Nevertheless, while "a pending motion for summary judgment removes the ability of a plaintiff to take a voluntary dismissal as a matter of right, . . . the trial court may still permit in appropriate circumstances a voluntary dismissal while a summary judgment motion is pending." J.E.T., Inc. v. Hasty, No. M2023-00253-COA-R3-CV, 2024 WL 1156558, at *3 n.2 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 18, 2024) (citing Stewart v. Univ. of Tenn., 519 S.W.2d 591, 593 (Tenn. 1974); Autin v. Goetz, 524 S.W.3d 617, 631 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2017); Ewan, 465 S.W.3d at 136). We shall first consider whether the sanctions order authorizing Defendants to recover an undetermined amount of attorney's fees as a Rule 37 sanction bestowed upon them a vested right to recover their attorney's fees.
The rule grants plaintiffs a broad right to dismiss an action at any time before the trial begins by filing a written notice of dismissal and serving it on all parties. See J.E.T., Inc. v. Hasty, No. M2023-00253-COA-R3-CV, 2024 WL 1156558 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 18, 2024), no perm. app. filed ("[T]he general rule is that a party has a free and unrestricted right to voluntarily dismiss an action until trial." (quoting Britt v. Usery, No. W2022-00256-COA-R3-CV, 2024 WL 195879, at *3 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 18, 2024), no perm app. filed)).
Id. We also found vested rights arising out of a contractual obligation in J.E.T., Inc. v. Hasty, No. M2023-00253-COA-R3-CV, 2024 WL 1156558 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 18, 2024). During the litigation in that case, the parties had established a discovery deadline and agreed that failure to meet that deadline would result in dismissal with prejudice, and they filed an agreed order to that effect that was approved by the trial court.