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finding five months of water accumulation in detainee's cell did not objectively violate contemporary standards of decency and noting that "slippery prison floors, at best, pose a claim of negligence, which is not actionable under the United States Constitution."
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05 Civ. 9435 (SAS).
August 6, 2007
Plaintiff (Pro Se): Frederick Jennings, #03-A-4591, Green Haven Correctional Facility, Stormville, New York.
Counsel for Defendants: Jeffrey S. Dantowitz, Assistant Corporation Counsel for the City of New York, New York, New York.
OPINION AND ORDER
I. INTRODUCTION
Frederick Jennings, appearing pro se, brings this action against defendants Martin F. Horn, Commissioner of the New York City Department of Corrections ("DOC"), and Patrick Walsh, Warden of the George Motchan Detention Center ("GMDC") (together, "Defendants"), pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Jennings claims that the Defendants violated his Fourteenth Amendment rights through deliberate indifference to the hazardous and unsanitary conditions in his cell between November 2002 and April 2003. Defendants have moved for summary judgment pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. For the following reasons, Defendants' motion is granted.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Facts
On May 29, 2002, Frederick Jennings began a term of incarceration as a pre-trial detainee at Rikers Island. For part of his incarceration at Rikers Island, Jennings was assigned to cell number fourteen of the GMDC. In mid-November, 2002, Jennings began to notice water accumulating on the floor of his cell. Jennings informed Officer C. Carrington about the water leakage, who subsequently submitted a work order to the maintenance department. Jennings also requested a new cell assignment, but was told that because he required high custody accommodations, cell fourteen "was the only designated unit for [Jennings]." The maintenance department tried to fix the leak in Jennings' cell, but was unsuccessful.
See Defendant's Local Rule 56.1 Statement of Undisputed Material Facts ("Def. 56.1") ¶ 1.
See id.
See 11/7/05 Complaint of Frederick Jennings ("Complaint") at Facts Attachment ¶ 1.
See id. ¶¶ 2-4; 3/28/07 Deposition of Frederick Jennings ("Jennings Dep.") at 46:5-46:11. Jennings also informed Officer Martin about the leakage, see id., and complained to numerous other on-duty officers. See Complaint at Facts Attachment ¶ 6.
See Complaint at Facts Attachment ¶¶ 2-4.
Id. ¶ 10.
See id. ¶ 3.
The source of the leak was later discovered to be a broken pipe in the access closet between Jennings' cell and the adjacent cell (cell fifteen). Water accumulated in Jennings' cell when the occupant of cell fifteen flushed the toilet. Upon learning the cause of the leak, Officer Watts, another on-duty officer, submitted another work order. Maintenance again visited Jennings' cell to fix the problem, but the leakage continued. Jennings testified that he contained the water by routinely mopping his cell. Jennings also testified that "[i]t wasn't a big puddle of water, it wasn't bad," and that the floor tile became completely loose only three or four times.
See id. ¶¶ 12-14.
See Def. 56.1 ¶ 10; Complaint at Facts Attachment ¶¶ 12-15.
See Complaint at Facts Attachment ¶ 15.
See id. ¶ 17.
See Jennings Dep. at 52:21-53:6.
Id. at 41:5-41:7, 42:12-42:18.
On April 1, 2003, Jennings woke up and noticed a larger than usual accumulation of water on the floor of his cell. Jennings got up and got dressed in the dark. While walking across his cell, Jennings slipped and fell on a loosened tile, causing him to exacerbate a pre-existing back injury. On April 3, 2003, Jennings submitted a grievance to the Inmate Grievance Review Committee ("IGRC") for the injuries he sustained as a result of his fall, in which he stated "[o]n 4-1-03 I slipped upon deteriorating floor tiles and waste water from a broken pipe and sustained injuries. I have complained about this water leak since November 2002 to no avail." Additionally, Jennings' grievance stated that "I am seeking some form of compensation for my serious injuries. The broken pipe has been fixed now since April 1st when I returned from medical." On April 8, 2003, a committee member informed Jennings that injuries are non-grievable, and instructed him to file a Notice of Claim with the Comptroller's Office. In his Complaint in the instant action, Jennings indicated that he understood the grievance procedure "does not cover incidents involving injury" and that the only claim he previously grieved were his injuries. Furthermore, Jennings testified that he never submitted a grievance for the conditions of his cell, the basis for the present suit. On September 3, 2003, Jennings was convicted of robbery and transferred to a New York State correctional facility.
See Def. 56.1 ¶ 8.
See id. ¶ 9
See id.
4/3/03 Grievant's Statement Form ("Grievance"), Ex C. to 5/7/07 Declaration of Jeffrey S. Dantowitz, counsel for defendants ("Dantowitz Decl."). Jennings' requested action stated: "I am seeking some' form of compensation for my serious injuries. The broken pipe has been fixed now since April 1st when I returned from medical." Grievance.
Id. (emphasis added).
See 4/8/03 Response of IGRC to Grievance, Ex A. to Complaint. The Office of the Comptroller later disallowed Jennings' claim "based on information provided by the New York City Department of Correction, which indicated that the incident in question was not due to the City's negligence." 5/4/04 Letter From the Office of the Comptroller to Jennings ("May 4 Letter"), Ex. B-3 to Complaint. The May 4 Letter went on to say that the disallowance still allowed Jennings to seek redress though the Civil Court, provided he does so within one year and ninety days of the occurrence. See id.
See Complaint at 4.
See Jennings Dep. at 64:1-64:6.
See Def. 56.1 ¶ 2.
B. The Department of Corrections Inmate Grievance Resolution Program
Before bringing suit in federal court, an inmate must satisfy the DOC's five-step administrative Inmate Grievance Resolution Program ("IGRP"). The process requires an inmate to: (1) file a grievance with the Committee which must be resolved within five working days; (2) request a formal hearing where witnesses may be called to appear before the Committee, which must then render a decision within three working days; (3) take an appeal of the IGRC's formal recommendation to the Warden, who is required to render a decision within five working days; (4) appeal the Warden's decision to the Central Office Review Committee ("CORC"), which must render a decision within fifteen working days; and (5) appeal the CORC's decision to the Board of Correction, which must issue a recommendation to the Commissioner within twenty working days.
See 3/4/85 IGRP, Ex. B to Dantowitz Decl.
C. Procedural History
On November 7, 2005, Jennings commenced this action by filing a Complaint which alleged a violation of his Fourteenth Amendment rights as a result of unsanitary cell conditions at GMDC. On May 8, 2007, Defendants moved for summary judgment against Jennings. Having received no response from Jennings, the Court issued an Order on June 20, 2007, stating that Jennings' opposition papers were due no later than July 6, 2006. No opposition papers have been submitted.
On May 16, 2004, Jennings commenced an action in state court, alleging that the April 1 fall occurred due to the negligence of the DOC. Nonetheless, in the case before this Court, Jennings alleges deliberate indifference to his health or safety on the part of each defendant. In his deposition, Jennings testified that he did not believe any DOC official intended that he slip and fall. See Jennings Dep. at 119:24-120:17; 5/16/04 Frederick Jennings Complaint Against Municipality, Supreme Court, Bronx County ("State Action"), Ex. D to Dantowitz Decl.
III. LEGAL STANDARD
A. Summary Judgment
Summary judgment is appropriate "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." An issue of fact is genuine "`if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.'" A fact is material when it "`might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law.'" "It is the movant's burden to show that no genuine factual dispute exists."
Williams v. Utica Coll. of Syracuse Univ., 453 F.3d 112, 116 (2d Cir. 2006) (quoting Stuart v. American Cyanamid Co., 158 F.3d 622, 626 (2d Cir. 1998)).
Bouboulis v. Transport Workers Union of Am., 442 F.3d 55, 59 (2d Cir. 2006) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)).
Vermont Teddy Bear Co. v. 1-800 Beargram Co., 373 F.3d 241, 244 (2d Cir. 2004) (citing Adickes v. S.H. Kress Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157 (1970)).
In turn, to defeat a motion for summary judgment, the non-moving party must raise a genuine issue of material fact. To do so, it must do more than show that there is "`some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts,'" and it "`may not rely on conclusory allegations or unsubstantiated speculation.'" However, "`all that is required [from a non-moving party] is that sufficient evidence supporting the claimed factual dispute be shown to require a jury or judge to resolve the parties' differing versions of the truth at trial.'"
McClellan v. Smith, 439 F.3d 137, 144 (2d Cir. 2006) (quoting Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986)).
Jeffreys v. City of New York, 426 F.3d 549, 554 (2d Cir. 2005) (quoting Fujitsu Ltd. v. Federal Express Corp., 247 F.3d 423, 428 (2d Cir. 2002)).
McClellan, 439 F.3d at 144 (quoting First Nat'l Bank of Ariz. v. Cities Serv. Co., 391 U.S. 253, 288-89 (1968)).
In determining whether a genuine issue of material fact exists, the court must construe the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and draw all justifiable inferences in that party's favor. However, "[i]t is a settled rule that `[c]redibility assessments, choices between conflicting versions of the events, and the weighing of evidence are matters for the jury, not for the court on a motion for summary judgment.'" Summary judgment is therefore inappropriate "if there is any evidence in the record that could reasonably support a jury's verdict for the non-moving party."
See Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hamilton Beach/Proctor Silex, Inc., 473 F.3d 450, 456 (2d Cir. 2007) (citing Stern v. Trustees of Columbia Univ., 131 F.3d 305, 312 (2d Cir. 1997)).
McClellan, 439 F.3d at 144 (quoting Fischl v. Armitage, 128 F.3d 50, 55 (2d Cir. 1997)). Accord Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249.
Marvel Characters, Inc. v. Simon, 310 F.3d 280, 286 (2d Cir. 2002) (citing Pinto v. Allstate Ins. Co., 221 F.3d 394, 398 (2d Cir. 2000)).
B. When a Motion for Summary Judgment Is Unopposed
When the non-moving party "`chooses the perilous path of failing to submit a response to a summary judgment motion, the district court may not grant the motion without first examining the moving party's submission to determine if it has met its burden of demonstrating that no material issue of fact remains for trial.'" If the movant does not meet its burden of production, then the court must deny summary judgment even if the non-movant does not oppose the motion. Moreover, the court may not rely solely on the movant's statement of undisputed facts contained in its Rule 56.1 statement. The court must be satisfied that the movant's assertions are supported by the evidence in the record.
Vermont Teddy Bear Co., 373 F.3d at 244 (quoting Amaker v. Foley, 274 F.3d 677, 681 (2d Cir. 2001)).
See id. (citing Amaker, 274 F.3d at 681).
See id.
See id. (citing Giannullo v. City of N.Y., 322 F.3d 139, 140 (2d Cir. 2003)).
C. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies
The Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (" PLRA") mandates exhaustion by prisoners of all administrative remedies before bringing an action regarding prison conditions. Unlike previous versions of the PLRA, which encompassed only section 1983 suits, exhaustion is now required for all "action[s] . . . brought with respect to prison conditions," whether under section 1983 or "any other Federal law."
See 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a), which provides that "[n]o action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under § 1983 of this title, or any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted."
Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 524 (2002).
The PLRA's exhaustion requirement is mandatory. Failure to exhaust is an absolute bar to an inmate's action in federal court: "[section] 1997e(a) requires exhaustion of available administrative remedies before inmate-plaintiffs may bring their federal claims to court at all." Because the plain language of section 1997e(a) states "no action shall be brought," an inmate must have exhausted his claims at the time of the initial filling, given that "[s]ubsequent exhaustion after suit is filed . . . is insufficient." "Accordingly, `[c]omplete exhaustion of . . . administrative remedies through the highest level for each claim is required.'" Moreover, the exhaustion of administrative remedies must be proper — that is, in compliance with a prison grievance program's deadlines and other critical procedural rules — in order to suffice. Furthermore, the United States Supreme Court has held that "the PLRA's exhaustion requirement applies to all inmate suits about prison life, whether they involve general circumstances or particular episodes, and whether they allege excessive force or some other wrong."
See id. at 516. See also Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 739 (2001).
Neal v. Goord, 267 F.3d 116, 122 (2d Cir. 2001) (quotation marks and citations omitted, emphasis in original).
Id.
Varela v. Demmon, No. 05 Civ. 6079, 2007 WL 1438765, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. June 14, 2007) (quoting Veloz v. New York, 339 F. Supp. 2d 505, 514 (S.D.N.Y. 2004), aff'd, 178 Fed. Appx. 39 (2d Cir. 2006)).
See Woodford v. Ngo, 126 S. Ct. 2378, 2386-87 (2006).
Porter, 543 U.S. at 532.
The determination of whether an inmate has exhausted his available administrative grievance remedy requires a three-part inquiry:
[First, d]epending on the inmate's explanation for the alleged failure to exhaust, the court must ask whether administrative remedies were in fact "available" to the prisoner. The court should [next] inquire as to whether the defendants may have forfeited the affirmative defense of non-exhaustion by failing to raise or preserve it or whether the defendants' own actions inhibiting the inmate's exhaustion of remedies may estop one or more of the defendants from raising the plaintiff's failure to exhaust as a defense. If the court finds that administrative remedies were available to the plaintiff, and that the defendants are not estopped and have not forfeited their non-exhaustion defense, but that the plaintiff nevertheless did not exhaust available remedies, the court should consider whether "special circumstances" have been plausibly alleged that justify "the prisoner's failure to comply with administrative procedural requirements."
Hemphill v. New York, 380 F.3d 680, 686 (2d Cir. 2004) (quotations and citations omitted).
The Second Circuit has recently held that "[a]lert[ing] the prison officials as to the nature of the wrong for which redress is sought . . . does not constitute proper exhaustion." Further, "notice alone is insufficient because `[t]he benefits of exhaustion can be realized only if the prison grievance system is given a fair opportunity to consider the grievance' and `[t]he prison grievance system will not have such an opportunity unless the grievant complies with the system's critical procedural rules.'" D. Deliberate Indifference Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
Macias v. Zenk, ___ F.3d ___, 2007 WL 2127722, at *6 (2d Cir. July 26, 2007) (quoting Braham v. Clancy, 425 F.3d 177, 184 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) and citing Woodford, 126 S. Ct. at 2388) (finding plaintiff "cannot satisfy the PLRA's exhaustion requirement solely by filing two administrative tort claims, or by making informal complaints to the MDC's staff").
Id. (citing Woodford, 126 S. Ct. at 2388).
As a pre-trial detainee at the time of the incident, Jennings' claims are governed by the Fourteenth Amendment. In substance, Jennings alleges a claim under the Eighth Amendment, which applies to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment, and enjoins them from inflicting cruel and unusual punishments.
See Cuoco v. Moritsugu, 222 F.3d 99, 106 (2d Cir. 2000).
See Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 666 (1962). "[T]he standard for analyzing a pre-trial detainee's Fourteenth Amendment claim is the same as the Eighth Amendment standard." Thomas v. Nassau County Correctional Center, 288 F. Supp. 2d 333, 337 (E.D.N.Y. 2003).
The conditions of a prisoner's confinement can give rise to an Eighth Amendment violation if the prisoner satisfies both an objective and subjective prong. Under the objective prong, an inmate must prove "that the deprivation alleged is `objectively sufficiently serious' such that plaintiff was denied `the minimal civilized measure of life's necessities.'" This includes "`not only deprivations of medical care that produce physical torture and lingering death, but also less serious denials which cause or perpetuate pain.'" The condition, however, must be "one of urgency that may produce death, degeneration, or extreme pain." This is "[b]ecause society does not expect or intend prison conditions to be comfortable, only extreme deprivations are sufficient to sustain a `conditions-of-confinement' claim." Thus, the Eighth Amendment protects only "an inmate's right to be free from conditions of confinement that impose an excessive risk to the inmate's health or safety."
See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994).
Trammell v. Keane, 338 F.3d 155, 162 (2d Cir. 2003) (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834).
Brock v. Wright, 315 F.3d 158, 163 (2d Cir. 2003) (quoting Todaro v. Ward, 565 F.2d 48, 52 (2d Cir. 1977)). Accord Brady v. Griffith, No. 95 Civ. 2364, 1998 WL 8146, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 23, 1998).
Hathaway v. Coughlin, 37 F.3d 63, 66 (2d Cir. 1994).
Blyden v. Mancusi, 186 F.3d 252, 263 (2d Cir. 1999).
Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837.
The subjective prong requires a showing that defendant acted with a "`sufficiently culpable state of mind,' i.e., with `deliberate indifference to inmate health or safety.'" The level of culpability must be something "more than negligence, but less than conduct undertaken for the very purpose of causing harm." Under the Fourteenth Amendment, plaintiff must demonstrate that defendants engaged in conduct that was grossly negligent or reckless. Thus, deliberate indifference will exist when an official "knows that inmates face a substantial risk of serious harm and disregards that risk by failing to take reasonable measures to abate it."
Phelps v. Kapnolas, 308 F.3d 180, 185 (2d Cir. 2002) (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837).
Hathaway, 37 F.3d at 66.
See Bryant v. Mafucci, 923 F.2d 979, 983 (2d Cir. 1991) (defining gross negligence or reckless conduct as "conduct . . . where defendant has reason to know of facts creating a high degree of risk of physical harm to another and deliberately acts or fails to act in conscious disregard or indifference to that risk").
Farmer, 511 U.S. at 847.
V. DISCUSSION
A. Exhaustion
While Jennings testified that the only grievance he submitted through the IGRP's system was for the injuries sustained as a result of his fall, it is unclear whether Jennings' injuries and the condition of his cell can be divisible claims. Jennings' grievance clearly states that his injuries resulted from "deteriorating floor tiles and waste water from a broken pipe" which he "ha[d] complained about . . . since November 2002 to no avail." Further, it is questionable whether Jennings was confused about the prison's grievance program, which could have justified his failure to exhaust. Jennings' confusion may have resulted from the IGRC's instruction that his claim was non-grievable and to seek redress through the Comptroller's Office. On the other hand, Jennings' Complaint appears to convey an understanding that it was his injury, rather than his cell condition, which constituted a non-grievable claim. However, exploration of Jennings' failure or success in exhausting his administrative remedies is unnecessary, as it is clear that Jennings' claim is fatally flawed on the merits.
Grievance.
See Hemphill, 380 F.3d at 690 ("a reasonable interpretation of prison grievance regulations may justify an inmate's failure to follow procedural rules to the letter").
See Complaint at 4.
B. Deliberate Indifference
Jennings fails to demonstrate that the condition in his cell objectively violated "contemporary standards of decency." By Jennings' own admission, the water accumulation in his cell "wasn't bad." Routine discomfort and even harsh prison conditions are "part of the penalty that criminal offenders pay for their offenses against society." Further, slippery prison floors, at best, pose a claim of negligence, which is not actionable under the United States Constitution. Thus, the condition of Jennings' cell, as a matter of law, did not pose an unreasonable risk of serious damage to Jennings' health. Summary judgment for Defendants is therefore granted.
Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981)
Jennings Dep. at 41:5-41:7.
Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 347.
See LeMaire v. Maass, 12 F.3d 1444, 1457 (9th Cir. 1993) (holding that "slippery prison floors . . . do not state even an arguable claim" under the Eighth Amendment); Sylla v. City of New York, No. 04 Civ. 5692, 2005 WL 3336460, at *3, (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 8, 2005) ("plaintiff has not pleaded facts from which one could infer that the flooded bathroom posed an excessively serious risk to him; nor does the conclusory statement that [an authority] `knew that plaintiff might injure himself transform a wet floor into anything more than a negligent condition").
VI. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Defendants' motion for summary judgment is granted. The Clerk of the Court is directed to close this motion (docket # 25) and this case.
SO ORDERED: