Jines v. Greyhound Corp.

31 Citing cases

  1. Bizarro v. Ziegler

    254 Ill. App. 3d 626 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993)   Cited 5 times
    In Bizarro v. Ziegler, 254 Ill. App.3d 626, 627 N.E.2d 122 (1994), for example, the court noted that the entry of judgment following a jury trial triggers an obligation of the aggrieved party to file a post-trial motion attacking the decision within 30 days, even though a final judgment has not yet been entered.

    Whether plaintiff acted with due care is a question for the jury to determine based on the facts of the particular case. ( Jines v. Greyhound Corp. (1965), 33 Ill.2d 83, 210 N.E.2d 562.) A plaintiff is "contributorily negligent when she acts without that degree of care which a reasonably prudent person would have used for her own safety under like circumstances, and which action is the proximate cause of her injury." ( Blacconeri v. Aguayo (1985), 132 Ill. App.3d 984, 988, 478 N.E.2d 546.) Our supreme court has expressed its reluctance to set forth hard and fast rules as to which actions constitute contributory negligence as a matter of law, favoring instead a flexible approach.

  2. Mesich v. Austin

    217 N.E.2d 574 (Ill. App. Ct. 1966)   Cited 7 times

    "In determining whether defendants' motion for a directed verdict should have been allowed, all of the evidence, when viewed most favorably to plaintiff, must totally fail to establish one or more essential elements of the case." The same test was applied four months later in the case of Jines v. Greyhound Corp., 33 Ill.2d 83, 210 N.E.2d 562 (1965). The court was again considering a case in which the defendant urged that the plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law.

  3. Wallner v. Kitchens of Sara Lee, Inc.

    419 F.2d 1028 (7th Cir. 1970)   Cited 27 times
    In Wallner v. Kitchens of Sara Lee, Inc., 419 F.2d 1028, 1030 (7th Cir. 1969), the plaintiff sued a bakery for injuries caused by a conveyor belt which was subsequently repaired by the bakery.

    Contributory negligence is ordinarily a matter to be decided by the jury. Jines v. Greyhound Corp., 33 Ill.2d 83, 210 N.E.2d 562 (1965). In the instant case we believe the jury could reasonably find that Wallner was not guilty of contributory negligence.

  4. Hardware State Bank v. Cotner

    302 N.E.2d 257 (Ill. 1973)   Cited 62 times

    The issue of contributory negligence is ordinarily resolved by the jury. ( Jines v. Greyhound Corp., 33 Ill.2d 83.) However, conduct is contributorily negligent as a matter of law only when the totality of the evidence, taken in the light most favorable to the opponent, so overwhelmingly favors the movant that no contrary conclusion could ever stand.

  5. Pedrick v. Peoria Eastern R.R. Co.

    37 Ill. 2d 494 (Ill. 1967)   Cited 1,955 times
    Holding that when resolving a motion for a directed verdict, the trial court is to view the evidence in its aspect most favorable to the nonmoving party

    This court has said with some frequency that negligence and contributory negligence become questions of law when all of the evidence, viewed in its aspect most favorable to the party against whom the court would rule, is such that reasonable minds would reach the same conclusion. (See, e.g., Jines v. Greyhound Corp., 33 Ill.2d 83, 86-87; Geraghty v. Burr Oak Lines, Inc., 5 Ill.2d 153, 162; Sims v. Chicago Transit Authority, 4 Ill.2d 60, 67.) An apparently differing standard has been expressed in some of our decisions, to-wit: when all the evidence is considered in its light most favorable to the party against whom the verdict would be directed, together with all reasonable inferences therefrom, and it appears that there is no evidence in favor of the nonmovant on an essential issue in the case, it is the trial court's duty to direct the jury accordingly ( Smith v. Bishop, 32 Ill.2d 380, 384; Carter v. Winter, 32 Ill.2d 275, 282; Zank v. Chicago, Rock Island and Pacific Railroad Co., 17 Ill.2d 473, 477). That no substantial differences between these rules was thought to exist is evidenced by the fact that, in at least two cases in which we stated the any-evidence test, we also quoted the reasonable-man principle.

  6. Savoy v. Haayer

    2021 Ill. App. 2d 190809 (Ill. App. Ct. 2021)

    See e.g., Snelson, 204 Ill.2d at 26-27; In re Commitment of Sandry, 367 Ill.App.3d 949, 977 (2006); Marchese v. Vincelette, 261 Ill.App.3d 520, 526 (1994); People v. Johnigk, 111 Ill.App.3d 941, 943 (1982). ¶ 51 Plaintiff also cites Jines v. Greyhound Corp., 33 Ill.2d 83 (1965), which like, Rockett, concerns the admissibility of an opinion rather than sanctions and similarly provides only tangential guidance. The same is true of plaintiff's citations to Martin v. Sally, 341 Ill.App.3d 308 (2003); Smelser v. Norfolk Southern Ry Co., 105 F.3d 299 (6th Cir.1997); 475 S.E.2d 261 (Va. 1996); and Eskin v. Carden, 842 A.2d 1222 (De. 2004).

  7. DeYoung v. Alpha Construction Co.

    186 Ill. App. 3d 758 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989)   Cited 14 times
    Upholding $3.6 million loss of society award for death of 75-year-old

    "Defendant urges that this remark supports the indoctrination purpose of the questions asked during voir dire. In advancing this argument defendant is asking this court to overrule Scully v. Otis Elevator Co. (1971), 2 Ill. App.3d 185, 275 N.E.2d 905, Jines v. Greyhound Corp. (1964), 46 Ill. App.2d 364, 197 N.E.2d 58, rev'd on other grounds (1965), 33 Ill.2d 83, 210 N.E.2d 562, and Murphy v. Lindahl (1960), 24 Ill. App.2d 461, 165 N.E.2d 340, all cases where the court held that questions concerning a specific verdict amount tended to uncover jurors who might have bias or prejudice against large verdicts." (103 Ill. App.3d at 946.)

  8. Kinsey v. Kolber

    103 Ill. App. 3d 933 (Ill. App. Ct. 1982)   Cited 20 times
    In Kinsey, the appellate court held that an inquiry whether venire members would have trouble awarding $2 million if the law and evidence supported it was proper.

    In support of his position defendant relies on the closing arguments during which Kinsey's attorney reminded the jury that they had said they could sign a verdict in the sum of $2,000,000 if the evidence so warranted. Defendant urges that this remark supports the indoctrination purpose of the questions asked during voir dire. In advancing this argument defendant is asking this court to overrule Scully v. Otis Elevator Co. (1971), 2 Ill. App.3d 185, 275 N.E.2d 905, Jines v. Greyhound Corp. (1964), 46 Ill. App.2d 364, 197 N.E.2d 58, rev'd on other grounds (1965), 33 Ill.2d 83, 210 N.E.2d 562, and Murphy v. Lindahl (1960), 24 Ill. App.2d 461, 165 N.E.2d 340, all cases where the court held that questions concerning a specific verdict amount tended to uncover jurors who might have bias or prejudice against large verdicts. Defendant also claims that the questions asked during voir dire about the continued friendship of the parties suggested that this was a friendly lawsuit and that insurance would cover any judgment entered against defendant.

  9. Shelton v. Sunniday Chevrolet

    422 N.E.2d 993 (Ill. App. Ct. 1981)   Cited 1 times

    ) However, when there is direct foundational evidence which establishes with a reasonable degree of certainty that the subsequently discovered condition existed at the time the product left the manufacturer's control, the above factors are not controlling. See Jines v. Greyhound Corp. (1965), 33 Ill.2d 83, 210 N.E.2d 562; Mareci v. General Motors (1980), 90 Ill. App.3d 335, 413 N.E.2d 34; La Salle National Bank v. Feldman (1966), 78 Ill. App.2d 363, 223 N.E.2d 180; Grand Trunk Western R.R. Co. v. M.S. Kaplan Co. (1963), 43 Ill. App.2d 230, 193 N.E.2d 456; Gass v. Carducci (1962), 37 Ill. App.2d 181, 185 N.E.2d 285. In the present case, the only period of time for which there was no direct foundational evidence to establish that the condition found by the Sunniday employee existed at the time the product left the manufacturer's control was between the time the product left the manufacturer's control and when plaintiff first discovered the alleged condition, which was approximately two weeks after the van was sold.

  10. Mareci v. General Motors

    413 N.E.2d 34 (Ill. App. Ct. 1980)   Cited 3 times

    Citing Rotche, the court concluded that there was ample opportunity for the plug to have been lost or removed while standing on the purchaser's storage lot for almost three months. In Jines v. Greyhound Corp. (1965), 33 Ill.2d 83, 210 N.E.2d 562, the plaintiff was a passenger in a stalled automobile which was struck by the defendant's bus. In response to the defendant's contention that the plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence, the plaintiff testified that he and his companions were unable to push the stalled car off the roadway as a wheel brake appeared to be "frozen."