See Whitaker , 244 Ga. App. at 244 (4), 535 S.E.2d 283. See also Jenkins v. State , 259 Ga. App. 47, 51 (2) (b), 576 S.E.2d 300 (2002). Although O'Brien does not argue that the evidence to find her guilty of the charges in the accusation was legally insufficient, "if the evidence meets the standard of Jackson v. Virginia ,...the case may be retried."

Franks v. State , 240 Ga. App. 685, 687 (1), 524 S.E.2d 545 (1999) (citation and punctuation omitted). 259 Ga. App. 47, 576 S.E.2d 300 (2002). Id. at 51 (2) (b), 576 S.E.2d 300.

Alternatively, a showing of intent may be made by evidence, as here, that an individual was observed using one or more of the tools while committing the crime. See Spradlin v. State, 279 Ga.App. 638, 640 –641(2), 631 S.E.2d 828 (2006) (two men observed cutting security chain; bolt cutters found in front seat of truck occupied by appellant and a companion); Jenkins v. State, 259 Ga.App. 47, 51(2)(a), 576 S.E.2d 300 (2002) (appellant carried flashlight during burglary). Kenemer also specifically attacks the police officer's testimony in this case as inadequate to show “common” use.

Id. 5. See, e.g.,Robins v. State, 298 Ga.App. 70, 72(1), 679 S.E.2d 92 (2009) (robbery victims' in-court identification of suspect was sufficient evidence to sustain conviction); Walker v. State, 281 Ga.App. 94, 94–100, 635 S.E.2d 577 (2006) (evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of various theft-related offenses when he was found in possession of stolen items); Davis v. State, 275 Ga.App. 714, 716(1), 621 S.E.2d 818 (2005) (sufficient evidence to convict defendant of burglary when he was found in possession of stolen items within hours of burglary); Jenkins v. State, 259 Ga.App. 47, 50(2), 576 S.E.2d 300 (2002) (sufficient evidence to convict defendant of burglary when, inter alia, he was found in possession of items identified by the victim as having been stolen); Buckner v. State, 253 Ga.App. 294, 294–95(1), 558 S.E.2d 823 (2002) (evidence was sufficient to sustain convictions for burglary and fleeing to elude police when defendant was identified in court by officer and was found in possession of stolen items); see also OCGA § 24–4–8 (“The testimony of a single witness is generally sufficient to establish a fact.”). 6. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986).

(d) As a result, the State may retry Verdree on all of the offenses as indicted without violating his right against double jeopardy. See Jenkins v. State, 259 Ga. App. 47, 49 (2) ( 576 SE2d 300) (2002) ("The general rule is that the retrial of the defendant is not barred where reversal of the conviction results from trial error rather than evidentiary insufficiency.") (punctuation omitted). 6. Verdree contends that the charges for aggravated assault with a deadly weapon were lesser included offenses of either the kidnapping or armed robbery charges and, therefore, his aggravated assault convictions should have merged with the other convictions.

(Citation omitted.) Jenkins v. State, 259 Ga. App. 47, 49 (2) ( 576 SE2d 300) (2002). Thus, a defendant may not be retried for an offense following a reversal based on insufficient evidence.

Accordingly, the trial court erred in finding that the appellants waived their first appearance hearing by executing the waiver forms. See Smith v. State, 270 Ga. App. 759, 760-761 ( 608 SE2d 35) (2004) (vacating convictions of traffic offenses following a bench trial on the basis that the record contained no affirmative evidence that the defendant went to a bench trial upon a knowing and voluntary waiver of the jury trial right where there was neither an affidavit nor open-court colloquy showing that the defendant was informed of the various aspects of the right to a jury trial and of the general consequences of relinquishing that right and was asked whether he wished to waive his right to a jury trial); Jenkins v. State, 259 Ga. App. 47, 48-49 (1) ( 576 SE2d 300) (2002) (vacating convictions after a bench trial and remanding for determination of whether the defendant waived his right to a jury trial knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently where the record contained forms that said only "Comes now the defendant above-named and herein waives his right to a Trial by Jury and makes his/her request for a trial by the Court" or "makes his request for a non-jury"); Whitaker v. State, 244 Ga. App. 241, 244 (4) ( 535 SE2d 283) (2000) (vacating convictions after a bench trial and remanding for determination of whether the defendant waived his right to a jury trial knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently where the record contained a handwritten notation, I "`waive my right to a jury trial'"; before a trial judge accepts a written waiver of the right to a jury trial, "it would be preferable for the . . . judge to question the defendant on the record to ensure that the defendant personally has made a voluntary, knowing, and intellig

State v. Aycock, 283 Ga. App. 876, 877 ( 643 SE2d 249) (2007). See Burks v. United States, 437 U. S. 1, 9-10 (98 SC 2141, 57 LE2d 1) (1978); Jenkins v. State, 259 Ga. App. 47, 49 (2) ( 576 SE2d 300) (2002). See OCGA § 40-6-391 (a) (5) (a person shall not operate a moving vehicle if he has an alcohol concentration of "0.08 grams or more at any time within three hours after such driving or being in actual physical control from alcohol consumed before such driving or being in actual physical control ended"); Peters v. State, 281 Ga. App. 385, 386-387 (1) ( 636 SE2d 97) (2006) (per se DUI conviction reversed where there was insufficient evidence that the defendant had an unlawful alcohol concentration level); Abelson v. State, 269 Ga. App. 596, 598 (1) ( 604 SE2d 647) (2004) (conviction for per se DUI reversed where State failed to prove an essential element of OCGA § 40-6-391 (a) (5)).

(Citation omitted.) Jenkins v. State, 259 Ga. App. 47, 48 (1) ( 576 SE2d 300) (2002). the [s]tate bears the burden of showing that the waiver was made both intelligently and knowingly, either (1) by showing on the record that the defendant was cognizant of the right being waived; or (2) by filling a silent or incomplete record through the use of extrinsic evidence which affirmatively shows that the waiver was knowingly and voluntarily made.

This Court has even remanded cases for the trial court to conduct a hearing and determine whether the defendant personally, knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily participated in waiving his right to a jury trial. See, e.g., Jenkins v. State, 259 Ga. App. 47, 52 (2) (b) ( 576 SE2d 300) (2002). A trial court's determination on the question whether a defendant knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his right to a jury trial is reviewed under a clearly erroneous standard.