Opinion
H050484
09-26-2023
J.G., Appellant, v. D.H., Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Santa Clara County Super. Ct. No. 22CP000259
WILSON, J.
Mother (J.G.) brought a parentage action against father (D.H.), a Georgia resident, seeking an order awarding her custody and child support for their four-month-old son who was conceived in California and born in Texas. D.H. then sought an order dismissing the petition or quashing service, arguing that the trial court lacked personal jurisdiction over him and subject-matter jurisdiction over custody pursuant to the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Enforcement Act (UCCJEA). The trial court granted D.H.'s request, holding that it lacked personal jurisdiction over D.H. because he did not have the requisite minimum contacts with the state, and lacked subject-matter jurisdiction under the UCCJEA because California was not the child's "home state." The court dismissed J.G.'s petition in its entirety, without addressing her request for a child support order.
J.G. appeals, arguing that the trial court has: (1) personal jurisdiction over D.H. because he conceived a child in the state; (2) subject-matter jurisdiction pursuant to the UCCJEA because California is the child's home state or, alternatively, based on the child's and her significant connections to the state; and (3) subject-matter jurisdiction to issue the requested child support order pursuant to the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act (UIFSA). D.H. argues the trial court's ruling was correct, and that the court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction to issue a child support order pursuant to the UIFSA.
We hold that the trial court has personal jurisdiction over D.H. because he had the requisite minimum contacts by virtue of conceiving the child with J.G. in California. We further hold that the trial court properly determined it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over custody pursuant to the UCCJEA because Texas was the child's home state. However, we also hold that the UIFSA did not preclude the trial court from exercising subject-matter jurisdiction over J.G.'s request for a child support order and the court therefore improperly dismissed J.G.'s petition without addressing that request.
Accordingly, we reverse.
I. Factual and Procedural Background
A. Relationship between J.G. and D.H.
J.G. and D.H. initially met via social media in 2020 or 2021. At the time, J.G. lived in Los Angeles, while D.H. lived in Georgia and traveled around the country regularly for work as a professional athlete. In March 2021, while D.H. was in California for work, he and J.G. met at a hotel in Marina del Rey and had sex.
In April 2021, J.G. learned she was pregnant while visiting her mother in Texas. She gave birth to a boy (the child) in San Antonio, Texas in December 2021. In March and April 2022, the parties confirmed through DNA testing that D.H. was the child's biological father.
B. J.G.'s petition and request for order
On April 29, 2022, J.G. filed a petition in Santa Clara County Superior Court (petition) to determine parental relationship pursuant to the Uniform Parentage Act (UPA) (Fam. Code, § 7600 et seq.). J.G. checked the boxes on the judicial council form petition indicating that the court had personal jurisdiction over D.H. because he had engaged in sexual intercourse in California, which resulted in conception of the child, and that she filed the petition in that court because the child was living in Santa Clara County at the time. J.G. asked the court to determine the parent-child relationships for her and D.H., award her legal and physical custody of the child, grant D.H. visitation rights, and award her fees and costs.
Undesignated statutory references are to the Family Code.
J.G. also submitted a declaration in support of the petition, in accordance with the UCCJEA, in which she stated that the child had lived with her in San Antonio from birth until March 2022, at which point they moved to California and lived in San Jose.
On May 24, 2022, J.G. filed a judicial council form request for order, in which she sought a court order granting her sole custody and child support, as well as attorney fees.J.G. submitted an additional declaration in which, among other things, she set forth her "guideline child support [requested]" of $39,370 per month based on her and D.H.'s respective incomes. She also claimed that "for a period before and after [the child's] birth, I temporarily lived with my mother in San Antonio, Texas, so that my mother could help care for me and my newborn baby [but] I am back living in San Jose, California, where I grew up." D.H. was served with the summons and copies of the petition and request for order on May 28, 2022.
"In a family law proceeding, the term 'request for order' has the same meaning as the terms 'motion' or 'notice of motion' when they are used in the Code of Civil Procedure." (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.63(a).)
C. D.H.'s request for order dismissing or quashing
On June 27, 2022, D.H., appearing specially, filed a request for order dismissing or quashing the summons and petition, or in the alternative staying and transferring the action, "because California is not the appropriate forum." In his supporting points and authorities, D.H. argued that the court lacked personal jurisdiction over him because he is a resident of Georgia and does not have sufficient contacts with California. According to D.H., the single instance of engaging in sexual intercourse within the state is insufficient to confer personal jurisdiction over him. He also argued that the trial court did not have subject-matter jurisdiction over child custody because California is not the child's "home state" as defined in the UCCJEA. Instead, he contended, Texas was the child's home state because the child had lived there from birth until J.G. filed her petition. According to D.H., the trial court was precluded from exercising subject-matter jurisdiction over child custody pursuant to section 3421, which sets forth the possible bases for UCCJEA jurisdiction.
On June 23, 2022, shortly before filing his request for order in the superior court, D.H. filed a separate lawsuit against J.G. in Dekalb County, Georgia, for "paternity / legitimization and payment of child support."
The UCCJEA defines "home state" as "the state in which a child lived with a parent or a person acting as a parent for at least six consecutive months immediately before the commencement of a child custody proceeding. In the case of a child less than six months of age, the term means the state in which the child lived from birth with any of the persons mentioned. A period of temporary absence of any of the mentioned persons is part of the period." (§ 3402, subd. (g); In re Marriage of Nurie (2009) 176 Cal.App.4th 478, 491 (Nurie).)
J.G. opposed D.H.'s request for order. She argued the trial court had personal jurisdiction over D.H. pursuant to section 7620, subdivision (a) and section 5700.201, subdivision (a)(6), because he conceived a child in California. For that reason, she argued, the trial court had jurisdiction over D.H. to establish the parent-child relationship and issue a support order. J.G. conceded that California was not the child's home state for purposes of the UCCJEA, but argued Texas was not the home state either because she and the child had permanently moved from Texas to California. Accordingly, she contended, because no state was the home state, California could exercise jurisdiction under the UCCJEA based on the "significant connection" she and the child have with the state. J.G. argued there was substantial evidence of such a connection because she was born in California, had lived in the state most of her life, has a California driver's license, files her income taxes here, and is registered to vote in the state.
Section 7620, subdivision (a) provides, in pertinent part: "A person who has sexual intercourse or causes conception with the intent to become a legal parent by assisted reproduction in this state, or who enters into an assisted reproduction agreement for gestational carriers in this state, thereby submits to the jurisdiction of the courts of this state as to an action brought under this part with respect to a child who may have been conceived by that act of intercourse or assisted reproduction, or who may have been conceived as a result of that assisted reproduction agreement." Section 5700.201, subdivision (a)(6) provides, in pertinent part: "In a proceeding to establish or enforce a support order or to determine parentage of a child, a tribunal of this state may exercise personal jurisdiction over a nonresident individual or the individual's guardian or conservator if: [¶] . . . the individual engaged in sexual intercourse in this state and the child may have been conceived by that act of intercourse."
D. Trial court ruling
The trial court held a hearing on D.H.'s request for order on July 28, 2022. At the conclusion of the hearing, the court stated that D.H.'s request was granted "in its entirety." It added that, "I think probably the proper way to phrase it is that California lacks personal and / or subject matter jurisdiction." The court ordered D.H. to prepare a statement of decision. On August 18, 2022, the trial court entered its "Findings and Order after Hearing," which stated that D.H.'s request for order was granted in its entirety because his contacts with California were "so transitory, that to exercise personal jurisdiction over him would be a violation of the requirement for personal jurisdiction." The court stated that it lacked personal jurisdiction over D.H. and subject-matter jurisdiction over the minor child. Finally, it again ordered D.H. to prepare a proposed statement of decision.
On September 6, 2022, the court entered its statement of decision. The court held that it did not have the requisite jurisdiction to make the orders requested by J.G. for two reasons. First, it did not have personal jurisdiction over D.H. "for purposes of financial orders including child support and professional fees and costs." Specifically, the court noted that, although sections 7620 and 5700.201 "permit a California court to assert personal jurisdiction over a non-resident based upon sexual intercourse in California that results in the conception of a child," the court's exercise of personal jurisdiction is still subject to constitutional limitations. According to the court, D.H. did not have sufficient minimum contacts with California to establish general jurisdiction. In addition, it would be unreasonable and would offend "traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice" for the court to assert personal jurisdiction over him based on the singular act of conceiving the child in California.
Second, the court stated it did not have subject-matter jurisdiction to issue child custody orders. It explained that, because the child was born in Texas and had been living there continuously since birth-including on April 29, 2022, the commencement of the lawsuit-California was not the child's home state under the UCCJEA. The trial court therefore granted D.H.'s request and ordered J.G.'s petition "quashed and dismissed." The trial court did not address whether it had subject-matter jurisdiction to issue a child support order.
Although the general rule is that a statement of decision is not appealable- because courts typically embody their final rulings in orders or judgments-a reviewing court has the discretion to treat a statement of decision as appealable when it must, such as "when a statement of decision is signed and filed and does, in fact, constitute the court's final decision on the merits." (Estate of Reed (2017) 16 Cal.App.5th 1122, 1126 [trial court expressly reserved jurisdiction to issue a further statement of its reasons, so previously issued order was not final], citing Alan v. American Honda Motor Co., Inc. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 894, 901.)
II. Discussion
J.G. argues on appeal that (1) D.H. is subject to the trial court's personal jurisdiction pursuant to sections 7620, subdivision (a), and 5700.201, subdivision (a)(6) because the child was conceived in California; (2) the trial court has subject-matter jurisdiction to issue a child custody order under the UCCJEA because California is the child's home state or, alternatively, no state is the home state and the trial court may exercise subject-matter jurisdiction based on J.G.'s and the child's significant connections with the state; and (3) the trial court has subject-matter jurisdiction to issue a child support order
D.H. argues on appeal that (1) no constitutional basis exists for the trial court to exercise personal jurisdiction over him; (2) the trial court was precluded from making an initial custody determination under the UCCJEA because Texas was the child's home state when J.G. commenced the action; and (3) the trial court was precluded from making a child support order pursuant to the UIFSA.
A. Applicable law
We begin with an overview of personal jurisdiction principles and the different statutory schemes-the UPA, UCCJEA and UIFSA-at issue in this action.
1. Personal jurisdiction
California's long-arm statute authorizes courts to exercise personal jurisdiction "on any basis not inconsistent with the Constitution of this state or of the United States." (Code Civ. Proc., § 410.10; Pavlovich v. Superior Court (2002) 29 Cal.4th 262, 268 (Pavlovich); Vons Companies, Inc. v. Seabest Foods, Inc. (1996) 14 Cal.4th 434, 444 (Vons).) The statute" 'manifests an intent to exercise the broadest possible jurisdiction,' limited only by constitutional considerations of due process." (Integral Development Corp. v. Weissenbach (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 576, 583, quoting Sibley v. Superior Court (1976) 16 Cal.3d 442, 445.) A state court's assertion of jurisdiction comports with due process requirements "if the defendant has such minimum contacts with the state that the assertion of jurisdiction does not violate' "traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice." '" (Vons, supra, at p. 444, quoting International Shoe Co. v. Washington (1945) 326 U.S. 310, 316, [citation].) The primary focus of that inquiry is "the defendant's relationship to the forum State." (Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court (2017) ___U.S.___ [137 S.Ct. 1773, 1779] (Bristol-Myers).)
Courts have recognized two types of personal jurisdiction: general and specific. (Bristol-Myers, supra, ___ U.S. at p.___ [137 S.Ct. at pp. 1779-1780].) "A nonresident defendant may be subject to the general jurisdiction of the forum if his or her contacts in the forum state are 'substantial . . . continuous and systematic.'" (Vons, supra, 14 Cal.4th at p. 445, quoting Perkins v. Benguet Mining Co. (1952) 342 U.S. 437, 445.) "In such a case, 'it is not necessary that the specific cause of action alleged be connected with the defendant's business relationship to the forum.'" (Vons, supra, at p. 445, quoting Cornelison v. Chaney (1976) 16 Cal.3d 143, 147.) "A state court may exercise general jurisdiction only when a defendant is 'essentially at home' in the State." (Ford Motor Co. v. Montana Eighth Judicial District Court (2021) ___ U.S. ___ [141 S.Ct. 1017, 1024] (Ford Motor Company), [citation].)
A defendant without such continuous contacts nevertheless may be subject to a court's specific jurisdiction if it "has purposefully availed [itself] of forum benefits [citation], and the 'controversy is related to or "arises out of" a defendant's contacts with the forum.'" (Vons, supra, 14 Cal.4th at p. 446, quoting Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia v. Hall (1984) 466 U.S. 408, 414 (Helicopteros).) The assertion of personal jurisdiction must also comport with notions of "fair play and substantial justice." (Vons, supra, at p. 447.) Specific jurisdiction is contingent on the" 'relationship among the defendant, the forum, and the litigation.'" (Helicopteros, supra, at p. 414, [citation].)
" 'The purposeful availment inquiry . . . focuses on the defendant's intentionality. [Citation.] This prong is only satisfied when the defendant purposefully and voluntarily directs his activities toward the forum so that he should expect, by virtue of the benefit he receives, to be subject to the court's jurisdiction based on' his contacts with the forum." (Pavlovich, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 269, quoting United States v. Swiss American Bank, Ltd. (1st Cir. 2001) 274 F.3d 610, 623.) "Thus, the' "purposeful availment" requirement ensures that a defendant will not be haled into a jurisdiction solely as a result of "random," "fortuitous," or "attenuated" contacts [citations], or of the "unilateral activity of another party or a third person." '" (Pavlovich, supra, at p. 269, quoting Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz (1985) 471 U.S. 462, 475 (Burger King).)
The second prong of the specific jurisdiction analysis inquires whether a plaintiff has established that its claims" 'arise out of or relate to defendant's contacts with the forum.'" (Ford Motor Company, supra, ___ U.S. at p. ___ , italics omitted, [citation].) "The first half of that standard asks about causation; but the back half, after the 'or,' contemplates that some relationships will support jurisdiction without a causal showing. That does not mean anything goes. In the sphere of specific jurisdiction, the phrase 'relate to' incorporates real limits, as it must to adequately protect defendants foreign to a forum." (Ibid.)
Given these standards, a statute cannot create an independent basis for jurisdiction where the defendant otherwise lacks sufficient minimum contacts to satisfy due process. (Thomson v. Anderson (2003) 113 Cal.App.4th 258, 269 (Thomson); In re Marriage of Nosbisch (1992) 5 Cal.App.4th 629, 634-636 (Nosbisch).)
When a nonresident defendant challenges the assertion of personal jurisdiction, the burden of proof is on the plaintiff to demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that minimum contacts exist between the defendant and the forum state to justify imposition of personal jurisdiction. (Elkman v. National States Ins. Co. (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 1305, 1312-1313.) Only where that burden is satisfied does it then become the defendant's burden to demonstrate that the exercise of jurisdiction would be unreasonable. (Buchanan v. Soto (2015) 241 Cal.App.4th 1353, 1362.)
2. UPA
The UPA" 'provides the statutory framework for judicial determinations of parentage, and governs private adoptions, paternity and custody disputes, and dependency proceedings.'" (In re D.A. (2012) 204 Cal.App.4th 811, 824, [citation].) It defines the" '[p]arent and child relationship'" as "the legal relationship existing between a child and the child's natural or adoptive parents incident to which the law confers or imposes rights, privileges, duties, and obligations." (§ 7601, subd. (b); see also Johnson v. Calvert (1993) 5 Cal.4th 84, 89 ["UPA bases parent and child rights on the existence of a parent and child relationship rather than on the marital status of the parents"].)
In a UPA proceeding, a trial court may issue a judgment or order containing "any other provision directed against the appropriate party to the proceeding, concerning the duty of support, the custody and guardianship of the child, visitation privileges with the child, the furnishing of bond or other security for the payment of the judgment, or any other matter in the best interest of the child." (§ 7637.) Thus, where no other state is involved and the UIFSA provisions discussed below are not applicable, a superior court may have jurisdiction to issue a child support order pursuant to multiple statutes, including, as relevant here, sections 200 and 7637. (In re Marriage of Richardson (2009) 179 Cal.App.4th 1240, 1243 [pursuant to § 200, superior courts have exclusive jurisdiction over child support matters]; Robert J. v. Catherine D. (2005) 134 Cal.App.4th 1392, 1399 [§ 7637 envisions that an action under the UPA "may include a series of proceedings to determine child support, visitation, and / or custody"].)
As noted above, section 7620, subdivision (a), provides, among other things, that a person who has sexual intercourse in California submits to the jurisdiction of the courts of the state as to an action brought under the UPA with respect to a child who may have been conceived by that act of intercourse. (§ 7620, subd. (a); County of Humboldt v. Harris (1988) 206 Cal.App.3d 857 (County of Humboldt).)
3. UCCJEA
Where interstate conflicts are present, the UCCJEA may apply to supplement or limit the exercise of subject-matter jurisdiction over child custody disputes. "[A]mong the primary purposes of the uniform acts is to encourage states to respect and enforce the prior custody determinations of other states, as well as to avoid competing jurisdiction and conflicting decisions." (Nurie, supra, 176 Cal.App.4th at p. 497; see also, Hogoboom and King, California Practice Guide: Family Law (The Rutter Group 2023) Ch. 3-A, ¶ 3:5.)
"The UCCJEA is a model law that 'arose out of a conference of states in an attempt to deal with the problems of competing jurisdictions entering conflicting interstate child custody orders, forum shopping, and the drawn out and complex child custody legal proceedings often encountered by parties where multiple states are involved.'" (A.M. v. Superior Court (2021) 63 Cal.App.5th 343, 349-350 (A.M.), [citation].) It ensures that only one state will have exclusive, continuing jurisdiction to modify a child custody determination, once made. (In re J.W. (2020) 53 Cal.App.5th 347, 354-355 (J.W.).)
"California adopted the UCCJEA effective January 1, 2000, and it is codified in section 3400 et seq." (J.W., supra, 53 Cal App 5th at pp . 354-355; see also In re Aiden L. (2017) 16 Cal.App.5th 508, 516 ["designed to avoid jurisdictional conflicts between states and relitigation of custody decisions, promote cooperation between states, and facilitate enforcement of another state's custody decrees"].) In California, the UCCJEA is the exclusive method of determining subject-matter jurisdiction in child custody cases. (Guardianship of Ariana K. (2004) 120 Cal.App.4th 690, 702 (Ariana K.); Brown v. Brown (1999) 71 Cal.App.4th 358, 364.)
Under the UCCJEA, there are four possible bases of subject-matter jurisdiction over child custody determinations: (1) California was the child's home state when the action was commenced, or within six months before it was commenced and the child is absent from the state but a person acting as a parent continues to live in the state; (2) no other state is the child's home state, or a court of the child's home state has declined to exercise jurisdiction on the ground that California is the more appropriate forum, and both the child and a person acting as a parent have a significant connection with California and substantial evidence is available in California concerning the child's care, protection, training, and personal relationships; (3) all courts with jurisdiction have declined to exercise it on the ground that California is the more appropriate forum; or (4) no court of any other state would have jurisdiction under the criteria specified in paragraph (1), (2), or (3). (§ 3421, subd. (a); In re L.C. (2023) 90 Cal.App.5th 728, 736-737 (L.C.).)
Section 3421, subdivision (a), provides in its entirety: "(a) Except as otherwise provided in Section 3424, a court of this state has jurisdiction to make an initial child custody determination only if any of the following are true: [¶] (1) This state is the home state of the child on the date of the commencement of the proceeding, or was the home state of the child within six months before the commencement of the proceeding and the child is absent from this state but a parent or person acting as a parent continues to live in this state. [¶] (2) A court of another state does not have jurisdiction under paragraph (1), or a court of the home state of the child has declined to exercise jurisdiction on the grounds that this state is the more appropriate forum under Section 3427 or 3428, and both of the following are true: [¶] (A) The child and the child's parents, or the child and at least one parent or a person acting as a parent, have a significant connection with this state other than mere physical presence. [¶] (B) Substantial evidence is available in this state concerning the child's care, protection, training, and personal relationships. [¶] (3) All courts having jurisdiction under paragraph (1) or (2) have declined to exercise jurisdiction on the ground that a court of this state is the more appropriate forum to determine the custody of the child under Section 3427 or 3428. [¶ (4) No court of any other state would have jurisdiction under the criteria specified in paragraph (1), (2), or (3)."
The UCCJEA thus "determines the proper jurisdictional situs as between interested states for litigation of child custody determinations-which includes virtually any custody or visitation dispute." (A.M., supra, 63 Cal.App.5th at p. 350.) Under section 3421, subject-matter jurisdiction "either exists or does not exist at the time an action is commenced. [Citation.] There is no provision in the UCCJEA for jurisdiction by reason of the presence of the parties or by stipulation, consent, waiver, or estoppel." (Ibid.)
A court may also decline to exercise its jurisdiction under the UCCJEA if it determines that it is an inconvenient forum and a court of another state is a more appropriate forum. (§ 3427; Brewer v. Carter (2013) 218 Cal.App.4th 1312, 1319.)
Personal jurisdiction over a party or child is not necessary for the court to make a child custody determination under the UCCJEA. (§ 3421, subd. (c); Nurie, supra, 176 Cal.App.4th at pp. 493-494 ["personal jurisdiction over the parents is not required to make a binding custody determination, and a custody decision made in conformity with due process requirements is entitled to recognition by other states"].)
Notably, a child custody determination does not include a determination of child support or other monetary obligations. (§ 3402, subd. (c).)
4. UIFSA
The UIFSA governs the procedures for "establishing, enforcing and modifying child support orders in cases in which more than one state is involved." (In re Marriage of Crosby &Grooms (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 201, 206 (Crosby &Grooms); § 5700.101 et seq.) It operates in tandem with the Federal Full Faith and Credit for Child Support Orders Act to ensure that, even though the parties and their children may move from state to state, "in every case only one state exercises jurisdiction over child support at any given time." (Sawyer, supra, 57 Cal.App.5th at p. 733.)
Before 2016, the UIFSA was codified at section 4900 et seq. (See, e.g., In re Marriage of Sawyer (2020) 57 Cal.App.5th 724, 733 (Sawyer).)
Section 5700.204 sets forth conditions restricting a court's authority to exercise child support subject-matter jurisdiction where there are simultaneous proceedings in California and another state. Subdivision (a) of that section provides that, where the California petition was filed after a comparable pleading was filed in another state or country, the California court may exercise jurisdiction only if (1) the California petition was filed before the expiration of time to challenge the exercise of jurisdiction in the other state or country; (2) the contesting party timely challenged the exercise of jurisdiction there; and, (3) if relevant, California is the child's home state. (§ 5700.204, subd. (a).)
The UIFSA defines "home state" in the same manner as the UCCJEA: "the state or foreign country in which a child lived with a parent or a person acting as parent for at least six consecutive months immediately preceding the time of filing of a petition or comparable pleading for support and, if a child is less than six months old, the state or foreign country in which the child lived from birth with any of them. A period of temporary absence of any of them is counted as part of the six-month or other period. (§ 5700.102, subd. (8).)
Subdivision (b) of section 5700.204 provides that, where the California petition is filed before a comparable pleading is filed in another state or country, the California court may not exercise jurisdiction where (1) the comparable pleading in the other state or country was filed before the expiration of the time to challenge the exercise of jurisdiction in California; (2) the contesting party timely challenges the exercise of jurisdiction here; and (3) if relevant, the other state or country is the child's home state. (§ 5700.204, subd. (b).)
Section 5700.204 provides in its entirety: "(a) A tribunal of this state may exercise jurisdiction to establish a support order if the petition or comparable pleading is filed after a pleading is filed in another state or a foreign country only if: [¶] (1) the petition or comparable pleading in this state is filed before the expiration of the time allowed in the other state or the foreign country for filing a responsive pleading challenging the exercise of jurisdiction by the other state or the foreign country; [¶] (2) the contesting party timely challenges the exercise ofjurisdiction in the other state or the foreign country; and [¶] (3) if relevant, this state is the home state of the child. [¶] (b) A tribunal of this state may not exercise jurisdiction to establish a support order if the petition or comparable pleading is filed before a petition or comparable pleading is filed in another state or a foreign country if: [¶] (1) the petition or comparable pleading in the other state or foreign country is filed before the expiration of the time allowed in this state for filing a responsive pleading challenging the exercise ofjurisdiction by this state; [¶] (2) the contesting party timely challenges the exercise ofjurisdiction in this state; and [¶] (3) if relevant, the other state or foreign country is the home state of the child."
In other words, subdivision (a) of section 5700.204 "allows a California court to proceed even though a petition or comparable pleading already had been filed in another state if the California proceeding is filed within the time to respond in the other state and the contesting party files a timely challenge to the exercise of jurisdiction by that state [while] [s]ubdivision (b) prohibits California courts from exercising 'jurisdiction to establish a support order' if a comparable pleading is filed before a 'petition or comparable pleading' in another state if the pleading in the other state is filed within the time to respond to the California pleading and the contesting party challenges jurisdiction in this state," and, if relevant, the other state is the child's home state. (In re Marriage of Newman (2000) 80 Cal.App.4th 846, 850 (Newman); § 5700.204, subd. (b).)
Thus, the UIFSA's limitation on the exercise of jurisdiction over child support orders only comes into play when a comparable pleading has actually been filed in another state that is the child's home state within the applicable time period. (See, e.g., Hogoboom and King, California Practice Guide: Family Law (The Rutter Group 2023) paragraph 3:7:1, page 3-6 ["When there is no out-of-state support proceeding or support order, the UIFSA has no application"].)
The UIFSA also sets forth its own bases for a court's exercise of personal jurisdiction over nonresidents subject to child support orders. Section 5700.201 provides, among other things, that "[i]n a proceeding to establish or enforce a support order or to determine parentage of a child, a tribunal of this state may exercise personal jurisdiction over a nonresident individual or the individual's guardian or conservator if . . . [¶] the individual engaged in sexual intercourse in this state and the child may have been conceived by that act of intercourse." (§ 5700.201, subd. (a)(6).)
B. Standard of review
Where the facts are uncontested, "the ultimate determination ofjurisdiction is a question of law we review de novo." (Schneer v. Llaurado (2015) 242 Cal.App.4th 1276, 1287, fn. 5 (Schneer), citing Vons, supra, 14 Cal.4th at p. 449 ["When no conflict in the evidence exists . . . the question of [personal] jurisdiction is purely one of law and the reviewing court engages in an independent review of the record"]; Ariana K., supra, 120 Cal.App.4th at p. 701 ["Where the evidence is not in dispute, a determination of subject matter jurisdiction is a legal question subject to de novo review"].)
Where the facts are contested, a trial court's factual findings underlying a jurisdictional determination are reviewed for substantial evidence. (Schneer, supra, 242 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1286-1287, citing Haywood v. Superior Court (2000) 77 Cal.App.4th 949, 954.) "When conducting a substantial evidence review, we must review the entire record in the light most favorable to the prevailing party, resolve all conflicts in the evidence in favor of the ruling or judgment being reviewed, and indulge all reasonable inferences in support of the family court's findings." (Schneer, supra, 242 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1286-1287, citing In re Marriage of Hill & Dittmer (2011) 202 Cal.App.4th 1046, 1051.)
We decline to follow those cases which have held that a reviewing court independently reweighs the trial court's findings of jurisdictional facts. (See, e.g., Schneer, supra, 242 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1283-1287.)
Finally, as with any statute, interpretation of the UPA, UCCJEA or UIFSA is a question of law which we review de novo. (Schneer, supra, 242 Cal.App.4th at p. 1287.)
C. Analysis
1. Personal jurisdiction
As summarized above, the trial court determined that it lacked personal jurisdiction over D.H., notwithstanding sections 7620 and 5700.201, subdivision (a)(6), which the court described as otherwise "permitting] a California court to assert personal jurisdiction over a non-resident based upon sexual intercourse in California that results in the conception of a child." According to the trial court, D.H. did not have sufficient minimum contacts with California and it would offend' "traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice"' to assert personal jurisdiction based on the singular act of conceiving the child.
As we explain below, we determine the trial court had personal jurisdiction over D.H. for purposes of the UPA and UIFSA, pursuant to sections 7620 and 5700.201, subdivision (a)(6), respectively. We also determine that subjecting D.H. to personal jurisdiction on this record satisfies constitutional due process requirements because D.H. had sufficient minimum contacts with California.
Although we determine, post, only that the UIFSA does not preclude subject-matter jurisdiction over child support, and we remand to the trial court to consider whether it should exercise child support subject-matter jurisdiction, we nevertheless address personal jurisdiction under section 5700.201, subdivision (a)(6) because the analysis is the same as for section 7620, subdivision (a), and to provide potential guidance to the parties and trial court on remand. (See, e.g., Hale v. Morgan (1978) 22 Cal.3d 388, 405; Cameron v. State of California (1972) 7 Cal.3d 318, 326.)
J.G. has not contended, in the trial court or in this court, that D.H. was subject to general jurisdiction in California by virtue of substantial, continuous and systematic contacts. (See, e.g., Vons, supra, 14 Cal.4th at p. 445.)
a. Jurisdictional statutes
Both section 7620 and section 5700.201, subdivision (a)(6) expressly purport to confer personal jurisdiction over a nonresident who has conceived a child by engaging in sexual intercourse within the state. Section 7620, subdivision (a) provides that a person who has sexual intercourse within the state submits to the jurisdiction of California courts as to an action brought under the UPA "with respect to a child who may have been conceived by that act of intercourse." (§ 7620, subd. (a).) And section 5700.201, subdivision (a)(6) provides that, in UIFSA actions, a California court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a nonresident in a proceeding to establish or enforce a support order or determine parentage of a child, if the individual engaged in sexual intercourse in this state and the child may have been conceived by that act of intercourse.
Here, it is undisputed that D.H. engaged in sexual intercourse in California and that the child was conceived by that act. Because the facts are uncontested, our review of the application of these statutes is de novo. (Schneer, supra, 242 Cal.App.4th at p. 1286, fn. 5.) The plain language of these statutes authorizes the exercise of personal jurisdiction over D.H., subject to constitutional due process limitations. D.H. does not argue that the language of the statutes provides otherwise. In fact, he concedes that the statutes "provide personal jurisdiction over a parent," and that the relevant provisions "extend personal jurisdiction over a parent who engages in sexual intercourse resulting in conception of a child." Instead, he argues that, as the trial court held, notwithstanding the language of sections 7620 and 5700.201, the statutes "do not confer personal jurisdiction in circumstances inconsistent with the due process requirement of the state and federal constitutions" and that "[t]he minimum contacts doctrine determines if the contacts are constitutionally sufficient."
As we have noted, it is true that a statute cannot create an independent basis for jurisdiction where the defendant otherwise lacks sufficient minimum contacts to satisfy due process. (Thomson, supra, 113 Cal.App.4th at p. 269.) A defendant has such minimum contacts where (1) it has purposefully availed itself of forum benefits, (2) the controversy is related to, or arises out of, the defendant's contacts with the forum state, and (3) the exercise of jurisdiction would be fair and reasonable and comport with notions of fair play and substantial justice. (Vons, supra, 14 Cal.4th at p. 446.)
Accordingly, we must determine whether, on this record, conferring personal jurisdiction over D.H. pursuant to sections 7620 subdivision (a) and 5700.201 subdivision (a)(6) satisfies these constitutional requirements.
b. Purposeful availment
Beginning with the first of these requirements, we conclude that D.H. purposefully and voluntarily directed his activities toward California when he intentionally traveled to the state on business and engaged in sexual intercourse with J.G. Based on those undisputed activities alone, he should have expected, by virtue of the benefits and protections he received from California's laws related to those acts, and the potential liabilities stemming therefrom, to be subject to a California court's jurisdiction. (Pavlovich, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 269.) D.H.'s contacts with California were not random, fortuitous or attenuated. (Ibid.)
In the related tort context, the purposeful availment requirement is met when a plaintiff's claim is based on the actions of a defendant who traveled to a state and injured the plaintiff while there. (See, e.g., Taylor-Rush v. Multitech Corp. (1990) 217 Cal.App.3d 103, 111; Doe v. Damron (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 684, 691 (Damron).) "[I]t is well settled that jurisdiction is proper even when the alleged tort occurred during a single, brief visit. The classic example is a visitor who negligently causes a car accident." (Damron, supra, at p. 691, citing Hess v. Pawloski (1927) 274 U.S. 352, 356.) We see no reason why that standard should not apply in this context as well, where D.H. committed the relevant act while physically present in the state.
D.H. argues there was no purposeful availment here because, although J.G. was a California resident when the parties met in California, "it was not established" that D.H. knew she lived in California. In addition, he argues, he could not have known that, had they conceived a child, J.G. would raise it in California, and no government assistance was provided by California to J.G. for support of the child. We are unpersuaded. Here, it was the intentional and knowing act of sexual intercourse within the state that constituted the purposeful availment. The intentionality of that act was not predicated in any way on whether D.H. knew J.G. was a California resident or lived in the state, whether the child would be raised in California, or whether government assistance had already been provided. As the United States Supreme Court has explained, "the foreseeability that is critical to due process analysis . . . is that the defendant's conduct and connection with the forum State are such that he should reasonably anticipate being haled into court there." (World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson (1980) 444 U.S. 286, 297 (World-Wide Volkswagen).) In our view, D.H. should reasonably have anticipated being haled into court in California based on his purposeful act of having sexual intercourse within the state.
D.H. analogizes to Nosbisch, in which the court held that the father did not have minimum contacts with the state of Texas solely because he agreed to allow his children to move there with their mother. (Nosbisch, supra, 5 Cal.App.4th at p. 634.) We find the case distinct. The father in Nosbisch merely acquiesced to the mother's relocation of their children. (Ibid.) By contrast here, D.H. purposefully and affirmatively undertook an act within the state that foreseeably could expose him to potential liabilities as well as the benefits and protections of the laws of the state.
D.H. also relies on Kulko v. California Superior Court (1978) 436 U.S. 84, in which the United States Supreme Court similarly held that the father's acquiescence to the mother's relocation of their daughter to California did not constitute sufficient minimum contacts to establish personal jurisdiction. We find the case distinct for the same reason as Nosbisch. In addition, both Kulko and Nosbisch were so-called "effects" cases, which considered whether a state may exercise personal jurisdiction over a nonresident whose out-of-state act or omission has caused an "effect" within the state. (Kulko, supra, 436 U.S. at p. 96.) We are not confronted with such facts here, where D.H. undertook the act within the state.
When a defendant purposefully avails himself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum state, he "has clear notice that [he] is subject to suit there, and can act to alleviate the risk of burdensome litigation" by taking certain risk-limiting actions, including avoiding or severing his connection with the state altogether. (World-Wide Volkswagen, supra, 444 U.S. at p. 297.) Such clear notice existed here.
We conclude that D.H.'s conduct satisfies the purposeful availment prong of the minimum contacts analysis.
c. Arising from D. H.' s contacts with California
The second requirement to establish sufficient minimum contacts is that the controversy be related to, or have arisen out of, the defendant's contacts with the forum state. (Vons, supra, 14 Cal.4th at p. 446.) There must be an affiliation" 'between the forum and the underlying controversy', principally, [an] activity or an occurrence that takes place in the forum State and is therefore subject to the State's regulation." (Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown (2011) 564 U.S. 915, 919, [citation].) For this reason, "specific jurisdiction is confined to adjudication of 'issues deriving from, or connected with, the very controversy that establishes jurisdiction.'" (Ibid.)
Here, the underlying controversy-J.G.'s action for parentage, custody and support for the child-arises directly and solely from D.H.'s sexual intercourse with J.G., an activity that took place in the forum state.
D.H. argues that J.G.'s "suit for child support and needs-based fees does not legally arise out of [D.H.]'s California-related activity." He claims that the minimum contacts test "looks at the contacts at the time of the proceeding and not on whether past minimum contacts might suffice," relying on Muckle v. Superior Court (2002) 102 Cal.App.4th 218, 227. Although conception occurred in California, he argues that act constitutes irrelevant past contacts-by contrast, he contends, because the child "had not stepped foot in our state when [J.G.] commenced her action," there were insufficient contacts at the time of the proceeding. That misconstrues the applicable standard and the facts of Muckle. The general rule is that the relevant period during which minimum contacts must have existed is when the cause of action arose, rather than when the complaint was filed or served. (Cadle Co. II, Inc. v. Fiscus (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 1232, 1239, citing Weil &Brown, Cal. Practice Guide: Civil Procedure Before Trial (The Rutter Group 2007) ¶ 3:205.1, p. 3-55.) Moreover, Muckle was an initial family law proceeding for marital dissolution, not a custody and child support action. (Muckle, supra, 102 Cal.App.4th at p. 227 [mere fact of past residency, during which a party purchased out of state property, did not constitute sufficient contacts of such nature and quality for personal jurisdiction consistent with traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice].)
Applying the standards outlined above, we conclude the controversy here arose from D.H.'s contacts with California.
d. Reasonableness
Where, as here, a plaintiff carries her initial burden, it then shifts to the defendant to demonstrate that the court's exercise of personal jurisdiction would be unfair or unreasonable. (Burger King, supra, 471 U.S. at p. 472; Vons, supra, 14 Cal.4th at pp. 447-448.) Courts may evaluate" 'the burden on the defendant,' 'the forum State's interest in adjudicating the dispute,' 'the plaintiff's interest in obtaining convenient and effective relief,' 'the interstate judicial system's interest in obtaining the most efficient resolution of controversies,' and the 'shared interest of the several States in furthering fundamental substantive social policies.'" (Casey v. Hill (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 937, 973, quoting Burger King, supra, at pp. 476-477 [defendant who purposefully directed activities at forum must present a compelling case of unreasonableness].)
Evaluating those factors here, we conclude D.H. failed to carry his burden of demonstrating that the exercise of personal jurisdiction would be unfair or unreasonable. First, we perceive that the burden on D.H. would be extremely minimal. By his own admission, he travels to California for work multiple times per year. This is not an instance where it would impose a burden on the defendant to subject him to personal jurisdiction in a distant state he has no intention of visiting. (See, e.g., Asahi Metal Industry Co., Ltd. v. Superior Court (1987) 480 U.S. 102, 114 [severe burden on defendant residing in Japan to travel to California for litigation].)
Second, California plainly has an interest in adjudicating this dispute, where "the birth of a child imposes a substantial burden both upon the mother and where, as here, the mother is impecunious, upon the state." (County of Humboldt, supra, 206 Cal.App.3d at p. 861.) The trial court found that J.G. owns a bank account, is registered to vote, files her income tax returns, and has a driver's license in the state of California. In addition, J.G. submitted evidence-which D.H. has not disputed-showing that she was unemployed and had reported less than $22,000 in her 2020 California tax returns.
Because the facts are uncontested, our review here is de novo. (Schneer, supra, 242 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1286-1287.)
Moreover, the Legislature's decision to enact sections 7620 and 5700.201, subdivision (a)(6)-purporting to establish personal jurisdiction over a nonresident who conceives a child in the state-demonstrates California's interest in adjudicating disputes of this nature. (See, e.g., County of Humboldt, supra, 206 Cal.App.3d at p. 864 [existence of special jurisdictional statute is evidence California has a particularized interest in trying such cases in its courts].)
Third, for similar reasons, J.G.'s interest in obtaining convenient and effective relief in California courts is self-evident. (See, e.g., Vons, supra, 14 Cal.4th at p. 447 ["state has a manifest interest in providing its residents with a convenient forum for redressing injuries inflicted by out-of-state actors"].)
Lastly, we see nothing unreasonable here insofar as it pertains to the interstate judicial system's interest in obtaining the most efficient resolution of controversies, and the shared interest of the several states in furthering fundamental substantive social policies. Significantly, the statutes are part of uniform acts adopted by all states to govern the procedures for establishing, enforcing, and modifying, among other things, child support orders where more than one state is involved. (See, e.g., Crosby &Grooms, supra, 116 Cal.App.4th at p. 206.) The statutes advance, rather than undermine, the interstate judicial system's interest in efficient resolution of controversies. Moreover, exercising personal jurisdiction does not, by itself, establish that a court has or will exercise subject-matter jurisdiction.
We find County of Humboldt instructive on this point. In that case, the court held that the nonresident father was subject to personal jurisdiction by virtue of having conceived the child in California. (County of Humboldt, supra, 206 Cal.App.3d at p. 861.) The court first cited the predecessor statute to section 7620, which stated: "A person who has sexual intercourse. . . in this state thereby submits to the jurisdiction of the courts of this state as to an action brought under this part with respect to a child who may have been conceived by that act of intercourse." (County of Humboldt, supra, at p. 861; former Civ. Code, § 7007.)
The court acknowledged that personal jurisdiction nevertheless must comport with constitutional due process requirements. Still, it explained that "[t]he proposition that a jurisdictional statute similar to the one enacted in California satisfies the due process requirement and lawfully subjects the nonresident putative father to the jurisdiction of the state where the child was conceived and born, is well supported by sister state case authority." (County of Humboldt, supra, 206 Cal.App.3d at p. 861.) The court then analogized to cases from numerous other states that reached the same conclusion with similar or identical jurisdictional statutes. (Id. at pp. 861-863.) Finally, the court distinguished Kulko on various grounds, including that it "was decided upon general constitutional principles, without benefit of a specific jurisdictional statute." (Id. at p. 864.) Moreover, in Kulko, the United States Supreme Court had emphasized that" 'California has not attempted to assert any particularized interest in trying such cases in its courts by, e.g., enacting a special jurisdictional statute.'" (Ibid., quoting Kulko, supra, 436 U.S. at p. 98.) By contrast, County of Humboldt dealt with such a jurisdictional statute, so that "state legislation explicitly provides that a person who conceives a child in California submits himself to the jurisdiction of the state concerning any action 'brought under this part' of the code." (County of Humboldt, at p. 864.) The court therefore determined it would not be unreasonable to exercise personal jurisdiction over the nonresident defendant. (Id. at pp. 860-864.)
D.H. argues that exercising personal jurisdiction over him "would not comport with notions of fair play and substantial justice" because the child was born in Texas and lived there with J.G. when this action was commenced. He also argues that Texas has an interest in establishing support and that he has "submitted himself to that court's jurisdiction by filing an action in Texas." None of those facts, though, constitutes compelling evidence that the exercise of personal jurisdiction over D.H. in California would be unreasonable here based on the factors discussed above.
In sum, we conclude D.H. is subject to the trial court's personal jurisdiction for purposes of the UPA and the UIFSA.
Personal jurisdiction over a party is not necessary for the court to make a child custody determination under the UCCJEA. (§ 3421, subd. (c); Nurie, supra, 176 Cal.App.4th at pp. 493-494.)
2. Subject-matter jurisdiction
As summarized above, the trial court held that it did not have subject-matter jurisdiction over the child for purposes of making child custody orders under the UCCJEA. It did not address whether it had subject-matter jurisdiction over J.G.'s request for a child support order. We address these in turn.
a. UCCJEA-child custody
There are four possible bases for subject-matter jurisdiction under the UCCJEA. (§ 3421, subd. (a); L. C., supra, 90 Cal.App.5th at pp. 736-737.) None is present here.
First, California was not the child's home state at the time J.G. commenced this action. (§ 3421, subd. (a)(1).) Section 3402, subdivision (g) defines "home state" as "the state in which a child lived with a parent or a person acting as a parent for at least six consecutive months immediately before the commencement of a child custody proceeding. In the case of a child less than six months of age, the term means the state in which the child lived from birth with any of the persons mentioned." Here, the child, born in December 2021, was less than six months of age when the action was commenced on April 29, 2022. The trial court expressly found that the child had lived in Texas with his mother since his birth.
In her declaration in support of the petition, J.G. stated that she had lived with the child in San Jose since March 2022. Despite that, the trial court determined that J.G. had continued to live in Texas when she commenced the action on April 29, 2022. On appeal, J.G. contends that "[n]o one lived in Texas and [m]other and child had not lived there for almost months [sic]." To the extent that statement can be construed as a challenge to the trial court's factual finding that J.G. and the child lived in Texas from the child's birth to the date of commencement of the action, we consider the challenge waived, as J.G. has not addressed the evidence in the record supporting the finding. (Doe v. Roman Catholic Archbishop of Cashel &Emly (2009) 177 Cal.App.4th 209, 218 [failure to discuss challenged findings waived substantial evidence challenge to order quashing service]; Shenouda v. Veterinary Medical Board (2018) 27 Cal.App.5th 500, 515 [failure to explain why evidence did not support findings constituted waiver].) Because the facts are undisputed, our review here is de novo. (Schneer, supra, 242 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1286-1287.)
Given the trial court's findings, California was not the child's home state when the action commenced, and the court did not have subject-matter jurisdiction over the child pursuant to section 3421, subdivision (a)(1).
J.G. argues that California was the child's home state because no other state has jurisdiction. However, section 3421, subdivision (a) does not provide that California is the child's home state where no other state has jurisdiction; instead, it provides that California may exercise jurisdiction under certain circumstances where no other state is the home state, which is not the case here.
J.G. conceded in the trial court that California was not the child's home state.
That is because the trial court's finding also means Texas was the child's home state at the time J.G. commenced this action. Under the plain language of section 3402, subdivision (g), the home state for a child less than six months means the state in which the child lived from birth with a parent-and, here, the trial court found that the child had lived in Texas with his mother since birth.
For that reason, the trial court did not have subject-matter jurisdiction pursuant to the second possible ground under section 3421, subdivision (a), which applies where no state was the child's home state when the action was commenced. (§ 3421, subd. (a)(2).) Nor is there any evidence that a court in the child's home state-here, Texas-declined to exercise jurisdiction on the ground that California is the more appropriate forum, a separate possible basis for subject-matter jurisdiction under section 3421, subdivision (a)(2).
Mother contends that D.H. filed a paternity action in Texas on September 14, 2022. Even if that were the case, it would not be relevant to the inquiry here-whether Texas had declined UCCJEA jurisdiction at the time this action was commenced.
J.G. argues that, even if Texas ever "had jurisdiction," it "lost it" pursuant to section 3422, subdivision (a)(2), which sets forth certain conditions that end a court's exclusive continuing jurisdiction after making a child custody determination under the UCCJEA. But section 3422 is inapplicable here because no court had yet made a child custody determination.
J.G. also argues that she and the child have a "significant connection" with California, thereby conferring jurisdiction on California courts pursuant to section 3421, subdivision (a)(2). However, the "significant connection" inquiry under that subdivision only comes into play where no state is the child's home state or a court in the home state has declined jurisdiction, neither of which is the case here. (§ 3421, subd. (a)(2).)
A third possible basis for a California court to exercise subject-matter jurisdiction under the UCCJEA is where all courts with jurisdiction have declined to exercise it on the ground that California is the more appropriate forum. (§ 3421, subd. (a)(3).) There is no evidence here that any other court with jurisdiction has declined to exercise it.
Finally, the fourth possible basis for jurisdiction is where "[n]o court of any other state would have jurisdiction under the criteria specified in paragraph (1), (2), or (3)." (§ 3421, subd. (a)(4).) Because Texas was the child's home state here at the time the action was commenced, a court in that state would have jurisdiction under the criteria specified in paragraph (1) of section 3421, subdivision (a), and this basis would not apply for a California court to exercise jurisdiction.
In sum, the trial court properly determined that it did not have jurisdiction to issue a child custody order under the UCCJEA.
b. UIFSA-child support
As summarized above, J.G. sought an order for child support as well. The trial court, however, did not address that request or otherwise opine as to whether it had subject-matter jurisdiction to issue such an order.
As a threshold matter, we note that D.H. did not argue in his request for order that the trial court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to issue a child support order pursuant to the UIFSA. In her opposition, J.G. argued that "[t]he determination of child support and the determination of child custody are separate issues that are governed by separate statutes." D.H. did not address the issue in his reply brief in support of his request for order.
Nevertheless, both parties argue the issue in their briefs on appeal. J.G. argues that "[j]urisdiction to make a support order is not limited by [the] UCCJEA where there is no 'controlling order' in place. [. . .] California should make the child support order." D.H. argues that "California is precluded from making a support order under UIFSA" because "Texas is the home state and [D.H.] timely challenged [J.G.'s motion.]"
Although D.H. did not raise the issue in his request for order and the trial court did not reach it, we elect to decide whether the UIFSA precludes the trial court from exercising subject-matter jurisdiction over child support, rather than remanding for the trial court to decide that question in the first instance. Because the issue presents only a legal question determinable from uncontroverted facts, we will exercise our discretion to consider the merits of the argument. (Robbins v. Foothill Nissan (1994) 22 Cal.App.4th 1769, 1774; Warburton/Buttner v. Superior Court (2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 1170, 1180; see also, Tsemetzin v. Coast Federal Savings &Loan Association (1997) 57 Cal.App.4th 1334, 1341 [parties were given reasonable opportunity to address issue].)
Turning to the merits, as we have explained, a superior court has jurisdiction to issue a child support order pursuant to sections 200 and 7637 where there are no interstate conflicts. However, when multiple states are involved, the UIFSA may preclude such jurisdiction. For example, section 5700.204, subdivision (a) "allows a California court to proceed even though a petition or comparable pleading already had been filed in another state if the California proceeding is filed within the time to respond in the other state and the contesting party files a timely challenge to the exercise of jurisdiction by that state," while "[s]ubdivision (b) prohibits California courts from exercising 'jurisdiction to establish a support order' if a comparable pleading is filed before a 'petition or comparable pleading' in another state if the pleading in the other state is filed within the time to respond to the California pleading and the contesting party challenges jurisdiction in this state," and, if relevant, the other state is the child's home state. (Newman, supra, 80 Cal.App.4th at p. 850; § 5700.204, subd. (b).)
On the record before us, we conclude the UIFSA did not preclude the trial court from exercising subject-matter jurisdiction over child support. Subdivision (a) of section 5700.204 is not applicable here because no petition or comparable pleading had been filed in another state when J.G. filed her petition in this action. The record shows that D.H. filed an action in Georgia in June 2022, roughly two months after J.G. filed the petition in this case.
Nor does the prohibition in subdivision (b) of section 5700.204 apply here because no pleading was filed in another state that is the child's home state within the time to respond to the California pleading. While the record shows that a pleading was filed in Georgia within that time period, Georgia was not the child's home state. In briefing on appeal, both J.G. and D.H. claim that D.H. filed a pleading in a Texas court on September 14, 2022. However, even if that were the case and there were evidence of such a pleading in the record-which there is not-any such pleading filed on that date would not have been filed within the time to file a responsive pleading in this action, and the prohibition in section 5700.204, subdivision (b) would not apply.
A responsive pleading must be filed within 30 days of service of the initial pleading, absent an extension. (See, e.g., Code Civ. Proc., § 412.20, subd. (a)(3) [answer]; id., § 430.40, subd. (a) [demurrer]; see also Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.63(b) [motion to quash in family law proceeding].)
In sum, the UIFSA did not preclude the trial court from exercising subject-matter jurisdiction over child support.
We do not decide whether the trial court must or should exercise subject-matter jurisdiction over child support. Further, we express no opinion regarding any possible post-appeal developments that may impact these and other jurisdictional considerations under the UPA, UCCJEA and UIFSA, such as where the parties have lived since J.G. filed her petition, the action D.H. filed in Georgia in June 2022, or the action he purportedly filed in Texas in September 2022. The parties also claim, for instance, that J.G. filed a subsequent action in San Benito County Superior Court in December 2022, of which D.H. requests this court take judicial notice. We deny the request, as it is not relevant to our review of the trial court's decision here, a point on which both parties agree. On remand, the parties and the trial court may consider such facts as necessary through the proper procedural channels, including the propriety of communicating with courts in other states regarding such pending actions. (See, e.g., A.H. v. Superior Court (2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 504, 520, citing § 3410 [communications with other state courts under UCCJEA].)
III. Disposition
The trial court's order is reversed. We remand with directions to the trial court to enter a new order and for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. J.G. is awarded her costs on appeal.
WE CONCUR: Bamattre-Manoukian, Acting P.J., Danner, J.