Summary
In Jirousek v. Prudential Ins. Co. (1971), 27 Ohio St.2d 62, 63, 56 O.O. 2d 34, 35, 271 N.E.2d 866, 868, this court stated that "we agree with plaintiff's hypothesis that an automobile is a motor vehicle and that a motorcycle is a motor vehicle * * *.
Summary of this case from Horsely v. United Ohio Ins. Co.Opinion
No. 70-169
Decided June 30, 1971.
Insurance — Construction of policy — Insured fatally injured operating motorcycle — "Motorcycle" not synonymous with "automobile" and "motor vehicle."
Where an insured dies as the result of an accident incurred while he is operating a motorcycle, his beneficiary is not entitled to supplemental benefits from an insurer under a contract authorizing such benefits if accidental death is sustained (a) while driving or riding in a private automobile of pleasure car design or (b) as a result of being struck by a motor vehicle while not himself driving or riding in a motor vehicle.
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Cuyahoga County.
Plaintiff, Ruth Jirousek, filed an action in the Garfield Heights Municipal Court against The Prudential Insurance Company of America to recover $5,000 as beneficiary under a non-occupational vehicle accident provision contained in an insurance policy on the life of her deceased son. The facts were stipulated, and, where pertinent, are stated below.
In June 1968, while operating a motorcycle, the insured sustained injuries in an accident and died several days later. The defendant has paid to plaintiff, as beneficiary of her son's policy, both the initial $5,000 face amount of life insurance coverage, plus a second $5,000 required by a "double indemnity" clause payable in event of accidental death.
Defendant has refused, however, to pay a third $5,000 provided for in the "triple indemnity" clause, which is before us in this case for evaluation. This questioned provision would require such payment if the death of the insured has been sustained either ". . . (a) while driving or riding in a private automobile of pleasure car design (including station wagon or similar body types) not in use for commercial or occupational purposes by the insured, or (b) as a result of being struck by a motor vehicle while not himself or herself driving or riding in a motor vehicle. . . ."
The trial court, considering primarily condition (a), refused to classify decedent's motorcycle as "a private automobile of pleasure car design," and therefore denied recovery.
The Court of Appeals reversed, allowing recovery under condition (b), by construing the deceased to have been ". . . not himself . . . in a motor vehicle . . ." when the accident occurred. (Emphasis is that of the appellate court.)
Messrs. McCafferty, Perelman Holtz and Mr. A. Albert Perelman, for appellee.
Messrs. Johnson Umstead, Mr. George J. Umstead and Mr. John A. Salmon, for appellant.
The sole question involved in this appeal is whether the insured, who admittedly died of injuries received in an accident while operating his motorcycle, can qualify under either conditions (a) or (b) of the supplemental "Non-Occupational Vehicle Accident" provision. The opinion of this court is that he cannot.
In the trial court, the claim was made by plaintiff that the decedent's motorcycle should be classified as a vehicle included in the language ". . . private automobile of pleasure car design. . . ."
In both brief and oral argument, plaintiff has attempted to establish that the word "automobile" should be understood to include motorcycle. While we agree with plaintiff's hypothesis that an automobile is a motor vehicle and that a motorcycle is a motor vehicle, we cannot accept his conclusion that this renders the words "automobile" and "motorcycle" synonymous, or that the term "automobile" includes a motorcycle. Each word has its own meaning in every day usage, and the purchaser of insurance, as well as the scrivener of the provision, would understand the limited aspects of both "automobile" and "motorcycle," and the broader meaning of "motor vehicle."
Insured was, therefore, not operating a vehicle of the type required to allow recovery under condition (a) of the supplemental coverage. If there is coverage, then it must fall within condition (b), which requires that the accident occur (1) "as a result of being struck by a motor vehicle," and (2) "while not himself or herself driving or riding in a motor vehicle."
In the present situation, the insured was admittedly operating his motorcycle at the time of the accident. Eliminating alternatives, the controlling phrase applicable to the facts, "while not himself . . . driving . . . a motor vehicle," would preclude recovery under condition (b).
Plaintiff claims the wording is ambiguous because an alternative "or riding in" appears as part of the condition. He suggests that such wording requires that a driver or rider be "in" the motor vehicle, whereas a person drives or rides a motorcycle while "on" the vehicle; and he further points out that a strong implication therefore exists that motor bikes, motor scooters, or motorcycles were not intended to come within the meaning of "motor vehicle" as used in this condition.
We reject this contention because the term "motor vehicle" has a normal meaning in common usage which includes motorcycle. R.C. 4511.01(C) also defines a motorcycle as a motor vehicle. It is established that this court will not change the meaning of accepted words when their normal meaning is directly applicable to the facts under consideration.
Our position is in accord with our holding in Olmstead v. Lumbermen Mutl. Ins. Co. (1970), 22 Ohio St.2d 212, where, on page 216, we stated, ". . . When words used in a policy of insurance have a plain and ordinary meaning, it is neither necessary nor permissible to resort to construction unless the plain meaning would lead to an absurd result."
In Garlick v. McFarland (1953), 159 Ohio St. 539, at page 545, we likewise stated that "the rule is well established that words used in a contract of insurance are to be given their natural and usual meaning unless otherwise defined in the contract."
In First National Bank v. Houtzer (1917), 96 Ohio St. 404, this court stated:
"The parties . . . are presumed to have intended to contract in the manner and form in which they did contract. They are presumed to have intended to have given to the language of the contract the ordinary and usual meaning given to such language.
"True, this is a suretyship contract, and the rule has been well established for many years that such shall be strictly construed in favor of the surety. But that does not warrant a court in reading into a contract something that is not there by act of the parties, whether that something be a word, phrase or clause, varying the terms of the contract, or in reading into the contract doubt and ambiguity where the meaning is perfectly clear." (Emphasis supplied.)
See, also, Rose v. New York Life Ins. Co. (1933), 127 Ohio St. 265; and Fidelity Casualty Co. v. Hartzell Bros. (1924), 109 Ohio St. 566.
We conclude that where an insured dies as the result of an accident incurred while he is operating a motorcycle, his beneficiary is not entitled to supplemental benefits from an insurer under a contract authorizing such benefits if accidental death is sustained "(a) while driving or riding in a private automobile of pleasure car design . . . or (b) as a result of being struck by a motor vehicle while not himself . . . driving or riding in a motor vehicle."
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed and final judgment is entered for defendant.
Judgment reversed.
O'NEILL, C.J., HERBERT, DUNCAN, CORRIGAN, STERN and LEACH, JJ., concur.