Opinion
Court of Appeals No. A-9793.
April 30, 2008.
Appeal from the District Court, Third Judicial District, Anchorage, Brian K. Clark, Judge, Trial Court No. 3AN-05-2157 CR.
Robert M. Herz, Anchorage, for the Appellant. Amy K. Doogan, Assistant Municipal Prosecutor, and James N. Reeves, Municipal Attorney, Anchorage, for the Appellee.
Before: Coats, Chief Judge, and Mannheimer and Stewart, Judges.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND JUDGMENT
As Bryan M. Jenkins sat in his truck in the Burlington Coat Factory parking lot in the early morning hours, two police officers arrived to investigate a report that a burglar alarm had activated at the store. After determining that there were no obvious signs of a burglary, one of the officers pulled up behind Jenkins's truck and turned on his overhead flashing lights. The officer found Jenkins slumped over in the driver's seat of the truck, apparently asleep. As a result of this contact, Jenkins was convicted of driving while under the influence.
Jenkins argues that the officer's contact with him was an investigatory stop, and that this stop was illegal. Having reviewed the record, we conclude that the officer was justified in stopping Jenkins to find out if he needed assistance. Jenkins's truck was parked in an otherwise deserted parking lot at 2:00 a.m. The brake lights were on, indicating that someone was in the truck depressing the brake pedal. Yet the officer saw no movement in the truck, and no one was visible when he shined a spotlight on the truck. Because these circumstances created a substantial possibility that someone in the truck might need police assistance, we uphold the stop as a valid welfare stop.
Facts and proceedings
On March 11, 2005, at about 2:00 in the morning, Anchorage Police Officer Swaran Singh responded to a report that a burglar alarm had gone off at Burlington Coat Factory. When Singh pulled into the parking lot, he saw two vehicles: a sedan, which was parked closest to the building and was running, and a pickup truck that had its brake lights on, including the brake light at the top of the cab, which he knew was normally on only if someone was depressing the brake pedal.
Officer Singh made contact with the driver of the sedan, which was parked closest to the store. As he made this contact, a woman he recognized as an employee of an adjoining business approached. The woman told Singh that the sedan was her ride home.
Another officer, Dan Reeder, arrived, and he and Singh checked the perimeter of Burlington Coat Factory but saw no obvious signs of a break-in. As Singh was driving around the store, he shined a spotlight on the pickup truck, but he did not see anyone inside. He thought this was unusual because the brake lights were still engaged.
Officer Singh then received another dispatch, but he decided to check on the pickup truck before responding to the call. He found the lack of movement in the truck suspicious; he also thought it was possible someone in the truck needed assistance or had observed something in connection with the burglar alarm . For his own safety and to signal his location to other officers, as well as to reassure anyone in the truck that he was a police officer, Singh parked behind the truck and activated his "stage one" lights — that is, the flashing blue and red lights on the bottom half of the light bar on top of the patrol car.
When Officer Singh initially approached the vehicle, he could not see anyone inside, but as he got closer he saw that a man was in the driver's seat leaning over the center console. His eyes were closed and he appeared to be asleep. Singh knocked on the window and got no response. He continued to knock a little harder with his flashlight, and the man eventually rolled down the window. As he did, Singh smelled marijuana smoke coming out of the vehicle. Ultimately the driver, Jenkins, was charged with driving while under the influence.
AS 28.35.030(a).
Before trial, Jenkins moved to suppress the evidence, arguing that the contact was an investigatory stop and that Officer Singh did not have reasonable suspicion to stop him. After an evidentiary hearing, District Court Judge Brian K. Clark denied the motion. Judge Clark agreed that Jenkins was stopped for purposes of the Fourth Amendment when Singh pulled up behind the truck and activated his lights. But he ruled that the stop was justified because Singh had reasonable suspicion based on the report of a burglar alarm to believe that a break-in had occurred, and because Jenkins's truck was one of only two vehicles in the parking lot at 2:00 a.m. whose occupants might have information associated with the possible break-in. Judge Clark found that a prompt investigation was necessary because Jenkins's vehicle might quickly leave the scene. He added that Officer Singh did not see anyone when he shined his spotlight on the truck, even though the brake lights were engaged, "heightening suspicion that either Jenkins was involved in a break-in or needed help."
After Judge Clark denied the motion, Jenkins entered a Cooksey plea to driving while under the influence, preserving his right to appeal the denial of his motion to suppress. Why we conclude that the stop of Jenkins's vehicle was legal
See Cooksey v. State, 524 P.2d 1251 (Alaska 1974).
Jenkins argues that Judge Clark erred in ruling that Officer Singh was justified in stopping him as a potential witness to a break-in at Burlington Coat Factory.
We find it unnecessary to resolve this issue because the district court's undisputed findings demonstrate that Officer Singh was justified in contacting Jenkins under the community caretaker doctrine. Although Judge Clark did not uphold the stop on this ground, we can affirm the district court on any basis revealed by the record.
See Reichel v. State, 101 P.3d 197, 199-200 (Alaska App. 2004).
Police officers are justified in conducting what would amount to an investigative stop of a vehicle if they are aware of "at least some specific circumstances supporting a reasonable belief that the occupants of [the] vehicle need assistance." To justify a stop on this ground, the State does not have to show that it was more probable than not that the vehicle's occupants needed help, "only that there was a substantial possibility that police assistance was required."
Ozhuwan v. State, 786 P.2d 918, 922 (Alaska App. 1990); see also Crauthers v. State, 727 P.2d 9, 10-11 (Alaska App. 1986) (citing Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 441, 93 S. Ct. 2523, 2528, 37 L. Ed. 2d 706, 714 (1973)).
Marsh v. State, 838 P.2d 819, 821 (Alaska App. 1992).
Officer Singh noticed that the brake lights on Jenkins's pickup truck were engaged when he first drove into the Burlington Coat Factory parking lot — including the brake light on the cab of the truck. Officer Singh testified that normally this light is not activated unless someone is depressing the brake pedal. The brake lights were still on after Singh, together with Officer Reeder, checked the perimeter of the store for signs of a break-in. As Singh drove around the store, he shined a spotlight on the truck, but saw no one inside. He thought this was unusual, since the brake lights were still on.
Officer Singh decided to check on the truck in part because he thought it was possible someone in the truck needed help. He pulled behind the truck and activated his flashing overhead lights. When he approached the vehicle, he saw that someone was in the driver's seat leaning over the center console, apparently asleep or unconscious. He knocked on the window multiple times before he got a response. It was not until Jenkins rolled down his window that Singh smelled marijuana and began investigating Jenkins for driving while under the influence.
In Howell v. State, we held that a police officer was justified under the community caretaker doctrine in contacting a man he observed at 3:00 a.m. hunched over the steering wheel of a vehicle parked in a parking lot that was normally deserted at that time of night. Similarly, in Stewart v. State, we held that a police officer was justified in contacting the driver of a car that was parked on the side of the highway with its headlights on and the engine running, where the driver appeared to be slumped over in his seat and possibly in need of medical attention. And in Anchorage v. Cook , our supreme court held that it was reasonable for an officer to contact the driver of a vehicle that was in a parking lot with its headlights on and its front bumper "hung up" on a guardrail, where the driver was lying in the front seat, apparently asleep. The supreme court concluded that the intrusion involved in opening the driver's door of the vehicle was "of little moment" when weighed against society's interest in furnishing aid to persons who might need immediate medical attention.
115 P.3d 587 (Alaska App. 2005).
Id. at 588, 590.
763 P.2d 515 (Alaska App. 1988).
Id. at 516.
598 P.2d 939 (Alaska 1979).
Id. at 940-42.
Id.
When Jenkins was stopped, he was parked in an otherwise deserted parking lot in the middle of the night. Officer Singh could not see anyone in the vehicle, or any movement, even though the brake lights were engaged for some time. These circumstances gave Singh reason to believe someone might be in the vehicle but lying out of sight, possibly ill and in need of medical assistance. The fact that Singh also had other reasons for contacting Jenkins did not invalidate the stop as a welfare stop.
See Stewart, 763 P.2d at 516 (holding that investigative stop of driver who was parked in running car with headlights on, slumped over his seat apparently unconscious, was justified because police had legitimate interest in finding out if he needed help or if his presence behind the wheel posed a public danger).
For these reasons, we conclude that Jenkins's stop was justified, and that the district court did not err in denying Jenkins's motion to suppress.
Conclusion
We AFFIRM the decision of the district court.