Opinion
No. ED 107640
11-26-2019
Camden Deshean JENKINS, Appellant, v. STATE of Missouri, Respondent.
MEMORANDUM SUPPLEMENTING ORDER AFFIRMING JUDGMENT UNDER RULE 84.16(b)
This memorandum is for the information of the parties and sets forth the reasons for the order affirming the judgment.
THIS STATEMENT DOES NOT CONSTITUTE A FORMAL OPINION OF THIS COURT. IT IS NOT UNIFORMLY AVAILABLE. IT SHALL NOT BE REPORTED, CITED, OR OTHERWISE USED IN UNRELATED CASES BEFORE THIS COURT OR ANY OTHER COURT. IN THE EVENT OF THE FILING OF A MOTION TO REHEAR OR TRANSFER TO THE SUPREME COURT, A COPY OF THIS MEMORANDUM SHALL BE ATTACHED TO ANY SUCH MOTION.
Camden Deshean Jenkins ("Movant") appeals the denial of his Rule 24.035 postconviction relief motion without an evidentiary hearing. The motion court did not clearly err in denying Movant’s Rule 24.035 motion. We affirm.
All references to Rules are to Missouri Supreme Court Rules (2019).
BACKGROUND
Movant was charged with two counts of possession of a controlled substance arising from two separate cases. On August 19, 2016, Movant pleaded guilty to both charges. The plea court held a hearing to ensure Movant understood the legal rights he was waiving by entering his plea and that his guilty plea was made voluntarily. The plea court informed Movant that the State recommended he be sentenced to two concurrent seven-year sentences pursuant to Section 217.362 RSMo (2016), which would allow Movant to be placed on probation upon successful completion of a long-term treatment program ("treatment program"). Movant affirmed he understood if he successfully completed the program, he would be released within "a year or so." However, if he failed to complete the program, he would have to serve the imposed sentence.
All further statutory references are to RSMo (2016).
Movant agreed with the factual basis the prosecutor set forth for the crimes to which Movant pleaded guilty. He affirmed no promises or threats were made to him; that plea counsel had fully advised him of all his legal rights and the consequences of his guilty plea; and plea counsel had done everything he requested, answered all of his questions, and given him enough time to discuss his case. Movant testified he did not have any complaints or criticisms of plea counsel and he was satisfied with the representation he received. As a result, the plea court found that there was a factual basis for Movant’s guilty plea, that it was made voluntarily and intelligently, and accepted his guilty plea. The court then sentenced Movant to two concurrent seven-years of imprisonment. The sentence was suspended pending the successful completion of the treatment program. The court reiterated the terms of the treatment program, which Movant again acknowledged he understood. After inquiring about plea counsel’s representation once again, the court found there was no probable cause or prima facie basis for ineffective assistance of counsel.
Movant began the treatment program on November 17, 2017. He received five conduct violations within the first four months for engaging in a physical struggle with another offender, becoming loud and belligerent when failing to follow a staff directive, becoming aggressive towards staff, having items in his locker that did not belong to him, and bringing coffee to the gym, which was prohibited. Furthermore, Movant was also placed in administrative segregation for the majority of his stay, which precluded his attendance at the requisite interventions to change his behavior and impeded his advancement to phase two of the treatment program, which normally occurs within one month. Consequently, Movant was given an "unsuccessful exit" from the program and his sentences were automatically executed.
Movant was placed in administrative segregation on the following dates: December 8, 2016 to January 26, 2017; February 09, 2017 to February 14, 2017; and February 17, 2017 to February 24, 2017.
Movant timely filed his pro se motion for post-conviction relief on November 30, 2016. On January 8, 2019, the motion court issued its finding of fact and conclusions of law denying Movant’s post-conviction relief motion without an evidentiary hearing.
This appeal follows.
DISCUSSION
Standard of Review
Appellate review of the denial of a Rule 24.035 motion "is limited to a determination of whether the motion court’s findings and conclusions are clearly erroneous." Rule 24.035(k); Randle v. State, 473 S.W.3d 221, 223 (Mo. App. E.D. 2015). The motion court’s findings of fact and conclusions of law are clearly erroneous only when, "after reviewing the entire record, we are left with a definite and firm impression that a mistake has been made." Randle, 473 S.W.3d at 223.
Analysis
In his sole point on appeal, Movant argues the motion court clearly erred in denying his Rule 24.035 motion without an evidentiary hearing. Specifically, Movant claims he pleaded facts, not conclusively refuted by the record, showing plea counsel was ineffective by failing to advise him he could be terminated from the treatment program for committing minor violations.
A "claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is immaterial except to the extent it impinges upon the voluntariness and knowledge with which the guilty plea was made." Roberts v. State , 276 S.W.3d 833, 836 (Mo. banc 2009) (internal quotations omitted). To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, a movant must show that: (1) his plea counsel’s performance failed to conform to the degree of skill, care, and diligence of a reasonably competent attorney under similar circumstances; and (2) movant was prejudiced by that failure. Ventimiglia v. State, 468 S.W.3d 455, 462 (Mo. App. E.D. 2015) ; Strickland v. Washington , 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). A movant alleging ineffective assistance of counsel after a guilty plea has the burden of showing that "a serious dereliction of duty that materially affected his substantial rights and further show that his guilty plea was not an intelligent or knowing act." Meadors v. State , 571 S.W.3d 207, 211 (Mo. App. E.D. 2019). To establish prejudice, a movant "must show that but for counsel’s errors, he would not have pleaded guilty but would have insisted on going to trial." Bastain v. State , 560 S.W.3d 894, 896–97 (Mo. App. E.D. 2018).
An evidentiary hearing is not warranted for every 24.035 motion, especially where "the motion and files of the case conclusively show [he] is not entitled to relief." Ban v. State , 554 S.W.3d 541, 544 (Mo. App. E.D. 2018) ; Rule 24.035(h). In order to be entitled to an evidentiary hearing on a motion for post-conviction relief, the movant must (1) plead facts, not conclusions, which if true would warrant relief; (2) the facts alleged must not be refuted by the record; and (3) the matters at issue must have resulted in prejudice to the movant. Id.
On appeal, Movant alleges plea counsel failed to inform him his five "minor violations" could serve as grounds for termination from the treatment program. Movant’s assertions are conclusively refuted by the record. The record reflects during Movant’s plea hearing and sentencing, the court explained there were several possible grounds for termination from the treatment program and if he was dismissed from the program, his sentences would be executed. Movant repeatedly affirmed he understood the conditions of the treatment program. Thus, the record establishes Movant was fully aware that he was required to successfully complete the program in order to avoid serving any time in prison. Plea counsel’s failure to discuss every single possible cause for termination of the treatment program is not ineffective assistance. See Law v. State , 893 S.W.2d 884, 886 (Mo. App. S.D. 1995) (affirming the motion court’s finding that "[t]o require each specific and minute detail of movant’s probation and counseling programs to be disclosed to movant before he entered his guilty plea is unreasonable and ‘akin’ to asking the trial judge, prosecutor, and defense attorney to predict the future.").
Moreover, the record demonstrates Movant’s termination from the treatment program did not stem from plea counsel’s ineffective assistance; rather it arose out of his failure to comply with the rules of the program and repetitively being placed in segregation, which impeded him from fully participating in the treatment program’s therapeutic curriculum. As such, where the "examination of the guilty plea proceedings directly refute that movant’s plea was involuntary, movant is not entitled to an evidentiary hearing." Whitehead v. State , 481 S.W.3d 116, 122 (Mo. App. E.D. 2016) (internal quotation omitted).
Movant has failed to assert facts unrefuted by the record demonstrating that plea counsel failed to perform with the degree of skill, care, and diligence of a reasonably competent attorney in similar circumstances. See Ventimiglia, 468 S.W.3d at 462. The record reflects Movant’s guilty plea was a voluntary, knowing, and intelligent act done with sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and consequences of the plea. Whitehead , 481 S.W.3d at 123.
Accordingly, the motion court did not clearly err in denying Movant’s Rule 24.035 motion without an evidentiary hearing.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, we affirm the judgment of the motion court under Rule 84.16(b).