Accordingly, we conclude Garza failed to show that the trial court either inserted itself into the negotiations or was part of the plea bargaining process. See Doyle, 888 S.W.2d at 517-18; Coleman, 756 S.W.2d at 349; see also Jennings v. State, 754 S.W.2d 389, 390 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1988, pet. ref'd).
The court rationalized that “the trial judge should always avoid the appearance of any judicial coercion or prejudgment of the defendant since such influence might affect the voluntariness of the defendant's plea.” Id.; Jennings v. State, 754 S.W.2d 389, 391 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1988, pet. ref'd) (“We agree with the language discouraging judicial involvement in plea negotiations in Texas Court of Criminal Appeals cases relied on by appellant.”). Although the issue of whether the trial court erred in making a plea offer to appellant is not before us, our opinion in this case should not be read as approving of the trial court's actions in making this offer.We follow the rationale of Neal and conclude that, to preserve his complaint for appellate review, appellant was required to raise his claim of judicial vindictiveness before the trial court by timely request, objection, or motion.See id.;see alsoTex.R.App. P. 33.1(a)(1)(A).
The reason for this concern is that the trial court should always avoid the appearance of coercion or prejudgment of a defendant since such inference might affect the voluntariness of the plea. Id. (citing State ex rel. Bryan v. McDonald, 662 S.W.2d 5, 9 (Tex.Crim.App. 1983); Ex parte Shuflin, 528 S.W.2d 610, 616-17 n. 1 (Tex.Crim.App. 1975); Kincaid v. State, 500 S.W.2d 487, 490-91 (Tex.Crim.App. 1973)); see also Jennings v. State, 754 S.W.2d 389, 392 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1988, pet. ref'd) (noting that any agreement of trial court as part of plea bargain would constitute impermissible judicial coercion and render plea involuntary). In fact, in McDonald, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals held that judicial involvement in plea negotiations runs afoul of due process and fundamental fairness, in several ways.
Further, such action will not invalidate the bargain. See Jennings v. State, 754 S.W.2d 389, 390 (Tex.App. — Houston [1st Dist.] 1988, pet. ref'd). The Appellant next asserts that the bargain was involuntary because his ability to be paroled in absentia was a part of the plea bargain.