Opinion
Civil Action No. 0:05-0888-HFF-BM.
May 16, 2006
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
This action has been filed by the Plaintiff, pro se, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff, an inmate with the South Carolina Department of Corrections, alleges violations of his constitutional rights.
The Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment pursuant to Rule 56, Fed.R.Civ.P., on February 3, 2006 . As the Plaintiff is proceeding pro se, a Roseboro order was entered by the Court on February 7, 2006, advising Plaintiff of the importance of a motion for summary judgment and of the need for him to file an adequate response. Plaintiff was specifically advised that if he failed to respond adequately, the Defendants' motion may be granted, thereby ending his case. Plaintiff thereafter filed a memorandum in opposition, with attached affidavit and exhibits, on March 17, 2006. Defendants filed a reply memorandum on March 24, 2006. Defendants' motion is now before the Court for disposition.
This case was automatically referred to the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge for all pretrial proceedings pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A) and (B) and Local Rule 73.02(B)(2)(d) and (e), D.S.C. The Defendants have filed a motion for summary judgment. As this is a dispositive motion, this Report and Recommendation is entered for review by the Court.
Background and Evidence
Plaintiff alleges in his verified Complaint that he was housed at the Kershaw Correctional Institution (KCI), and that during his period of incarceration at that institution his right of access to the Courts was denied by policies implemented by the Defendant Ozmint and others. Specifically, Plaintiff objects to the prison's photocopy policies, which he alleges do not permit photocopying of any court documents that are solely generated or originated by the inmate, nor does it permit copying of caselaw or policies even if the prisoner has funds to pay for those photocopies. Plaintiff also complains that he is not allowed to send out certified legal mail "in his indigent state" unless it is being sent to the Attorney General of South Carolina. Plaintiff alleges that these policies have "affected the Plaintiff in particular in a family court proceeding as because he could not send out his summons, and complaint, he could not perfect service of process resulting in the matter being dismissed."Plaintiff also complains that the Defendant Ozmint has implemented policies that require Plaintiff not to have a balance in his trust fund account of more than $6.43 for a thirty day period in order to receive soap, toothbrush, toothpaste, deodorant, paper, envelopes, and a set of razors. Plaintiff alleges that this causes him to have to choose between hygiene items and the purchase of legal material, food or other incidentals. Plaintiff alleges that this policy denies him "basic human needs."
Plaintiff also alleges that he has been subjected to cruel and unusual punishment because the prison is overcrowded, promotes disease and violence, and is understaffed. Plaintiff alleges that he contracted the germ causing tuberculosis because an inmate with the disease was housed in a room with the Plaintiff. Plaintiff also alleges that he was attacked in December 2003, and that overcrowding has generally resulted in increased assaults and gang violence. Plaintiff alleges that due to understaffing, officers are not able to adequately do security checks, and that necessary programs, such as mental health counseling, are also being denied. Plaintiff further alleges that the Defendants Faulkenberry and Dunlap have violated his rights due to their failure to address these problems.
Plaintiff also alleges that the Defendant Sullivan, who is responsible for the operation of the KCI law library, has denied Plaintiff adequate access to the law library since February 1, 2004, "in that the inmate clerks who work for her are not properly trained, and she, herself has no knowledge of the law, and is unable to answer, and assist inmates with the proper filing of legal documents." Plaintiff further alleges that Sullivan does not keep legal materials adequately updated, making it difficult for him challenge the conditions of his confinement. Plaintiff alleges that after he filed several complaints and grievances against Sullivan relating to her operation of the law library, she filed a bogus and false disciplinary infraction against him. Plaintiff alleges that this disciplinary charge was later dismissed, although a subsequent charge filed against him by Sullivan resulted in a conviction. Plaintiff also faults Sullivan for failing to give him a job in the law library, and that the Defendants Faulkenberry and Dunlap have failed to take any corrective action with respect to Sullivan's conduct. Plaintiff also alleges that he was threatened by an inmate worker due to Plaintiff's filing of complaints and grievances against Sullivan and that he [Plaintiff] "stopped going to the law library for a short period for fear that these inmates would make good on these threats." Plaintiff alleges that Associate Warden Dunlap failed to investigate his complaint concerning this matter.
Plaintiff further alleges that the Defendant Neadle, the inmate financial account coordinator for KCI, denied him access to the courts by failing to provide him with requested legal material. Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that Neadle refused to provide him with requested envelopes so he could mail out legal materials, resulting in a federal court action being dismissed. Plaintiff alleges that his complaints to prison officials concerning Neadle's conduct were ignored.
Plaintiff seeks monetary damages, as well as certain declaratory and/or injunctive relief. See generally, Verified Complaint.
In support of summary judgment in the case, the Defendant Dunlap has submitted an affidavit wherein he attests that he is the Associate Warden at KCI. Dunlap attests that SCDC Policy OP-22.03, "Authorized Inmate Property and Disposition of Unauthorized Property" [Exhibit A-6 to Court Document No. 24] is designed for security interests within the SCDC and is in general application throughout the SCDC. Dunlap attests that providing unlimited photocopies and certified mail to prisoners is impractical given the limited resources of the SCDC, and that providing the unlimited photocopies and certified mail requested by the Plaintiff would severely burden the financial resources of the SCDC. Dunlap attests that the KCI commissary has writing paper, envelopes and writing instruments available for purchase by inmates, with indigent inmates being provided writing material free of charge on a monthly basis. SCDC policy also allows indigent inmates to send legal mail and have their trust fund debited.
Plaintiff is a frequent filer of litigation in this Court. Aloe Creme Laboratories, Inc. v. Francine Co., 425 F.2d 1295, 1296 (5th Cir. 1970) [This Court may take judicial notice of its own records.].
Dunlap further attests that inmates may deposit personal funds and make withdrawals through their trust fund for the purpose of purchasing goods and services, including postage, writing supplies, and photocopies permissible under SCDC policy. An inmate's right to receive photocopies and to have their mail certified are established under SCDC Policy GA-01.03 [Exhibit A-3 to Court Document No. 24]. Dunlap also attests that KCI has a core law library containing legal materials as delineated in SCDC Policy GA-01.03 (2.1) [Exhibit A-3 to Court Document No. 24], although material stolen from the law library presents an ongoing problem. Dunlap also attests that KCI is accredited by the American Correctional Association (ACA), with the accreditation process including a review of the Institutions' policies and procedures, which must meet or exceed the standards established by the ACA.
Dunlap also attests that on May 4, 2005, he was contacted by the SCDC Office of General Counsel and was advised that they believed Plaintiff was completing legal work for other inmates in violation of SCDC policy. Dunlap attests that, based on this contact, the contraband section at KCI was directed to search Plaintiff's legal materials on May 9, 2005 and to confiscate any contraband as that term is defined in SCDC Policy OP-22.03 [Exhibit A-6 to Court Document No. 24]. Dunlap attests that a substantial quantity of materials were initially identified as contraband and confiscated from the Plaintiff, following which Plaintiff met with Dunlap and other correctional personnel and alleged that materials he needed for his court case against Dunlap had been seized. Dunlap attests that he had not reviewed any of the materials that had been seized, and offered Plaintiff the option to have the General Counsel's office review the items and make a determination as to whether or not they were contraband. Dunlap attests that he subsequently prepared an incident report on May 16, 2005 [Exhibit A-1 to Court Document No. 24] charging Plaintiff with possession of contraband. Dunlap further attests that on that same day, he and another staff member reviewed additional materials that had been seized, and that those items determined not to be contraband were returned to the Plaintiff.
Dunlap attests that on May 20, 2005, he made a videotape of all of the non-contraband materials as each item was being returned to the Plaintiff, describing each item as it was returned. Dunlap also prepared a list of the documents which were retained as contraband [Exhibit A-2 to Court Document No. 24], which list includes other inmate's legal materials, considered contraband under the provisions of SCDC Policy OP-22.03. Plaintiff's contraband also included materials designated as stolen from the institution or the KCI law library. A disciplinary hearing was then held on June 2, 2005, at which Plaintiff entered a plea of guilty to the charge of possession of contraband. See [Exhibit A-1 (Incident Report, Disciplinary Report and Hearing Record) to Court Document No. 24].
Dunlap also attests that as reflected on the KCI law library sign in logs, Plaintiff visited the KCI law library approximately seventy-six (76) times from January 10, 2005 through May 17, 2005 [see Exhibit A-4 to Court Document No. 24]. Plaintiff was also for a period of time assigned as a law clerk in the law library, but lost that position after he was convicted of a rules violation (fighting) and spent time in the institution's Special Management Unit (SMU). Dunlap attests that when Plaintiff's subsequent request to be reassigned to the law library staff were not granted, he began complaining about the law clerks as well as the Defendant Sullivan (KCI librarian). See Exhibits A-7 and A-8 to Court Document No. 24. Plaintiff specifically complained about fellow inmate John Campbell, a law clerk at the KCI law library. Plaintiff complained that Campbell had made threats against him, and after consulting with the Warden and "Major Neasman", Dunlap placed Plaintiff in protective custody. See also, Exhibit A-9 to Court Document No. 24. Dunlap attests that he thereafter conducted a protective custody evaluation on June 15, 2005, following which he recommended that Plaintiff be transferred. This recommendation was accepted, and Plaintiff was transferred to the Allendale Correctional Institution (ACI). See Exhibit A-9 to Court Document No. 24. Dunlap attests, however, that Plaintiff did not want to be transferred, that he told several witnesses and employees that his various lawsuits against the SCDC were something he was "just having fun with" and "gave him something to do", but that he would drop all of his lawsuits if he was not transferred. Dunlap attests that he advised Plaintiff that no deals would be made concerning his lawsuits. See also Exhibit A-10 (Incident Reports) to Court Document No. 24.
Plaintiff disputes the frequency of his visits to the library, although he has himself submitted numerous pages of library sign-in sheets as exhibits on which his name is listed as signing in and out. Plaintiff has written "is not my handwriting" next to these entries.
Finally, Dunlap attests that Plaintiff was convicted of making threats to correctional officers in mid-February and mid-May of 2004, and that neither of those convictions have been overturned. Dunlap has also submitted a copy of SCDC Policy ADM-15.12, establishing the E.H. Cooper Trust Fund [Exhibit E-2 to Court Document No. 53-2], as well as medical records for the Plaintiff from December 31, 2003 through January 5, 2004 [Exhibit E-1 to Court Document No. 53-2]. See generally, Dunlap Affidavit (Court Document Nos. 53-2 and 24-1), with various attachments.
The Defendant Joanne Neadle has submitted an affidavit wherein she attests that during the relevant time period she was a Fiscal Technician I at KCI, and that part of her duties included computer analysis and determinations of inmate's indigency status as that term is defined in SCDC Policy ADM-15.12. Neadle attests that each month a computer utilized by the SCDC determines the balance in each inmate's trust fund account, and that those inmates who qualified for indigent benefits were provided those benefits. Neadle further attests that all inmates, including the Plaintiff, who qualified were provided indigent benefits, including but not limited to, free legal supplies (pen, paper and envelopes). Additionally, if an indigent inmate needed postage to mail legal documents and did not have sufficient funds in his trust account, his legal documents would be processed and mailed and his trust account debited. See generally, Neadle Affidavit.
The Defendants have also submitted an affidavit from Allison McCaskill, who attests that she is a registered nurse with the SCDC, posted to KCI, and that according to SCDC records Plaintiff tested positive for tuberculosis (TB) on June 6, 2003. McCaskill attests that a treatment plan was initiated, and that Plaintiff thereafter tested negative for TB on September 27, 2004 and again on April 25, 2005. See generally, McCaskill Affidavit.
In opposition to the Defendants' motion to summary judgment, Plaintiff has provided an affidavit wherein he attests that in June 2005 he was transferred from KCI to the Ridgeland Correctional Institution (RCI), and that as a result of this transfer he is not able to obtain any other affidavits other than the affidavit of inmate James Murphy. Plaintiff also attests that due to his indigency status he has been unable to depose any witnesses, and he also complains that he has not been able to obtain relevant documentation in support of his claims. See generally, Plaintiff's Affidavit. Notwithstanding this statement, however, Plaintiff has submitted sixty-one (61) pages of various documents in opposition to the Defendants' motion as attachments to his memorandum in opposition.
Finally, as attachments to their reply memorandum, Defendants have submitted copies of documents concerning Plaintiff's legal cases, which documents reflect requests for voluntary dismissal by the Plaintiff with regard to a family court matter.
Discussion
Summary judgment "shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Rule 56(c), Fed.R.Civ.P. The moving party has the burden of proving that judgment on the pleadings is appropriate. Once the moving party makes this showing, however, the opposing party must respond to the motion with "specific facts showing there is a genuine issue for trial." Rule 56(e), Fed.R.Civ.P. Further, while the Federal Court is charged with liberally construing a complaint filed by apro se litigant to allow the development of a potentially meritorious case, see Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319 (1972);Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972), the requirement of liberal construction does not mean that the Court can ignore a clear failure in the pleadings to allege facts which set forth a Federal claim, nor can the Court assume the existence of a genuine issue of material fact where none exists. Weller v. Dep't of Social Services, 901 F.2d 387 (4th Cir. 1990).
I.
First, with respect to the named Defendant South Carolina Department of Corrections (SCDC), this Defendant is immune from suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 because the Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution divests this Court of jurisdiction to entertain a suit brought against the State of South Carolina or its integral parts. See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999);College Savs. Bank v. Florida Prepaid Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666 (1999); College Savs. Bank v. Florida Prepaid Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 627 (1999); Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996); Alabama v. Pugh, 438 U.S. 781, 782 nn. 1-2 (1978); Will v. Michigan Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 61-71 (1989); Bellamy v. Borders, 727 F. Supp. 247, 248-50 nn. 2-3 (D.S.C. 1989); Coffin v. South Carolina Dep't of Social Servs., 562 F. Supp. 579, 583-585 (D.S.C. 1983);Belcher v. South Carolina Bd. of Corrections, 460 F. Supp. 805, 808-09 (D.S.C. 1978); see also Harter v. Vernon, 101 F.3d 334, 338-39 (4th Cir. 1996); Pennhurst State School Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89 (1984) (although express language of Eleventh Amendment only forbids suits by citizens of other States against a State, Eleventh Amendment bars suits against a State filed by its own citizens). Cf. Suarez Corp. Indus. v. McGraw, 125 F.3d 222 (4th Cir. 1997).
Under Pennhurst, 465 U.S. at 99 n. 9, a state must expressly consent to suit in a federal district court. Here, as part of the enactment of the South Carolina Tort Claims Act, the South Carolina General Assembly expressly provided that the State of South Carolina does not waive Eleventh Amendment immunity, consents to suit only in a court of the State of South Carolina, and does not consent to suit in a federal court or in a court of another state. See S.C. Code Ann. § 15-78-20(e); see also McCall v. Batson, 285 S.C. 243, 329 S.E.2d 741, 743 (1985) (Opinion abolishing sovereign immunity in tort "does not abolish the immunity which applies to all legislative, judicial and executive bodies and to public officials who are vested with discretionary authority, for actions taken in their official capacities."). Cf. Pennhurst, 465 U.S. at 121 ("[N]either pendent jurisdiction nor any other basis of jurisdiction may override the Eleventh Amendment."). Because the SCDC is a state agency and integral part of the state of South Carolina, it may not be sued in this Court by Plaintiff. Accordingly, the SCDC is entitled to summary dismissal as a party Defendant in this case.
II.
As employees of the South Carolina Department of Corrections, the remaining Defendants are all subject to suit for damages in their individual capacities. Hafer v. Melo, 112 S.Ct. 358, 365 (1991); Goodmon v. Rockefeller, 947 F.2d 1186 (4th Cir. 1991);Inmates v. Owens, 561 F.2d 560 (4th Cir. 1977); Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635, 640 (1980). However, for the reasons set forth hereinbelow, the undersigned does not find that the Plaintiff has set forth sufficient evidence to create a genuine issue of fact as to whether his constitutional rights were violated by any named Defendant, and that this case should therefore be dismissed.
Since Plaintiff has now been transferred and is no longer a resident at the Kershaw Correctional Institution, his request for declaratory and/or injunctive relief as set forth in his Complaint is now moot. See Williams v. Griffin, 952 F.2d at 823 ["[T]he transfer of a prisoner render[s] moot his claim for injunctive and declaratory relief."]; Taylor v. Rogers, 781 F.2d 1047, 1048 n. 1 (4th Cir. 1986) [holding that prisoner's transfer mooted a request for declaratory and injunctive relief]. However, Plaintiff's damages claims survive his transfer to another institution, and are therefore addressed on the merits hereinabove. Mawhinney v. Henderson, 542 F.2d 1, 2 (2d Cir. 1976).
With respect to Plaintiff's claim of denial of access to the Courts, Plaintiff has provided no evidence to show that the policies at issue denied him access to the courts in general, or that he suffered any harm in any legal proceeding because of any Defendants' actions. In order to survive summary judgment on this claim, Plaintiff must submit evidence at least sufficient to create a genuine issue of fact as to both a denial of court access and whether he suffered some prejudice resulting from the denial of access. See Strickler v. Waters, 989 F.2d 1375, 1382-1383 (4th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 949 (1993);Magee v. Waters, 810 F.2d 451, 452 (4th Cir. 1987) ["Courts have required a showing by a complaining prisoner of actual injury or specific harm to him before a claim of lack of access to the courts will be sustained"]; Hause v. Vaught, 993 F.2d 1079, 1084-1085 (4th Cir. 1993); Cochran v. Morris, 73 F.3d 1310, 1317 (4th Cir. 1996) [Dismissal of access to court claim proper where inmate relied on conclusory allegations and failed to identify any actual injury].
The policies presented as evidence to the Court reflect that indigent prisoners are provided pens and paper as well as mailing privileges, while prisoners with money in their trust accounts are able to purchase writing paper, envelopes and other materials. It is also clear that the KCI maintains a law library for use by inmates, and the institutional records submitted as exhibits show that Plaintiff was himself a frequent visitor to that law library. Plaintiff's general and conclusory claims and allegations that he did not visit the library as often as those record show, as well as that the law library was inadequately stocked, maintained or staffed, without any supporting evidence, is insufficient to maintain a claim for denial of access to the courts. See Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986) [courts need not assume the truth of legal conclusions couched as factual allegations]; Morgan v. Church's Fried Chicken, 829 F.2d 10, 12 (6th Cir. 1987) ["even though pro se litigants are held to less stringent pleading standards then attorneys, the court is not required to `accept as true legal conclusions or unwarranted factual inferences.'"]. Nor is there any constitutional impediment to requiring prisoners to hand copy documents, as long as no constitutional violation is indicated.See generally, Hendrix v. Galloway, No. 03-740, 2004 WL 3090229 (D.S.C. 2004); In re Sawyer, 76 F.3d 375 (4th Cir. 1996); Zulu X v. Moore, C/A No. 6:95-1198-3AK (D.S.C. January 31, 1996); Johnson v. Moore, 948 F.2d 517, 521 (9th Cir. 1991) [there is no constitutional right to free photocopies]; Young v. Larkin, 871 F.Supp. 772, 782 n. 19 (M.D.Penn. 1994) [there is no constitutional right to free photocopies]; Harrell v. Keohane, 621 F.2d 1059, 1061 (10th Cir. 1980); Dugar v. Coughlin, 613 F.Supp. 849, 853 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) [indigent litigants are not entitled to free photo-copies or unlimited free postage (prisoner case)]; Carroll v. North Carolina Dep't of Corrections, 91-7562, 1991 WL 158146 (4th Cir. 1991) [pro se prisoners may handwrite legal papers to submit for submission to the court].
In any event, Defendants correctly note that Plaintiff has failed to present any evidence of any harm he suffered as a result of any purported denial of his right of access to the courts. The federal court action Plaintiff references in his Complaint was filed and served, not dismissed as claimed by the Plaintiff. See Jenkins v. Hagin, C/A No. 0:05-744. As for Plaintiff's family court matter, the Defendants have provided evidence to show that Plaintiff himself moved for a voluntary dismissal of that lawsuit. No constitutional violation is shown in this evidence. McGee, 810 F.2d at 452 ["courts have required a showing by a complaining prisoner of actual injury or specific harm to him before a claim of lack of access to the courts will be sustained"]; see House v. New Castle County, 824 F.Supp. 477, 485 (D.Md. 1993) [plaintiff's conclusory allegations insufficient to maintain claim]. Plaintiff's denial of access to the courts claim should be dismissed.
III.
With respect to Plaintiff's claim that the Defendant Sullivan filed a false or bogus disciplinary action against him in retaliation for his having pursued grievances or claims against her, there is no evidence before the Court to support this allegation. Indeed, Dunlap attests in his affidavit, and the disciplinary and hearing documents attached as Exhibit A1 to Dunlap's affidavit show, that Plaintiff pled guilty to the contraband charge filed against him by Sullivan. Plaintiff argues in his memorandum opposing summary judgment that by "bringing forth this false allegation, which [Sullivan] knew was a lie, evidences that Defendant Sullivan's intent was to get back at Plaintiff for filing [a] grievance." Given the evidence before the Court, however, there is no basis on which the Court could find a genuine issue of fact exists as to whether this charge was a "lie" or "false".In sum, Plaintiff has asserted a conclusory claim of retaliatory conduct by the Defendant Sullivan, with no evidentiary support for this claim. This claim should therefore be dismissed. Woods v. Edwards, 51 F.3d 577, 580-581 (5th Cir. 1995) [summary judgment affirmed where inmate offered no evidence other than his personal belief that the alleged retaliatory actions were based on his exercise of his rights]; Atkinson v. Bohn, 91 F.3d 1127, 1129 (8th Cir. 1996) (per curiam) [speculative and conclusory allegations cannot support retaliation claim]; Wright v. Vitall, No. 91-7539, 1991 WL 127597 at **1 (4th Cir. July 16, 1991) [Retaliation claim based on mere conclusory statements cannot withstand defendants' summary judgment motion]; LaCroix v. Williams, No. 97-0790, 2000 WL 1375737 at *4 (W.D.N.Y. Sept. 21, 2000) ["Plaintiff's conclusory allegations aside, there is simply nothing in the record to support his version of the facts and plaintiff's claim for retaliation fails"]; Harris v. Ostrout, 65 F.3d 912, 916 (11th Cir. 1995)[case dismissed where Plaintiff produced nothing beyond his own conclusory allegations suggesting that prison official's actions were motivated by a retaliatory animus].
IV.
To the extent Plaintiff has intended to assert a claim in his Complaint concerning the alleged threat he received from inmate Campbell, Plaintiff has failed to present sufficient evidence to create a genuine issue of fact as to whether any named Defendant had actual knowledge of a substantial risk of harm to him and was then deliberately indifferent to that substantial risk, which is the standard he must meet in order to survive summary judgment on this claim. See Washington v. LaPorte County Sheriff's Department, 306 F.3d 515 (7th Cir. 2002). See generally, Farmer v. Brennen, 114 S.Ct. 1970, 1978-1979 (1994); Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298 (1991); Bagola v. Kindt, 131 F.3d 632, 646 (7th Cir. 1997) ["Although prison officials need not intend that a known risk will actually harm an inmate, they must intentionally ignore this known risk in order to be liable under the Eighth Amendment."].
Specifically, Plaintiff has failed to present any evidence to show deliberate indifference on the part of a named Defendant to his concerns. To the contrary, the evidence before the Court shows that, as a result of Plaintiff's complaints, Plaintiff was placed in protective custody and thereafter transferred to the Allendale Correctional Institution. Hence, while Plaintiff apparently did not want to be transferred, he has failed to present any evidence to show that a Defendant was deliberately indifferent to his concerns. Pruitt v. Moore, No. 02-395, 2003 WL 23851094 at *9 (D.S.C. July 7, 2003) [only deliberate or callous indifference on the part of prison officials to a specific known risk of harm states on Eighth Amendment claim],cert. denied, 2004 WL 232748 (4th Cir. 2004); Levy v. State of Ill. Dept. of Corrections, No. 96-4705, 1997 WL 112833
(N.D.Ill. March 11, 1997) ["A defendant acts with deliberate indifference only if he or she `knows of and disregards' an excessive risk to inmate health or safety.'"]; Farmer v. Brennen, 511 U.S. 825, 835 (1994) [defendants must have engaged in conduct "for the very purpose of causing harm or with the knowledge that harm [would] result".]; see also Pressly v. Hutto, 816 F.2d 977 (4th Cir. 1987); cf. Tubbs v. Kelly, No. 01-17333, 2002 WL 31075824 at **1 (9th Cir. Sept. 17, 2002); Joyner v. McKellar, No. 87-7752, 1988 WL 12253 at **1 (4th Cir. 1988); Hampton v. Fairman, No. 93-4076, 1995 WL 144440 at *2 (N.D.Ill. Mar. 30, 1995). Therefore, this claim is without merit and should be dismissed.
V.
The remainder of Plaintiff's claims can essentially be described as a hodge podge of various grievances, disagreements, and disputes with prison administrators about the general conditions of his confinement, their conduct towards him, and other matters. However, while these complaints clearly indicate Plaintiff's dissatisfaction with being an inmate at the Kershaw Correctional Institution, there is no evidence that any of the actions alleged to have occurred constitute a denial of the basic necessities of life, or rise to a constitutional magnitude.
In order to establish an Eighth Amendment violation of cruel and unusual punishment, Plaintiff must show that he suffered a serious deprivation of a basic human need, and that the Defendant prison officials showed a deliberate indifference with regard to the cited prison conditions. Strickler, 989 F.2d at 1379; see Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294 (1991). In a prison setting, the Fourth Circuit has held that
. . . the constitutional prohibition against the infliction of cruel and unusual punishment "does not mandate comfortable prisons, and only those deprivations denying the minimal civilized measure of life's necessities are sufficiently grave to form the basis of an Eighth Amendment violation." Wilson, 501 U.S. 298 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). Indeed, the ordinary discomfort accompanying prison life is part and parcel of the punishment those individuals convicted of criminal offenses endure as recompense for their criminal activity. Hudson 503 U.S. at 9. Accordingly, only extreme deprivations are adequate to satisfy the objective component of an Eighth Amendment claim.Shakka v. Smith, 71 F.3d 162, 166 (4th Cir. 1995).
While the Defendants have not expressly addressed these general allegations in the Complaint as a separate cause of action, to the extent Plaintiff's claims concerning overcrowding, violence, and the like are deemed separate claims for purposes of Defendants' motion for summary judgment, the undersigned finds that Plaintiff has failed to show the necessary extreme deprivation in his evidence or allegations. "In the context of a conditions-of-confinement claim, to demonstrate that a deprivation is extreme enough to satisfy the objective component of an Eighth Amendment claim, a prisoner must `produce evidence of a serious or significant physical or emotional injury resulting from the challenged conditions,' or demonstrate a substantial risk of such serious harm resulting from the prisoner's unwilling exposure to the challenged conditions."Shakka, 71 F.3d at 166; Strickler, 989 F.2d at 1381. Plaintiff has failed to do so.
During the time period set forth in the Complaint, Plaintiff was an inmate in a state correctional facility, not a hotel. It should be expected that conditions in such a setting are oftentimes less than ideal. Lunsford v. Bennett, 17 F.3d 1574, 1581 (7th Cir. 1994); Hadley v. Peters, No. 94-1207, 1995 WL 675990 * 8 (7th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S.Ct. 1333 (1996) ["prisons are not required to provide and prisoners cannot expect the services of a good hotel."] (quoting Harris v. Fleming, 839 F.2d 1232, 1235 (7th Cir. 1988)). Even accepting Plaintiff's claim that he contracted TB while an inmate at the prison, the evidence before the Court shows that Plaintiff has been successfully treated for this condition. Hence, Plaintiff has failed to establish a claim for deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs. See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976); Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837;Sosebee v. Murphy, 797 F.2d 179 (4th Cir. 1986); Wester v. Jones, 554 F.2d 1285 (4th Cir. 1977); Russell v. Sheffer, 528 F.2d 318 (4th Cir. 1975); Belcher v. Oliver, 898 F.2d 32 (4th Cir. 1990). Further, Plaintiff has set forth this claim (to the extent he has even intended to assert it as a claim) in only the most general and conclusory fashion, and has presented neither sufficient factual allegations nor evidence to proceed with such a claim past summary judgment. Cf. Beverati v. Smith, 120 F.3d 500, 504 and n. 4 (4th Cir. 1997) [accepting Plaintiff's allegations for purposes of summary judgment that cells were unbearably hot, infested with vermin, smeared with human feces and urine, flooded with water from a leaky toilet above, and where food provided was cold and provided in smaller portions, but holding that such conditions were not "so atypical that exposure to them for six months imposed a significant hardship in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life."]; Lopez v. Robinson, 914 F.2d 486, 490-491 (4th Cir. 1990) [Plaintiff's allegations that the ventilation system at the prison was deficient, defective, and otherwise incapable of providing adequate airflow within the individual cells did not give rise to a cognizable Eighth Amendment claim where the court found that the allegations were conclusory and there was no specific evidence of any unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain resulting in serious medical and emotional harm to the plaintiffs]; Calhoun v. Wagner, Nos. 93-4075, 93-4122, 1997 WL 400043 at *4 (E.D.Pa. July 14, 1997) [Temporary water shut-off did not give rise to a constitutional violation because of the legitimate purpose behind the action and the short duration of the alleged deprivation]; Kidwell v. Buchanan, No. 93-15056, 1993 WL 230224 at **1 (9th Cir. June 29, 1993) [Where temporary restriction of amenities was found not to be cruel and unusual punishment]; see generally, Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472 (1995); See also Rish v. Johnson, 131 F.3d 1092, 1096 (4th Cir. 1997) ["only extreme deprivations are adequate to satisfy the objective component of an Eighth Amendment claim regarding conditions of confinement"]; Harris v. Fleming, 839 F.2d at 1235 [prisoner deprived of toilet paper, soap, toothpaste and toothbrush while kept in filthy, roach infested cell suffered no punishment when no physical harm resulted]; Isaac v. Fairman, No. 92-3875, 1994 WL 63219, * 5-6 (N.D.Ill. 1994) [allegation that prisoner was provided only one uniform and denied adequate opportunity to wash did not state claim]; Wilson v. Cook County Bd. of Commissioners, 878 F.Supp. 1163, 1167-1168 (N.D.Ill. 1995) [pretrial detainee failed to establish that overcrowding, inadequate staffing, inadequate opportunity for exercise, and inadequate grievance procedures in detention facility violated detainee's due process rights, as detainee failed to allege remedial injury]. This claim should therefore be dismissed.
Conclusion
Based on the foregoing, it is recommended that the Defendants' motion for summary judgment be granted, and that this case be dismissed.