suzan and Brandon's extended families. Meanwhile, J.S. has no background or ties to Chad or his family, as he has not seen or heard from Chad in well over five years. ¶ 62 As to factor (d), the child's sense of attachments, again, Suzan and Brandon are the only parents J.S. has known since he was an infant. His sense of familiarity and attachment is with the Miller family, evidenced by him having the name "Miller" on his basketball jersey and writing "[J.] Miller" when the GAL asked him to write down his name. Chad admits that it appeared that J.S. was happy and in a stable home. ¶ 63 As to factor (e), the child's wishes and long-term goals, J.S. unequivocally stated in his in camera interview that he wanted Chad's parental rights to be terminated and to be adopted by Brandon. He made similar statements to the GAL on two separate occasions. As to factor (f), the child's community ties, the testimony reflects that J.S. attends Irvington Grade School and is doing well academically. He has friends and is 25 involved in extracurricular activities, such as track, basketball, and wrestling. As to factor (g), the child's need for permanence, including the child's need for stability and continuity of relationships, again, Chad admitted that J.S. has a stable home life with Suzan and Brandon, and the only familial relationships that J.S. knows are those with Brandon, Suzan, and their extended families. J.S.'s relationship with Chad and his family does not exist and has not existed for over five years. As to factor (h), we agree with the trial court that the most unique aspect of the parties is that Chad has absolutely no relationship with J.S. and has not attempted to contact him in five years. Otherwise, J.S. is leading a normal 10-year-old's life with his mother, stepfather, and siblings in a "noisy and active" home. ¶ 64 Factor (i), the risks attendant to entering and being in substitute care, do not apply in this case. As to factor (j), the preferences of the persons available to care for the child, Suzan and Brandon want Chad's parental rights to be terminated and for Brandon to adopt J.S. Chad does not want his rights to be terminated and believes it is in J.S.'s best interests for them to develop a relationship, though he admits that he does not know how to go about this. ¶ 65 Chad had the opportunity to cross-examine witnesses and present evidence rebutting Suzan and Brandon's claims, yet very little contradictory evidence was presented by Chad. Upon review of the trial court's analysis of the factors and its finding by a preponderance of the evidence that it was in J.S.'s best interests for Chad's parental rights to be terminated, we find that the trial court's decision was reasonable and clearly 26 based on the evidence presented; therefore, it was not against the manifest weight of the evidence. ¶ 66 Chad also argues that the trial court placed too much weight on the testimony elicited from J.S.'s in camera interview and on the GAL's opinions. Specifically, Chad asserts that J.S.'s in camera testimony should not have been considered by the trial court because in J.S.'s interview, he appeared confused and gave conflicting answers. He also asserts that the GAL's testimony should not have been considered because she had minimal contact with J.S., never interviewed Chad or his family, and had a previous relationship with Suzan and Brandon. We find Chad's assertions meritless. ¶ 67 At the in camera interview, the court attempted to explain the adoption process in terms a 10-year-old could understand. J.S. indicated that he understood. The court laid out J.S.'s adoption options as: 1) Chad's parental rights are not terminated and Brandon does not adopt J.S. or 2) Chad's parental rights are terminated and Brandon adopts J.S. The court told J.S. that no matter what happened, he would continue to live with Suzan and Brandon, and Suzan would still be his mom. After clearing up any confusion about the options, J.S. clearly chose the second option. The court stated that it was satisfied that J.S. "understood the question asked, the answer that he provided, and that no one put him up to providing the answer." ¶ 68 In regard to the GAL's testimony, we first note that as to the GAL's previous relationship with Suzan and Brandon, she testified she had previously been the GAL in a proceeding with another one of Brandon's children in a previous case in Marion County. She stated that she has been the GAL for all abuse and neglect cases in Marion County 27 for the last 10 years and did not remember the child until she saw him. This court disagrees with Chad that this qualifies as a "previous relationship" with Brandon and Suzan that would result in a biased conclusion on the GAL's part. ¶ 69 The GAL testified that she spoke with J.S. for approximately 45 minutes alone in his room, where, after explaining the adoption process in "kid language," J.S. told her that he views Brandon as his father and that that he has no desire to see Chad. He reiterated his desire to be adopted by Brandon when he saw her out in public at a later date. Overall, there is no indication in the record that the GAL spent an insufficient length of time with J.S. ¶ 70 The GAL also testified that she tried and failed to meet with Chad on multiple occasions and that Chad never called her after her most recent request. In his brief, Chad notes that "[t]here is no doubt that the respondent should have availed himself of meeting with the GAL prior to the beginning of the hearings." We agree and find that Chad's lack of effort to respond to the GAL's attempts to interview him does not diminish the value of her testimony. ¶ 71 The trial court's determination at the best-interest hearing is afforded great deference by this reviewing court. In re Jay H., 395 Ill. App. 3d 1063, 1070 (2009). We find nothing unreasonable in the trial court's determination that it was in J.S.'s best interests that Chad's parental rights be terminated, and therefore conclude that the decision was not against the manifest weight of the evidence. 28 ¶ 72 The orders of the Washington County circuit court finding that Chad was an unfit parent and that it was in J.S.'s best interest that his parental rights be terminated are affirmed. ¶ 73 Affirmed.