Jenkins v. State

8 Citing cases

  1. Carter v. State

    252 Ga. 502 (Ga. 1984)   Cited 24 times

    As we view the record, the evidence was sufficient to authorize a rational trier of fact in finding beyond a reasonable doubt that the appellant was guilty of the subject offenses. As held in Jenkins v. State, 190 Ga. 556 (1) ( 9 S.E.2d 909) (1940), "All of the participants in a plan to rob are criminally responsible for the acts of each, committed in the execution of the plan, and which may be said to be a probable consequence of the unlawful design, even though the particular act may not have actually been a part of the plan." Accord Fortner v. State, 248 Ga. 107 (5) ( 281 S.E.2d 533) (1981) and cit.

  2. Morris v. State

    228 Ga. 39 (Ga. 1971)   Cited 52 times

    The appellant, under these circumstances, was equally guilty with the others. Gore v. State, 162 Ga. 267, 271 ( 134 S.E. 36); Jenkins v. State, 190 Ga. 556 (1) ( 9 S.E.2d 909); Evans v. State, 222 Ga. 392 (8) ( 150 S.E.2d 240). The witness Davis sufficiently corroborated this testimony by relating the appellant's statement to him.

  3. Hill v. State

    39 S.E.2d 675 (Ga. 1946)   Cited 28 times

    The intent of the actual slayer is imputable to his coconspirators." In Jenkins v. State, 190 Ga. 556 (1) ( 9 S.E.2d 909), this court held: "All of the participants in a plan to rob are criminally responsible for the acts of each, committed in the execution of the plan, and which may be said to be a probable consequence of the unlawful design, even though the particular act may not have actually been a part of the plan." See also Berryhill v. State, 151 Ga. 416 (1) ( 107 S.E. 158); Lumpkin v. State, 176 Ga. 446, 449 (1) ( 168 S.E. 241); Compton v. State, 179 Ga. 560 (3), 563 ( 176 S.E. 764); Simmons v. State, 181 Ga. 761 (1), 762 ( 184 S.E. 291); Adkins v. State, 187 Ga. 519 (1) ( 1 S.E.2d 420); Daniels v. State, 58 Ga. App. 599 (9) ( 199 S.E. 572). Grounds 5 and 6 are without merit.

  4. Emmett v. State

    195 Ga. 517 (Ga. 1943)   Cited 39 times
    Rejecting defendantโ€™s argument that his custodial status at the time his co-defendant made certain statements rendered his failure to deny those statements inadmissible, and that it was improper to instruct the jury that such silence could amount to an admission, but providing that "in so doing the judge should be careful to inform the jury that they are to determine whether under all the circumstances an answer or denial was required"

    There is no merit in this exception. See Gore v. State, 162 Ga. 267 ( 134 S.E. 36); Simpson v. State, 168 Ga. 598 ( 148 S.E. 511); Simmons v. State, 181 Ga. 761 ( 184 S.E. 291); Jenkins v. State, 190 Ga. 556 ( 9 S.E.2d 909). 6.

  5. Kalb v. State

    195 Ga. 544 (Ga. 1943)   Cited 30 times

    The ruling thus made has been followed in several later decisions, and the charge here assailed was in substantial accord therewith. Gore v. State, 162 Ga. 267 ( 134 S.E. 36); Simpson v. State, 168 Ga. 598 ( 148 S.E. 511); Simmons v. State, 181 Ga. 761 ( 184 S.E. 291); Jenkins v. State, 190 Ga. 556 ( 9 S.E.2d 909). The charge was authorized by the evidence, and was not otherwise erroneous as contended.

  6. Burns v. State

    11 S.E.2d 350 (Ga. 1940)   Cited 43 times

    But even if the testimony was inadmissible, we are of the opinion that its admission did not prejudice the defendant, in view of the other testimony of the same witness as to her conversation with the defendant Burns himself and as to his conduct in directing return of the stolen jewelry, which was done as directed. His own language and conduct as related by the same witness more thoroughly implicated him than anything said by either Daniels or Thompson, and in the circumstances the statements by them were clearly harmless. South Georgia Railway Co. v. Niles, 131 Ga. 599 (3) ( 62 S.E. 1042); Hamilton v. State, 143 Ga. 265 ( 84 S.E. 583); Jenkins v. State, 190 Ga. 556 ( 9 S.E.2d 909); Glisson v. State, 57 Ga. App. 169 ( 194 S.E. 877). Grounds 9 and 10 are without merit. 9.

  7. Graham v. State

    142 S.E.2d 287 (Ga. Ct. App. 1965)   Cited 3 times

    2. While, ordinarily, the confession of one joint offender or conspirator, made after the enterprise is ended, shall be admissible only against himself ( Code ยง 38-414), yet evidence as to written admissions or confessions of guilt, involving the defendant on trial, made by a co-conspirator after the termination of the conspiracy, was admissible, where it appeared that they were made in the presence of the defendant himself and were then freely and voluntarily declared by the defendant to be true. Gunter v. State, 19 Ga. App. 772 (5) ( 92 S.E. 314); Morris v. State, 177 Ga. 106 (1), 110 ( 169 S.E. 495; Jenkins v. State, 190 Ga. 556 (5), 561 ( 9 S.E.2d 909). 3. The above evidence having been properly admitted and the evidence authorizing the verdict of guilty found by the jury, there was no error in overruling the grounds of the motion for new trial.

  8. Davis v. State

    12 S.E.2d 124 (Ga. Ct. App. 1940)   Cited 1 times

    The order of proof rests in the discretion of the trial judge. This ground is not meritorious. Jenkins v. State, 190 Ga. 556 ( 9 S.E.2d 909). 4. Grounds 4 and 5 object to certain testimony of E. E. Holder, witness for the State, to the effect that on several occasions he had bought whisky from the defendant, on the ground that the defendant was charged with possessing whisky, and that evidence of selling whisky was immaterial and prejudicial to the defendant and should have been excluded.