No. 05-04-01539-CR
Opinion Issued August 10, 2005. DO NOT PUBLISH. Tex.R.App.P. 47.
On Appeal from the 204th Judicial District Court, Dallas County, Texas, Trial Court Cause No. F01-73011-PQ. Affirmed.
Before Justices FRANCIS, LANG-MIERS, and MALONEY.
The Honorable Frances Maloney, Retired, Court of Appeals, Fifth District of Texas at Dallas, sitting by assignment.
Opinion By Justice MALONEY.
This is a probation revocation case. In a single point of error, appellant complains she was denied her due process rights because the trial court failed to sua sponte conduct a competency inquiry. We affirm the trial court's judgment.
Background
Appellant entered her plea of guilty to burglary of a habitation without benefit of a plea bargain agreement. The trial court assessed an eight year sentence and a $500 fine, suspended the eight year sentence, and placed appellant on community supervision for four years. The State moved to revoke appellant's community supervision for multiple violations. Appellant entered a plea of true to the allegations. The trial court found the allegations true, revoked appellant's community supervision, and assessed punishment at confinement in the Texas Department of Criminal Justice-Institutional Division for five years and a $500 fine. COMPETENCY
In a single point of error, appellant claims that during her testimony, she twice referred to her mental illness issues and this mental illness made her unable to abide by the conditions of community supervision. Appellant maintains that these statements alone should have raised a bona fide doubt in the trial judge's mind on her competency to stand trial. The State responds that "two references by counsel to appellant's `mental illness issues' . . . without more," does not meet the bona fide doubt standards. Specifically, the State argues that mental illness is not evidence of incompetency. 1. Standard of Review
We review a trial court's decision on whether to hold a competency hearing to determine if the trial court abused its discretion. See Moore v. State, 999 S.W.2d 385, 393 (Tex.Crim.App. 1999). A trial court abuses it discretion if its decision is arbitrary or unreasonable. See Lewis v. State, 911 S.W.2d 1, 7 (Tex.Crim.App. 1995). 2. Applicable Law
A defendant is presumed competent to stand trial. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 46B.003(b) (Vernon Supp. 2004-05). A defendant is incompetent to stand trial if she does not have (1) sufficient present ability to consult with her lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding, or (2) a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against her. Id. art. 46B.003(a). The due process right to a fair trial prevents the government from subjecting a person to trial who lacks the mental capacity to understand the nature and object of the proceedings against her, to consult with counsel, and to assist in preparing her defense. See Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 171-72 (1975). The test that determines when the trial court must make an informal inquiry into competency "is not whether the accused labored under some mental, behavioral, or psychological impairment," but rather whether the evidence shows an inability to consult with her attorney and to understand the proceedings against her. See Rice v. State, 991 S.W.2d 953, 957 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 1999, pet. ref'd). To require a trial judge to sua sponte hold a hearing on a defendant's competency, the judge must receive evidence from a reasonable or credible source that raises a bona fide doubt as to a defendant's competency to stand trial. See Alcott v. State, 51 S.W.3d 596, 599 (Tex.Crim.App. 2001) (citing Townsend v. State, 427 S.W.2d 55, 63 (Tex.Crim.App. 1968)). A bona fide doubt is raised when "evidence indicates recent severe mental illness, at least moderate mental retardation, or truly bizarre acts by the defendant." See Collier v. State, 959 S.W.2d 621, 625 (Tex.Crim.App. 1997). 3. Application of Law to Facts
The only testimony during the revocation hearing came from appellant. The record shows the trial court questioned appellant about her understanding of the allegations of violating the terms and conditions of her probation. Appellant not only acknowledged that she had received a copy of those allegations, but also had discussed them with her attorney and understood them. She also understood that she could enter a plea of true or not true and the range of punishment open to the trial court. During her testimony, she acknowledged that the trial court had given her several chances on probation and admitted she had used cocaine. She did not blame her use of drugs on her homelessness, but on her inability to get treatment. Appellant's attorney twice mentioned "mental illness issues" in referring to her inability "to make it on probation" and not being able to "go to Wilmer." Apparently, appellant entered her plea of true to ask for the least amount of time the trial judge could give her under the law. None of the above evidence raised a bona fide doubt as to appellant's incompetency. Rather, the record shows appellant exhibited an ability to understand the proceedings against her and had consulted with her attorney on all matters, including her ability to "cope" with probation. Thus, the trial court did not abuse his discretion in not sua sponte conducting a preliminary hearing on appellant's competency. We resolve appellant's issue against her. We affirm the trial court's judgment.