Additionally, this "extraordinary" remedy "should best be used sparingly." Jerome-Duncan, Inc. v. Auto-By-Tel, L.L.C., 966 F. Supp. 540, 541 (E.D. Mich. 1997) (Gadola, J.) (citations omitted). When considering whether to grant the "extraordinary" remedy of a preliminary injunction, a district court must consider and balance four factors: (1) whether the moving party has a strong likelihood of success on the merits; (2) whether the moving party would suffer irreparable injury without the preliminary injunction; (3) whether issuance of the preliminary injunction would cause substantial harm to others; and (4) whether the public interest would be served by issuance of the preliminary injunction.
Jerome-Duncan, Inc. v. Auto-By-Tel, L.L.C. 966 F.Supp. 540, 541 (E.D. Mich. 1997) (alterations and quotations omitted). Plaintiff has failed to establish that it will suffer irreparable harm absent the injunction as the damages it complains of are monetary.
See, e.g., Innoviant Pharmacy, Inc. v. Morganstern, 390 F. Supp. 2d 179, 190 (N.D.N.Y. 2005) (finding that the threatened loss of referral sources constitutes irreparable harm, as referral sources are "one step removed" from "the ultimate source of Innoviant's revenue"); but see Guttenberg v. Emery, 26 F. Supp. 3d 88, 102 (D.D.C. 2014) (finding no irreparable harm despite plaintiffs' argument that "because their business is based on referrals, lost referrals threaten[] their practice"); Jerome-Duncan, Inc. v. Auto-By-Tel, L.L.C., 966 F. Supp. 540, 543 (E.D. Mich. 1997) ("Should a determination of damages be required at a latter date, a court could look to [plaintiff's] past performance or . . . the actual dealers which received the referrals in place of [plaintiff]. There is nothing unique about this case, with regard to damages, which would take it out of the ordinary breach of contract remedies context.").
Additionally, this "extraordinary" remedy "should best be used sparingly." Jerome-Duncan, Inc. v. Auto-By-Tel, L.L.C., 966 F. Supp. 540, 541 (E.D. Mich. 1997) (citations omitted). For the reasons discussed below, the Court concludes that Plaintiff has not shown that this situation merits the extraordinary preliminary injunction remedy.
Van-Rob states that ENA can "cover" by paying the increased price and pursuing "adequate compensatory or other correct relief . . . at a later date, in the ordinary course of litigation." Sampson v. Murray, 415 U.S. 61, 90 (1974) (quoting Virginia Petroleum Jobbers Ass'n v. Federal Power Commission, 259 F.2d 921, 925 (D.C. Cir. 1958)); see also e.g., Cellnet Communications, Inc. v. New Par, 291 F. Supp.2d 565, 570 (E.D. Mich. 2003) ("[t]he classic remedy for breach of contract is an action at law for damages. If the injury complained of may be compensated by an award of monetary damages, then an adequate remedy at law exists and no irreparable harm may be found as a matter of law") (quoting Jerome-Duncan, Inc. v. Auto-By-Tel,L.L.C., 966 F. Supp. 540, 541 (E.D. Mich. 1997)); Paw Paw Wine Distributors, Inc. v. Joseph E. Seagram Sons, Inc., 603 F. Supp. 398, 401 (W.D. Mich. 1985) (finding that although obtaining wine from another distributor was more expensive, plaintiff did not suffer irreparable harm and money damages were adequate). Van-Rob asserts that ENA's "adequate compensatory or other complete relief" is suing Van-Rob for the difference between the alleged contract price and Van-Rob's price. Van-Rob asserts that this course of action will allow ENA to preserve its business relationship with Chrysler, prevent its production from being interrupted, save its reputation, and maintain its right to pursue damages from Van-Rob.
Injunctive relief "is an extraordinary remedy which should best be used sparingly." Jerome-Duncan, Inc. v. Auto-By-Tel, L.L.C., 966 F. Supp. 540, 541 (E.D.Mich. 1997). Injunctive relief will issue only where an extraordinary equitable case has been made by plaintiff.