Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County No. 37-2007-00076370- CU-WM-SC, William Cannon, Judge.
HALLER, J.
Jackie Lancaster and Earl Jentz (petitioners) petitioned for a writ of mandate seeking an order that the City of Chula Vista (City) produce public records requested under the California Public Records Act (CPRA). After the City produced numerous documents and privilege logs in response to petitioners' requests, the parties filed cross-motions for judgment. The court granted the City's motion and denied petitioners' motion for judgment in their favor, finding all requested public records had been produced.
The court also denied petitioners' request for attorney fees under Government Code section 6259, subdivision (d), which requires a court to award a plaintiff reasonable attorney fees if the plaintiff prevailed in litigation under the CPRA. The court determined petitioners were not prevailing parties because the litigation did not cause the City to produce the records, and the requested documents would have been produced irrespective of the litigation. The court thus entered judgment in the City's favor.
Section 6259, subdivision (d) states: "The court shall award court costs and reasonable attorney fees to the plaintiff should the plaintiff prevail in litigation filed pursuant to this section...." All statutory references are to the Government Code unless otherwise specified.
On appeal, petitioners challenge only the court's ruling they were not prevailing parties under section 6259, subdivision (d). We conclude substantial evidence supports the court's finding that petitioners' lawsuit did not cause the City to disclose any of the documents ultimately produced to petitioners. Accordingly, the court did not err in concluding petitioners were not prevailing parties and in refusing to award attorney fees to petitioners.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
As explained below, the issue before us is whether there was substantial evidence to support the trial court's factual conclusion that petitioners' lawsuit did not cause the City to release some or all of the requested public records. To resolve this issue, it is necessary to examine in detail the communications between the parties, the timing of the public record productions, and the nature of the records produced.
I. Factual Summary of Events Before Lawsuit
From mid-2006 through mid-2007, the City engaged in a political process to prepare a new land use plan for the downtown Chula Vista area, known as the Urban Core Specific Plan (Specific Plan). Lancaster and Jentz each filed a CPRA request with the City seeking documents pertaining to the adoption of the Specific Plan. We summarize each request and the City's responses below.
A. Lancaster's CPRA Request
On March 19, 2007, Lancaster requested the City to produce public records under the CPRA. Two months later, on May 9, Lancaster resubmitted her request through counsel. This request included all records pertaining to "communications [from] December 1, 2006 through the present between Mr. Gordon Carrier" and "Mayor Cox and/or any of the mayor's staff." Carrier was an architect who worked on matters relating to the Specific Plan.
Nine days later, on May 18, the City responded to Lancaster's request, stating it was locating and collecting responsive documents and would need until June 4 to respond to her request. On June 4, the City emailed responsive documents to Lancaster.
About one month later, on July 9, Lancaster's counsel requested the City to provide additional responsive documents that were "referred to" in the public records provided on June 4. Of particular relevance here, Lancaster's counsel attached an Exhibit 1 to his letter, which was a copy of a May 1, 2007 e-mail from Mayor Cheryl Cox to senior assistant city attorney Bart Miesfeld, stating that Cox has a document responsive to Lancaster's request, and the document was "from Mr. Carrier which he gave me at a meeting at February 14" and "Natalie will bring a copy to you." Lancaster's counsel said the June 4 public records production did not include a copy of this document ("the Carrier document"), and requested assistant city attorney Miesfeld to provide Lancaster with a copy.
Two weeks later, on July 23, Miesfeld responded that he had requested "the appropriate personnel [to] begin researching and collecting the additional [requested] documents" and asked for an additional two weeks to respond to Lancaster's request.
Three weeks later, on August 15, Lancaster's attorney sent another letter to Miesfeld noting that Lancaster had not yet received the requested documents, including the Carrier document. Two weeks later, on August 31, Lancaster's attorney wrote another letter to Miesfeld, again identifying the "unfilled" document requests, which included the Carrier document.
One week later, on September 7, the City responded, enclosing one of Lancaster's requested documents, and stating: "With regard to your request for a copy of the [Carrier document]..., currently the City has been unable to locate this document. We are still searching for the same, and will notify you when the same has been located."
Two weeks later, on September 21, Lancaster (with Jentz) filed the writ petition at issue in this appeal, claiming the City had violated the CPRA. Two weeks after petitioners filed this petition, the City produced the Carrier document and another set of documents that Carrier had given to Mayor Cox. As detailed below, the City later produced evidence showing the documents were produced as soon as they were located.
B. Jentz's CPRA Request
After the City adopted the Specific Plan, Jentz filed a lawsuit against the City ("the Jentz I action"), alleging the Specific Plan was inconsistent with the City's controlled growth provisions, popularly known as the "Cummings Initiative."
The Cummings Initiative was adopted by Chula Vista voters in 1988, and is contained in Section 19.80 of the Chula Vista Municipal Code.
On July 27, 2007, Jentz's counsel submitted a CPRA request for the following documents: "All communications, electronic and hardcopy (including but not limited to drafts and final memoranda, e-mails, reports, letters, and all other documents), concerning and/or containing City staff evaluation, analysis, or any other consideration of compliance and/or consistency between the [Specific Plan], or any portion thereof, and the [Cummings Initiative]. The requested records include all such communications, including but not limited to those concerning previous or non-final drafts or proposals for the [Specific Plan], and proposed or non-final drafts or amendments to the [Cummings Initiative]. The requested records include all such documents in the custody, possession, or control of the Community Development Department, and each and every City or Redevelopment Agency employee within the Department." Jentz's counsel stated he was seeking "inspection and photocopying of [the specified] records" and that "[t]he purpose this request is to obtain complete photocopies of [the] records...."
Five days later, on August 1, the City's outside counsel, Mark Dillon, telephoned Jentz's counsel, John Lemmo, to discuss the City's preparation of the administrative record in Jentz I and to clarify Jentz's CPRA request, particularly to inquire whether the request was duplicative of documents Jentz would receive as part of the Jentz I administrative record. Lemmo responded that the request was intended to be separate and distinct from, and narrower in scope than, the request for the preparation of the administrative records.
On August 7, Dillon wrote to Lemmo summarizing this telephone conversation. In the letter, Dillon confirmed that the City would be preparing the requested administrative record in the Jentz I litigation. With respect to Jentz's CPRA request, Dillon stated that during the August 1 phone conversation,
"you indicated that your [CPRA] request... was intended to be narrower in scope than the request for preparation of the [administrative] record and you further indicated that the request was intended to refer to specific documents analyzing the consistency between the [Specific Plan] and the [Cummings Initiative]. We agreed to ask City staff whether they have documents responsive to such a request; you noted that you might be agreeable to including the production of such documents, if they exist, in the [Jentz I] administrative record. Pursuant to our inquiry, staff has indicated that they would like further clarification as to what you are requesting, as they have broadly interpreted your request to include much of what is anticipated to be included in the record in this case. Therefore, please provide us with clarification as to the intended scope of your [CPRA] request, and whether it is intended to relate to specific documents, so that staff can determine whether or not there are documents responsive to your request." (Italics added.)
Two days later, on August 9, Lemmo wrote to Dillon, reiterating that Jentz was seeking documents "specifically address[ing] the compliance or consistency" of the Specific Plan with the Cummings Initiative:
"My request was intended to be narrower than was apparently understood by staff. To clarify, I am requesting inspection and photocopying of specific records of intra- and inter-office correspondence, discussions, evaluations, analyses, and the like which specifically address the compliance or consistency of the [Specific Plan] (or any aspect or subset of the [Specific Plan] with the Cummings Initiative.... I am aware of at least several discussions of this issue in staff reports published with Council Agendas. I believe that there are other such records that were not published as part of staff reports. I believe that the Community Development Department staff are aware of such records, and can identify and produce them rather quickly...."
Fifteen days later, on August 24, Dillon notified Lemmo that the City staff would be "responding directly to your [CPRA] request."
One week later, on August 31, Lemmo wrote to City Attorney Anne Moore, complaining that the City had not complied with the CPRA, which requires a public agency to respond to a public records request within 10 days by communicating a determination whether the request seeks "disclosable public records" in the agency's possession and a time estimate for the availability of the documents. (§ 6253, subd. (c).) Lemmo stated that the City "has not communicated any determination" in response to his July 27 request, and that "[i]n light of the clear description provided and recent nature of the records requested, there is no legitimate reason that staff could have any difficulty identifying and producing the records...." Lemmo asked the City to respond by September 5, and said he intended to seek judicial relief and attorney fees if the City did not comply with its statutory obligations.
Section 6253, subdivision (c) provides: "Each agency, upon a request for a copy of records, shall, within 10 days from receipt of the request, determine whether the request, in whole or in part, seeks copies of disclosable public records in the possession of the agency and shall promptly notify the person making the request of the determination and the reasons therefor. In unusual circumstances, the time limit prescribed in this section may be extended by written notice by the head of the agency or his or her designee to the person making the request, setting forth the reasons for the extension and the date on which a determination is expected to be dispatched. No notice shall specify a date that would result in an extension for more than 14 days. When the agency dispatches the determination, and if the agency determines that the request seeks disclosable public records, the agency shall state the estimated date and time when the records will be made available."
One week later, on September 7, deputy city attorney Michael Shirey wrote to Lemmo, stating: (1) the City considered Jentz's request to have been made on August 9, rather than July 27, based on the clarifications in the August 9 letter; (2) the City needed 24 additional days to respond because of the need to search for documents in "field facilities or other establishments" and to examine "voluminous" records; and (3) "[a]dding this 24-day extension... to August 9th indicates that a response date from this office would be on or about September 4...." Shirey also said Jentz's request remained unclear, but the City would be producing responsive documents:
"[T]he 'clarification' language submitted in your August 9th letter did not really clarify the request. Terms and phrases like: 'discussion (which is not a record),' 'and the like,' and 'any aspect or subset of the [Specific Plan]' do not clearly identify a public record. As we discussed on the telephone, staff did indeed still have difficulty in interpreting your request and this office did have to attempt to assist staff in determining exactly what records you actually wanted.
"To that end, and to comply with your request, staff has provided this office with responsive documents. However, they still may not be what you are, in actuality, looking for. Pursuant to your clarified request above, you are requesting documents that specifically address the compliance or consistency of the [Specific Plan] with the Cummings Initiative. The only document that does this is Attachment 6, 'Analysis of CVCMC 19.80 and the Urban Core Specific Plan' which was included in the agenda packets for the... hearings (which you should already have a copy of and which also will be provided as part of the Administrative Record for the Jentz [I] Case). Further, staff did submit other memoranda and exhibits which are also responsive to your request and which will be provided to you.
"Notwithstanding the forgoing, and pursuant to Government Code § 6253(1)(a), which requires a public agency to assist the public in obtaining responsive documents, if you are looking for staff reports and information concerning potential revisions to the Cummings Initiative, this information does exist; however, these documents do not address the compliance or consistency of the [Specific Plan] with the Cummings Initiative as they were being prepared for City Council's consideration in light of the Cummings Initiative being almost 20-years old. If these are the documents that you are actually looking for, please so advise and this office will forward them to you."
Shirey enclosed Attachment 6 with this letter.
Three days later, on September 10, Lemmo wrote to Shirey, again reiterating his July 27 request seeking documents that address the consistency between the Specific Plan and the Cummings Initiative:
"My July 27 request was clear, and addresses a narrow scope of records in the manner described by City staff at public meetings a few months earlier. For example, Planning and Building Director Jim Sandoval has publicly stated that the Cummings Initiative needed to be addressed in order for the [Specific Plan] to move forward, i.e. in order for the [Specific Plan] to be compliant and/or consistent with the Cummings Initiative. Certainly, responsive records that we expect you to produce will include the memoranda, internal email communications and other records related to, relied upon and referred to by Mr. Sandoval (and other staff) in statements to the public and the Council. Also responsive are staff notes and other records from internal meetings and conferences where revisions to the Cummings Initiative were discussed.
[¶]... [¶]
"Given the highly politicized nature of growth in the City, the proposed Cummings Initiative revisions, the [Specific Plan], and the numerous discussions at public meetings by staff and officials (concerning the precise topic of my records request), it is simply not credible for City officials to now pretend that they do not understand the request. Further, there is no legitimate reason that the City has not made a determination and fully produced records responsive to my request that was received by the City more than six weeks ago....
"In any event, although you have failed to make the determination required by the Act, it has become clear that the City possesses numerous responsive records. You mentioned by telephone... that staff is compiling responsive documents, and that you expected them to be available for inspection by Wednesday, September 12. [Your] September 7 letter [also] appears to refer to some of those records. Please contact me as to time of day and location for the records inspection."
That same day, Shirey responded to Lemmo's letter as follows:
"As I indicated in my [September 7 letter], this office worked with staff in an attempt to determine if there were indeed responsive documents and we informed you that if you were looking for staff reports and information concerning potential revisions to the Cummings Initiative, this information does exist; however, again, these documents do not address the compliance or consistency of the [Specific Plan] with the Cummings Initiative, as your August 9th clarification letter specifically requested.
"Your [September 10] letter indicates that you want to inspect the responsive documents. You are welcome to schedule an appointment... or I can forward the responsive documents to you...."
The next day, on September 11, the City sent 115 pages of responsive documents to Lemmo. The documents consisted primarily of a planning commission agenda and copies of draft proposed amendments to the City's municipal code, and only one e-mail between city employees.
Two days later, on September 13, Lemmo wrote to Shirey, stating that the documents produced did not appear to constitute a complete response to his CPRA request. Specifically, Lemmo stated:
"I requested all staff email communications... regarding the consistency of the [Specific Plan] with the Cummings Initiative.... In our telephone conversation on September 10, I clarified to you that my request included the proposed revisions to the Cummings Initiative considered by the city several months ago. You produced only one email message, which was a transmission of an agenda item from a secretary to members of the public. We find it very difficult to believe that only one email record was generated concerning a significant revision of an important ordinance. Please confirm that this was the only email message sent or received by any city or agency staff member related to the proposed revisions to the Cummings Initiative. Please also state the name and titles of the person(s) responsible for that determination.
"Also, I have obtained from various other sources copies of several clearly responsive records which I expected to encounter in your production, which were not produced. Therefore, I request that you immediately identify and produce all writings, as defined in the Act, from all staff that relate to or discuss any proposed revisions of the Cummings Initiative that were generated anytime in the past 12 months.... I also request the electronic forms of all responsive records pursuant to section 6253.9. As my request has been pending for seven weeks, please identify and produce the records quickly.
"We would like a production no later than Monday, September 17. We would like to avoid seeking judicial relief.... However, if we cannot obtain a complete production from the city, we will not hesitate to seek judicial relief...."
Four days later, on September 17, Shirey wrote to Lemmo, stating the City "disagrees with your contention that the City has failed to provide responsive documents," and noting the City had provided Jentz with a document (Attachment 6) responsive to the request for documents regarding the "compliance or consistency" of the Specific Plan with the Cummings Initiative. Shirey also said that based on Lemmo's September 13 letter, it appeared that Jentz's request had changed to seeking documents pertaining to " 'any proposed revisions of the Cummings Initiative,' " rather than only documents relating to the consistency between the Specific Plan and the Cummings Initiative. Shirey then stated:
"In any event, staff had already forwarded to me certain documents responsive to your request for documents relating to the proposed revisions of the Cummings Initiative, which I... forwarded to you on September 11, 2007. Please be advised, I forwarded everything to you that staff provided to this office.
"Since your request has indeed changed, this office considers September 13..., as the date of the [new] initial request.... I am advising you that we have forwarded your September 13... request to staff and have again requested that they provide this office with any additional responsive records, if they exist. Further, since your request is wide-ranging in that you request 'all writings' from 'all staff,' this office must again assert its authority to extend the time to reply. As discussed below, if you have a certain document or documents in mind that you are specifically looking for, please provide a description of such documents and this office will endeavor to have staff search for and provide them to us for our review.
".... Please be advised, this office has no intention of withholding responsive records from disclosure, unless they fall under a statutory exception therefrom (in which case we would review whether disclosure of the information clearly outweighs the public interest in disclosure) or contain privileged information.
"This office has requested that staff immediately again go through their files and forward any additional responsive records, if any such documents exist, to us for review. Upon receipt of any responsive records, and after our review, this office will contact you regarding the same." (Italics added.)
Shirey also expressed concern that Jentz had improperly obtained privileged documents from another source, and asked Jentz to forward any such documents to the City.
Four days later, on September 21, Jentz (with Lancaster), filed the petition for writ of mandate seeking an order directing the City to provide petitioners "with photocopies and electronic forms of all public records responsive to [petitioners'] CPRA Requests..., including all email and other electronic records...."
II. Events Occurring After the September 21 Lawsuit Was Filed
On October 4, two weeks after filing their lawsuit, petitioners filed a motion for production of the requested records, and noticed a November 9 hearing for the motion.
The next day, on October 5, the City sent petitioners 526 pages of responsive documents. These documents consisted of the missing Carrier document and another set of documents prepared by Carrier, and numerous documents responsive to Jentz's request. The Jentz responsive documents included records specifically pertaining to the consistency of the Specific Plan with the Cummings Initiative, and proposed revisions to the Cummings Initiative. The City also produced an index of documents exempt from production, in which the City indicated it was withholding 55 e-mail documents based on "Confidential Attorney-Client and Work-Product Privileges." The City's counsel also stated that "we have requested [City] staff to continue to search for any additional documents that may be responsive to Mr. Jentz's [CPRA] request." Eleven days later, the City sent petitioners about 450 additional pages of documents responsive to Jentz's request (consisting of e-mails and other documents), and a revised privilege log identifying additional documents the City claimed were exempt based on the attorney-client privilege and work product doctrine.
The City also produced a declaration by assistant city attorney Miesfeld who was initially responsible for responding to Lancaster's request. He stated that in May 2007 Mayor Cox had delivered to him the Carrier document, which was a "two-page matrix," and that in his opinion the matrix did not appear to be responsive to Lancaster's request. In response to Lancaster's repeated requests, Miesfeld conducted further investigation and learned there was an additional document that Carrier had given to Mayor Cox, but that document could not be immediately located by staff. Thereafter, the additional Carrier document (which consisted of a set of documents labeled A, B, and C) was located and provided to Lancaster (along with the matrix) on October 5 or 6. The City also produced additional records to Lancaster which it had discovered were inadvertently not included in the prior production.
With respect to Jentz's document request, the City stated: "all responsive documents received from City staff that are not otherwise exempt have been produced." The City also confirmed that all of the documents identified on the Exemption Logs were protected by the attorney-client privilege and/or the attorney work product doctrine. The City asserted it had attempted to work in good faith with petitioners' counsel to clarify and locate all responsive documents, and petitioners had failed to show the City had improperly withheld any records. The City also stated that petitioners had never requested documents in electronic form.
In reply, petitioners objected to the privilege logs, stating the logs did not show the withheld documents involved an attorney-client communication, and requested the court to perform an in camera review of the documents. Petitioners also argued that the City had improperly withheld many responsive records, including e-mail messages, and gave numerous examples of e-mails that would be expected based on the documents produced. Petitioners also argued the most recent production was incomplete because "[n]o records were produced in an electronic format" and "[t]he records were never provided for inspection as requested, but were photocopied and billed to petitioner."
At the November 9 hearing, the City's outside counsel (Dillon) confirmed he had met with City staff, and had personally communicated to the staff the nature of Jentz's document requests and the importance of identifying and producing all responsive documents. He said that City staff was continuing to look for documents in response to petitioners' claims that there appeared to be missing records. Dillon also agreed to provide amended privilege logs to identify the roles of the sender and recipient of each withheld document, and the general context of each document. Dillon further agreed to produce documents in an electronic format after petitioners' counsel stated that Jentz had made that request in his September 13 letter. The court urged the parties to work together on these issues, and told the parties to bring any additional disputes to the court's attention.
One month later, on December 6, the City provided updated Exemption Log indexes. At a status conference held one month later in January 2008, the City's counsel confirmed the City was continuing to conduct a time-consuming review of numerous additional documents, including e-mails and other electronic documents. Two weeks later, on January 18, the City produced approximately 100 additional pages responsive to Jentz's request, and a third volume of the Exemption Log index with documents redacted to exclude the protected text. During the next month, the City produced numerous additional responsive documents in electronic form on three different dates. At the end of this production, the City stated: "This completes the production of electronic documents in connection with the referenced case."
On February 7, the City produced a DVD containing approximately 4,000 pages of electronic documents. On February 21, the City produced a supplemental Exemption Log (Volume 4), identifying the electronic documents claimed as exempt from production, and a DVD containing approximately 478 pages of electronic documents with the exempt portions redacted. Also on that same date, the City produced a DVD containing approximately 1,702 pages of responsive e-mails/Outlook files. On February 27, the City produced a supplemental Exemption Log (Volume 5), indexing the e-mails/Outlook files claimed as exempt and a DVD containing approximately 2,952 pages of exempt e-mails/Outlook files with the exempt portions redacted.
The next month, on March 6, the City moved for judgment in its favor, arguing the undisputed facts showed it had fully complied with the CPRA in responding to petitioners' requests. Petitioners opposed the motion, stating it appeared the City was still improperly withholding numerous documents and the City was continuing to apply CPRA exemptions too broadly. Petitioners identified several examples of potentially responsive documents, including staff calendar entries and drafts of various memoranda.
The next month, on April 8, petitioners moved for judgment in their favor, and requested the court to find they had prevailed in the action because the "lawsuit and the subsequent instructions given by this Court have forced the City to meet some of its obligations under the CPRA." (Italics in original.) Petitioners argued that they "have obtained additional, directly-responsive records only because of this lawsuit seeking that relief, and because the City hired outside counsel to help it try to comply." Petitioners also asserted that the City continued to improperly withhold records, and asked the court to review in camera the records claimed to be exempt. In support, petitioners produced a lengthy declaration of their counsel, Gregory Moser. In the declaration, Moser stated that the City was still "withholding and redacting what appear to be draft memoranda or other writings" that did not appear to be subject to attorney-client privilege or the work product doctrine, and he described many of these documents.
On April 22, the City filed an opposition to petitioners' motion, arguing that petitioners were not prevailing parties because the lawsuit did not motivate the production of the requested records. The City produced the declaration of Johnny Tran, an associate in the City's outside counsel's law firm, who described the time-consuming nature of the document search and production. In particular, he stated: "I have personal knowledge that Jentz's production of documents took several months because of the sheer volume of documents produced (around 11,000) and because Jentz insisted documents be produced in hardcopy and electronic form. The production of documents to Jentz was delayed in part due to technological issues. For example, a lot of effort went into redacting documents electronically and providing e-mails without granting access to the City's databases and servers, which contained unresponsive and highly sensitive material. Also documents had to be put into different electronic formats so they could be produced to Jentz...." The City also opposed the request for an in camera review of the withheld documents.
The day before filing this opposition, on April 21, the City sent a letter to petitioners' counsel stating the City has "re-reviewed records that have not yet been produced to your clients in response to their respective [CPRA] requests. This undertaking took place in order to further meet and confer with you over disputes centered on exempted or privileged documents. After having completed this process, the City has elected to disclose additional records, which are currently being placed onto a disk and will be produced to you by Tuesday or Wednesday of this week. We estimate that an additional 1,500 pages of record have been disclosed, bringing the total produced documents to over 11,000 pages. The disk also contains records that have been redacted, and we will enclose a revised privilege log along with the disk to explain the basis for withholding particular records. The City's most recent production discloses as much information as possible without substantively violating the exemptions and privileges described below. [¶]... [¶] [W]e submit that the City has competed production of the non-privileged documents that are responsive to your client's [CPRA] requests."
On April 22, the City produced approximately 1,300 additional documents to petitioners, consisting of about 4,000 pages.
Nine days later, the court issued a ruling tentatively granting the City's motion for judgment, and denying petitioners' motion to be declared prevailing parties. However, at the hearing, the court agreed to provide petitioners with a continuance to allow petitioners to review the City's most recent (April 22) public records production. The court permitted each party to file additional briefs based solely on new issues raised by the City's April 22 production.
In their supplemental brief, petitioners described that many of the newly produced documents specifically concerned the issue of the compliance/consistency of the Specific Plan with the Cummings Initiative, and many of those documents were authored by, or copied to, deputy city attorney Shirey within several months of Jentz's initial (July 2007) request that specifically sought these documents. Petitioners also described that the documents show Shirey was the city employee responsible for many aspects of the Specific Plan/Cummings Initiative consistency issue. Based on this new information, petitioners asserted that Shirey must have known in July, August, and September 2007, that there were numerous records responsive to the request for Specific Plan/Cummings Initiative consistency documents, but Shirey nonetheless withheld them, and that it was necessary for petitioners to file a lawsuit in September 2007 to finally trigger the City's production of these documents. Petitioners argued: "The April 22 production demonstrates that the City staff knew exactly what Jentz was asking for, and where to find it. The City did not respond in good faith. The City finally produced ma[n]y records on April 22, 2008 directly as a result of this lawsuit and the [petitioners'] motion requesting that the Court review those first-concealed then wrongfully-withheld records in camera."
In response, the City denied that it had "hid" any documents, and asserted it had produced all responsive records in a timely fashion. The City explained that its latest (April 2008) record production was the result of several factors, including: (1) the City staff had difficulty understanding the scope of the request; (2) petitioners "changed and broadened"their request to include documents not requested previously; (3) petitioners requested the records be produced electronically and the process of formatting, producing, and redacting electronic records was extremely burdensome and time-consuming; (4) the City was required to redact thousands of pages of attorney-client privileged information; (5) the City had to comply with numerous other CPRA requests filed by petitioners at about the same time; (6) the City's April 22 production consists entirely of re-reviewed records, and thus required additional time for review and redaction of attorney-client privileged communication and attorney-work product. The City also detailed its efforts to comply with the numerous other public records requests filed by Jentz, which the City described as "massive and involved the assistance of numerous city attorneys and staff." The City asserted that: "These administrative difficulties explain the delay and that Mr. Shirey and the City were not hiding any documents. And although producing 11,000 pages of documents took time, the City did provide them, in compliance with the CPRA."
For example, the City stated that one of Jentz's other requests containing 98 line items generated 15 bankers' boxes, amounting to approximately 36,840 pages of records. In another instance, over 3,570 records were produced to petitioners with the assistance of three attorneys spending approximately 30 hours, four legal assistants spending approximately 32 hours and other City staff spending approximately 20 hours. City staff handled many of the CPRA requests at the same time they were locating, reviewing and copying records subject to CPRA requests that are the subject of this litigation.
The City also produced deputy city attorney Shirey's declaration to support that he acted in good faith to produce the requested documents and did not intentionally fail to produce any responsive documents. Shirey stated in part: "[P]etitioners claim that, without this suit, the City would not have responded to Mr. Jentz's CPRA requests. This is not accurate. The record shows that the City was not withholding documents and that it continued to search for responsive documents irrespective of this lawsuit." Shirey also said that petitioners' claims that he did not initially produce responsive documents "misstate[ ] my September 2007 correspondence. It also misstates ongoing efforts by me, City staff, and outside counsel, to continue to produce documents responsive to Mr. Jentz's CPRA requests irrespective of this lawsuit. For example, the closing paragraph of my September 17, 2007 letter [sent four days before petitioners filed the lawsuit] again informed Mr. Lemmo that the City would keep searching for responsive records...." The City also submitted a supplemental declaration of associate Tran, who again described the time-consuming nature of producing the documents in electronic form and redacting electronic documents.
At the May 30 hearing, the court stated it had reviewed the "additional paperwork" and this new information did not alter its conclusion that the lawsuit did not cause the City to produce any responsive documents. Petitioners' counsel countered that the newly produced documents clearly showed that Shirey had not been forthright in his initial assertions (before the lawsuit was filed) that there were no more responsive documents addressing the Specific Plan's consistency/compliance with the Cummings Initiative. The court interrupted and said that it disagreed with counsel's assertion that "the City or one of the city attorneys basically knew that the Cummings Initiative comparison was going on and they should have revealed that to you all through time...." The court stated: "[T]he court feels differently than you do about the culpability of the City. After reviewing all the documents, I do not feel that the City showed any type of lack of desire to comply with the law and to go forward with it. And... it took ten months to get everything done. [¶] I think there were a lot of issues involved that the City had to get involved in in order to interpret it. But I do not feel that there was a culpability on the part of the City in intentionally not providing you with the documents necessary." (Italics added.)
The court then confirmed its earlier ruling, finding in the City's favor and concluding petitioners were not prevailing parties entitled to attorney fees because petitioners did not show the lawsuit was the motivating factor in the production of the requested public records. On the prevailing party issue, the court explained its reasoning as follows:
" 'A plaintiff prevails in litigation under the Public Records Act if the litigation motivated the defendant to release the requested documents.' (Motorola Commun. & Electronics v. Dep't of General Servs. (1997) 55 Cal.App.4th 1340, 1344.) This is true if the action compelled [the defendant] to produce even one document. (Los Angeles Times v. Alameda Corridor Transportation Authority (2001) 88 Cal.App.4th 1381, 1391-1392.) Plaintiffs may be prevailing parties even though judgment was not entered in their favor. (Belth v. Garamendi (1991) 232 Cal.App.3d 896, 902.) The rationale for such an award is that the lawsuit spurred defendant to act or was a catalyst speeding defendant's response. (Ibid....) ' "The appropriate benchmarks in determining which party prevailed are (a) the situation immediately prior to the commencement of suit, and (b) the situation today, and the role, if any, played by the litigation in effecting any changes between the two." ' (Ibid....) 'More than post hoc, ergo propter hoc must be demonstrated.' (Motorola Commun. & Electronics v. Dep't of General Servs. (1997)55 Cal.App.4th 1340, 1345.)
"With respect to Lancaster, the lawsuit was not the motivating factor in producing the single document that was outstanding when the action was filed.... The missing document was produced on October 5, shortly after this action was filed. The City was clearly responding to Lancaster's request and there is no indication that the City would not have continued searching for the missing document if this action had not been filed.
"Jentz's position is essentially that the City's record of producing documents shortly before a hearing demonstrates the City has not been acting in good faith. Jentz highlights the City's decision to suddenly produce hundreds of pages of documents that it had previously withheld as privileged.
"While Jentz's argument may be facially appealing, the record shows the City was reasonably trying to comply with his requests. Jentz initially sought to obtain 'complete photocopies' of all Community Development Department communications regarding staff consideration of compliance and/or consistency between the [Specific Plan] and the Cummings Initiative. The City never stated that it did not intend to produce responsive documents, except for documents it believed were exempt under the Public Records Act. The City provided the only document it believed was responsive and suggested to plaintiff's counsel that the request might need to be clarified if Jentz were really looking for other documents, such as staff reports concerning potential revisions to the Cummings Initiative.
"In September 2007 Jentz changed his request to include all writings from all staff that relate to or discuss any proposed revisions to the Cummings Initiative within the past 12 months. This new request was broader because it was not limited to compliance and/or consistency between the [Specific Plan] and the Cummings Initiative and it was not limited to Community Development Department communications.
"In addition to the changing scope of the request, production was complicated by Jentz' request for the first time on September 13 that documents be produced in electronic form. On September 17, 2007[ ], shortly before this action was filed, the City stated 'it has no intention of withholding responsive records from disclosure, unless they fall under a statutory exception' or contain privileged information. The City stated it has requested that staff immediately go through their files again and if any responsive records were found plaintiffs would be notified.
"When the lawsuit was filed the City was actively trying to comply with the PRA request. Tran's declaration states much effort went into redacting documents electronically and providing emails without granting access to the City's databases and servers, and documents had to be put into different electronic formats.
"Moreover, the City was overwhelmed responding to numerous Public Record Act requests from Jentz's counsel at the same time.... Given the number of documents that had to be reviewed, it is unreasonable to expect full compliance within a matter of days or even weeks. The City released groups of documents as it conducted its review. The fact that the City considered Jentz's counsel's comments and decided to release some documents that it had previously determined were exempt does not compel a finding that plaintiffs are the prevailing parties. Given the extensive back and forth communication between the City and plaintiffs' counsel it is just as likely that the City was trying to work with plaintiffs to get them the documents they wanted. The above described circumstances show the City complied with the various requests and likely would have done so even if this action had not been filed." (Paragraph breaks added.)
The court also denied petitioners' motion for an in camera inspection of the withheld documents, noting that the CPRA does not authorize an in camera review for documents claimed to be protected by the attorney-client privilege. (See § 6259, subd. (a); Evid. Code, § 915, subd. (b).) The court additionally denied the City's request for attorney fees, finding petitioners' action was not "clearly frivolous." (See § 6259, subd. (d).) The court entered judgment in the City's favor on the preemptory writ.
On appeal, petitioners challenge only the court's ruling that they were not prevailing parties entitled to attorney fees under the CPRA.
DISCUSSION
I. The CPRA
The Legislature has declared that " 'access to information concerning the conduct of the people's business is a fundamental and necessary right of every person in this state.' " (§ 6250; see Filarsky v. Superior Court (2002) 28 Cal.4th 419, 426 (Filarsky).) To ensure this access, public agencies must keep public records "open to inspection at all times" during office hours. (§ 6253, subd. (a).) Additionally, "each state or local agency, upon a request for a copy of records that reasonably describes an identifiable record or records, shall make the records promptly available to any person...," unless the document is specifically exempt from disclosure. (§ 6253, subd. (b).) Exemptions from disclosure are set forth in sections 6254 and 6255. The CPRA must be broadly interpreted in favor of disclosure "to safeguard the accountability of government to the public." (Rogers v. Superior Court (1993) 19 Cal.App.4th 469, 475, 476; see Los Angeles Unified School Dist. v. Superior Court (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 759, 765.)
Upon receiving a request for a copy of public records, a public agency "generally must determine within 10 days whether the request seeks public records in the possession of the agency that are subject to disclosure" (Filarsky, supra, 28 Cal.4th at p. 426), and then promptly notify the requesting party of this determination and the reasons for the determination. (§ 6253, subd. (c); see fn. 3, ante.) Additionally, the agency must provide an "estimated date and time when the records will be made available." (Ibid.)
In "unusual circumstances," the public entity may extend this 10-day period "by written notice... setting forth the reasons for the extension and the date on which a determination is expected to be dispatched." (§ 6253, subd. (c).) But even if "unusual circumstances" exist, the agency cannot extend the determination date "for more than 14 days." (Ibid.)
Although the CPRA generally requires an agency within 10 days to determine whether responsive documents exist and provide an estimated date for the disclosure, the statutory scheme does not require production of the documents within that time and "does not specify when records must be produced to a requesting party." (Motorola Communication & Electronics, Inc. v. Department of General Services, supra, 55 Cal.App.4th at p. 1349 (Motorola Communication).)However, based on the statutory language and the overall purpose of the statute, the production must be prompt and made within a reasonable time after the request.
The CPRA sets forth specific procedures for a party to challenge a public agency's response to a public records request. (Filarsky, supra, 28 Cal.4th at p. 426.) Section 6258 provides: "[a]ny person may institute proceedings for injunctive or declarative relief or writ of mandate in any court... to enforce his or her right to inspect or to receive a copy of any public record or class of public records...." Because of the importance of the right to public records, the court must then reach a decision on the petition "at the earliest possible time." (§ 6258.) If the court "finds that the public official's decision to refuse disclosure is not justified under Section 6254 or 6255, the court shall order the public official to make the record public." (§ 6259, subd. (b).)
A plaintiff prevailing in litigation under the CPRA is entitled to attorney fees. (§ 6259, subd. (d); see fn. 1, ante.) This attorney fees award "is mandatory if the plaintiff prevails." (Filarsky, supra, 28 Cal.4th at p. 427; see Los Angeles Times v. Alameda Corridor Transportation Authority, supra, 88 Cal.App.4th at p. 1391 (Los Angeles Times).) The mandatory attorney fees award to a prevailing plaintiff serves to encourage " 'members of the public to seek judicial enforcement of their right to inspect public records subject to disclosure.' " (Galbiso v. Orosi Public Utility Dist. (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th 1063, 1088 (Galbiso).)
Although the statute does not define what it means for a plaintiff to "prevail" in CPRA litigation, the courts have construed this term to have a meaning similar to a "successful party" under Code of Civil Procedure section 1021.5. (See Belth v. Garamendi, supra, 232 Cal.App.3d at pp. 901-902 (Belth).) As explained in Belth, " 'Case law takes a pragmatic approach in defining [a prevailing party]. [Citation.] 'In order to justify a fee award, there must be a causal connection between the lawsuit and the relief obtained.' [Citation.] 'However, a plaintiff need not achieve a favorable final judgment in order to be a successful party. A defendant's voluntary action induced by plaintiff's lawsuit will still support an attorneys' fee award on the rationale that the lawsuit spurred defendant to act or was a catalyst speeding defendant's response.' [Citation.]... 'If plaintiff's lawsuit "induced" defendant's response or was "material factor" or "contributed in a significant way" to the result achieved then plaintiff has shown the necessary causal connection.' [Citation.] A plaintiff is considered the prevailing party if his lawsuit motivated defendants to provide the primary relief sought or activated them to modify their behavior [citation], or if the litigation substantially contributed to or was demonstrably influential in setting in motion the process which eventually achieved the desired result [citation]. ' "The appropriate benchmarks in determining which party prevailed are (a) the situation immediately prior to the commencement of suit, and (b) the situation today, and the role, if any, played by the litigation in effecting any changes between the two." ' [Citation.]" (Ibid., italics added.)
Thus, a plaintiff prevails within the meaning of section 6259, subdivision (d), " ' "when he or she files an action which results in defendant releasing a copy of a previously withheld document." [Citation.]' [Citations.] An action... results in the release of previously withheld documents 'if the lawsuit motivated the defendants to produce the documents.' [Citations]." (Galbiso, supra, 167 Cal.App.4th at p. 1085; see Los Angeles Times, supra, 88 Cal.App.4th at p. 1391.) Additionally, if a plaintiff succeeds in obtaining only partial relief, the plaintiff is entitled to attorney fees unless the plaintiff obtains results "that are so minimal or insignificant as to justify a finding that the plaintiff did not [in fact] prevail." (See Los Angeles Times, supra, 88 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1391-1392.)
A court's ruling on the issue whether a plaintiff is a prevailing party under section 6259, subdivision (d) is a factual determination reviewed under the substantial evidence standard. (Galbiso, supra, 167 Cal.App.4th at p. 1085; see Motorola Communication, supra, 55 Cal.App.4th at p. 1351; Rogers v. Superior Court, supra, 19 Cal.App.4th at pp. 482-483.) Numerous courts have applied this review standard to the issue whether a plaintiff's lawsuit caused the production of public records. (See, e.g., Motorola Communication, supra, 55 Cal.App.4th at p. 1351; Rogers v. Superior Court, supra, 19 Cal.App.4th at p. 482; see also Los Angeles Times, supra, 88 Cal.App.4th at p. 1391 ["[c]ases denying attorney fees to a plaintiff under the [A]ct have done so because substantial evidence supported a finding that the 'litigation did not cause the [agency] to disclose any of the documents ultimately made available' "].) The courts have recognized that this causation question is "intensely factual" and requires a "pragmatic" analysis of numerous objective and subjective factors. (See Posada v. Lamb County (5th Cir. 1983) 716 F.2d 1066, 1072; Belth, supra, 232 Cal.App.3d at pp. 901-902.) An appellate court is required to defer to the trial court's determinations on the causation issue, unless there is no evidence to support the court's factual conclusion.
Despite this well-settled law, petitioners argue that a de novo review standard governs this case because the facts are undisputed. We disagree. Although the facts may be "undisputed" in the sense that the chronology of events is based primarily on the facts contained in the documents, there are differing factual inferences to be drawn from these documents and from the various declarations filed by the parties and their counsel. If different inferences may be reasonably drawn from undisputed evidence, the issue remains a factual question and the conclusion of the trial judge must be accepted by the appellate court unless the inference was wholly unsupported or otherwise legally improper. (See In re Providian Credit Card Cases (2002) 96 Cal.App.4th 292, 301; Clark v. Claremont University Center (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 639, 669.) When the court decides a factual issue the decision must be upheld if it is supported by substantial evidence, even if the facts were contained solely in written documents or declarations. (See Betz v. Pankow (1993) 16 Cal.App.4th 919, 923; Khan v. Superior Court (1988) 204 Cal.App.3d 1168, 1170-1171, fn. 1.) This analysis differs from a court's legal interpretation of a contract or a statute. (See Agnew v. State Bd. of Equalization (2005) 134 Cal.App.4th 899, 909, fn. 15.)
To support their de novo review argument, petitioners rely on Galbiso, supra, 167 Cal.App.4th 1063. In Galbiso, the trial court found the plaintiff was a prevailing party but refused to award attorney fees because the court believed that the plaintiff's action was not the type of proceeding (an action challenging "access" to the records) that permits attorney fees. (Id. at pp. 1086-1087.) The Court of Appeal applied a de novo review standard to determine that the court's legal interpretation of the statute was improper (id. at pp. 1087-1088), but recognized that the question whether a plaintiff's lawsuit caused the defendant to release records is subject to a substantial evidence review. (Id. at p. 1085.)
Petitioners' reliance on Versaci v. Superior Court (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 805 is similarly misplaced. In Versaci, the issue before the court did not involve attorney fees, and instead concerned the propriety of the trial court's determination that the requested public record (pertaining to a public employee's performance goals) was exempt from disclosure as a personnel record or whether the record was part of the employment contract. (Id. at pp. 810-811.) In resolving this issue, this court determined the meaning of various terms in the CPRA and in the employment contract at issue, and weighed competing privacy and disclosure interests. (Id. at pp. 814-822.) There was nothing in this legal analysis suggesting that a de novo standard applies to the attorney fees causation issue.
In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, we are guided by familiar appellate rules. We must view the record in the light most favorable to respondent and resolve all inferences in support of the judgment. (San Diego Metropolitan Transit Development Bd. v. Handlery Hotel, Inc. (1999) 73 Cal.App.4th 517, 528.) We are precluded from second-guessing the trial court's credibility determinations. (Sav-On Drug Stores, Inc. v. Superior Court (2004) 34 Cal.4th 319, 334.) Evidence supporting a judgment may not be rejected on appeal unless the record shows the evidence is physically impossible or inherently improbable. (Beck Development Co. v. Southern Pacific Transportation Co. (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 1160, 1204.) Likewise, "[w]hen two or more inferences can be reasonably deduced from the facts, the reviewing court is without power to substitute its deductions for those of the trial court." (Estate of Teel (1994) 25 Cal.2d 520, 526.) If " 'substantial' evidence is present, no matter how slight it may appear in comparison with the contradictory evidence, the judgment must be upheld." (Howard v. Owens Corning (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 621, 631.) "[E]ven if the judgment of the trial court is against the weight of the evidence, we are bound to uphold it" if there is supporting evidence that is " ' "reasonable in nature, credible, and of solid value...." ' " (Ibid.)
II. Analysis
Applying these principles, we determine substantial evidence supported the trial court's factual conclusions that the City complied with petitioners' public record requests and would have produced the records even if the lawsuit had not been filed.
First with respect to Lancaster, the evidence shows Lancaster identified one record (the Carrier document) missing from the City's response when petitioners filed the action. The City had specifically notified Lancaster that it could not locate the document, but that it would keep searching for the document. Two weeks after the lawsuit was filed, the City produced the document, and indicated it had recently found the document. The City submitted assistant city attorney Miesfeld's declaration supporting this claim. The City also submitted deputy city attorney Shirey's declaration explaining that he searched for any documents that had been attached to the Carrier document, including by contacting architect Carrier's office, but no such documents could be located.
Based on this record, the court found credible the City's assertions that it would have continued to search for the Carrier document even if the action had not been filed, and would have produced it as soon as it was located. This finding is supported by counsels' declarations and the chronology of events showing the document was produced two weeks after the action was filed. The fact that the court could have reached a different conclusion is not relevant to our analysis. The court's conclusion that the City produced the document promptly after locating the document and that the City would have done so regardless of the litigation was supported by the factual record. Thus, it must be upheld.
With respect to Jentz's CPRA requests, the court recognized that the City had produced thousands of pages of responsive documents after Jentz filed the lawsuit, but concluded the City "likely would have done so even if this action had not been filed." The court reasoned that the scope of Jentz's CPRA request was not made clear until September 13, 2007, when Jentz stated he sought documents relating to proposed revisions to the Cummings Initiative (not merely those pertaining to the consistency with the Specific Plan) and, for the first time stated he was seeking documents to be produced in an electronic format. Shortly after this request, the City confirmed it had "no intention" of withholding nonexempt responsive records from disclosure, and requested staff to immediately "go through their files again." Instead of waiting for the results of this search, Jentz filed a lawsuit four days later. The court found that at the time this lawsuit was filed, "the City was actively trying to comply with the [CPRA] request."
The court also found that the manner in which the City thereafter produced the documents — in numerous "batches" rather than all at once — was reasonable, particularly given the broad scope of the requests and the volume of potentially responsive documents. Additionally, the fact that many of the e-mails had been authored by, or sent to, the city attorney's office, meant that the City was required to engage in a time-consuming examination of the documents for privilege. The court also emphasized that the "City was overwhelmed responding to numerous [other] [CPRA] requests from Jentz's counsel at the same time," and the City had voluntarily agreed to reevaluate numerous documents based on Jentz's comments and responses. Further, the court cited the evidence showing that the production of documents in electronic form created numerous technical difficulties, particularly in preparing the redacted documents for production.
Because the court found the City was complying with the CPRA requests before and after the lawsuit was filed and found the delays in the production were caused by unavoidable administrative difficulties, the court had a reasonable basis to find the lawsuit was not the motivating factor for the City's production of the requested records. The court never ordered the production of a single document, and instead the City continued to search for documents, evaluate the documents for privilege, and produce all nonexempt responsive documents. These voluntary efforts support a conclusion that the City would have acted in the same way even if a lawsuit had not been filed.
Petitioners devote large portions of their appellate briefs to arguing their view of the evidence, and their strong belief that deputy city attorney Shirey acted in bad faith by intentionally concealing the existence of responsive documents and acted contrary to his statutory duty to assist Jentz in making a proper public records request. However, the court repeatedly rejected this view of the evidence and specifically stated it found the City acted with the intent to produce all responsive documents and the responding City employees had no intent to conceal any of the documents. It is not our role to reweigh the evidence and reach inferences contrary to those made by the trial court.
Specifically, relying on the April 2008 records production, petitioners argue that Shirey must have known of the existence and location of responsive public records when Jentz first made the CPRA request in July 2007, but deliberately refused to disclose these documents. They emphasize that the e-mails produced in April 2008 show that Shirey was actively involved in discussions pertaining to the Cummings Initiative and the Specific Plan during the first part of 2007, and that Jentz made a request for these documents only a few months later in July 2007. Yet, the City did not produce many of these e-mail documents until 10 months later, in April 2008.
Although these facts arguably support an inference that Shirey did not initially intend to produce the e-mails and did so only in response to the litigation, the court was not required to reach these conclusions. The court reviewed the lengthy declaration of Shirey, in which Shirey confirmed that he had never refused to produce any requested documents, was unaware of (or had not recalled) many of the e-mails that were later produced, and that the City "continued to search for responsive documents irrespective of this lawsuit." The court, as the finder of fact, was entitled to find Shirey credible, and reject petitioners' arguments.
Petitioners contend Shirey intentionally misled Jentz by stating in September 2007 that no additional responsive documents existed pertaining to the compliance/consistency issue. However, as found by the court, Shirey did not necessarily deny the existence of these documents or state that the City would not produce them. Viewing his statements in context, Shirey said that there was one document that was clearly responsive (Attachment 6 to Shirey's September 7 letter, which was immediately provided to Jentz), but repeatedly acknowledged that there were other documents and that City staff intended to review them and the City would produce them if they were responsive and not otherwise exempt or privileged.
We also find petitioners' focus on the delays in the production to be unpersuasive on the prevailing party issue. The court found petitioners did not establish that the City violated the CPRA by failing to produce the documents more promptly. Petitioners have not appealed from this ruling. Further, substantial evidence supports the court's findings that the timing of the production was reasonable and did not reflect the City's unwillingness to produce the documents without a court order. The City submitted evidence that it made every effort to satisfy Jentz's request in a more timely fashion, but that numerous factors prevented it from doing so, including the necessity of reviewing thousands of e-mails for privileged information, the burden of responding to numerous other public records requests by Jentz at the same time, the technical difficulty of redacting the documents, and the technical difficulty of producing redacted versions of the e-mails in electronic format. A public entity's good faith and reasonable explanations for a delay in producing documents is relevant to show "production would ultimately have occurred whether or not suit was filed." (Motorola Communication, supra, 55 Cal.App.4th at p. 1346.)
Petitioners contend the court was required to find they prevailed in the action because the City never told Jentz before he filed the lawsuit that any documents were being withheld as privileged. This fact does not undermine the court's finding that the City would have disclosed this information if petitioners had not filed the lawsuit. As the court found, four days before the lawsuit was filed, the City notified Jentz that it intended to continue searching for documents and would produce all responsive documents, unless they were exempt. The court was entitled to infer that these continued efforts would have included notification to Jentz of the existence of withheld documents. Moreover, the CPRA does not require a party to produce any form of a privilege log until after a lawsuit is filed. (See Haynie v. Superior Court (2001) 26 Cal.4th 1061, 1075.)
Likewise, we find unhelpful petitioners' focus on the City's conduct in producing additional documents after it stated in October 2007 and March 2008 that it had produced all responsive documents. Petitioners argue the City's statements reflect that the City was engaged in evasive and/or stalling tactics to avoid its statutory obligations. Although this conclusion may be one inference to draw from the evidence, it is also reasonable to view these statements as reflecting the belief of the responding City employees that the City had fulfilled its obligations, but that they were willing to continue to consider Jentz's responses and concerns, and act upon those concerns. Given that the City produced the additional documents on its own initiative and without a court order, the court could have reasonably concluded that the City was open to continue looking for documents until the very last document was produced.
Petitioners additionally contend the court applied the wrong legal standard because it improperly believed that "so long as the City complied with the CPRA after the lawsuit was filed, then that cures the violation and the City wins." The record does not support that the court found this to be the governing law. In explaining its determination, the court correctly stated the applicable law: " 'A plaintiff prevails in litigation under the Public Records Act if the litigation motivated the defendant to release the requested documents.'... This is true if the action compelled [the defendant] to produce even one document." (Italics added.) The court's detailed written explanation of its ruling showed that it fully understood and applied the correct legal principles and carefully considered the entire record in reaching its conclusion.
In challenging the court's conclusions, petitioners rely on several decisions in which the appellate court held a plaintiff was the prevailing party and entitled to attorney fees. However, in each of these cases, it was undisputed that the public entity's production of the records was motivated by the lawsuit. (See Bernardi v. County of Monterey (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th 1379, 1393[the public entity "does not argue on appeal that [the plaintiff] was not the prevailing party in the underlying CPRA litigation," and instead challenges only the amount of fees awarded]; Galbiso, supra, 167 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1085-1088 [trial court specifically found plaintiff was prevailing party by filing the lawsuit that triggered the release of the public records, but improperly concluded that the petitioners' action was not "the type of proceeding" that permits an attorney fees award]; Los Angeles Times, supra, 88 Cal.App.4th at p. 1391 ["it was undisputed that the document... was disclosed only because the Times sued to obtain it"]; Belth, supra, 232 Cal.App.3d at p. 902[undisputed that the agency sought permission to disclose the requested documents only "in response to, and in hopes of resolving the litigation"].) Unlike these cases, the primary issue here iswhether the lawsuit motivated the defendant's conduct in releasing the documents.
The record before us shows the court understood the legal issues, carefully reviewed the facts, including Shirey's prelitigation correspondence, evaluated the credibility of all parties and the motivations underlying their conduct, and considered all of the relevant factors to reach a reasoned conclusion. The fact that we might have reached a different conclusion is not relevant. Unlike this court, the trial court had the benefit of presiding over the matter during an eight-month period, during which it held several status conferences and hearings. The trial court was in the best position to evaluate the credibility of the City's assertions that it always intended to produce all responsive, nonexempt documents, and would have done so without the filing of the lawsuit. The court was aware of petitioners' complaints that the document production was taking too long and reviewed numerous briefs and declarations on this subject. The court permitted the parties to file supplemental briefs on the new issues raised by the April 22 production, and considered this new information before reaching its final conclusion.
Viewing the record in its entirety, the court's conclusions were reasonable and supported by the evidentiary record. Thus, under the substantial evidence review standard, we are required to affirm.
DISPOSITION
Judgment affirmed. The parties to bear their own costs on appeal.
WE CONCUR: McCONNELL, P. J., AARON, J.