Tennessee courts have concluded that this test has been met if "the party against whom collateral estoppel is asserted had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue in a prior suit." Jenne v. Snyder-Falkinham, 967 S.W.2d 327, 330 (Tenn.App. 1997); see also Taylor v. Eaton (In re Eaton), No. 02-2064 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. April 29, 2003) ("The actually litigated requirement requires only that the issue was effectively raised in the prior action and `that the losing party has a `fair opportunity procedurally, substantively and evidentially' to contest the issue.'") (quoting Harris v. Byard (In re Byard), 47 B.R. 700, 707 n. 9 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1985)).
Generally, Tennessee courts have applied collateral estoppel if "the party against whom collateral estoppel is asserted had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue in a prior suit." Jenne v. Snyder-Falkinham, 967 S.W.2d 327, 330 (Tenn.App. 1998); see also Harris v. Byard (In re Byard), 47 B.R. 700, 707 n. 9 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1985) (The actually litigated requirement requires only that the issue was effectively raised in the prior action and "that the losing party has had `a fair opportunity procedurally, substantively, and evidentially' to contest the issue."). The fraud issue was well pleaded and properly raised in the State Court complaint.
Nonetheless, provided the other elements of collateral estoppel exist, Tennessee courts have applied collateral estoppel if "the party against whom collateral estoppel is asserted had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue in the prior suit." See, e.g., Jenne v. Snyder-Falkinham, 967 S.W.2d 327, 330 (Tenn.App. 1998); Morris v. Esmark Apparel, Inc., 832 S.W.2d 563, 566 (Tenn.App. 1992). See also Harris v. Byard (In re Byard), 47 B.R. 700, 707 n. 9 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1985) (The actually litigated requirement requires only that the issue was effectively raised in the prior action and "that the losing party had `a fair opportunity procedurally, substantively, and evidentially' to contest the issue."
Id. at 702; 747 A.2d at 771. The most comparable Tennessee case we have encountered in our research is Jenne v. Snyder-Falkinham, 967 S.W.2d 327, 328 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1997), which involved a Tennessee attorney (and another attorney from Virginia) who filed suit in Tennessee against a Virginia client for contractual attorney's fees. The client had retained the attorneys to represent her in a lawsuit in Virginia.
The party seeking the summary judgment has the burden of satisfying the court that the requirements of Tenn.R.Civ.P. 56 have been met. See Shadrick v. Coker, 963 S.W.2d 726, 731 (Tenn. 1998); Jenne v. Snyder-Falkinham, 967 S.W.2d 327, 331 (Tenn. Ct.App. 1997). Once a moving party has met its burden, the opposing party must come forward v, rith specific facts creating a material, triable factual dispute.
5. that the party against whom collateral estoppel is asserted had a full and fair opportunity in the earlier suit to litigate the issue now sought to be precluded. See Jenne v. Snyder-Falkinham, 967 S.W.2d 327, 330 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1997); Morris v. Esmark Apparel, Inc., 832 S.W.2d at 566; Restatement (Second) of Judgments ยง 29 (1982). At common law, the collateral estoppel doctrine required mutuality of the parties and could only be used defensively.
See Shadrick v. Coker, 963 S.W.2d 726, 731 (Tenn. 1998); Jenne v. Snyder-Falkinham, 967 S.W.2d 327, 331 (Tenn.Ct.App. 1997). Once a moving party has met its burden, the opposing party must come forward with specific facts creating a material, triable factual dispute.