Opinion
February 18, 1986
Appeal from the Supreme Court, Queens County (LeVine, J.).
Order reversed insofar as appealed from, with costs, order dated September 26, 1984 vacated, motion granted, and complaint dismissed.
The defendant employer correctly asserts that a prior arbitration award, which found simply that the plaintiff William Jenkins was discharged for just cause, was a "final and definite award on the subject matter submitted" (cf. CPLR 7511 [b] [1] [iii]), and, thus, pursuant to the principle of res judicata, bars relitigation of the propriety of the discharge (see, Matter of Ranni [Ross], 58 N.Y.2d 715). The award did not, however, preclude a relitigation in the Unemployment Insurance Administrative Law Judge Section of the New York State Department of Labor of the circumstances surrounding Jenkins' dismissal, as a "just cause" discharge does not automatically preclude entitlement to unemployment compensation (see, Matter of Hulse [Levine], 41 N.Y.2d 813; Matter of Guimarales [New York City Bd. of Educ. — Roberts], 109 A.D.2d 1042). The Administrative Law Judge could determine that the arbitration award was, under the circumstances, not entitled to collateral estoppel effect with respect to the plaintiffs claim for unemployment compensation (see, Matter of Guimarales [New York City Bd. of Educ. — Roberts], supra). Thus, contrary to Special Term's reasoning, the Administrative Law Judge's determination that Jenkins was not guilty of the misconduct that was the basis for his discharge went only to his eligibility for unemployment benefits and did not effect the validity of the arbitration award. Accordingly, Special Term should have granted the defendant's motion to dismiss the complaint. Mangano, J.P., Niehoff, Rubin and Kunzeman, JJ., concur.