Opinion
No. 1 CA-JV 19-0233
03-03-2020
JERRY S., ASHLEY C., Appellants, v. DEPARTMENT OF CHILD SAFETY, M.S., Appellees.
COUNSEL Maricopa County Public Advocate, Mesa By Suzanne Sanchez Counsel for Appellant Ashley C. Law Office of H. Clark Jones, LLC, Mesa By H. Clark Jones Counsel for Appellant Jerry S. Arizona Attorney General's Office, Mesa By Amanda Adams Counsel for Appellee Department of Child Safety
NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION. UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.
Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
No. JD531806
The Honorable David B. Gass, Judge
AFFIRMED
COUNSEL
Maricopa County Public Advocate, Mesa
By Suzanne Sanchez
Counsel for Appellant Ashley C.
Law Office of H. Clark Jones, LLC, Mesa
By H. Clark Jones
Counsel for Appellant Jerry S.
Arizona Attorney General's Office, Mesa
By Amanda Adams
Counsel for Appellee Department of Child Safety
MEMORANDUM DECISION
Judge Kent E. Cattani delivered the decision of the Court, in which Presiding Judge Maria Elena Cruz and Chief Judge Peter B. Swann joined.
CATTANI, Judge:
¶1 Ashley C. ("Mother") and Jerry S. ("Father") appeal the superior court's ruling terminating their parental rights as to their son, M.S. For reasons that follow, we affirm.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
¶2 In July 2018, the Department of Child Safety ("DCS") filed a dependency petition alleging neglect and substance abuse after police found Mother and Father living at a storage facility with eight-month-old M.S. in over 100-degree weather. After being taken to the hospital, M.S. tested positive for methamphetamine. The superior court found M.S. dependent as to both parents.
¶3 Both parents were referred for urinalysis testing and substance abuse treatment programs but failed to submit to drug testing or otherwise participate in a treatment program. And on September 4, 2018, both parents were arrested and subsequently charged with possession of methamphetamine and drug paraphernalia. Although Mother and Father participated in visitation services, their participation was inconsistent.
¶4 In February 2019, DCS moved to terminate both parents' parental rights on grounds of substance abuse and six-months' out-of-home placement. See A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(3), (8)(b). DCS also filed a notice of initial hearing, which included a warning to Mother and Father that "if [they] fail[ed] to appear without good cause, the hearing may go forward in [their] absence and may result in termination of [their] parental rights based upon the record and the evidence presented to the Court."
¶5 In June 2019, Mother and Father failed to appear for a scheduled pretrial conference. Over the objection of their attorneys, the court proceeded with a termination hearing. After considering the evidence presented, the superior court concluded that DCS met its burden of proving both statutory grounds and that severance would be in M.S.'s
best interests. Accordingly, the court terminated Mother's and Father's parental rights.
¶6 Approximately three hours after the hearing, Father filed a "Request to the Court" asking the court not to terminate Mother's and his parental rights. Addressing both parents' absence from the hearing, Father explained:
[A]s far as not being here, we w[o]ke up in a field behind bushes. This morning we got on the bus at 0700 leaving everything behind to be here dirty. After (4) transfers we arrive[d] late around 11:25. We do not have a working phone anymore.
¶7 Each parent then filed a motion to set aside the superior court's rulings, asserting good cause for their failure to appear and citing to "the reasons set forth in Father's Request to the Court." The superior court found no good cause for the parents' failure to appear and denied both motions:
[Mother and Father] offered no explanation for missing the Mediation. They overslept for the Pretrial Conference. The explanation does not rise to good cause. Indeed, the explanation is consistent with the basis for the dependency. Mother and Father are not able to care for themselves, let alone the child.
¶8 Mother and Father timely appealed. We have jurisdiction under A.R.S. § 8-235(A).
DISCUSSION
¶9 Mother and Father argue that the superior court erroneously denied their motions to set aside its ruling for good cause, asserting that the record does not support the superior court's finding that they "overslept."
¶10 After a motion for termination of parental rights is filed, if a parent fails to appear at a pretrial conference without good cause, the court may find that the parent has waived legal rights and admitted the allegations in the motion for termination and may proceed with the termination hearing in the parent's absence. See A.R.S. § 8-863(C); Ariz. R.P. Juv. Ct. 64(C); Marianne N. v. Dep't of Child Safety, 243 Ariz. 53, 54, ¶¶ 1-2 (2017). Even after a parent fails to appear without good cause, the parent's counsel may nevertheless "fully participate" in the proceedings on the
parent's behalf. See Brenda D. v. Dep't of Child Safety, 243 Ariz. 437, 440, ¶¶ 2-3 (2018).
¶11 A parent shows good cause for failing to appear by proving mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect. Christy A. v. Ariz. Dep't of Econ. Sec., 217 Ariz. 299, 304, ¶ 16 (App. 2007). We review a finding that a parent lacked good cause for an abuse of discretion and will only reverse if the superior court's exercise of discretion was "manifestly unreasonable, or exercised on untenable grounds, or for untenable reasons." Adrian E. v. Ariz. Dep't of Econ. Sec., 215 Ariz. 96, 101, ¶ 15 (App. 2007) (citation omitted). Because the superior court is in the best position to weigh evidence and assess witness credibility, we view the evidence and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of supporting the court's findings. See Christy A., 217 Ariz. at 305, ¶ 19; Jesus M. v. Ariz. Dep't of Econ. Sec., 203 Ariz. 278, 280, 282, ¶¶ 4, 12-13 (App. 2002).
¶12 Here, the record supports the superior court's conclusion that Mother and Father did not have good cause for failing to appear. The only explanations for their absence provided in their motions to set aside were "the reasons set forth in Father's Request to the Court." Although Father's Request did not specifically indicate that they overslept, the superior court could reasonably infer from the Request that Mother and Father did not appropriately manage their time on the morning of the hearing to ensure they would be present, despite being warned of the consequences of failing to appear. This inference is consistent with the superior court's conclusion that "Mother and Father are not able to care for themselves, let alone the child." Because neither Mother nor Father provided any alternative explanation for their absence that rises to the level of good cause, the superior court did not abuse its discretion by denying Mother and Father's motions to set aside.
¶13 Because both parents lacked good cause for failing to appear, we decline to consider their remaining arguments that rely on a showing of good cause.
CONCLUSION
¶14 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm.