Opinion
Civil No. 1:19-CV-85
01-17-2019
JEMELWILLIAMS, Plaintiff v. McCLEAF, et al., Defendants.
(Judge Rambo)
( ) REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
I. Factual Background
This case comes before us for a legally mandated screening review of the plaintiff's complaint. (Doc. 1.) The plaintiff, Jemel Williams, is currently incarcerated in Georgia, but files this pro se civil action relating to incidents which allegedly occurred in Pennsylvania in 2017. (Id.) Williams filed this pro se complaint, along with a motion to proceed in forma pauperis in this case, (Doc. 2), on January 14, 2019.
In his pro se complaint, Williams alleges that troopers of the Pennsylvania State Police unjustly arrested him in February of 2017 and used excessive force to take him into custody at that time. (Id.) Williams also alleges that he was then illegally held on these charges for a period of time by the police and the courts. (Id.)
On the basis of these averments, Williams has brought a civil rights lawsuit against six Pennsylvania state troopers who he alleges directly participated in this unlawful arrest. Williams' complaint, however, goes on to name the Pennsylvania State Police as an institutional defendant, and sues the Magisterial District Judge who presided over initial aspects of his Pennsylvania state criminal case.
We will direct that the lodged complaint be filed on the docket for screening purposes only and will conditionally GRANT the plaintiff's motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis. (Doc. 2.) However, for the reasons set forth below, we recommend that this complaint be dismissed with respect to institutional defendant named in this pleading, the Pennsylvania State Police, and the Magisterial District Judge named as a defendant in this action.
II. Discussion
A. Screening of Pro Se Complaints-Standard of Review
This Court has an on-going statutory obligation to conduct a preliminary review of pro se complaints brought by plaintiffs given leave to proceed in forma pauperis. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). Specifically, we are obliged to review the complaint to determine whether any claims are frivolous, malicious, or fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. This statutory text mirrors the language of Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides that a complaint should be dismissed for "failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
With respect to this benchmark standard for legal sufficiency of a complaint, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has aptly noted the evolving standards governing pleading practice in federal court, stating that:
Standards of pleading have been in the forefront of jurisprudence in recent years. Beginning with the Supreme Court's opinion in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) continuing with our opinion in Phillips [v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 230 (3d Cir. 2008)] and culminating recently with the Supreme Court's decision in Ashcroft v. Iqbal 556 U.S. 662, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009) pleading standards have seemingly shifted from simple notice pleading to a more heightened form of pleading, requiring a plaintiff to plead more than the possibility of relief to survive a motion to dismiss.Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 209-10 (3d Cir. 2009).
In considering whether a complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, the court must accept as true all allegations in the complaint and all reasonable inferences that can be drawn therefrom are to be construed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Jordan v. Fox Rothschild, O'Brien & Frankel, Inc., 20 F.3d 1250, 1261 (3d Cir. 1994). However, a court "need not credit a complaint's bald assertions or legal conclusions when deciding a motion to dismiss." Morse v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 132 F.3d 902, 906 (3d Cir. 1997). Additionally, a court need not "assume that a ... plaintiff can prove facts that the ... plaintiff has not alleged." Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal. v. California State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 526 (1983). As the Supreme Court held in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), in order to state a valid cause of action a plaintiff must provide some factual grounds for relief which "requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of actions will not do." Id. at 555. "Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level." Id.
In keeping with the principles of Twombly, the Supreme Court has underscored that a trial court must assess whether a complaint states facts upon which relief can be granted when ruling on a motion to dismiss. In Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009), the Supreme Court held that, when considering a motion to dismiss, "[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice." Id. at 678. Rather, in conducting a review of the adequacy of complaint, the Supreme Court has advised trial courts that they must:
[B]egin by identifying pleadings that because they are no more than conclusions are not entitled to the assumption of truth. While legal conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint, they must be supported by factual allegations. When there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.Id. at 679.
Thus, following Twombly and Iqbal a well-pleaded complaint must contain more than mere legal labels and conclusions. Rather, a complaint must recite factual allegations sufficient to raise the plaintiff's claimed right to relief beyond the level of mere speculation. As the Third Circuit has stated:
[A]fter Iqbal, when presented with a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, district courts should conduct a two-part analysis. First, the factual and legal elements of a claim should be separated. The District Court must accept all of the complaint's well-pleaded facts as true but may disregard any legal conclusions. Second, a District Court must then determine whether the facts alleged in the complaint are sufficient to show that the plaintiff has a "plausible claim for relief." In other words, a complaint must do more than allege the plaintiff's entitlement to relief. A complaint has to "show" such an entitlement with its facts.Fowler, 578 F.3d at 210-11.
Two years after Fowler, the Third Circuit further observed:
The Supreme Court in Twombly set forth the "plausibility" standard for overcoming a motion to dismiss and refined this approach in Iqbal. The plausibility standard requires the complaint to allege "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570, 127 S. Ct. 1955. A complaint satisfies the plausibility standard when the factual pleadings "allow[ ] the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556, 127 S. Ct. 1955). This standard requires showing "more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully." Id. A complaint which pleads facts "merely consistent with" a defendant's liability, [ ] "stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of 'entitlement of relief.'"Burtch v. Milberg Factors, Inc., 662 F.3d 212, 220-21 (3d Cir. 2011).
In practice, consideration of the legal sufficiency of a complaint entails a three-step analysis:
First, the court must "tak[e] note of the elements a plaintiff must plead to state a claim." Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1947. Second, the court should identify allegations that, "because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth." Id. at 1950. Finally, "where there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement for relief." Id.Santiago v. Warminster Tp., 629 F.3d 121, 130 (3d Cir. 2010).
In addition to these pleading rules, a civil complaint must comply with the requirements of Rule 8(a) of the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure, which defines what a complaint should say and provides that:
(a) A pleading that states a claim for relief must contain (1) a short and plain statement of the grounds for the court's jurisdiction, unless the court already has jurisdiction and the claim needs no new jurisdictional support; (2) a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief; and (3) a demand for the relief sought, which may include relief in the alternative or different types of relief.Fed. R. Civ. P. 8.
Thus, a well-pleaded complaint must contain more than mere legal labels and conclusions. Rather, a pro se plaintiff's complaint must recite factual allegations that are sufficient to raise the plaintiff's claimed right to relief beyond the level of mere speculation, set forth in a "short and plain" statement of a cause of action.
Judged against these legal guideposts, for the reasons set forth below it is recommended that this complaint be dismissed complaint with respect to institutional defendant named in this pleading, the Pennsylvania State Police, and the Magisterial District Judge named as a defendant in this action.
B. Williams' Claims for Damages Against The Pennsylvania State Police Fail as a Matter of Law
In this case, dismissal of Williams' claims for damages from the Pennsylvania State Police as an institutional defendant is warranted because the complaint fails to meet the substantive standards required by law, in that it does not set forth a "short and plain" statement of a cognizable violation of some right guaranteed by the Constitution or laws of the United States. At the outset, we note that, this pro se complaint runs afoul of basic constitutional and statutory rules limiting lawsuits against state agencies and officials.
First, as a matter of constitutional law, the Eleventh Amendment to the Constitution provides that "[t]he Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the ... States....", U.S. Const. Amend XI. By its terms, the Eleventh Amendment strictly limits the power of federal courts to entertain cases brought by citizens against the state and state agencies. Moreover, a suit brought against an individual acting in his or her official capacity constitutes a suit against the state and therefore also is barred by the Eleventh Amendment. Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 109 S.Ct. 2304, 105 L.Ed.2d 45 (1989).
Pursuant to the Eleventh Amendment, states, state agencies and state officials who are sued in their official capacity are generally immune from lawsuits in federal courts brought against them by citizens. Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 54, 116 S.Ct. 1114, 134 L.Ed.2d 252 (1996). Under the Eleventh Amendment, the Commonwealth's immunity exists as a matter of law unless waived by the state, or expressly and unequivocally abrogated by Congress. Congress has not expressly abrogated this constitutional immunity with respect to federal civil rights lawsuits against the Pennsylvania State Police, and the Commonwealth clearly has not waived its immunity. Quite the contrary, the Commonwealth has specifically by statute invoked its Eleventh Amendment immunity in 42 Pa.C.S. § 8521(b). This, while Pennsylvania has, by law, waived sovereign immunity in limited categories of cases brought against the Commonwealth in state court, See 42 Pa.C.S. § 8522, Section 8521(b) flatly states that: "Nothing contained in this subchapter shall be construed to waive the immunity of the Commonwealth from suit in federal courts guaranteed by the Eleventh Amendment to the Constitution of the United States." 42 Pa.C.S. § 8521(b).
The constitutional protections afforded to the states under the Eleventh Amendment also expressly apply to the state agencies that are integral parts of Pennsylvania's criminal justice system like the Pennsylvania State Police. Therefore, the "Eleventh Amendment bars claims for damages against the P[ennsylvania] S[tate] P[olice], a state agency that did not waive its sovereign immunity. See 71 P.S. §§ 61, 732-102; Capogrosso v. Supreme Court of N.J., 588 F.3d 180, 185 (3d Cir.2009)." Atkin v. Johnson, 432 F. App'x 47, 48 (3d Cir.2011). Moreover, as a matter of statutory interpretation, the plaintiff cannot bring a damages action against this state agency or state officials in their official capacity since it is also well-settled that a state, a state agency, or a state official acting in an official capacity is not a "person" within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the principal federal civil rights statute. Will v. Michigan Dep't. of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71, 109 S.Ct. 2304, 105 L.Ed.2d 45 (1989).
In sum, Williams' federal civil rights claims for damages against the State Police are barred both by the Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution and by cases construing the federal civil rights statute, 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Therefore, since the state police as an agency of state government cannot be sued in this fashion in federal court, the State Police should be dismissed as a Defendant from this action.
C. The Magisterial District Judge Named in the Complaint Should Also Be Dismissed from this Lawsuit
In addition, the magisterial district judge named in Williams' complaint should also be dismissed from this lawsuit. To the extent that Williams seeks in his complaint to hold a state judge personally liable for civil rights violations, it is well-settled that such an official is individually cloaked with immunity from liability. The United States Supreme Court has long recognized that those officials performing judicial, quasi-judicial, and prosecutorial functions in our adversarial system must be entitled to some measure of protection from personal liability for acts taken in their official capacities. In order to provide this degree of protection from liability for judicial officials, the courts have held that judges, Mireless v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 13, 112 S.Ct. 286, 116 L.Ed.2d 9 (1991); prosecutors, Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 427, 96 S.Ct. 984, 47 L.Ed.2d 128 (1976); and those who perform adjudicative functions, Imbler, 424 U.S. at 423 n. 20 (grand jurors); Harper v. Jeffries, 808 F.2d 281, 284 (3d Cir.1986) (parole board adjudicators); are entitled to immunity from personal liability for actions they take in our adversarial system of justice.
These longstanding common law immunities for judicial, quasi-judicial, and prosecutorial officials are applicable here and prevent Williams from maintaining this civil action against Magisterial District Judge Eyer. Indeed, it is well-established that a judge, like Magisterial District Judge Eyer, who presides over a case is entitled to absolute judicial immunity for actions taken in the course of that case. Kwasnik v. Leblon, 228 F.App'x 238, 243 (3d Cir.2007). As the Third Circuit explained when it rejected a similar effort to impose personal civil rights liability on a judge in a state case, this immunity is both broad and absolute:
A judicial officer in the performance of his or her duties has absolute immunity from suit. Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 12, 112 S.Ct. 286, 116 L.Ed.2d 9 (1991). "A judge will not be deprived of immunity because the action he took was in error, was done maliciously, or was in excess of his authority; rather, he will be subject to liability only when he has acted in the 'clear absence of all jurisdiction.' " Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356-57, 98 S.Ct. 1099, 55 L.Ed.2d 331 (1978) (citation omitted).Kwasnik, 228 F.App'x at 243.
This judicial immunity applies to Section 1983 actions like the lawsuit brought here by Williams, see Dennis v. Sparks, 449 U.S. 24, 27, 101 S.Ct. 183, 66 L.Ed.2d 185 (1980), and embraces both requests for damages, as well as costs and attorney's fees. See Corliss v. O'Brien, No. 3:05-CV-0347, 2005 WL 2334792 (M.D.Pa.2005), aff'd, 200 F.App'x. 80 (3d Cir.2006). This judicial immunity also expressly extends to Pennsylvania magisterial district court judges. Indeed, as the United States of Appeals for the Third Circuit has aptly observed, there is no distinction "between judges of courts of limited and general jurisdiction" when applying the judicial immunity doctrine, Figueroa v. Blackburn, 208 F.3d 435, 441 (3d Cir.2000), and "[t]he doctrine of judicial immunity applies equally to courts of limited jurisdiction, such as district justices, as to courts of general jurisdiction." Martin v. Bicking, 30 F.Supp.2d 511, 512 (E.D.Pa.1998); see also Schuler v. City of Chambersburg, 641 F.Supp. 657, 659 (M.D.Pa.1986); Horne v. Farrell, 560 F.Supp. 219, 222-23 (M.D.Pa.1983). Moreover, this judicial immunity specifically applies to judicial actions ruling on bail requests, making probable cause determinations, and presiding over preliminary hearings in state criminal cases. See, e.g., Pokrandt v. Shields, 773 F.Supp. 758 (E.D.Pa.1991); Fox v. Castle, 771 F.Supp. 411 (M.D.Pa.1977).
Thus, the very judicial acts complained of here by Williams are actions which are clearly encompassed by this absolute judicial immunity from lawsuit. Nor can Williams vitiate this immunity by claiming that Judge Eyer erred in these rulings. Even if Judge Eyer's decisions were in error, those rulings still may not give rise to civil liability since judicial immunity applies to all of a judge's rulings, even those that are later determined to be mistaken. See Gallas v. Supreme Court of Pennsylvania., 211 F.3d 760, 769 (3d Cir.2005). See Walker v. Zook, No. 4:10-CV-0467, 2010 WL 3896193, at *3 (M.D. Pa. Aug. 2, 2010), report and recommendation adopted, No. 4:10-CV-0467, 2010 WL 3893836 (M.D. Pa. Sept. 30, 2010). Accordingly, Williams' claims against Judge Eyer should also be dismissed.
III. Recommendation
Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, the plaintiff's motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis, (Doc. 2), is CONDITIONALLY GRANTED but IT IS RECOMMENDED that the plaintiff's complaint be dismissed with respect to institutional defendant named in this pleading, the Pennsylvania State Police, and the Magisterial District Judge named as a defendant in this action.
The plaintiff is further placed on notice that pursuant to Local Rule 72.3:
Any party may object to a magistrate judge's proposed findings, recommendations or report addressing a motion or matter described in 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(B) or making a recommendation for the disposition of a prisoner case or a habeas corpus petition within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy thereof. Such party shall file with the clerk of court, and serve on the magistrate judge and all parties, written objections which shall specifically identify the portions of the proposed findings, recommendations or report to which objection is made and the basis for such objections. The briefing requirements set forth in Local Rule 72.2 shall apply. A judge shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made and may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge. The judge, however, need conduct a new hearing only in his or her discretion or where required by law, and may consider the record developed before the magistrate judge, making his or her own determination on the basis of that record. The judge may also receive further evidence, recall witnesses or recommit the matter to the magistrate judge with instructions.
Submitted this 17th day of January, 2019.
S/Martin C . Carlson
Martin C. Carlson
United States Magistrate Judge