Plaintiff Eric J. Jennings (“Plaintiff”), a former state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, brings this civil action pursuant 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging cruel and unusual punishment in violation of his Eighth Amendment rights. Under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2) (D.S.C.), the undersigned is authorized to review the pleadings in this case and submit recommendations to the United States District Judge. For the reasons discussed below, the undersigned recommends that this action be summarily dismissed.

BACKGROUND

The instant case is premised on Defendants' purported failure to provide Plaintiff adequate medical care while he was incarcerated at Lieber Correctional Institution (“Lieber” or “LCI”). The undersigned notes at the outset, however, that the true scope of Plaintiff's claims is difficult to ascertain due to the disorganized, incoherent nature of his allegations. Indeed, the Complaint 1 employs a kitchen sink approach, setting forth a long list of vague injuries and medical conditions without offering any meaningful context. For example, Plaintiff states:

Any references to the “Complaint” herein encompass Dkt. Nos. 1, 9, and 10. Although piecemeal pleadings are generally discouraged, Wells v. Spartanburg Cty. Det. Ctr. Facility Employees, No. 8:10-cv-1490-CMC-BHH, 2010 WL 4853868, at *2 (D.S.C. Oct. 26, 2010), adopted, 2010 WL 4853836 (D.S.C. Nov. 23, 2010), the undersigned has considered Plaintiff's original Complaint (Dkt. No. 1) and supplemental letters (Dkt. Nos. 9, 10) together as one comprehensive pleading in light of his pro se status. See Laber v. Harvey, 438 F.3d 404, 426 (4th Cir. 2006) (emphasizing “the federal policy in favor of resolving cases on their merits instead of disposing of them on technicalities”) (internal citations omitted).

Medical is trying to keep me from getting any help[.] I wrote plenty [of] staff request[s] and never had any good results. I have had strokes and irregular heartbeats that sound[] like a marchin[g] band, my ears have this ringing sound and I can feel pressure pushing through my veins in my head. [I]t also feels as if my brain and heart just click off and on. . . . These nurses are refusing to send me to the hospital. It feels as if the Wardens and medical along with mental health are using me as a . . . lab rat.

(Dkt. No. 1 at 6.) The Complaint also references blood clots, burning pains in Plaintiff's chest, lung issues, brain damage, a brain hemorrhage, stress, anxiety, and problems with Plaintiff's bones. (See Dkt. No. 1 at 6-7; Dkt. No. 9; Dkt. No. 10.) The Complaint does not, however, clarify when or how Plaintiff developed these conditions and, more importantly, the specific circumstances surrounding Defendants' apparent denial of Plaintiff's request for medical treatment in relation thereto.

Based on the undersigned's review, Plaintiff does appear to focus on one incident in particular, although he fails to clearly link the event to any of his purported medical conditions. Specifically, Plaintiff claims that on December 7, 2020, he was assaulted by a group of inmates and sustained a cut above his eye and two stab wounds to his body. (Dkt. No. 1 at 5-6, 8, 11; Dkt. No. 10 at 1.) After the attack, the inmates apparently put Plaintiff in the shower and threatened to kill him if he reported the incident. (Dkt. No. 10.) What came next is somewhat unclear, as Plaintiff's account is inconsistent and difficult to follow; however, it appears that Defendant Howard, a correctional officer at Lieber, was made aware of the incident and eventually called LCI's first response team, which arrived approximately fifteen minutes later to administer care to Plaintiff. (See Id. at 2.) Plaintiff claims that Defendant Howard was delayed in responding to his injuries-noting that she was “trying to play on [his] nerves by making [him] 2 answer . . . questions”-although he expressly acknowledges that he ultimately “receive[d] some medical treatment.” (Id.)

Nevertheless, Plaintiff claims that he still asked to be taken to a hospital to see “outside personnel” following the attack because he was concerned that LCI's medical team would purposefully withhold proper treatment as part of an underlying conspiracy to kill him. (See Dkt. No. 1 at 11; see also Dkt. No. 9, stating that “it seems as if these people are premeditating my death. . . .”) Indeed, the Complaint states that Turbeville Correctional Institution had intentionally sent a certain inmate to Lieber for the very purpose of instigating the attack and “bust[ing] the blood clots” in Plaintiff's head. (See Dkt. No. 1 at 6-7, alleging that the December 2020 attack was intended to kill Plaintiff, and that LCI “was just trying to have somebody hit [Plaintiff] and parolize [sic] [him].”) Thus, Plaintiff claims that Lieber's medical personnel denied his request to go to the hospital in an effort to “cover up” their “dirt” and “mistakes, ” and, instead, “tossed” him in the Restrictive Housing Unit (“RHU”) for several weeks without further medical treatment. (See Id. at 6-8; see also Id. at 11, alleging that Defendants knew Plaintiff would “expose” their actions if he went to the hospital).

The undersigned reiterates that while the December 2020 attack provides a possible window into Plaintiff's Eighth Amendment claims, the circumstances underlying Defendants' purported disregard for Plaintiff's medical needs mostly remain unclear. This is further complicated by Plaintiff's assertion that Defendants' conspiracy to harm him actually began before December 2020-as LCI nurses apparently denied Plaintiff's previous requests to visit a hospital-and continued thereafter. (See Id. at 6, 16.) As a result, Plaintiff's allegations of inadequate medical treatment leave the Court with little temporal and factual context. Notwithstanding this lack of clarity, however, the Complaint contends that Plaintiff is entitled to 3 $350,000 for the physical harm and emotional distress resulting from Defendants' alleged history of ignoring Plaintiff's purported medical needs. (Id. at 14.) The Complaint also requests that Plaintiff be taken to the hospital. (Id.)

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Upon reviewing Plaintiff's initial filings, the undersigned issued an order dated February 24, 2021, informing Plaintiff that his case was not in proper form, as he had failed to submit the necessary service documents and a financial certificate in support of his motion to proceed in forma pauperis. (Dkt. No. 6.) In light of Plaintiff's pro se status, however, the undersigned granted him twenty-one days to cure these deficiencies by filing the outstanding information with the Court. The order also warned Plaintiff that he must immediately notify the Clerk of Court regarding any changes to his address to ensure that he received orders and/or other instructions specifying his filing deadlines. (Id. at 2.) The undersigned emphasized that if Plaintiff missed a deadline for failure to comply with this order, his case may be dismissed.

Plaintiff complied with the undersigned's instructions and filed the requested documents on March 11, 2021. (Dkt. Nos. 11, 11-1.) With the case in proper form, the undersigned then issued a second order, notifying Plaintiff that the Complaint (Dkt. Nos. 1, 9, 10) was subject to summary dismissal for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, and giving him an opportunity to cure the pleading deficiencies by filing an amended complaint with the Court. (Dkt. No. 13.) However, the order was eventually returned to the Court as “undeliverable, ” as Plaintiff had been released from Lieber Correctional Institution and failed to notify the Court of his new address. (Dkt. No. 16.) As a result, Plaintiff's deadline to file an amended complaint lapsed. 4

On August 25, 2021, Plaintiff filed a Notice of Change of Address (Dkt. No. 17), providing the Court with a new mailing address at the Clarendon County Detention Center. Notwithstanding Plaintiff's failure to timely notify the Court of his release from Lieber or his new address, the undersigned allowed Plaintiff one more opportunity, in an abundance of caution, to file an amended complaint. (Dkt. No. 18.) The undersigned resent a copy of the most recent order (Dkt. No. 13) to Plaintiff's new address and gave him twenty-one days to cure the identified pleading deficiencies in his Complaint. (Dkt. No. 19.) Despite this extension, Plaintiff has not filed any amended pleading or factual allegations, and the time to comply with the undersigned's order has once again expired.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Under established local procedure in this judicial district, a careful review has been made of the pro se Complaint pursuant to the procedural provisions of the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321 (1996). This action has been filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915, which permits an indigent litigant to commence an action in federal court without prepaying the administrative costs of proceeding with the lawsuit, and is also governed by 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, which requires the court to review a complaint filed by a prisoner that seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity.

To protect against possible abuses, the court must dismiss any prisoner complaints, or portions of complaints, that are frivolous or malicious, fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b). A complaint is frivolous if it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact. Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 31 (1992). Indeed, a claim based on a meritless legal theory may be dismissed sua sponte “at any time” under 28 U.S.C. 5

§ 1915(e)(2)(B). Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 324-25 (1989). The United States Supreme Court has explained that the statute “is designed largely to discourage the filing of, and waste of judicial and private resources upon, baseless lawsuits.” Id. at 326.

As to failure to state a claim, a complaint filed in federal court must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief” as required under Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). In order to satisfy this standard, a plaintiff must do more than make conclusory statements. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (explaining that the court need not accept as true a complaint's legal conclusions). Rather, the complaint “must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'” See Id. (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). When “it is clear that no relief could be granted under any set of facts that could be proved consistent with the allegations, ” Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984), the complaint fails to state a claim.

Pro se complaints are held to a less stringent standard than those drafted by attorneys. Gordon v. Leeke, 574 F.2d 1147, 1151 (4th Cir. 1978). A federal court is therefore charged with liberally construing a complaint filed by a pro se litigant to allow the development of a potentially meritorious case. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). Nonetheless, the requirement of liberal construction does not mean that the court can ignore a clear failure to allege facts that set forth a cognizable claim under Rule 8(a)(2). See Weller v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387, 390- 91 (4th Cir. 1990); see also Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 684 (2009) (outlining pleading requirements under Rule 8, Fed. R. Civ. P., for “all civil actions”). The Fourth Circuit has explained that “though pro se litigants cannot, of course, be expected to frame legal issues with the clarity and precision ideally evident in the work of those trained in law, neither can district courts be required to conjure up and 6 decide issues never fairly presented to them.” Beaudett v. City of Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1276 (4th Cir. 1985). Such is the case here.

DISCUSSION

A civil action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 “creates a private right of action to vindicate violations of rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States.” Rehberg v. Paulk, 566 U.S. 356, 361 (2012). Thus, to state a claim to relief under § 1983, the plaintiff must allege two essential elements: (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). Plaintiff fails to raise a plausible claim under § 1983 for several reasons.

As a threshold matter, the Complaint is premised on rambling, unconnected, and conclusory allegations that make it difficult to ascertain the true facts underlying the claims against Defendants. While some of Plaintiff's claims appear to stem from the attack on December 7, 2020, most of his allegations are entirely without context, leaving the Court to fill in the gaps. As the undersigned previously warned Plaintiff, federal courts cannot serve as “mind readers” or advocates for pro se litigants. (See Dkt. No. 13 at 2.) See Beaudett, 775 F.2d at 1278 (stating that the principle of liberal construction does not require district judges to “construct full-blown claims” on the pro se plaintiff's behalf); Bell v. Bank of Am., N.A., No. 1:13-cv-00478-RDB, 2013 WL 6528966, at *1 (D. Md. Dec. 11, 2013) (noting that while “a pro se plaintiff is general[ly] given more leeway than a party represented by counsel . . . a district court is not obligated to ferret through a [c]omplaint . . . that is so confused, ambiguous, vague or otherwise unintelligible that its true substance, if any, is well disguised”) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted); see also see also Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528, 536-37 (1974) (noting that federal courts lack the power 7 to entertain claims that are “so attenuated and unsubstantial as to be absolutely devoid of merit”). This Court is not empowered to cobble together facts from the Complaint to validate Plaintiff's vague and presumptive claims of inadequate medical treatment.

Second, Plaintiff's allegations are largely premised on the frivolous, unsubstantiated theory that Defendants purposefully denied him medical care as part of a conspiracy to kill him. (See Dkt. No. 1 at 6-7, 11.) It is well-settled that the court has the authority to dismiss such obviously “fantastic” or “delusional” claims. Adams v. Rice, 40 F.3d 72, 74 (4th Cir. 1994); see also Feurtado v. McNair, No. 3:05-cv-1933-SB, 2006 WL 1663792, at *2 (D.S.C. Jun. 15, 2006) (noting that frivolousness encompasses inarguable legal conclusions and fanciful factual allegations), aff'd, 227 Fed.Appx. 303 (4th Cir. 2007); Cabbagestalk v. Sterling, No. 5:17-cv-2703-RMG, 2018 WL 339940, at *1 (D.S.C. Jan. 9, 2018) (“[W]ild allegations that prison staff and inmates are conspiring against Plaintiff are not ‘magic words' that permit endless abuse of judicial process.”)

Third, Plaintiff must demonstrate that the alleged Eighth Amendment violations were committed by persons acting under the color of state law. West, 487 U.S. at 48 (emphasis added). A medical department, such as “LCI Medical, ” is a group of persons working in a department, building, or facility, and therefore cannot qualify as a “person.” See Harden v. Green, 27 Fed.Appx. 173, 178 (4th Cir. 2001) (finding that the medical department of a prison is not a “person” pursuant to § 1983); see also Barnes v. Bakersville Corr. Ctr. Med. Staff, No. 3:07-cv-00195, 2008 WL 2564779 (E.D. Va. June 25, 2008) (holding that use of the term “staff” or the equivalent as a name for alleged defendants, without the naming of specific staff members, is not adequate to state a claim against a “person” as required under § 1983). Accordingly, as the undersigned previously explained (Dkt. No. 13 at 3), Plaintiff's claims against “LCI Medical” are subject to summary dismissal. 8

Moreover, a person acting under color of state law can be held liable under § 1983 only if he or she was personally involved in the deprivation of the plaintiff's constitutional rights. Wilcox v. Brown, 877 F.3d 161, 170 (4th Cir. 2017); see also Polk Cnty. v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 325 (1981) (noting that “Section 1983 will not support a claim based on a respondeat superior theory of liability”); Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676 (“Because vicarious liability is inapplicable to . . . § 1983 suits, a plaintiff must plead that each Government-official defendant, through the official's own individual actions, has violated the Constitution.”). Nevertheless, Defendants Kendall (Warden) and Sheppard (Assistant Warden) do not appear in Plaintiff's Complaint beyond the caption and being named as defendants. Without any factual allegations regarding these Defendants' personal roles in the deprivation of Plaintiff's constitutional rights, the claims against them are subject to summary dismissal. See Hamilton v. United States, No. 2:20-cv-1666-RMG-MHC, 2020 WL 7001153, at *4 (D.S.C. Aug. 26, 2020), adopted sub nom., 2020 WL 5939235 (D.S.C. Oct. 7, 2020) (dismissing claims where, other than naming defendants in the caption of her complaint, plaintiff failed to include sufficiently clear allegations of any personal conduct or wrongdoing in connection with the alleged federal violations).

Notably, the only personal involvement alleged in the Complaint seems to be Defendant Howard's purported delay in calling the first response team following the attack against Plaintiff on December 7, 2020. As the Fourth Circuit recently explained, however, not every delay in medical care constitutes a cognizable violation. To state a claim under the Eighth Amendment, the plaintiff “must allege acts or omissions sufficiently harmful to evidence deliberate indifference to serious medical needs.” See Moskos v. Hardee, 24 F.4th 289, 297 (4th Cir. 2022) (referencing Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)); see also Scinto v. Stansberry, 841 F.3d 219, 225 (4th Cir. 2016). In other words, the plaintiff must show “that the alleged delay . . . put him at a 9 ‘substantial risk' of ‘serious harm.'” See Moskos, 24 F.4th at 298 (citing Moss v. Harwood, 19 F.4th 614, 624 (4th Cir. 2021)); see also Webb v. Hamidullah, 281 Fed.Appx. 159, 166 (4th Cir. 2008) (“An Eighth Amendment violation only occurs . . . if the delay results in some substantial harm to the patient.”); Scinto, 841 F.3d at 225 (noting that to be “sufficiently serious, ” the constitutional deprivation must be “extreme”). Plaintiff has failed to do that here.

At the outset, the undersigned reiterates that Plaintiff's allegations regarding the events of December 7, 2020, are inconsistent and difficult to follow. (See Dkt. No. 13 at 3-4, warning Plaintiff that the Court could not meaningfully review his claims regarding Defendant Howard's response to the December 2020 attack without further clarification of the facts.) While the Complaint suggests that Defendant Howard waited approximately ten minutes to help Plaintiff after learning of the attack, it also states that she called the first response team only five minutes after Plaintiff showed her his two stab wounds. (Dkt. No. 10 at 2.) Regardless of this varying timeline, however, the Complaint does not allege a substantial risk of serious harm in relation to the limited delay.

As discussed at length above, the Complaint does not clarify which of Plaintiff's numerous ailments, if any, stemmed from or were exacerbated by Defendant Howard's alleged delay in responding to Plaintiff's medical needs. Moreover, Plaintiff does not provide any coherent insight into the severity of his alleged injuries following the attack. In fact, any claims of serious harm are belied by Plaintiff's own allegations that he initially declined the medical treatment offered to him by Defendant Howard and the first response team, and walked himself to the prison's medical unit to request different accommodations at an independent hospital. (Id.) The undersigned simply 10 cannot surmise substantial harm from these facts. See, e.g., Moskos, 24 F.4th at 298 (finding no Eighth Amendment violation where prison officials waited approximately two hours to decontaminate plaintiff after he was sprayed with pepper spray because plaintiff failed to show a serious medical reaction); Jones v. Nowlin, No. 1:21-cv-837-RDA-TCB, 2021 WL 5893290, at *2 (E.D. Va. Dec. 13, 2021) (dismissing Eighth Amendment claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A because “[a] minimal delay without substantial harm resulting from the delay does not constitute deliberate indifference”); see also Wright v. Lassiter, No. 1:18-cv-90-FDW, 2018 WL 4186418, at *10 (W.D. N.C. Aug. 30, 2018) (dismissing deliberate indifference claim where plaintiff's allegations regarding the extent of his injuries were too vague to establish a serious medical need). Accordingly, the undersigned finds that Plaintiff's claims against Defendant Howard are subject to summary dismissal as currently written.

As an aside, a prisoner's disagreement with medical personnel over the course of his treatment is inadequate to state a cause of action under the Eighth Amendment. Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841, 849 (4th Cir. 1985).

For reference, the Fourth Circuit recently identified scenarios in which substantial harm existed for purposes of the Eighth Amendment:

And the facts here do not remotely resemble cases where we have found the objective prong to be met, as with an inmate who collapsed and subsequently died after the use of pepper spray, see Iko v. Shreve, 535 F.3d 225, 241 (4th Cir. 2008), or an inmate who was denied medical attention for several days while vomiting blood, see Scinto, 841 F.3d at 231-32.

Moskos, 24 F.4th at 298.

Finally, it is worth noting that the Eleventh Amendment bars § 1983 damages actions against state prison officials in their official capacities. See Will v. Michigan Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 70 (1989) (explaining that the Eleventh Amendment bars damages actions against the State, as well as its agencies, divisions, departments, officials, and other “arms of the State”); Fordham v. Bachman, No. 2:16-cv-249-RMG-MGB, 2016 WL 11409542, at *3 (D.S.C. Apr. 5, 2016), adopted, 2016 WL 1688743 (D.S.C. Apr. 26, 2016) (finding prison officials immune from suit under the Eleventh Amendment as arms of the State). Plaintiff's request for monetary damages 11 against the individual Defendants in their official capacities are therefore precluded by the Eleventh Amendment.

Although Plaintiff also requests that he be permitted to go to the hospital, the request is now moot given that he was released from Lieber Correctional Institution. See Wallace v. Solomon, 740 Fed.Appx. 283, 284 (4th Cir. 2018) (explaining that a plaintiff has no further need for declaratory or injunctive relief once they are free of the policy or practice that provoked the lawsuit in the first place).

CONCLUSION

For the reasons discussed above, the undersigned RECOMMENDS that the Court summarily dismiss Plaintiffs Complaint with prejudice. See Ackbar v. Monaco, No. 4:19-cv-2774-RMG, 2020 WL 1164194, at *3 (D.S.C. Mar. 11, 2020), aff'd, 828 Fed.Appx. 913 (4th Cir. 2020) (dismissing complaint with prejudice where pro se plaintiff failed to amend the pleading after repeated notices and warnings that his complaint was subject to dismissal); see also Workman v. Morrison Healthcare, 724 F. App'x. 280, 281 (4th Cir. June 4, 2018). In light of the undersigned's conclusion, the Clerk of Court shall not issue the summons forms or forward this matter to the United States Marshal Service for service of process at this time.

IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.

Plaintiffs attention is directed to the important notice on the next page. 12

Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation

The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. “[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must ‘only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.'” Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4^th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 72 advisory committee's note).

Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:

Robin L. Blume, Clerk United States District Court Post Office Box 835 Charleston, South Carolina 29402

Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984). 13

Jennings v. Sheppard

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Jennings v. Sheppard

Jennings v. Sheppard

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Jennings v. Sheppard

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