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Jennings v. State

Court of Appeals Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
Jun 27, 2017
No. 05-15-01408-CR (Tex. App. Jun. 27, 2017)

Opinion

No. 05-15-01408-CR

06-27-2017

DONAVIN JOCOLYN JENNINGS, Appellant v. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee


On Appeal from the 366th Judicial District Court Collin County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. 366-81858-2014

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Before Justices Lang, Brown, and Whitehill
Opinion by Justice Brown

Donavin Jocolyn Jennings appeals his jury convictions for continuous sexual abuse of a young child and indecency with a child by contact. The trial court assessed punishment at twenty-five years' confinement in the continuous sexual abuse case and two years' confinement in the indecency case. In three points of error, appellant generally contends the evidence is legally insufficient to support his convictions and the trial court abused its discretion in denying his motion to suppress. For the following reasons, we affirm.

In two indictments, a grand jury alleged appellant committed several sexual offenses against R.M. The first indictment alleged appellant committed the offenses of continuous sexual abuse of a child younger than fourteen years of age and indecency with a child. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 21.02 (West Supp. 2016) (person commits offense if during period of 30 or more days he commits two or more acts of sexual abuse against a child younger than 14 years of age); id. at § 21.11 (person commits offense if he engages in sexual contact with a child). The second indictment alleged four counts of sexual assault of a child based on conduct the State alleged occurred after R.M. turned fourteen.

At trial, R.M. testified she met appellant in 2012 at a church youth group. At that time, appellant was twenty years old, but he told R.M. he was fifteen and in high school. After R.M. and appellant became friends, their relationship turned sexual. R.M. said appellant regularly put his "private part" in her private part, in her mouth, and in her "butt."

In the fall of 2013, R.M. started ninth grade at the school appellant claimed he attended. When appellant was observed on school premises, he was given a criminal trespass warning. Appellant was subsequently arrested inside the school. In a custodial interrogation, police questioned appellant about his relationship with R.M. Appellant admitted having sexual intercourse with her on at least ten to eleven occasions. That same day, Eli Molina interviewed R.M. at the Child Advocacy Center. R.M. told him that appellant put his penis in her vagina and also had touched her breasts.

The State also presented evidence that, after appellant was released from jail, he continued his relationship with R.M. R.M. testified they engaged in sexual contact on several more occasions. The jury found appellant guilty of continuous sexual abuse of a child and indecency with a child, but not guilty of the sexual assault offenses.

In his first two points of error, appellant contends the evidence is legally insufficient to support his convictions for continuous sexual abuse and indecency with a child. Appellant's sufficiency complaint is somewhat convoluted. First, he contends that, because the jury acquitted him of the sexual assault offenses, the jury must not have believed R.M.'s testimony alone was sufficiently credible to prove his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Thus, he asserts the jury must have found him guilty based on his confession and, if his confession had not been admitted, the jury "would have found him not guilty." He concludes the evidence is therefore legally insufficient to support his convictions. Appellant's sufficiency argument fails in several regards.

First, in determining whether legally sufficient evidence exists to support a conviction, the question is whether "any rational trier of fact could have found appellant guilty of the offenses." Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979) (emphasis original). Furthermore, in reviewing the legal sufficiency of the evidence, we consider all of the evidence before the jury, whether properly or improperly admitted. Clayton v. State, 235 S.W.3d 772, 778 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). Finally, we may not speculate as to why a jury did not find appellant guilty of other offenses. United States v. Powell, 469 U.S. 57, 66 (1984) (any attempt to determine jury's reasons for reaching inconsistent verdicts would require pure speculation and involve an improper inquiry into jury's deliberations).

Here, appellant acknowledges the State presented evidence which, if believed, was sufficient to show he committed the offenses. That evidence included the testimony of R.M., outcry testimony, and appellant's videotaped statement. We conclude the evidence is legally sufficient to support appellant's convictions. We overrule appellant's first and second points of error.

In his third point of error, appellant contends the trial court abused its discretion in denying his motion to suppress his videotaped confession. Specifically, appellant asserts his confession was not admissible under the "Texas Confession Statute" because he lacked sufficient mental ability to knowingly and intentionally waive his Miranda rights.

Under article 38.22 of the code of criminal procedure, for a videotaped statement to be admissible, the defendant must be given the Miranda warnings and he must knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waive those rights. TEX. CRIM. PROC. CODE ANN. art. 38.22 (West Supp. 2016); see also Davidson v. State, 25 S.W.3d 183, 186 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000). A trial court's determination as to whether a defendant has done so is a mixed question of law and fact. Leza v. State, 351 S.W.3d 344, 349 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011). In reviewing a mixed question, we defer almost wholly to the trial court on questions of historical fact and credibility, but review de novo all questions of law and mixed questions of law and fact that do not turn on credibility determinations. Id.

Appellant's videotaped statement was obtained by Detective Helen Taylor and Sergeant Jim Blackburn. At the hearing on appellant's motion to suppress, Detective Taylor testified that she was familiar with appellant and knew he could read and write. The officers read appellant the Miranda warnings and appellant signed a sheet of a paper indicating he understood them. Taylor testified that, based on her prior interactions with appellant, she believed he was capable of understanding the Miranda warnings.

To show he did not understand the warnings, appellant relied on statements he made on the videotape that show he did not know how to spell his middle name. Appellant also called his uncle, Anthony Rhodes, to testify. Rhodes testified that appellant was not of "normal" intelligence and, although he had graduated from high school, he was in special education. Rhodes also testified that appellant received social security benefits because of his learning disabilities.

On appeal, to show his statement was not admissible, appellant relies on evidence he presented after the statement was admitted that showed he suffers from mild mental retardation. That evidence was not before the trial court at the time of its ruling, so we may not consider it in our review. See Willover v. State, 70 S.W.3d 841, 845 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002) (noting that a reviewing court must review a trial court's ruling on admission of evidence in light of evidence before the trial court at the time the ruling was made). Regardless, it is well-settled that mental retardation does not alone render a defendant's statement inadmissible. See Grayson v. State, 438 S.W.2d 553, 555 (Tex. Crim. App. 1969); see also Oursbourn v. State, 259 S.W.3d 159, 171-74 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008); ("youth, intoxication, mental retardation, and other disabilities are usually not enough, by themselves, to render a statement inadmissible . . . ."). We conclude the evidence supports the trial court's finding that appellant knowingly and intentionally waived his rights. See Bizzarri v. State, 492 S.W.2d 944, 946 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973); see also Leza, 351 S.W.3d at 353. We overrule appellant's third point of error.

We affirm appellant's convictions.

/Ada Brown/

ADA BROWN

JUSTICE Do Not Publish
TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b) 151408F.U05

JUDGMENT

On Appeal from the 366th Judicial District Court, Collin County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. 366-81858-2014.
Opinion delivered by Justice Brown. Justices Lang and Whitehill participating.

Based on the Court's opinion of this date, the judgment of the trial court is AFFIRMED. Judgment entered this 27th day of June, 2017.


Summaries of

Jennings v. State

Court of Appeals Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
Jun 27, 2017
No. 05-15-01408-CR (Tex. App. Jun. 27, 2017)
Case details for

Jennings v. State

Case Details

Full title:DONAVIN JOCOLYN JENNINGS, Appellant v. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

Court:Court of Appeals Fifth District of Texas at Dallas

Date published: Jun 27, 2017

Citations

No. 05-15-01408-CR (Tex. App. Jun. 27, 2017)