Jenks v. Quinn

14 Citing cases

  1. Brown v. Weir

    95 App. Div. 78 (N.Y. App. Div. 1904)   Cited 3 times

    There are two rules of law which stand in the way of plaintiff's recovery for the loss of her engagements, either of which is sufficient to justify a reversal of the judgment. The first of these rules is that which imposes upon a party subjected to injury from a breach of contract the active duty of making reasonable exertion to render the injury as light as possible. ( Hamilton v. McPherson, 28 N.Y. 72, 77, and authorities there cited; Jenks v. Quinn, 137 id. 223, 228.) The other is that damages for breach of contract are only those which are incidental to, and directly caused by, the breach, and may reasonably be presumed to have entered into the contemplation of the parties; and not speculative profits, or accidental or consequential losses.

  2. Hamilton v. Farmer

    292 S.W. 683 (Ark. 1927)   Cited 7 times

    It has been said: "An eviction brought about by collusion would not sustain the action for breach of covenant, nor could the plaintiff recover any damages which could have been prevented or avoided by reasonable diligence on his part, and he owed a duty to the defendant to so conduct himself as to make the damages as little as possible." Jenkes v. Quinn, 137 N.Y. 223, 33 N.E. 376. The chancellor in his opinion said: "This leaves for consideration the express warranty, on which little need be said. This warranty, reduced to its final analysis, is a promise to protect possession. This covenant is not breached until there has either been an actual or constructive eviction by paramount title.

  3. Hunt v. Hay

    108 N.E. 851 (N.Y. 1915)   Cited 3 times

    Where there is a complete breach of a covenant of warranty on the sale of real property the damage is the value of the real property at the time of the covenant. (Kent's Commentaries, vol. 4, 475; Staats v. Executors of Ten Eyck, 3 Caines, 111 f.; Jenks v. Quinn, 61 Hun, 427; S.C., 137 N.Y. 223; Baldwin v. Munn, 2 Wend. 399.) The value of the real property at the time of the covenant is conclusively presumed to be the consideration of the sale in connection with which the covenant was made. (Rawle on Covenants, 243; Sedgwick on Damages [9th ed.]; Staats v. Executors of Ten Eyck, supra; Jenks v. Quinn, supra; Sweet v. Howell, 96 App. Div. 45; Baldwin v. Munn, supra; Bennett v. Jenkins, 13 Johns. 50; Kelly v. Dutch Church of Schenectady, 2 Hill, 105; Brown v. Allen, 73 Hun, 291; Utica, C. S.V.R.R. Co. v. Gates, 8 App. Div. 181.)

  4. Uihlein v. Matthews

    172 N.Y. 154 (N.Y. 1902)   Cited 30 times

    The two instruments conveying to the defendant the right to maintain her party wall expressly provided that the rights and covenants therein provided for should run with the land, and although nothing on that subject is mentioned in the quitclaim deed, yet, in the absence of some words of limitation, that form of conveyance carries to the grantee the benefit of all covenants running with the land. (Devlin on Deeds, sec. 849; Jenks v. Quinn, 137 N.Y. 223; Brady v. Spurck, 27 Ill. 478; Morgan v. Clayton, 61 Ill. 35. ) It cannot be doubted that the agreement between the parties which contains the restriction in question created an easement in favor of the plaintiffs and their land and imposed a servitude upon the defendant's property.

  5. Ehmer v. Title Guarantee Trust Co.

    156 N.Y. 10 (N.Y. 1898)   Cited 15 times

    It will be seen that the first and third propositions are based upon the assumption that the plaintiff should have sold No. 123, the house covered by the deed as originally given by the owner, to the end that the damages recovered, or for which the defendant should be made liable, might be made as light as possible. ( Hamilton v. McPherson, 28 N.Y. 72-77; Dillon v. Anderson, 43 N.Y. 231; Allen v. McConihe, 124 N.Y. 342; Jenks v. Quinn, 137 N.Y. 223; Hymes v. Esty, 133 N.Y. 342. ) Without attempting to ascertain whether that principle has any application to actions of this character, it is clear that it cannot be applied to the facts of this case, since the plaintiff never owned or could sell No. 123, although she had a deed of it from the owner.

  6. Mills v. City of New York

    269 App. Div. 306 (N.Y. App. Div. 1945)   Cited 1 times

    The intention to convey easements over the abutting mapped streets, was clearly expressed in the contract of sale and deed of conveyance made by Sound Realty and plaintiffs' intermediate grantors and also in the deeds to and out of Lefkowitz which made reference to the lots as shown on filed map of South Vernon Park. It is no answer to this rule that plaintiffs through mesne conveyances obtained their title by bargain and sale rather than by full covenant and warranty deed. Covenants of warranty run with the land (Real Property Law, § 253) and inure to the benefit of subsequent grantees, although they acquire title by bargain and sale deed. ( Jenks v. Quinn, 137 N.Y. 223, 230; Matter of City of New York [ Newton Avenue], 183 App. Div. 564, 567; Mygatt v. Coe, 147 N.Y. 456; Holloway v. Southmayd et al., 139 N.Y. 390.) King et al. v. Mayor, etc., of N.Y. et al. ( 102 N.Y. 172), relied on by respondents, is not here controlling.

  7. Hunt v. Hay

    156 App. Div. 138 (N.Y. App. Div. 1913)   Cited 2 times

    In such case the measure of damages, not including interest, is the value of the land at the time of the defendant's conveyance, which is conclusively presumed to be the actual consideration received by him. ( Jenks v. Quinn, 61 Hun, 427; affd., 137 N.Y. 223; Petrie v. Folz, 54 N.Y. Super. Ct. 223; Crisfield v. Storr, 36 Md. 129. See, also, 8 Am. Eng. Ency. of Law [2d ed.], 190, and authorities cited.) So that no matter how much the subsequent grantee may have paid for the property, he is limited in his recovery in an action against a remote grantor to the consideration received by the latter.

  8. Jacobs v. Fowler

    135 App. Div. 713 (N.Y. App. Div. 1909)   Cited 4 times

    These covenants and the right of action upon them are assignable, and a conveyance of land by a bargain and sale, or even a quitclaim deed containing no covenants, operates to transfer such rights to the grantee named therein. ( Beddoe's Executor v. Wadsworth, 21 Wend. 120; Hunt v. Amidon, 4 Hill, 345; Jenks v. Quinn, 137 N.Y. 223, 230; Thomas v. Bland, 91 Ky. 1.) As was said in the last case: "A covenant of warranty of title runs with the land, to which the vendee looks as security against any defect in the title, and which is transmitted to each successive purchaser; and the fact that a purchaser with this covenant sells the land to another person without his covenant of warranty does not restrict the latter's right, so far as the previous warranty is concerned, to his immediate vendor. If the immediate vendor has a covenant of warranty, as it runs with the land, it is included in the sale of his title, notwithstanding the fact that he declines to warrant the title thus conveyed. This covenant of warranty is not conveyed by a succeeding covenant of warranty, but by the words of conveyance, and any words that convey the title convey the warranty that the vendor holds, because, as said, it runs with the land, and is transmitted by the conveyance.

  9. Growen Realty Corporation v. Levy

    143 Misc. 797 (N.Y. Mun. Ct. 1932)   Cited 2 times
    Holding specific metes and bounds prevail over a street address

    It would seem to be well settled that a covenant of warranty of title runs with the land and is transmitted to each successive purchaser, and the fact that a purchaser sells the land to another person without his covenant of warranty does not restrict the latter's right, so far as the previous warranty is concerned, to his immediate vendor, and this covenant of warranty is not conveyed by a succeeding covenant of warranty, but by the words of conveyance, and any words that convey the title convey the warranty that the vendor holds, because, as said, it runs with the land and is transmitted by the conveyance. ( Jacobs v. Fowler, 135 A.D. 713; Jenks v. Quinn, 137 N.Y. 223, at pp. 229, 230.) It does not appear that the defendants ever owned other premises than those conveyed by them.

  10. Matter of Julia Boylan

    119 Misc. 545 (N.Y. Cnty. Ct. 1922)   Cited 1 times

    In Wilcox v. Campbell, 106 N.Y. 325, it was held that where the grantor assumed and agreed to pay a mortgage incumbering the premises granted and the grantee lost the land conveyed to him through the foreclosure of the mortgage, the latter was entitled to recover his actual damages, probably on the theory that the agreement to pay the mortgage was to be considered an agreement to indemnify. See, also, Jenks v. Quinn, 137 N.Y. 223, 227. But the cases last cited only constitute exceptions to the general rule which, under the overwhelming weight of authority in this state, I must follow.