Assuming in appellant's favor, perhaps somewhat generously, that counsel's remark was an offer to prove that Murrell had complained to Manzo about the manual loading of lesser weights, the evidence should have been admitted. Knowledge of danger is relevant to a determination of negligence, the Nitro-Glycerin Case, 15 Wall. 524, 536-537, 82 U.S. 524, 536-537, 21 L.Ed. 206 (1873), and evidence that such knowledge was gained through an express communication is admissible. 2 Wigmore, Evidence (3d ed. 1940) § 245; New York Life Ins. Co. v. Seighman, 140 F.2d 930, 932-933 (6 Cir., 1944); Evans v. Pennsylvania R.R., 255 F.2d 205, 209-210, 70 A.L.R.2d 158 (3 Cir., 1958); Smith v. Whittier, 95 Cal. 279, 30 P. 529 (1892); Jenkins v. Reichert, 125 Conn. 258, 5 A.2d 6 (1939); Dowling v. L.H. Shattuck, Inc., 91 N.H. 234, 17 A.2d 529 (1941); Killian v. Andrews Mfg. Co., 187 N.C. 810, 123 S.E. 86 (1924). However, the probative effect of the excluded evidence would not have been great.

More than eighty years ago, this court observed: "Admission of testimony of a witness ... that the day before the accident he had told [the foreman] ... that the stone should be removed before someone was injured ... was not hearsay ... and was admissible as tending to impute to the defendants notice of the situation and its potential dangers." Jenkins v. Reichert , 125 Conn. 258, 264, 5 A.2d 6 (1939) ; see Rogers v. Board of Education , 252 Conn. 753, 767, 749 A.2d 1173 (2000) (statements in transcript were not inadmissible hearsay because they were offered "for the relevant purpose of showing that the statements had been made in the presence of the plaintiff"); Whitman Hotel Corp. v. Elliott & Watrous Engineering Co. , 137 Conn. 562, 574, 79 A.2d 591 (1951) (admitting letters from plaintiffs' attorney to defendants to show "the fact of the defendants' knowledge of the claimed effect of their operations, since that knowledge should influence their future conduct").Although our decision in State v. Saucier , supra, 283 Conn. at 207, 926 A.2d 633, contemplates that a hearsay determination, when based on an interpretation of the Code of Evidence, is solely a question of law, it also instructs us to "examine the nature of the ruling at issue in the context of the issues in the case."

ing of (A) one or more nonprofit entities, and (B)(i) one or more business corporations incorporated pursuant to chapter 601 or any predecessor statutes thereto or authorized to do business pursuant to chapter 601 having as a purpose the construction, acquisition or related rehabilitation of affordable or assisted housing, and having a certificate or articles of incorporation approved by the commissioner in accordance with regulations adopted pursuant to section 8-437, (ii) one or more for-profit partnerships, limited partnerships, joint ventures, sole proprietorships, trusts or associations having as a purpose the construction, acquisition or related rehabilitation of affordable or assisted housing, and having basic documents of organization approved by the commissioner in accordance with regulations adopted pursuant to section 8-437, or (iii) any combination of the entities specified in subparagraphs (i) and (ii) of this subdivision." The defendant argues to the contrary, relying on Jenkins v. Reichert, 125 Conn. 258, 5 A.2d 6 (1939), in which the defendants requested a jury instruction that, in order to find a partnership, the jury had to find "that all acts and things necessary to be done in connection with this work were done . . . with the expectation that both would profit from their joint enterprise. . . ." (Internal quotation marks omitted.)

The finding does not disclose what, if any, answer was made by the witness to the question asked, and, therefore, no error can be predicated on the ruling. Pitt v. Kent, 149 Conn. 351, 356, 179 A.2d 626; Duncan v. Milford Savings Bank, 134 Conn. 395, 403, 58 A.2d 260; Jenkins v. Reichert, 125 Conn. 258, 264, 5 A.2d 6.

The finding fails to disclose what, if any, answer was made to the question, and therefore no error can be predicated on the ruling. Jenkins v. Reichert, 125 Conn. 258, 264, 5 A.2d 6; Duncan v. Milford Savings Bank, 134 Conn. 395, 403, 58 A.2d 260. We assume, however, from the court's findings that the financing of the Kenneil purchase was arranged for Blitz and Price in the same manner as the purchase of the Kent property and that the line of inquiry objected to developed evidence of these negotiations. "Unless excluded by some rule or principle of law, any fact may be proved which logically tends to aid the trier in the determination of the issue.

The plaintiff argues that this evidence was admissible as an "express communication" to defendant to prove that defendant "was on notice that there might be something unsafe in its shops." Evidence of an express communication to prove that a person charged with negligence had notice of the dangerous condition of a machine or place is generally held to be admissible, as against an attack on the ground that it is hearsay or opinion evidence, 38 Am.Jur., Negligence, Sec. 324, p. 1020; Wigmore on Evidence (3rd Ed.) Sec. 252; Smedra v. Stanek, 10 Cir., 1951, 187 F.2d 892; People v. Lang Transp. Corp., 43 Cal.App.2d 134, 110 P.2d 464; Jenkins v. Reichert, 125 Conn. 258, 5 A.2d 6; Dowling v. L.H. Shattuck, Inc., 1941, 91 N.H. 234, 17 A.2d 529. But one of the elementary rules of evidence is that "matters offered in evidence must be relevant to the issues of the case and tend to establish or disprove them; * * *." 38 Am.Jur., Negligence, Sec. 312. "Particularly if the character of evidence challenged as irrelevant is such as to arouse the sympathy of the jurors, or calculated to create prejudice, the reception of such evidence should be accorded careful consideration.

Nevertheless, the acts and circumstances occurring between husband and wife do not have the significance relative to the establishment of a joint venture or business partnership, which they would have if they occurred between strangers. (See Jenkins v. Reichert, 125 Conn. 258, 5 A. [2d] 6.) Thus the mere fact that a wife devoted some indefinite part of her time to helping her husband conduct a merchandise business would not make her his business partner. (See Brecker v. Brecker, 122 W. Va. 120, 8 S.E. [2d] 522.) With these principles in mind it is necessary to look at the particular facts and circumstances of the case to ascertain whether they would warrant a legal implication that the parties entered into a contract or agreement of joint venture or business partnership.

Persons employed by such a person are not employees of the person for whom the work is being done. Jenkins v. Reichert, 125 Conn. 258, 265, 5 A.2d 6; Bates v. Connecticut Power Co., 130 Conn. 256, 259, 33 A.2d 342. Without 5230, they would have no right to claim compensation from the principal under the act, and the purpose of that section is to broaden its scope so as to include them, if the conditions specified in it are met. Bello v. Notkins, 101 Conn. 34, 38, 124 A. 831; Johnson v. Mortenson, 110 Conn. 221, 226, 147 A. 705.

The plaintiff assigns as error the admission over her objection of three questions; no answers to them appear in the record, and these rulings present nothing which we can properly consider. Jenkins v. Reichert, 125 Conn. 258, 264, 5 A.2d 6. Two other questions admitted during the cross-examination of the plaintiff were objected to as not within the scope of the direct examination and as irrelevant; the finding contains no statement of the matters dealt with in the direct examination, and the first objection presents nothing we can review; State v. Mosca, 90 Conn. 381, 390, 97 A. 340; and the answers given, even if irrelevant to any issue in the case, were so immaterial to the grounds upon which we have decided it as to make the rulings harmless. The remaining ruling, even if erroneous, is of too little consequence to justify a new trial.

These rulings cannot, therefore, be made a ground of error. Jenkins v. Reichert, 125 Conn. 258, 264, 5 A.2d 6. Another question by the state's attorney on cross-examination was objected to as a statement. It was, on the contrary, a question attempting to elicit from the witness an explanation of an ambiguous answer.