Jenkins v. Jones

29 Citing cases

  1. Hannah v. State

    97 Ga. App. 188 (Ga. Ct. App. 1958)   Cited 6 times

    The Supreme Court went extensively into the matter of jurisdiction of courts in cases of this type in City of Atlanta v. Landers, 212 Ga. 111, 113 ( 90 S.E.2d 583) in the following language: "That the only courts with authority or jurisdiction under our Constitution to try 'State cases', or persons charged with the violation of State laws, are State courts, is firmly established by the previous decisions of this court. Welborne v. State, 114 Ga. 793 ( 40 S.E. 857); Clarke v. Johnson, 199 Ga. 163 ( 33 S.E.2d 425); Gibson v. Gober, 204 Ga. 714 ( 51 S.E.2d 664); Jenkins v. Jones, 209 Ga. 758 ( 75 S.E.2d 815); Grant v. Camp, 105 Ga. 428 ( 31 S.E. 429) . . . As we interpret the constitutional provisions hereinbefore quoted, and the decisions of this court hereinbefore cited, the trial of State cases is a function of the State, . . The creation of State courts is a sovereign State function, and they can be created only by the General Assembly, and the creation of such courts involves the appointment or the selection of the judges and of the necessary court officers, and this phase of the creation of the court is likewise a function of the State and cannot be delegated by the General Assembly to a lesser governmental unit of the State ( Mosley v. Garrett, 182 Ga. 810, 816, 187 S.E. 20), . . . the legislature has no power to establish a municipal court, or police court, and make it subordinate to the will of the municipal authorities, and at the same time to confer upon it jurisdiction to try offenses against the State when committed within the limits of the municipal corpora

  2. Gordon v. Green

    228 Ga. 505 (Ga. 1972)   Cited 6 times

    " Relying upon the rationale of cases exemplified by Jenkinsv. Jones, 209 Ga. 758 ( 75 S.E.2d 815), the appellee contended in his application for the writ of habeas corpus that the 1955 amendment to the Uniform Act Regulating Traffic on Highways quoted above is an attempt on the part of the General Assembly to constitute the Municipal Court of the City of Macon as a State court and to delegate to the City of Macon authority to operate a State Court contrary to the provisions of the Constitution contained in Art. VI, Sec. I, Par. I ( Code Ann. § 2-3601) vesting the judicial powers of the State in the Supreme Court, a Court of Appeals, Superior Courts, Courts of Ordinary, Justices of the Peace, Notaries Public who are ex officio Justices of the Peace and such other courts as have been or may be established by law; that the provisions of the 1953 Act of the General Assembly above referred to declaring the operation of a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquors to be a crime and fixing the punishment therefor is a general law of the State of Geor

  3. City of Atlanta v. S.W.A.N. Consulting Security

    274 Ga. 277 (Ga. 2001)   Cited 7 times
    Discussing implied preemption under the Georgia Private Detective and Security Agencies Act

    After conducting a hearing, the trial court held that, as applied to SWAN, the municipal enactment was an unconstitutional special law impliedly preempted by the comprehensive general Act. See generally Jenkins v. Jones, 209 Ga. 758, 763 (2) ( 75 S.E.2d 815) (1953). The City appeals from the trial court's order.

  4. State v. Hartrampf

    273 Ga. 522 (Ga. 2001)   Cited 2 times

    Thus, the proposed application of the ordinance would violate the State Constitution. See Jenkins v. Jones, 209 Ga. 758 ( 75 S.E.2d 815) (1953). The County contends that OCGA § 32-6-83 does not apply because Action Outdoor did not have a lawful right to use the sign at the time of the tornado damage because the lot was a non-conforming size and had no means of ingress and egress.

  5. Kolker v. State

    260 Ga. 240 (Ga. 1990)   Cited 17 times
    Holding that Article VI, § 1, ¶ 1 of the Georgia Constitution "authorizes the General Assembly to vest municipal courts with jurisdiction over state misdemeanor offenses"

    This the General Assembly cannot do. "That the only courts with authority or jurisdiction under our Constitution to try `State Cases,' or persons charged with the violation of State laws, are State courts, is firmly established by the previous decisions of this court. Welborne v. State, 114 Ga. 793 ( 40 S.E. 857); Clarke v. Johnson, 199 Ga. 163 ( 33 S.E.2d 425); Gibson v. Gober, 204 Ga. 714 ( 51 S.E.2d 664); Jenkins v. Jones, 209 Ga. 758 ( 75 S.E.2d 815); Grant v. Camp, 105 Ga. 428 ( 31 S.E. 429)." City of Atlanta v. Landers, 212 Ga. 111, 113 ( 90 S.E.2d 583) (1955).

  6. State v. Millwood

    248 S.E.2d 643 (Ga. 1978)   Cited 9 times

    This the General Assembly cannot do. "That the only courts with authority or jurisdiction under our Constitution to try `State cases,' or persons charged with the violation of State laws, are State courts, is firmly established by the previous decisions of this court. Welborne v. State, 114 Ga. 793 ( 40 S.E. 857); Clarke v. Johnson, 199 Ga. 163 ( 33 S.E.2d 425); Gibson v. Gober, 204 Ga. 714 ( 51 S.E.2d 664); Jenkins v. Jones, 209 Ga. 758 ( 75 S.E.2d 815); Grant v. Camp, 105 Ga. 428 ( 31 S.E. 429)." City of Atlanta v. Landers, 212 Ga. 111, 113 ( 90 S.E.2d 583) (1955).

  7. Aliotta v. Gilreath

    174 S.E.2d 403 (Ga. 1970)   Cited 4 times
    In Aliotta v. Gilreath, 226 Ga. 263, 174 S.E.2d 403 (1970), the Supreme Court of Georgia interpreted a statute that provided "[a] joint authority given to any number of persons, or officers, may be executed by a majority of them, unless it is otherwise declared."

    The specific limitation in Section 14 on the mayor's right to vote must prevail over the general language in other sections of the charter giving the mayor and aldermen joint duties and powers concerning officers, but not mentioning the right to vote on these matters. Mayor c. of Savannah v. Savannah Electric c. Co., 205 Ga. 429, 437 ( 54 S.E.2d 260); Jenkins v. Jones 209 Ga. 758, 761 ( 75 S.E.2d 815). Under Section 14, the mayor can vote on the question of dismissal of an officer only where the vote of the aldermen is tied. The trial judge therefore erred in declaring that the mayor has an unqualified right to vote on the dismissal of an officer.

  8. Board of Chiropractic Examiners v. Ball

    224 Ga. 85 (Ga. 1968)   Cited 9 times

    "Ejusdem generis is a rule of construction to ascertain and give effect to legislative intent." Jenkins v. Jones, 209 Ga. 758, 761 ( 75 S.E.2d 815); Gilmore v. Gilmore, 201 Ga. 770, 777 ( 41 S.E.2d 229). For a revocation of a physician's license on facts similar to this case applying this rule see Forman v. State Board of Health, 157 Ky. 123 ( 162 S.W. 796). The appellee's employing display type advertising to advertise free x-rays is not an act of like character to the seven specified grounds provided for the revocation of the appellee's license.

  9. John P. King Mfg. Co. v. Clay

    218 Ga. 382 (Ga. 1962)   Cited 4 times
    In John P. King Mfg. Co. v. Clay, 218 Ga. 382, 386-87 (128 S.E.2d 68) (1962), it was said: "The charter of the defendant corporation is a contract between the State and the corporation and also between the corporation and its stockholders.

    In the construction of the provisions of a corporate charter the same rule applied in the construction of statutes and contracts prevails, and that rule is as follows: Where general words in the charter are followed by a description of specific objects, the meaning of the general words ordinarily will be presumed to be limited to the enumerated specific objects and to include only those things of the same nature as those specifically enumerated unless a clear manifestation of a contrary intent appears from the charter. See Jenkins v. Jones, 209 Ga. 758 ( 75 S.E.2d 815). We thus are of the opinion that since the charter of the defendant corporation has no provision that the charter could be amended by a majority vote of its stockholders, the statute which requires a two-thirds vote is applicable.

  10. City of Atlanta v. Landers

    90 S.E.2d 583 (Ga. 1955)   Cited 9 times

    That the only courts with authority or jurisdiction under our Constitution to try "State cases," or persons charged with the violation of State laws, are State courts, is firmly established by the previous decisions of this court. Welborne v. State, 114 Ga. 793 ( 40 S.E. 857); Clarke v. Johnson, 199 Ga. 163 ( 33 S.E.2d 425); Gibson v. Gober, 204 Ga. 714 ( 51 S.E.2d 664); Jenkins v. Jones, 209 Ga. 758 ( 75 S.E.2d 815); Grant v. Camp, 105 Ga. 428 ( 31 S.E. 429). That State courts are only those which "may be established by law," that the General Assembly alone "shall have power to make all laws consistent with this Constitution," and that "the legislative power of the State shall be vested in a General Assembly," is firmly fixed by the foregoing provisions of the Constitution, and that this power cannot be delegated is likewise settled beyond doubt. Bennett v. City of Baxley, 149 Ga. 275 ( 99 S.E. 864); Phillips v. City of Atlanta, 210 Ga. 72 ( 77 S.E.2d 723). As we interpret the constitutional provisions hereinbefore quoted, and the decisions of this court hereinbefore cited, the trial of State cases is a function of the State, this court having held in Strauss v. Mayor c. of Waycross, 97 Ga. 475 ( 25 S.E. 329), that municipal corporations have no right to inflict punishment for violations of the criminal laws of this State. The creation of State courts is a sovereign State functio