Opinion
No. 96C-01-008.
Submitted: March 17, 1999.
Decided: August 26, 1999.
Upon Defendant Delaware Technical Community College's Renewed Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law and Motion for New Trial DENIED.
Steven Schwartz, Esq., Dover, Delaware. Attorney for Plaintiff.
A. Ann Woolfolk, Esq., Wilmington, Delaware. Attorney for Involuntary Plaintiffs.
Vincent A. Bifferato, Esq., Wilmington, Delaware. Attorney for Defendants.
ORDER
Upon consideration of the Parties' briefs and the record in this case, it appears that:
1. Plaintiff Theodore Jeffries ("Jeffries") filed a personal injury action against Defendants Kent County Vocational Technical School District Board of Education ("Vo-Tech") and Delaware Technical and Community College ("DTCC") after he sustained injuries in a slip and fall accident on January 24, 1994. Jeffries alleged in his complaint that one or both defendants owned and/or controlled the parking lot in which he fell, and that their negligence in maintaining the premises caused his injuries. Prior to trial, Jeffries settled his claim against Vo-Tech. The trial went forward against DTCC, and a verdict was rendered in plaintiff's favor. DTCC has filed the present motion for judgment as a matter of law and motion for new trial on the basis that the evidence produced at trial was insufficient to support the verdict.
2. Jeffries was a student at DTCC. He had a class scheduled for 9:00 a.m. on Monday, January 24, 1994. The DTCC campus is located adjacent to the VoTech campus. They are separated only by a small road. Jeffries' class was scheduled to take place in a building owned by Vo-Tech located on the Vo-Tech campus in which DTCC leased classroom space. DTCC had canceled its classes for the preceding Thursday and Friday due to severe ice storms. Although the storms ended before that Monday, ice had accumulated on the roadways and in the parking lot directly outside of the Vo-Tech building such that students could not enter the building without encountering ice patches. Jeffries slipped and fell on one of these ice patches while attempting to walk to the Vo-Tech building.
The property leased by DTCC is defined in pertinent part by the written lease agreement between DTCC and Vo-Tech as "the entire second floor . . . together with limited right of ingress and egress thereto." DTCC students were allowed to park in the Vo-Tech parking lot outside of the Vo-Tech building when they were attending classes there; however they were required to display their DTCC parking stickers at all times. If a DTCC student abused parking privileges, such as by parking in a handicapped space, DTCC security was called to the scene to issue a ticket. One of DTCC's guards was specifically assigned to guard the leased premises on weekdays from 5:00 until 11:00 p.m. This security officer was required to patrol the leased premises for the safety of DTCC students and to help students to and from their cars whenever the need arose, such as when they were carrying something heavy or when they requested an escort to the parking lot late at night. However, no guard was assigned to the Vo-Tech side of the campus during morning classes.
Lease Agreement at 1.
The lease agreement is ambiguous as to which defendant, DTCC or Vo-Tech, controlled the parking lot outside of the Vo-Tech building. However, the agreement does provide some guidance. For example, the agreement states that DTCC is responsible to keep its area clean and that Vo-Tech is responsible for exterior maintenance and repair of the structure. As to the parking area, the lease provides that Vo-Tech would designate 100 parking spaces for use by DTCC students, and that DTCC "will provide their own personnel for supervision of this designated parking area. It will be the obligation of [DTCC] to enforce this provision." VoTech reserved the right to revoke the above privilege if it was abused by students or employees of DTCC. Apparently, 100 parking spaces were never specifically designated for use by DTCC students and DTCC never provided personnel to specifically supervise the parking lot. Rather, Vo-Tech generally maintained the lot and took care of snow and ice removal. However, if the DTCC security officers noticed any problems with the area, they would alert Vo-Tech personnel to fix it. Finally, the agreement contained an indemnification clause in which DTCC assumed full responsibility for any liability resulting from incidents occurring on or about the leased premises and agreed to hold Vo-Tech harmless from such liability.
Lease Agreement at 2.
Lease Agreement at 4.
Lease Agreement at 2.
3. Prior to the trial, DTCC filed a motion for summary judgment claiming that, as a matter of law, it cannot be liable for Jeffries' injuries because the accident did not occur on its property. The Court found that there were outstanding issues of fact regarding whether or not DTCC and Vo-Tech had joint control over the parking area, making them both liable. The matter thus proceeded to trial on the issue of whether DTCC had a duty toward Jeffries, an invitee, to make the parking area safe for his use. The Court instructed the jury that there were two theories upon which it could find that DTCC was liable. First, the jury was to ascertain whether DTCC had joint control over the parking area, establishing a duty to keep the lot safe for invitees. Second, the jury was to determine whether DTCC undertook a duty to inspect the parking area to discover dangerous conditions for the protection of its students even if there was no finding of control. At the end of Jeffries' case in chief and again at the close of all evidence, DTCC made motions for judgment as a matter of law on the basis that no reasonable jury could find it liable on the evidence produced. Both motions were denied on the basis that there was evidence upon which a jury could find DTCC liable on either or both of the theories presented. In response to special interrogatories, the jury found that DTCC had both joint control over the parking area and had undertaken a duty to inspect the parking area to keep it safe for its students. It also found DTCC 20% negligent, VoTech 75% negligent, and Jeffries 5% negligent, and awarded Jeffries $300,000 in damages.
Jeffries v. Kent County Vocational Technical Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., Del. Super., C.A. No. 96C-01-008, Terry, J. (Mar. 13, 1998), Let. Op. at 5.
Judgment was ultimately entered against DTCC in the amount of $60,000 on August 27, 1998 in light of the jury verdict and the joint tortfeasor release between Jeffries and Vo-Tech.
4. DTCC has renewed its motion for judgment as a matter of law and has moved for a new trial. DTCC presents three arguments in support of its motions. First, DTCC asserts that there is no reasonable view of the evidence to support the jury's finding that it had actual control of the parking area. Second, DTCC argues that there is no reasonable view of the evidence to support the jury's finding that it undertook a duty to inspect the parking lot, and that, as a matter of law, DTCC could not have assumed such a duty because the injury did not occur on its property. DTCC also argues that the Court improperly instructed the jury on the law in this area, necessitating a new trial if judgment as a matter of law is not granted. Finally, DTCC requests a new trial on the basis that the Court improperly admitted the lease agreement's indemnification clause without a limiting instruction even though the clause is ambiguous, irrelevant and highly prejudicial to DTCC.
Jeffries opposes DTCC's motions and asserts that there was sufficient evidence upon which a reasonable jury could find both that DTCC had joint control over the parking lot and, that even if there was no joint control, DTCC had undertaken a duty to inspect the parking lot to protect its students. Jeffries also believes that the jury was properly instructed on the law regarding undertaking a duty because ownership of the property is not an essential element of that claim. Finally, Jeffries asserts that the introduction of the indemnification clause was not improper. On the contrary, Jeffries maintains that the clause was relevant to the issue of DTCC's control of the parking lot because a reasonable reading of the lease requires the inference that DTCC would not have assumed liability if it did not have sufficient control.
5. A motion for judgment as a matter of law will only be granted where there is no substantial evidence to support the verdict. If there is any reasonable view of the evidence to support the jury's findings, the motion should be denied. A jury's findings should not be disturbed as long as there is any competent evidence to support it. When testing the sufficiency of the evidence in this context, the prevailing party is entitled to the benefit of all inferences in his favor. A motion for a new trial will only be granted where the verdict is against the great weight of the evidence so that a reasonable jury could not have reached that verdict, or where a miscarriage of justice would result. A motion for a new trial and a motion for judgment as a matter of law serve different purposes; they are not interchangeable. Therefore, the decision with regard to one motion should not influence the decision on the other.
McCarthy v. Mayor and Council of Wilmington, Del. Super., 100 A.2d 739, 740 (1953).
Ebersole v. Lowengrub, Del. Supr., 208 A.2d 495, 497-98 (1965).
Furek v. University of Delaware, Del. Supr., 594 A.2d 506, 514 (1991) (citing Turner v. Vineyard, Del. Supr., 80 A.2d 177, 179 (1951)).
Id. at 522; McCloskey v. McKelvey, Del. Super., 174 A.2d 691, 693 (1961).
Storey v. Camper, Del. Supr., 401 A.2d 458, 465 (1979); McCloskey, 174 A.2d at 693.
Peters v. Gelb, Del. Supr., 314 A.2d 901, 904 (1973).
6. The parties agree that DTCC would have a duty to keep the parking lot safe for its invitees and could be held liable for any resulting injuries caused by its negligence in failing to do so, if it is determined that it had at least joint control of the lot. For a duty to exist, there must be evidence of actual control, which is defined as "the `authority to manage, direct, superintend, restrict or regulate.'" Actual control, rather than exclusivity, is the key, as control can be actual and joint. The question of control between two business entities is a factual one.
Craig v. A.A.R. Realty Corp., Del. Super., 576 A.2d 688, 695 (1989) (quoting Kirby v. Zlotnick, Conn. Supr., 278 A.2d 822, 824 (1971)), aff'd, Del. Supr., 571 A.2d 786 (1989).
Monroe Park Apartments Corp. v. Bennett, Del. Supr., 232 A.2d 105, 108 (1967).
See Jardel Co., Inc. v. Hughes, Del. Supr., 523 A.2d 518, 526 (1987) (discussing issues of control between a parent company and its subsidiary).
7. In the present matter, the jury was presented with sufficient evidence that DTCC had joint control of the parking area which its students used to attend classes at the Vo-Tech building. The most persuasive evidence in this regard is the lease agreement itself in which Vo-Tech and DTCC specifically agreed that DTCC was responsible for supervising the parking area used by its students. The lease also states that DTCC is responsible for enforcing that clause and, if problems arise, VoTech can rescind this grant of authority. A jury could reasonably view this evidence as Vo-Tech granting DTCC the authority to manage and regulate all aspects of its parking area where DTCC students are involved. This inference is reasonable in light of the testimony that DTCC hired a guard whose job consisted of patrolling the areas contained in the lease and helping students and faculty get to and from their cars safely. Also, if a problem arose in the parking area concerning a DTCC student, DTCC security would be called rather than Vo-Tech personnel. The jury could reasonably infer that, if Vo-Tech had exclusive control over the parking lot, it would not need to call DTCC security to handle simple matters such as writing tickets for illegally parked cars. Therefore, I find that there was sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to find that DTCC had control over the parking lot, whether fully exercised or not, so as to create a duty to keep the area safe for its students. Also, I find that the circumstances with respect to this issue do not constitute a miscarriage of justice necessitating a new trial.
8. The jury was presented with two possible theories upon which to find DTCC liable, and a verdict in favor of either theory was sufficient to impose a duty on DTCC to make the premises safe for invitees. Since the jury found that DTCC had a duty based on control, it is unnecessary to determine whether a reasonable jury could have found that DTCC assumed a duty to inspect the parking lot. Even if the submission of that issue to the jury had been erroneous, it would amount to harmless error as the verdict would stand based on the issue of control. Therefore, the second issue is moot. DTCC also argues that it suffered prejudice because the jury was instructed that DTCC could be liable for undertaking a duty even though it did not own or control the premises, which DTCC claims is in contradiction to settled Delaware law. However, even if the jury instruction was erroneous, there could have been no prejudice as the jury made a specific finding that DTCC did have control of the parking area, a finding which this Court has upheld. Therefore, there is no basis to grant DTCC's motion on this issue.
9. DTCC's final argument is that it is entitled to a new trial because it was prejudiced by the introduction into evidence of the indemnification clause from the lease agreement between it and Vo-Tech. DTCC argues that the clause is irrelevant to the issue of control and is highly prejudicial because the jury could erroneously infer that DTCC agreed to be responsible for incidents occurring outside of the leased premises and because the clause is inextricably intertwined with insurance issues. Further, DTCC argues that the Court should have given an explanatory instruction as to the meaning of an indemnity clause before admitting it into evidence. Such an instruction was not given in this case.
10. Evidence is relevant if it has "any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence." Relevant evidence may be excluded where "its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice" or is otherwise confusing to the jury. The decision to admit or exclude evidence is made within the sound discretion of the trial court. Where evidence has limited admissibility, the court may instruct the jury accordingly upon request. The failure to give a specific jury instruction is error only if an objection is made in a timely manner.
Mercedes-Benz of N. Am. Inc. v. Norman Gershman's Things to Wear, Inc., Del. Supr., 596 A.2d 1358, 1366 (1991).
Del. Super. Ct. Civ. R. 51.
11. The indemnification clause is relevant to the issue of control as it may provide some evidence of the parties' intentions under the lease. Also, because the lease is ambiguous as to what part of Vo-Tech's property is encompassed by the various clauses, the jury was entitled to consider the entire agreement before making its determination of whether the leased premises included the parking lot. The indemnification clause is not unfairly prejudicial to DTCC because it does not discuss insurance issues. Further, the parties were free to argue the relevance and meaning of the clause as well as how it should be interpreted. The parties were also afforded the opportunity to request specific jury instructions regarding the proper interpretation of the lease. Although the Court indicated at one point that it would consider giving an instruction regarding the proper meaning to be attributed to an indemnification clause, the Court stated that it would address that issue at the appropriate time upon objection or application by the attorneys. Further application for such an instruction was never made by either attorney. Also, DTCC's attorney never objected to plaintiff's closing argument regarding the permissible inferences to be drawn from the presence of the clause in the agreement. Rather, DTCC's attorney chose to argue that plaintiff's argument was erroneous. Therefore, there was no miscarriage of justice warranting a new trial as a result of the admission of the indemnity clause without an explanatory instruction.
Delaware Technical Community College's Renewed Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law and Motion for New Trial are denied.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
_________________ Judge
oc: Prothonotary cc: Order Distribution