Jerauld ex Rel. Robinson v. Carl

16 Citing cases

  1. Kindoll v. S. Health Partners

    CIVIL ACTION NO. 17-84-DLB-CJS (E.D. Ky. Mar. 28, 2019)

    However, under the doctrine of qualified immunity, "government officials performing discretionary functions . . . are shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known." Jerauld ex rel. Robinson v. Carl, 405 F. App'x 970, 975 (6th Cir. 2010) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)). The Defendants do not contest that they acted under color of state law.

  2. Jordan v. Summit Cnty.

    CASE NO. 5:17-cv-02047 (N.D. Ohio Mar. 10, 2020)   Cited 1 times

    "To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States, and must show that the alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law." Gray v. City of Detroit, 399 F.3d 612, 615 (6th Cir. 2005) (quoting West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48, 108 S. Ct. 2250, 101 L.Ed.2d 40 (1988)); Watkins v. City of Battle Creek, 273 F.3d 682, 685 (6th Cir. 2001) ("To establish a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must 'identify a right secured by the United States Constitution and the deprivation of that right by a person acting under color of state law.'") (quoting Russo v. City of Cincinnati, 953 F.2d 1036, 1042 (6th Cir. 1992); see also Jerauld v. Carl, 405 Fed. Appx. 970, 974-975 (6th Cir. Dec. 30, 2010). Plaintiff alleges a violation of Jordan's constitutional rights, arguing Defendants violated his right to be free from deliberate indifference to a serious medical need, the right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment and the right to reasonable medical treatment while detained so as not to unnecessarily and wantonly inflict pain.

  3. Jordan v. Summit Cnty.

    CASE NO. 5:17-cv-02047 (N.D. Ohio Sep. 11, 2018)   Cited 2 times

    Gray v. City of Detroit, 399 F.3d 612, 615 (6th Cir. 2005) (quoting West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48, 108 S. Ct. 2250, 101 L.Ed.2d 40 (1988)); Watkins v. City of Battle Creek, 273 F.3d 682, 685 (6th Cir. 2001) ("To establish a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must 'identify a right secured by the United States Constitution and the deprivation of that right by a person acting under color of state law.'") (quoting Russo v. City of Cincinnati, 953 F.2d 1036, 1042 (6th Cir. 1992); see also Jerauld v. Carl, 405 Fed. Appx. 970, 974-975 (6th Cir. Dec. 30, 2010).

  4. Grabow v. Cnty. of Macomb

    580 F. App'x 300 (6th Cir. 2014)   Cited 52 times
    Holding that a plaintiff who exhibits suicidal tendencies during detention has satisfied this element

    In the context of inmate suicide cases, "the proper inquiry concerning the liability of a City and its employees in both their official and individual capacities under § 1983 . . . is[] whether the decedent showed a strong likelihood that [s]he would attempt to take [her] own life in such a manner that failure to take adequate precautions amounted to a deliberate indifference to the decedent's serious medical needs." Gray v. City of Detroit, 399 F.3d 612, 616 (6th Cir. 2005) (quoting Barber v. City of Salem, 953 F.2d 232, 239-40 (6th Cir. 1992)); see also Jerauld v. Carl, 405 F. App'x 970, 976 (6th Cir. 2010) ("[T]he central inquiry is whether the defendants identified [the inmate's] suicidal tendencies and were deliberately indifferent to them."); Cooper v. Cnty. of Washtenaw, 222 F. App'x 459, 470 (6th Cir. 2007) (finding that a claim that an official "should have known that [an inmate] was suicidal" was "insufficient for a deliberate indifference claim"). Under our deliberate indifference jurisprudence, we have held that a plaintiff demonstrated deliberate indifference sufficient to overcome a motion for summary judgment when, for example: (1) the prison official who placed the inmate on suicide watch failed to review medical records and psychological tests administered to an inmate, did not speak to officers who arranged psychological consults for an inmate or observed the inmate on a daily basis, did not speak with psychologists who previously met with an inmate, and only asked the inmate a few cursory questions before removing the inmate from close observation, Comstock, 273 F.3d at

  5. Troutman v. Louisville Metro Dep't of Corr.

    Civil Action No. 3:16-cv-742-DJH-CHL (W.D. Ky. Mar. 3, 2020)

    When an inmate does not express ongoing suicidal ideation or behavior suggesting suicidal tendencies to a prison official, generally that official cannot be found "aware of a substantial risk that [the] inmate would attempt suicide." Jerauld v. Carl, 405 F. App'x 970, 978 (6th Cir. 2010); see also Soles, 148 F. App'x at 419 (finding defendant's decision to return inmate to general population did not amount to deliberate indifference when inmate had not expressed suicidal thoughts for two weeks and there was "no glaring, new factor" that defendants should have investigated). If the prison official was not aware of the risk, he could not have acted with deliberate indifference.

  6. Ward v. Corizon Health, Inc.

    CIVIL ACTION NO. 15-cv-11902 (E.D. Mich. Jul. 12, 2016)   Cited 7 times

    And with regard to Defendant Nakata's alleged violation of a standing order that an inmate who is experiencing a neurological problem be seen by healthcare staff immediately, Plaintiff has not provided any evidence to suggest that such a violation amounts to more than mere negligence. See Jerauld ex rel. Robinson v. Carl, 405 F. App'x 970, 976 (6th Cir. 2010) (citation omitted) ("Deliberate indifference requires a degree of culpability greater than mere negligence."). Plaintiff has failed to show that Defendant Nakata acted unconstitutionally, and where there is no constitutional violation, "the plaintiff's § 1983 claim fails as a matter of law and the defendant is therefore entitled to summary judgment and does not need qualified immunity."

  7. Lawler v. Hardeman Cnty.

    93 F.4th 919 (6th Cir. 2024)   Cited 53 times
    Finding no deliberate indifference where inmate "ranted and raved over... six and a half hours" and repeatedly kicked and hit his cell door before committing suicide

    We have repeatedly stated that the estates of deceased inmates can satisfy this element by showing that the inmates suffered from "psychological needs" that led them to have "suicidal tendencies." Horn v. Madison Cnty. Fiscal Ct., 22 F.3d 653, 660 (6th Cir. 1994); see, e.g., Baker-Schneider v. Napoleon, 769 F. App'x 189, 192 (6th Cir. 2019); Nallani v. Wayne County, 665 F. App'x 498, 507 (6th Cir. 2016); Broughton v. Premier Health Care Servs., 656 F. App'x 54, 56 (6th Cir. 2016); Bonner-Turner v. City of Ecorse, 627 F. App'x 400, 407-08 (6th Cir. 2015); Jerauld ex rel. Robinson v. Carl, 405 F. App'x 970, 975 (6th Cir. 2010); Cooper v. County of Washtenaw, 222 F. App'x 459, 465 (6th Cir. 2007); Linden v. Washtenaw County, 167 F. App'x 410, 416 (6th Cir. 2006); Comstock v. McCrary, 273 F.3d 693, 703-04 (6th Cir. 2001).

  8. Broughton v. Premier Health Care Servs., Inc.

    Case No. 15-4150 (6th Cir. Jul. 15, 2016)   Cited 8 times

    While Broughton's disclaimer of suicidal ideation does not automatically insulate the defendants from liability, it does undermine the claim that they willfully ignored his past medical history and current symptomology. See, e.g., Grabow, 580 F. App'x at 304 (noting that the plaintiff said that she "never attempted suicide and did not feel like she wanted to hurt herself at that time"); Jerauld ex rel. Robinson v. Carl, 405 F. App'x 970, 978 (6th Cir. 2010) (noting that the plaintiff "did not express suicidal ideations . . . to any . . . jail personnel"); Perez v. Oakland Cty., 466 F.3d 416, 434-35 (6th Cir. 2006) (Griffin, J., concurring) (concluding that a plaintiff who "appeared and claimed to be in a much-improved state of mind" could not establish deliberate indifference); Gray, 399 F.3d at 614 (noting that the defendant "had not expressed any suicidal intent"). Even taking all of this circumstantial evidence together, it cannot be said that these defendants subjectively perceived facts from which to infer Broughton's risk of suicide, that they did in fact draw the inference, and that they then disregarded the risk.

  9. Horn v. City of Covington

    CIVIL ACTION NO. 14-73-DLB-CJS (E.D. Ky. Aug. 14, 2018)   Cited 5 times
    In Horn v. City of Covington, the court found the plaintiff satisfied the "obviousness" standard because he presented sufficient evidence that he exhibited obvious manifestations of pain - he complained of abdominal pain, was unable to void, had genital pain, and brown urine.

    Horn has presented evidence that his complaints were "ignored or [officers] responded unreasonably to [Horn's] request for help." Jerauld exrel. Robinson v. Carl, 405 F. App'x 970, 979 (6th Cir. 2010). "Where officers are aware that an inmate is exhibiting severe symptoms, there exists 'a triable issue of fact about whether the guards should have contacted medical personnel in response to this problem or at least should have tried to engage [the inmate] verbally or entered his cell.'"

  10. Bradford v. Albercook

    CIVIL ACTION NO. 16-cv-12214 (E.D. Mich. Jul. 31, 2018)   Cited 1 times
    Rejecting claim that termination of early chow pass amounted to deliberate indifference to inmate's gastroesophageal reflux disease

    Plaintiff's allegation against Defendant Albercook, at most, represents an allegation of mere negligence, which is simply not sufficient to allow Plaintiff's claim to proceed as a constitutional violation for deliberate indifference. See Jerauld ex rel. Robinson v. Carl, 405 F. App'x 970, 976 (6th Cir. 2010) (citation omitted) ("Deliberate indifference requires a degree of culpability greater than mere negligence."). Defendant Albercook's Motion for Summary Judgment (docket no. 35) should therefore be granted.