Opinion
B327268 B328977
12-28-2023
MARGARET L. JENNINGS, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. TERESA D. JENNINGS, Defendant and Appellant.
The Green Firm and Noah Green for Defendant and Appellant. Stone & Sallus, Daniel R. Sallus, and Shenne J. Hahn for Plaintiff and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, No. 21CMCV00006 Michael Shultz, Judge. Affirmed in part, reversed in part.
The Green Firm and Noah Green for Defendant and Appellant.
Stone & Sallus, Daniel R. Sallus, and Shenne J. Hahn for Plaintiff and Respondent.
CHANEY, J.
In the proceedings below, respondent Margaret L. Jennings accused her daughter, appellant Teresa D. Jennings, her son, Montoya Jennings, and an attorney, Lisa Collins-Williams, of stealing her house by way of a quitclaim deed transferring title from Margaret to Teresa and Montoya, a deed that Margaret insisted she did not sign and of which she had been unaware.She also claimed that after the house was transferred into Teresa and Montoya's name, they began depriving her of access to the house, to her car, and to her bank accounts.
We refer to individuals with the same surname by their first name to avoid confusion.
After a six-day jury trial, the jury found both Teresa and Collins-Williams liable to Margaret for financial elder abuse and fraudulent concealment, and found Teresa liable to Margaret for conversion / trespass to chattels. The jury also awarded punitive damages against Collins-Williams. Teresa filed a motion for a new trial and the court informed Margaret that because it believed that a portion of the damages awarded by the jury represented the value of the house, and the court intended to cancel the quitclaim deed, essentially returning the house to Margaret, the court intended to grant the new trial motion unless Margaret accepted a reduction in the damages awarded. Margaret agreed, and a judgment was ultimately entered: (1) awarding Margaret $6,500 in economic damages and $15,000 in non-economic damages against both Teresa and Collins-Williams for financial elder abuse; (2) awarding Margaret $4,000 in damages against Teresa for conversion and trespass to chattels; (3) awarding Margaret $10,000 in punitive damages against Collins-Williams; and (4) cancelling the quitclaim deed. Thereafter, the court granted Margaret's motion for attorneys' fees, awarding $123,206.50 in fees.
The trial court granted Montoya's motion for nonsuit.
On appeal, Teresa contends that substantial evidence does not support the jury's verdict and that to the extent attorneys' fees should have been awarded at all, the amount awarded was excessive. We conclude that, with one exception-the $6,500 in economic damages awarded for financial elder abuse- substantial evidence supports the jury's verdict. We additionally conclude the court did not abuse its discretion in the amount of attorneys' fees awarded. We therefore reverse only the portion of the judgment awarding $6,500 in economic damages and affirm the remainder.
Collins-Williams is not a party to this appeal.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
We limit our summary to the facts and procedural history relevant to the issues raised on appeal.
A. Complaints
1. Margaret's Complaint
In January 2021, Margaret filed a complaint. In August 2021, Margaret filed a verified first amended complaint (FAC, the operative complaint) against Teresa, Montoya, and Collins-Williams.
The FAC alleged that in October 2019, Teresa brought Margaret to her longtime friend Collins-Williams, an attorney whom she claimed would help Margaret with her estate planning. With Teresa present, Margaret expressed to Collins-Williams "her intent to stay in her home and her intent to distribute her assets after her death." However, Collins-Williams drafted a quitclaim deed transferring the house from Margaret to Teresa and Montoya, "which was never Plaintiff's intent." Collins-Williams did not explain that signing a quitclaim deed would result in an immediate transfer of ownership; instead, Collins-Williams simply asked Margaret to sign some documents, which she later gave to Teresa.
Margaret attached a copy of a signed quitclaim deed, alleging that either the document was a forgery or that she was misled into signing it.
In May 2020, Margaret spoke with another attorney, Evelyn Gillespie. In July 2020, Gillespie prepared a living trust for Margaret, along with a grant deed transferring title of the house from Margaret to the living trust. Teresa did not record the quitclaim deed until September 2020.
The FAC also alleged that, in 2020, Teresa took "complete control" of her mother's personal property such as her car and her bank accounts. Margaret alleged that Teresa took the keys to her car and refused to return them. After Margaret demanded the return of the car in writing, Teresa returned it to her house, but kept the keys.
Margaret additionally alleged that Teresa had been added to her bank accounts without Margaret's knowledge or consent, and "transferred $42,647.02 to Teresa's own personal account, leaving $0.12 in" Margaret's account. Margaret filed a fraud claim with the bank and, despite Collins-Williams's representation to the bank that Teresa had "a legal right over [Margaret]'s affairs," the bank reversed the transfer. Despite this, in July 2020, Teresa took another $499 of Margaret's money.
Based on these allegations, Margaret brought causes of action for financial elder abuse, fraud, negligent misrepresentation, professional negligence, cancellation of instrument, conversion, and trespass to chattels. Teresa, Montoya, and Collins-Williams answered the FAC in September 2021.
2. Teresa's and Montoya's Cross-Complaint
In March 2021, Teresa and Montoya filed a crosscomplaint. In April 2021, they filed a verified first amended cross-complaint (FACC) against Margaret, alleging causes of action for partition and quiet title. The FACC alleged that, pursuant to their mother's wishes for the house to be sold after her death, with the proceeds split among the surviving siblings, Teresa took their mother to an attorney's office in October 2019, where a quitclaim deed was signed transferring the house to Teresa and Montoya in fee simple. However, approximately six months later, Margaret's daughter Margaret M. Jennings moved Margaret into her home, and subsequently brought Margaret to another attorney. This attorney prepared a trust and a grant deed transferring the house to the trust. This deed was recorded in August 2020. Teresa subsequently recorded the earlier quitclaim deed. Based on these allegations, Teresa and Montoya sought to quiet title to the house, and for the house to be sold and the proceeds divided among Teresa, Montoya, and their remaining siblings. Margaret answered the FACC in June 2021.
B. Trial
A six-day jury trial commenced in August 2022. Several witnesses testified. We summarize only the testimony pertinent to this appeal.
1. Margaret L. Jennings
Margaret testified that she had purchased the house with her husband in 1962. In October 2019, approximately six months after her husband's death, Margaret and Teresa went to Collins-Williams's office to create a living trust-it was Teresa's idea to use Collins-Williams. Margaret told Collins-Williams that she wanted to remain in her home and in "full control." Margaret was never told she would be transferring title of the house out of her name, which was something she would never want to do.
Teresa was present the entire time Margaret was with Collins-Williams. Collins-Williams gave Margaret two pieces of paper to sign; Margaret did not know what was contained within the papers. However, she was adamant that she had never signed a quitclaim deed, and that no one ever explained the different types of deeds to her. After signing the two pieces of paper, Margaret asked Collins-Williams whether there was anything else to sign and Collins-Williams responded that she and Teresa could "finish the papers up." Margaret testified no notary was present when she signed the papers.
In cross-examination, a copy of the signed quitclaim deed was shown to Margaret; she testified the signature was not hers.
Sometime later, Margaret learned from another attorney that she no longer owned the house. When she asked Collins-Williams about this, Collins-Williams told her she needed to speak with her family and then stopped answering Margaret's calls.
Teresa and Montoya told Margaret that she could not return to the house unless she agreed to pay for a caregiver. When speaking about the situation with Montoya, he claimed they had done Margaret a favor by taking the house out of her name, because she could now receive money from the County, something Margaret did not want to do. Margaret requested that title to the house be restored to her, but Teresa refused, claiming Margaret would "give it to the grandkids." Additionally, after Margaret made this request, Teresa threatened to force Margaret to "spend every penny [she] had."
Margaret also testified that Teresa took the keys to her car as well as all of Margaret's "important papers." Margaret was forced to pay $1,400 to have new keys made for her car.
Teresa also managed to be added to Margaret's bank accounts without Margaret's knowledge or permission. In or around May 2020, Margaret discovered that an account that had previously contained $42,647.02 now contained only $0.12; Teresa had transferred the remainder out of the account. When Margaret discovered this, she asked her granddaughter to take her to the bank. When she arrived at the bank, Montoya was present. Montoya pointed his finger in her face and ordered her to get back into her car. After the incident at the bank, Margaret went to live with another daughter (Margaret M.). The bank eventually restored the transferred funds back to her account.
A caregiver who had been staying at the house with Margaret subsequently testified that she was paid by Teresa and that she had told Teresa when Margaret left for the bank because Teresa had informed her that Margaret was not supposed to go to the bank.
2. Margaret M. Jennings
Margaret's daughter, Margaret M., testified about the incident in which her brother Montoya confronted her mother at the bank around the end of April 2020. Margaret M. stated that her daughter called her to inform her that Montoya was yelling at Margaret. As Margaret M. drove toward the bank, she could hear Montoya yelling at Margaret to go home, and that he would not return her walker if she did not go home. Margaret M. called the sheriff's department, and deputies met her at the bank. Teresa was also present. After the deputies spoke with everyone, one retrieved and returned Margaret's walker, and Margaret asked to go home with Margaret M.
After the incident at the bank, Margaret asked Margaret M. to call Collins-Williams to ask about the documents about which Margaret had gone to see Collins-Williams. Collins-Williams responded that "she was unaware of what we were talking about because my mother did not complete any documents at her office." However, on a call a few days later, Collins-Williams asked Margaret if she remembered the documents she had signed. When asked to clarify, Collins-Williams claimed Margaret had signed a quitclaim deed and a power of attorney-Margaret denied she had done so.
Margaret M. also spoke with Teresa and asked her to return the house to their mother. Teresa refused and stated she was going to "make sure my mother spends every [d]ime fighting for her house back."
3. Montoya Jennings
Montoya testified that, in April 2020, he received a call from Teresa stating that Margaret had gone to the bank and they "needed to avoid her doing anything irrational." He heard that Margaret had gone with her granddaughter and believed Margaret would be withdrawing money to give to the granddaughter.
Montoya testified that in October 2019, Margaret called him to tell him that he had been put on the deed to the house to ensure "Teresa does the right thing." He admitted telling Margaret she could only return to her house if she had a caregiver.
4. Lisa Collins-Williams
Collins-Williams testified that she never told Margaret that the paperwork would be completed at a later time by Collins-Williams and Teresa. She claimed that, during the meeting with Margaret, Margaret signed a power of attorney and a quitclaim deed among other documents, and Collins-Williams went over each document with her. Despite Collins-Williams's advice that the quitclaim deed be recorded "as soon as possible," it was not recorded until September 2020; Collins-Williams understood from Teresa that she would not record the document unless something happened to Margaret. Collins-Williams did not record the deed herself both because it would be inconvenient to do so and because of the cost (she claimed she did the work for Margaret pro bono), but she did pay the notary fee of $15 per signature for nine or ten of Margaret's signatures.
In May 2020, Collins-Williams drafted a letter to Bank of America, stating that Teresa "had a power of attorney" for Margaret.
5. Teresa Jennings
Teresa testified that Margaret added her to her bank accounts sometime after her father died, and that it was Margaret's idea to do so. She also testified that it was Margaret's idea to go to Collins-Williams, that Margaret did not want to establish a trust, but wanted to deed the house to Teresa, so that, after Margaret's death, Teresa could sell the house and distribute the proceeds. After Teresa drove Margaret to see Collins-Williams, Teresa stayed in the room at Margaret's request, but did not speak. She testified that she witnessed her mother signing the quitclaim deed during that visit to Collins-Williams's office. The quitclaim deed was given to Teresea along with other documents, and Teresa put them in her safe. She intended to wait for her mother to pass before recording the quitclaim deed. Teresa eventually recorded the quitclaim deed after the grant deed prepared by Gillespie was recorded.
Teresa admitted to transferring money out of Margaret's bank account but claimed she did so to prevent anyone else from fraudulently spending it-Teresa spent none of it herself.
6. Evelyn Gillespie
Gillespie, an attorney, testified that when she first met Margaret, Margaret sought only to revoke a power of attorney. Margaret informed her that she had believed the power of attorney would not take effect until she was incapacitated. Margaret also stated that when she was in Collins-Williams's office, she recalled signing only two documents, with no notary present. Margaret believed one of the documents was the power of attorney she was trying to revoke but did not know what the other one was, only that it had to do with real property.
Gillespie sent a letter to Teresa, revoking the power of attorney. Upon subsequent investigation, Gillespie learned that there were six or seven documents Margaret purportedly signed and had notarized in Collins-Williams's office. When she asked Margaret about this, her story remained consistent-she claimed she had signed only two documents, and there was no notary present when she did so.
Gillespie admitted sending a letter to Collins-Williams asking about a deed, "type unknown" but denied Margaret had told her a deed existed, just that there was some document that related to real property.
7. Rikisha Thomas
Thomas testified that she was an attorney and a notary, and that she notarized Margaret's signatures on six documents in Collins-Williams's office in October 2019, including a power of attorney and a quitclaim deed.
8. Denise Washington
Washington, another one of Margaret's daughters, testified that she spoke with Teresa about the house and asked Teresa to return it to Margaret. Teresa refused and stated she was going to make sure Margaret did not give it to Margaret M. or any grandchildren, but "only to siblings." Washington also asked Montoya to return the house, but Montoya refused, stating he was originally intending to let Margaret live there, but was mad at what Margaret had said about him. Washington testified that when Margaret discovered the quitclaim deed, she called Collins-Williams to state she had never quitclaimed the house to Teresa and Montoya. Collins-Williams told Margaret that she did not sign and complete all the documents in her office, and promised to call Teresa to arrange a meeting. However, neither Washington nor Margaret heard from Collins-Williams thereafter.
C. Jury Verdict
At the beginning of the trial, the court granted a motion for nonsuit as to Margaret's professional negligence cause of action (pled against Collins-Williams only). After both parties rested, the court granted a nonsuit as to the negligent misrepresentation cause of action, finding it barred by the statute of limitations. Later, the court granted a nonsuit as to Montoya on all causes of action.
Jury deliberations began the afternoon of August 29 and completed mid-morning on August 30. The jury found both Teresa and Collins-Williams liable for financial elder abuse and awarded $1,500 for past economic loss for medical expenses and $5,000 for other past economic loss. The jury also awarded $15,000 for pain and suffering. The jury found Teresa and Collins-Williams liable for fraudulent concealment and awarded $536,500 in past economic damages, $15,000 in past noneconomic loss including physical pain and mental suffering, and $15,000 in future noneconomic loss including physical pain and mental suffering. The jury additionally found Teresa liable for conversion / trespass to chattels and awarded $4,000 in damages. Finally, the jury awarded $10,000 in punitive damages.
D. Court Enters Reduced Judgment
In October 2022, Teresa made a motion for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict or, in the alternative, for a new trial. In November 2022, Margaret opposed the motion and Teresa replied.
At the hearing for the motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, the court first issued its ruling on the equitable causes of action in the case, finding that the quitclaim deed should be cancelled because the jury found fraud and financial elder abuse. Relatedly, the court denied the FACC's claims for quiet title and partition.
The court then stated it was inclined to grant Teresa's motion for a new trial on the grounds that there was insufficient evidence to support damages of $536,500 on the fraudulent concealment cause of action, unless Margaret agreed to accept a reduction of those damages to $0. The court found it was "abundantly clear" that the jury had awarded those damages in compensation for the loss of the house, which would be returned to Margaret because of the cancellation of the quitclaim deed. Margaret accepted the reduced damage award. The court therefore entered judgment as follows: On the first cause of action for financial elder abuse, Margaret was awarded $6,500 in economic damages and $15,000 in non-economic damages against Teresa and Collins-Williams. On the second cause of action for fraud and the fifth cause of action for cancellation of instrument, the judgment awarded no monetary damages, but cancelled the quitclaim deed. On the sixth cause of action for conversion and the seventh cause of action for trespass to chattels, Margaret was awarded $4,000 in damages against Teresa. Finally, the judgment awarded $10,000 in punitive damages against Collins- Williams only, and awarded nothing on the FACC. Teresa timely appealed the judgment.
The initial proposed judgment submitted by Margaret awarded her $30,000 in non-economic damages on the fraudulent concealment cause of action, which was consistent with the jury's award for past and future pain and suffering. However, Teresa objected to this, arguing that "the court expressly ruled on December 6, 2022 that there was no evidence of damages on any cause of action, including plaintiff's second cause of action for fraud." The court sustained this objection, finding that the "Remittitur sought to reduce damages from $566,500.00 to zero and Plaintiff accepted the Remittitur." Because Margaret has not contended the court erred in sustaining this objection, we do not address this issue.
E. Attorneys' Fees
In February 2023, Margaret moved for attorneys' fees under Welfare and Institutions Code section 15657.5, seeking a total of $187,148.50 in fees for the work done by Jason Stone (lead counsel), two of his associates (Lindsay Altamirano and Shenne J. Hahn), and several paralegals. Margaret also sought a multiplier of 1.5 for the fees, claiming the litigation benefited the community. In support of the motion, Margaret submitted declarations from Stone and Hahn, stating their billing rates and the number of hours worked, and generally describing the tasks completed. Teresa opposed the motion, arguing that Margaret's lawyers performed "far more work" than Teresa's lawyers and deriding opposing counsel's skills. Teresa also decried the fact that Margaret's counsel failed to provide the court with "any bills, timekeeping records, or other documents" to support the motion, and argued that the attorneys' descriptions of the work performed was non-existent, was incomplete, or requested too many hours for the tasks described.
(Welf. & Inst. Code, § 15657.5, subd. (a) ["Where it is proven by a preponderance of the evidence that a defendant is liable for financial abuse, as defined in Section 15610.30, in addition to compensatory damages and all other remedies otherwise provided by law, the court shall award to the plaintiff reasonable attorney's fees and costs"].).
In March 2023, the court granted Margaret's motion. The court noted that although Stone had billed at both $485 and $525 per hour, $485 was a reasonable rate. It multiplied that rate by the 105.4 hours that Stone claimed he had billed and awarded $51,119 in fees for Stone's work. As for Hahn, the court noted that she had billed at both $395 and $450 an hour and found $395 to be a reasonable rate. The court further found that "Hahn attended depositions, prepared, and responded to discovery requests, attended hearings, attended trial on equitable claims and prepared judgment and post judgment filings" and had billed 182.5 hours on the case. Multiplying those hours by $395, the court awarded $72,087.50 for Hahn's work. The court declined to award fees for Altamirano or the paralegals due to the lack of declarations from those individuals. The court also declined to apply a multiplier. Therefore, the court awarded a total of $123,206.50 in attorneys' fees.
Teresa timely appealed the order granting the motion for attorneys' fees. In August 2023, we granted her motion to consolidate her two appeals.
DISCUSSION
"In reviewing the sufficiency of evidence to support the jury's finding, we review the record in the light most favorable to the prevailing party, resolving in favor of the prevailing party all conflicts in either the evidence or the reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom, to determine whether the record contains substantial evidence, contradicted or uncontradicted, supporting the finding." (Markow v. Rosner (2016) 3 Cal.App.5th 1027, 1045.)
Teresa contends that we should review de novo the question of "[w]hether appellant's act of taking her mother to the family's attorney who then drafted a quitclaim deed transferring the mother's house to the appellant and her brother, but not recording the deed until the mother had a contrary deed in favor of other siblings prepared amounts to Financial Elder Abuse or Intentional Misrepresentation/Fraud by appellant." As this is not a question we are reviewing, we decline to apply the de novo standard of review. To the extent Teresa asks us to review whether the jury erred in finding that Teresa took Margaret's property for a wrongful use or with intent to defraud, we determine if substantial evidence supports that conclusion.
A. Financial Elder Abuse
The elements of a cause of action for financial elder abuse are (1) the defendant took, hid, appropriated, obtained, or retained plaintiff's property; (2) plaintiff was at least 65 years old or a dependent adult at the time of the conduct; (3) the defendant took, hid, appropriated, obtained, or retained plaintiff's property for a wrongful use, or with the intent to defraud, or by undue influence; (4) the plaintiff was harmed; and (5) the defendant's conduct was a substantial factor in causing plaintiff's harm. (See CACI No. 3100.) Teresa argues substantial evidence does not support the finding that she took Margaret's property for a wrongful use or with the intent to defraud, and does not support the finding that Margaret suffered $6,500 in economic damages. We address each argument in turn.
1. Wrongful Use and Intent to Defraud
The jury answered "Yes" to the question "Did Teresa Jennings take, appropriate, obtain or retain Margaret L. Jennings'[s] property for a wrongful use, with the intent to defraud, or by undue influence?" On appeal, Teresa argues "there was no evidence of fraud (or wrongful use) by Teresa." We disagree.
"A person . . . shall be deemed to have taken, secreted, appropriated, obtained, or retained property for a wrongful use if, among other things, the person . . . takes, secretes, appropriates, obtains, or retains the property and the person . . . knew or should have known that this conduct is likely to be harmful to the elder ...." (Welf. &Inst. Code, § 15610.30, subd. (b).)
Here, no one disputes that Teresa (and Montoya) obtained Margaret's house by way of a quitclaim deed. Margaret testified, however, that her intention in estate-planning was to create a living trust, without transferring title to the house until after her death. Margaret further testified that it was Teresa's idea to go to Collins-Williams to create the living trust and that, while there, no one explained anything about a quitclaim deed. In fact, Margaret was adamant that the quitclaim deed was never presented to her at Collins-Williams's office. Both Teresa and Margaret also testified that Teresa was present at Collins-Williams's office for the entire meeting. Further, it is undisputed that after Margaret recorded a deed transferring the house to her living trust-a clear indication that she did not want to quitclaim the house to Teresa and Montoya-Teresa recorded her quitclaim deed, which heretofore she had simply stored in her safe. There was also testimony that Teresa refused to return the house to Margaret because she was going to ensure Margaret did not give it to Margaret M. or her grandchildren.
From this testimony, it was reasonable for the jury to conclude that Teresa knew or should have known that her mother did not want to quitclaim the house to her, and thus knew or should have known that receiving the house through a quitclaim deed was harmful to Margaret. The same testimony would have permitted the jury to reasonably conclude that Teresa did not initially record the quitclaim deed because she knew that Margaret had not intended to quitclaim the title of the house to her (and the recordation may have alerted Margaret to the existence of the quitclaim deed), but only recorded it once Margaret had recorded a contrary claim. Such a conclusion would have supported a finding that Teresa obtained the house with an intent to defraud Margaret (i.e., with an intent to conceal from Margaret that the house had been quitclaimed to her). (See Lovejoy v. AT&T Corp. (2004) 119 Cal.App.4th 151, 161 [intent to defraud may be inferred when defendant took plaintiff's money without his knowledge or consent while concealing material fact].) Therefore, substantial evidence supports the jury's finding that Teresa took the house for a wrongful use and/or an intent to defraud.
2. Damages
"Appellate review of a fact finder's award of damages is limited. [Citation.] In the absence of error in the admission of testimony supporting a claim of economic damages, including expert opinion about lost profits, we will affirm the judgment if substantial evidence supports the damage award." (Pannu v. Land Rover North America, Inc. (2011) 191 Cal.App.4th 1298, 1321-1322.)
The jury found that Margaret suffered $1,500 in damages for past medical expenses and $5,000 for "other past economic loss" as a result of Teresa's financial elder abuse. Teresa argues no evidence supports the jury's award. We agree. In her appellate brief, Margaret counters generally that the jury was "empowered to decide what damages had been caused by Defendants' conduct and the value of those damages" and that its findings "are not contrary to law and are supported by sufficient evidence." But Margaret does not specify what evidence supports the finding that she suffered $6,500 in past economic losses for financial elder abuse and we have uncovered no such support in our independent review of the record. As such, we reverse the portion of the judgment awarding Margaret $6,500 for past economic damages for Teresa's financial elder abuse.
B. Fraudulent Concealment
The jury found that Teresa was liable to Margaret for fraudulent concealment, and awarded $535,500 for "other past economic loss," $15,000 for past noneconomic loss, including physical pain and mental suffering, and $15,000 for future noneconomic loss, including physical pain and mental suffering. After Teresa filed a motion for new trial, the court stated it would grant that motion unless Margaret accepted a reduction of these damages to $0. Margaret's agreement to this condition is reflected in the judgment.
On appeal, Teresa does not dispute she had a duty to disclose, but claims "there is no evidence that Teresa hid any material fact from her mother" and no evidence that Margaret suffered any economic loss.
We need not address Teresa's claims regarding damages because Margaret accepted the court's reduction of damages to $0 for this cause of action.
As to evidence that Teresa concealed material facts from Margaret, as discussed above, Margaret testified that it was Teresa's idea to go to Collins-Williams's office to implement Margaret's desire to create a living trust. Margaret further testified that, while in Collins-Williams's office, no one mentioned a quitclaim deed and she did not sign a quitclaim deed. It is undisputed that Teresa was present during the entire meeting and that, after the meeting, Teresa placed a signed quitclaim deed in her safe, and did not record it until a contrary deed was recorded. From these facts, a jury could reasonably have concluded that Teresa intentionally failed to disclose to Margaret that a quitclaim deed transferring title from her to Teresa and Montoya was going to be, and was, created. Thus, substantial evidence supports the jury's finding of liability for fraudulent concealment.
Teresa's citations to Estate of Beckley (1965) 233 Cal.App.2d 341 and Estate of Mann (1986) 184 Cal.App.3d 593 are inapposite. Estate of Beckley addressed whether the probate court erred in granting a nonsuit as to one proponent and a directed verdict as to a second proponent of a will and found that "[t]he primary issue for determination by this court is whether there is substantial evidence in support of either ground of contest, i.e., (1) that at the time of the execution of the will Mrs. Beckley was of unsound mind, or (2) that in executing the same she acted under undue influence." (Estate of Beckley, at p. 342.) Similarly, Estate of Mann addressed the sufficiency of evidence of a decedent's testamentary capacity and whether he was unduly influenced. (Estate of Mann, at pp. 602-609.) But Margaret's fraudulent concealment cause of action did not require a showing that she was of unsound mind or that Teresa exerted undue influence on her.
C. Conversion / Trespass to Chattels
After finding Teresa liable for conversion / trespass to chattels, the jury awarded Margaret $4,000 in damages. Teresa contends there is no evidence her mother suffered $4,000 in damages-or any monetary losses-from the money that Teresa transferred out of Margaret's bank account, because that money was returned to Margaret's bank account.
But in finding Teresa liable for conversion, the jury was asked about more than the bank account transfers-the verdict form also asked whether Teresa prevented Margaret from having access to her car, to her car keys, and to the household items and furniture within her home. The jury answered affirmatively. When a defendant's conversion interferes with the plaintiff's right of possession, the plaintiff is "entitled to actual damages in an amount sufficient to compensate him for any impairment of the property or loss of its use." (Zaslow v. Kroenert (1946) 29 Cal.2d 541, 551-552.)
Margaret testified that Teresa prevented her from having access to her car and car keys, and refused to let her back into her home unless she was willing to hire a caregiver. She further testified she needed to have new keys made for her car, at a cost of $1,400. Teresa offers no reason why the jury could not have ascribed $4,000 as reasonable compensation to Margaret for having to have her car rekeyed, and for losing the use of her property.
D. Attorneys' Fees
The court awarded Margaret $123,206.50 in attorneys' fees, consisting of $51,119 for 105.4 hours of work done by Jason Stone (the lead trial attorney) and $72,087.50 for 182.5 hours of work done by Shenne J. Hahn (one of his associates). On appeal, Teresa argues that the court erred in awarding these fees both because Margaret failed to attach any bills, timekeeping records, or other documentation to support her request for fees, and because the number of hours billed by Margaret's counsel was excessive.
We reject Teresa's first argument. "The law is clear . . . that an award of attorney fees may be based on counsel's declarations, without production of detailed time records." (Raining Data Corp. v. Barrenechea (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 1363, 1375.) Teresa cites no authority to the contrary.
As for the amount of fees awarded," '[t]he "experienced trial judge is the best judge of the value of professional services rendered in his court, and while his judgment is of course subject to review, it will not be disturbed unless the appellate court is convinced that it is clearly wrong" '-meaning that it abused its discretion." (PLCM Group, Inc. v. Drexler (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1084, 1095.)
Here, Teresa argues that, instead of the 105.4 hours the court awarded, Stone should have spent only 86.7 hours on the case, consisting of 40 hours for trial preparation, 8 hours for a one-day mediation, 37.9 hours for six days of trial, 0.5 hours for the court trial on the equitable claims, and 0.3 hours for the hearing on Teresa's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. We find the variance of 18.7 hours within the court's discretion. It was well within the bounds of reason for the court to determine that Stone spent at least another 18.7 hours performing work outside of the courtroom during the six-day trial, preparing for the trial on the equitable issues, and reviewing the various briefs filed in the case.
Teresa calculated this number by noting the start and end time of each of the six days of trial and then totaling those hours.
As for Hahn (the associate), the court found that she "attended depositions, prepared, and responded to discovery requests, attended hearings, attended trial on equitable claims and prepared judgment and post judgment filing" and did not reduce the 182.5 hours she billed in the case. On appeal, Teresa contends these tasks should have taken no more than 25 hours to complete. Because she provides neither reasoned argument nor citation to any authority or evidence, we find this argument forfeited. (WFG National Title Ins. Co. v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (2020) 51 Cal.App.5th 881, 894 ["appellant must supply the reviewing court with some cogent argument supported by legal analysis and citation to the record"]; United Grand Corp. v. Malibu Hillbillies, LLC (2019) 36 Cal.App.5th 142, 156 ["' "[i]f a party fails to support an argument with the necessary citations to the record, . . . the argument [will be] deemed to have been waived"' "].) Accordingly, we discern no abuse of discretion in the court's attorneys' fees award.
Teresa also complains about the number of hours worked by a second associate, Lindsay Altamirano. However, we need not consider these arguments because the court awarded no fees for Altamirano's time.
DISPOSITION
The portion of the judgment awarding Margaret $6,500 in economic damages for financial elder abuse is reversed. In all other respects, the judgment is affirmed. In the interests of justice, both parties will bear their own costs on appeal.
We concur: BENDIX, Acting P. J., WEINGART, J.