Jenkins v. Hayman

7 Citing cases

  1. Jackson v. Gandy

    Civil No. 09-1141 (AMD) (D.N.J. Sep. 29, 2014)   Cited 2 times

    Nyhuis v. Reno, 204 F.3d 65, 77-78 (3d Cir. 2000); see also Spruill v. Gillis, 372 F.3d 218, 234 (3d Cir. 2004) (noting that the formal grievance process aims "to put the prison officials on notice of the persons claimed to be guilty of wrongdoing"). Some courts have correspondingly relaxed the strict compliance requirement, in favor of determining whether the non-compliant procedure utilized by the plaintiff satiated the essential purpose of the exhaustion process. See, e.g., Jenkins v. Hayman, No. 09-4989, 2013 WL 3201326, at *9 (D.N.J. June 24, 2013) (finding the exhaustion requirement satisfied, and denying defendants' motion for summary judgment). In light of the record before the Court, the Court concludes that Plaintiff's presentment of his assault allegations in the context of his disciplinary hearing satisfies the exhaustion requirement.

  2. Coleman v. United States

    CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:15-1942 (D.N.J. May. 26, 2021)

    Moreover, "'[t]he infliction of pain in the course of a prison security measure . . . does not amount to cruel and unusual punishment simply because it may appear in retrospect that the degree of force authorized or applied for security purposes was unreasonable, and hence unnecessary in the strict sense.'" Jenkins v. Hayman, Civil Action No. 09-4989, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 88446, at *25 (D. N.J. June 24, 2013) (quoting Whitley, 475 U.S. at 319). When evaluating the nature of the force used, the absence of injury is relevant but not determinative.

  3. Thompson v. Lanigan

    Civil Action No. 16-1913 (MAS) (TJB) (D.N.J. Jul. 30, 2019)   Cited 1 times

    "The Eighth Amendment requires prison officials to take reasonable measures to protect prisoners from violence at the hands of other prisoners, as well as at the hands of guards or other state actors." Jenkins v. Hayman, No. 09-4989, 2013 WL 3201326, at *14 (D.N.J. June 24, 2013) (citing Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 833 (1994)). To establish a failure to protect claim, an inmate must demonstrate that: (1) he or she is "incarcerated under conditions posing a substantial risk of serious harm;" and (2) the prison official acted with "deliberate indifference" to his or her health and safety.

  4. Kates v. Packer

    NO. 3:13-CV-01525 (M.D. Pa. Feb. 6, 2018)   Cited 1 times
    Denying summary judgment where there was a genuine issue of fact as to whether the officer watched an inmate get attacked for thirty to forty five seconds without intervening

    On the present record, an issue of fact exists as to whether Brandt failed to intervene in violation of Kates' constitutional rights with respect to the incident on the "landing." See, e.g., Kenney v. City of Pittsburgh, No. 12-551, 2014 WL 789082, at *4 (W.D. Pa. Feb. 26, 2014); Jenkins v. Hayman, No. 09-4989, 2013 WL 3201326, at *14 (D.N.J. June 24, 2013) ("the Court similarly concludes that the record reveals issues of material fact as to whether Defendants observed unconstitutional conduct in the effort to subdue Plaintiff, had a realistic opportunity to intervene during the altercation, and failed to do so."). Thus, the Magistrate Judge did not err in recommending that Defendant Brandt be denied summary judgment on the failure to intervene claim related to this incident.

  5. Miller v. Fraley

    Civil Action No. 12-4470 (MAS) (LHG) (D.N.J. Aug. 9, 2017)   Cited 2 times

    "[I]n determining whether the evidence supports Defendants' argument [regarding an alleged Eighth Amendment violation], the Court[, therefore,] may not consider any evidence presented by Plaintiff that would be inconsistent with [a] prison disciplinary decision against him . . . ." Jenkins v. Hayman, No. 09-4989, 2013 WL 3201326, at *10 (D.N.J. June 24, 2013). Here, Plaintiff's claim is based on three purported facts: (1) that Defendants intentionally permitted Plaintiff to be on the tier at the same time as inmate Johnson; (2) that inmate Johnson attacked Plaintiff unprovoked; and (3) that "[w]hile [P]laintiff was being attacked[,] both [D]efendants . . . were watching."

  6. Watkins v. Merriel

    Civil Action No. 12-4851 (FLW) (D.N.J. Sep. 29, 2015)   Cited 2 times

    Thus, the Third Circuit and courts in this District have recognized that an inmate may satisfy the exhaustion requirement where he follows an accepted grievance procedure, even where that procedure contradicts a written or formal policy. See Baez v. Fauver, 351 F. Appx. 679, 681-82 (3d Cir. 2009) (vacating and remanding decision of a district court, in part, because the court failed to consider the existence of a parallel reporting procedure put in place at Bayside State Prison); see also Smith v. Merline, 719 F.Supp.2d 438, 445-46 (D.N.J.2010); Jackson v. Gandy, 877 F. Supp. 2d 159, 178 (D.N.J. 2012); Jenkins v. Hayman, CIV. 09-4989, 2013 WL 3201326, at *8-9 (Jun. 24, 2013); see also Curtis v. Timberlake, 436 F.3d 709, 712 (7th Cir. 2005). It is notable that prison authorities may also waive the exhaustion requirement if the ultimate administrative authority fully examines the inmate's complaint on the merits, regardless of whether the complaint complied with the prison grievance process.

  7. Floyd v. Olshefski

    3:13-CV-578 (M.D. Pa. Jan. 6, 2014)

    Id. at 506. See also Jenkins v. Hayman, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 88446,*24-*33 (D.N.J. 2013) (The Court could, for purposes of a summary judgment motion, credit plaintiff's version of the facts insofar as it did not contradict the basis for his underlying prison administrative conviction, since that conviction was never reversed or otherwise impaired.).