The memoranda or writings must plainly set forth the parties to the contract, the subject matter thereof, the price or consideration, a description of the property, and all of the terms and conditions of the contract, and must leave nothing to rest in parol. Irvine v. Haniotis, 208 Okla. 1, 252 P.2d 470; Hawkins v. Wright, 204 Okla. 55, 226 P.2d 957; Jennings v. New York Petroleum Royalty Corp., 169 Okla. 528, 43 P.2d 762; Mason Motors Spirit Distributing Co. v. Cosden, 105 Okla. 244, 231 P. 890; Atwood v. Rose, 32 Okla. 355, 122 P. 929; Halsell v. Renfrow, 14 Okla. 674, 78 P. 118, aff'd 202 U.S. 287, 26 S.Ct. 610, 50 L.Ed. 1032. Parol evidence cannot be permitted to supply an omission of any essential element of the contract. Halsell v. Renfrow, supra.
The memoranda or writings must plainly set forth the parties to the contract, the subject matter thereof, the price or consideration, a description of the property, and all of the terms and conditions of the contract, and must leave nothing to rest in parol. See Irvine v. Haniotis, 208 Okla. 1, 252 P.2d 470; Hawkins v. Wright, 204 Okla. 55, 226 P.2d 957; Jennings v. New York Petroleum Royalty Corp., 169 Okla. 528, 43 P.2d 762; Mason Motors Spirit Distributing Co. v. Cosden, 105 Okla. 244, 231 P. 890; Atwood v. Rose, 32 Okla. 355, 122 P. 929; and Halsell v. Renfrow, 14 Okla. 674, 78 P. 118, aff'd 202 U.S. 287, 26 S.Ct. 610, 50 L.Ed. 1032. It is true that this Court holds that a contract for the sale of lands, binding under the statute of frauds, may be gathered from letters, writings and telegrams between the parties relating to the subject matter of the contract and so connected with each other that they may be fairly said to constitute one paper relating to the contract, but in order to be sufficient, the letters, telegrams and writings relied upon must, by reference to each other, disclose every material part of a valid contract and must be signed by the party sought to be charged, must set out the parties, the subject matter, the price, the description of the property, terms and conditions and leave nothing to rest in parol.
"It is now well established that the statute of frauds applies to the vendee as well as the vendor, and the words, `the party to be charged,' have been generally defined to mean the party against whom the contract is sought to be enforced, whether this party be the vendor or the vendee. Jennings v. New York Pet. Royalty Corp., 169 Okla. 528, 43 P.2d 762; Davis v. Holman, 163 Okla. 59, 20 P.2d 575; Stegall v. Jack, 172 Okla. 154, 44 P.2d 97; Aikman v. Evans, 181 Okla. 94, 72 P.2d 479. No contention is made that plaintiff, the purported vendee herein, signed a written contract or any note or memorandum of any agreement for the purchase of the property involved herein. No contention is made that there was sufficient partial performance of the contract to take the case out of the operation of the statute of frauds. It appears that defendants have failed to establish a valid contract for the purchase of said property".
The memoranda must plainly set out the parties to the contract, the subject matter, the price, the description of the property and all of the terms and conditions of the contract, and must leave nothing to rest in parol. Jennings v. New York Petroleum Royalty Corp., 169 Okla. 528, 43 P.2d 762; Mason Motors Spirit Distributing Co. v. Cosden, 105 Okla. 244, 231 P. 890; Davis v. Holman, 163 Okla. 59, 20 P.2d 575. We think it is obvious that the memoranda relied upon within themselves do not meet the requirements of a complete contract.
This court has also held that the phrase "party to be charged", as used in the statute of frauds, may apply to either the vendor or the vendee. Jennings et al. v. N.Y. Petroleum Royalty Corp., 169 Okla. 528, 43 P.2d 762. It was also held in Davis v. Holman, 163 Okla. 59, 20 P.2d 575, that the term "party to be charged" means the party against whom a contract is sought to be enforced. Raymond Hawkins and wife have not sought to compel George Wright to carry out the alleged contract to purchase.
Illinois Pearl Button Co., Inc., v. Acme Plastics Mfg. Co., Inc., 51 N.Y.S.o.2d 5. In the case of Jennings et al. v. New York Petroleum Royalty Corp., 169 Okla. 528, 43 P.2d 762, the Halsell case was discussed and numerous other cases cited supporting the reasoning therein. The writings in the instant case did not contain one of the essentials declared necessary by the above-quoted interpretations of the statutory provision, that is, the identity of the vendee.
"5. An agreement for the leasing for a longer period than one year, or for the sale of real property, or of an interest therein; and such agreement, if made by an agent of the party sought to be charged, is invalid, unless the authority of the agent be in writing, subscribed by the party sought to be charged." This court has held that the words "party to be charged," as used in the foregoing statute, may refer to the vendor, which in this case is the Penn Mutual Life Insurance Company. Jennings v. New York Petroleum Royalty Corporation, 169 Okla. 528, 43 P.2d 762; House v. Boylan, 186 Okla. 124, 96 P.2d 532. We have also held that the statute of frauds (sec. 136, supra) may be raised by a general demurrer to plaintiff's petition.
It is now well established that the statute of frauds applies to the vendee as well as the vendor, and the words, "the party to be charged," have been generally defined to mean the party against whom the contract is sought to be enforced, whether this party be the vendor or the vendee. Jennings v. New York Petroleum Royalty Corp., 169 Okla. 528, 43 P.2d 762; Davis v. Holman, 163 Okla. 59, 20 P.2d 575; Stegall v. Jack, 172 Okla. 154, 44 P.2d 97; Aikman v. Evans, 181 Okla. 94, 72 P.2d 479. No contention is made that plaintiff, the purported vendee herein, signed a written contract or any note or memorandum of any agreement for the purchase of the property involved herein. No contention is made that there was sufficient partial performance of the contract to take the case out of the operation of the statute of frauds. It appears that defendants have failed to establish a valid contract for the purchase of said property.
Defendant is shown to have been in no position to fulfill its contract, and the plaintiff was entitled to rely on the record and act accordingly. See Campbell v. Harsh, 31 Okla. 436, 122 P. 127; Jennings v. New York Petroleum Royalty Corp., 169 Okla. 528, 43 P.2d 762. In a case of this character title must be good of record if tender of conveyance is to be of any effect. Since defendant was in no position to make valid tender, there was no necessity for plaintiff to demand it (58 C. J. 1071); and he was under no duty to tender payment until defendant could deliver a record title free from all encumbrances. 58 C. J. 1082.
Where the vendee is the party to be charged, there must be some writing or the execution of some instrument by him. In such case the execution and deposit in escrow of a deed and escrow agreement signed only by the vendor, who is the party seeking relief and not the party to be charged, is not sufficient to take the contract out of the statute of frauds, Davis v. Holman (1933) 163 Okla. 59, 20 P.2d 575; Jennings v. New York Petroleum Royalty Corporation (1934) 169 Okla. 172 Okla.2d 762; Stegall v. Jack (1935) 172 Okla. 154. 44 P.2d 97. The case at bar is of this latter type. The execution of the new lease, assignment, and escrow agreement, signed by the plaintiff and other vendors, and deposited in the bank with the draft, was not sufficient memorandum in writing to take the case out of the operation of the statute, for neither Aikman nor his agent, Vaughn, signed any of these instruments or any writing by which they agreed to take the lease.