Opinion
2017–00177 Docket Nos. Z–23345–12 Z–23349–12
12-27-2017
In the MATTER OF JAYDEN M. A.-M. (Anonymous). Jennifer A. (Anonymous), appellant; v. Gregory M. (Anonymous), et al., respondents. (Proceeding No. 1) In the Matter of Kenneth J. A.-M. (Anonymous). Jennifer A. (Anonymous), appellant; v. Gregory M. (Anonymous), et al., respondents. (Proceeding No. 2)
John C. Macklin, New Hyde Park, NY, for appellant. Seymour W. James, Jr., New York, N.Y. (Tamara A. Steckler and Diane Pazar of counsel), attorney for the children.
John C. Macklin, New Hyde Park, NY, for appellant.
Seymour W. James, Jr., New York, N.Y. (Tamara A. Steckler and Diane Pazar of counsel), attorney for the children.
JOHN M. LEVENTHAL, J.P., SYLVIA O. HINDS–RADIX, HECTOR D. LASALLE, VALERIE BRATHWAITE NELSON, JJ.
DECISION & ORDERAppeal from an order of the Family Court, Queens County (Emily Ruben, J.), dated November 25, 2016. The order, in effect, after a hearing, denied the biological mother's petitions to enforce the postadoption contact provisions of judicial surrenders of the subject children.
ORDERED that the order is affirmed, without costs or disbursements.
On December 22, 2008, the biological mother signed conditional judicial surrenders pursuant to Social Services Law § 383–c(2)(b) for her children Kenneth and Jayden, subject to their adoption by Gregory M. and/or Hernando A., with postsurrender/postadoption communication or contact agreements allowing her one visit every six months after the adoption, and such other visits as are agreed upon between the parties. The children were subsequently adopted by Gregory M. and Hernando A., and the postadoption contact agreement was incorporated into the order of adoption. On November 13, 2012, the biological mother filed petitions for enforcement of the postadoption contact agreements. After a hearing, the Family Court, in effect, denied the petitions.
The postadoption contact provisions of a judicial surrender incorporated into an order of adoption will be enforced only where the court determines that enforcement is in the child's best interests (see Domestic Relations Law § 112–b[4] ; Social Services Law § 383–c[2][b] ; Matter of Jayden A.[Jennifer A.], 123 A.D.3d 816, 818–819, 998 N.Y.S.2d 425 ; Matter of Rebecca O., 46 A.D.3d 687, 688, 847 N.Y.S.2d 610 ). Inasmuch as the Family Court's determination with respect to the best interests of a child or children depends to a great extent upon its assessment of the credibility of the witnesses and upon the character, temperament, and sincerity of the parties, deference is accorded to its findings, and such findings will not be disturbed unless they lack a sound and substantial basis in the record (see Matter of Harrison v. McClellan, 151 A.D.3d 723, 723, 53 N.Y.S.3d 548 ; Matter of Estrada v. Palacios, 148 A.D.3d 804, 804, 50 N.Y.S.3d 292; Matter of Hargrove v. Langenau, 138 A.D.3d 846, 847, 30 N.Y.S.3d 166). Here, there is a sound and substantial basis in the record for the Family Court's determination that enforcement of the contact provisions of the surrender agreements is not in the children's best interests (see Matter of Shaquana Michelle M.-L. v Leake & Watts, 139 A.D.3d 513, 513, 31 N.Y.S.3d 497 ; Matter of Sapphire W. [Mary W.—Debbie R.], 120 A.D.3d 1584, 1585, 992 N.Y.S.2d 599 ; Matter of Kristian J.P. v. Jeannette I.C., 87 A.D.3d 1337, 1338, 930 N.Y.S.2d 704).
The biological mother's remaining contentions are without merit.
LEVENTHAL, J.P., HINDS–RADIX, LASALLE and BRATHWAITE NELSON, JJ., concur.