Opinion
Civil Action 3:23-CV-1087
06-11-2024
MATTHEW JOHN JENNER, Plaintiff v. TROOPER GREGORY PIMM, et al., Defendants
MUNLEY, D.J.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
William I. Arbuckle, U.S. Magistrate Judge
Defendant PSP Troop P-Force's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, Doc. 34
I. INTRODUCTION
Matthew John Jenner (“Plaintiff”) initiated this pro se civil rights action against three members of the State Police and a Police Troop while he was incarcerated at SCI-Rockview. Currently before the Court is the Defendant Police Troop's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings. (Doc. 34).
For the reasons explained herein, it will be RECOMMENDED that the Defendant Police Troop's Motion be GRANTED.
II. BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Plaintiff alleges that, on January 28, 2022, State Police arrested him. He also alleges that the officers used excessive force while making the arrest. (Doc. 29). On June 29, 2023, Plaintiff lodged a complaint, in which he sought damages from the officers and PSP Troop P-Force, in this Court. (Doc. 1). On July 27, 2023, Plaintiff submitted a motion requesting leave to proceed in forma pauperis. (Doc. 5). The Court granted Plaintiff's request and directed that Plaintiff's Complaint be served. (Doc. 7).
On October 23, 2023, in response to Defendants' Motion for a More Definite Statement, Plaintiff filed an amended complaint. (Doc. 29). In his Amended Complaint, Plaintiff names three State Police (Trooper Gregory Pimm, Trooper Blade Bernosky, and Corporal Jacob Burgess) and PSP Troop P-Force as Defendants. The only relief sought is money damages. On November 7, 2023, Defendants filed an answer. (Doc. 31).
Currently before the Court is Defendant PSP Troop P-Force's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings. (Doc. 34). Along with its Motion, Defendant PSP Troop P-Force filed a brief in support. (Doc. 35). Plaintiff was directed to respond on or before February 8, 2024. (Doc. 40). On February 7, 2024, the Court received a document in which Plaintiff wrote:
The only discovery I have pertaining to PSP Troop P-Force is They should have there troopers trained for situations, instead of causing serious bodily injury to a person in such a manner. The PSP Troop P-Force should be held responsible for there officers in a manner as in which they acted.(Doc. 42) (errors in original). During a telephone conference, Plaintiff confirmed that this document is his brief in opposition. (Doc. 47). Therefore, Defendant PSP Troop P-Force's Motion (Doc. 34) is fully briefed and is ready to resolve.
III. LEGAL STANDARD
A party may move for judgment on the pleadings “[a]fter the pleadings are closed-but early enough not to delay trial.” In this case, the pleadings were considered “closed” when Defendants' Answer was filed. Judgment on the pleadings will be granted only if “the movant clearly establishes that no material issue of fact remains to be resolved and that [the movant] is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
See Austin Powder Co. v. Knorr Contracting, Inc., No. 3:08-CV-1428, 2009 WL 773695, at *1 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 20, 2009) (“The pleadings are closed after the complaint and answer are filed, along with any reply to additional claims asserted in the answer.”).
Rosenau v. Unifund Corp., 539 F.3d 218, 221 (3d Cir. 2008) (quoting Jablonski v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 863 F.2d 289, 290-91 (3d Cir. 1988)).
“The purpose of judgment on the pleadings is to dispose of claims where the material facts are undisputed and judgment can be entered on the competing pleadings and exhibits thereto, and documents incorporated by reference.” Venetec Int'l, Inc. v. Nexus Med., LLC, 541 F.Supp.2d 612, 617 (D. Del. 2008); see also In re Burlington Coat Factory Sec. Litig., 114 F.3d 1410, 1426 (3d Cir. 1997) (explaining that any documents integral to pleadings may be considered in connection with Rule 12(c) motion). “The issue is not whether a plaintiff will ultimately prevail but whether the claimant is entitled to offer evidence to support the claims.” Burlington Coat Factory, 114 F.3d at 1420. Ultimately, a motion for judgment on the pleadings can be granted “only if no relief could be afforded under any set of facts that could be proved.” Turbe [v. Government of the Virgin Islands, 938 F.2d 427, 428 (3d Cir. 1991)].
Letke v. Jennings, No. 23-1230-GBW, 2024 WL 2390863, at *2 (D. Del. May 23, 2024).
In its motion, Defendant PSP Troop P-Force argues that Plaintiff failed to state a claim against it upon which relief can be granted. Where a motion for judgment on the pleadings asserts that a plaintiff fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, the reviewing court is required to view the facts presented in the pleadings and the inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.“Ordinarily, in deciding a motion for judgment on the pleadings, the court considers the pleadings and attached exhibits, undisputedly authentic documents attached to the motion for judgment on the pleadings if plaintiffs' claims are based on the documents, and matters of public record.”
See Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(h)(2) (explaining that a party may argue that a pleading fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted in a motion for judgment on the pleadings under Rule 12(c)).
Zimmerman v. Corbett, 873 F.3d 414, 417 (3d Cir. 2017) (“A motion for judgment on the pleadings based on the defense that the plaintiff has failed to state a claim is analyzed under the same standards that apply to a Rule 12(b)(6) motion,” and “[i]n considering a motion for judgment on the pleadings, a court must accept all of the allegations in the pleadings of the party against whom the motion is addressed as true and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party.”)
Atiyeh v. Nat'l Fire Ins. Co. of Hartford, 742 F.Supp.2d 591, 595 (E.D. Pa. 2010) (internal footnotes omitted).
IV. DISCUSSION
We construe Plaintiff's Amended Complaint as asserting a Fourth Amendment claim of excessive force against Defendant PSP Troop P-Force under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. In its Motion, Defendant PSP Troop P-Force argues that it is entitled to judgment on the pleadings because it is not a “person” under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Defendant PSP Troop P-Force is correct that it is not considered a “person” under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
“Section 1983 imposes civil liability upon any person who, acting under the color of state law, deprives another individual of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States.” “It is well settled that § 1983 does not confer any substantive rights, but merely ‘provides a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.'” To establish a claim under § 1983, Plaintiff must establish a deprivation of a federally protected right and that this deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law.
Shuman ex rel. Shertzer v. Penn Manor Sch. Dist., 422 F.3d 141, 146 (3d Cir. 2005).
Williams v. Pa. Hum. Rels. Comm'n, 870 F.3d 294, 297 (3d Cir. 2017) (quoting Hildebrand v. Allegheny Cnty., 757 F.3d 99, 104 (3d Cir. 2014)).
Woloszyn v. Cnty. of Lawrence, 396 F.3d 314, 319 (3d Cir. 2005).
The Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution provides:
The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.
This immunity extends to state agencies, like the Pennsylvania State Police and State Police Troops. Congress did not abrogate this immunity when it enacted 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania has not consented to be sued under § 1983 in federal court.
See Akl v. Pa. State Police Troop K-Delaware Cnty., No. 16-CV-1096m 2916 WL 5341744, at *3 (M.D. Pa. Sept. 23, 2016) (explaining that the Pennsylvania State Police is an arm of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, is entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity and is not a person and extending this rationale to dismiss a claim brought against a “Police Troop”).
Phillips v. James, No. 13-1196, 2014 WL 1652914, at *8 (W.D. Pa. Apr. 23, 2014) (observing that no exceptions to Eleventh Amendment immunity applied to a litigant's § 1983 claim against an arm of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania because the Commonwealth did not consent to suit under § 1983, and Congress did not abrogate the Commonwealth's Eleventh Amendment immunity under 42 U.S.C. § 1983).
Defendant PSP Troop P-Force is not amenable to suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 because it is not a “person,” and because it is entitled to immunity under the Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution. Thus, Plaintiff cannot obtain relief from Defendant PSP Troop P-Force under any set of facts. Defendant PSP Troop P-Force has clearly established that no fact material to this issue is in dispute and that considering the material facts, it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
V. RECOMMENDATION
Accordingly, it is RECOMMENDED that:
(1) Defendant PSP Troop P-Force's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings (Doc. 34) be GRANTED; and
(2) The docket in this case be updated to reflect that Defendant PSP Troop P-Force is no longer a party to this lawsuit.
NOTICE OF LOCAL RULE 72.3
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that any party may obtain a review of the Report and Recommendation pursuant to Local Rule 72.3, which provides:
Any party may object to a magistrate judge's proposed findings, recommendations or report addressing a motion or matter described in 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(B) or making a recommendation for the disposition of a prisoner case or a habeas corpus petition within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy thereof. Such party shall file with the clerk of court, and serve on the magistrate judge and all parties, written objections which shall specifically identify the portions of the proposed findings, recommendations or report to which objection is made and the basis for such objections. The briefing requirements set forth in Local Rule 72.2 shall apply. A judge shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made and may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge. The judge, however, need conduct a new hearing only in his or her discretion or where required by law, and may consider the record developed before the magistrate judge, making his or her own determination on the basis of that record. The judge may also receive further evidence, recall witnesses, or recommit the matter to the magistrate judge with instructions.